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THE

WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE,

IN NINE VOLUMES.

THE NINTH EDITION.

VOLUME THE EIGHTH.

LONDON:

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CONTENTS

OF THIS

VOLUME.

	Page
SOME Thoughts concerning Education - -	1
An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of ſeeing all Things in God - - -	211
A Diſcourſe of Miracles - - -	256
Memoirs relating to the Life of Anthony, firſt Earl of Shafteſbury - - -	266
Some familiar Letters between Mr. Locke, and ſeveral of his Friends - - -	285
Index.	

SOME

THOUGHTS

CONCERNING

EDUCATION.

TO

EDWARD CLARKE, OF CHIPLEY, Esq;

SIR,

THESE Thoughts concerning Education, which now come abroad into the world, do of right belong to you, being written several years since for your sake, and are no other than what you have already by you in my letters. I have so little varied any thing, but only the order of what was sent you at different times, and on several occasions, that the reader will easily find, in the familiarity and fashion of the style, that they were rather the private conversation of two friends, than a discourse designed for public view.

The importunity of friends is the common apology for publications men are afraid to own themselves forward to. But you know I can truly say, that if some, who having heard of these papers of mine, had not pressed to see them, and afterwards to have them printed, they had lain dormant still in that privacy they were designed for. But those whose judgment I defer much to, telling me, that they were persuaded, that this rough draught of mine might be of some use, if made more public, touched upon what will always be very prevalent with me. For I think it every man's indispensible duty, to do all the service he can to his country; And I see not what difference he puts between himself and his cattle, who lives without that thought. This subject is of so great concernment, and a right way of education is of so general advantage, that did I find my abilities answer my wishes, I should not have needed exhortations or importunities from others. However, the meanness of these papers, and my just distrust of them, shall not keep me, by the shame of

doing ſo little, from contributing my mite, where there is no more required of me, than my throwing it into the public receptacle. And if there be any more of their ſize and notions, who liked them ſo well, that they thought them worth printing, I may flatter myſelf, they will not be loſt labour to every body.

I myſelf have been conſulted of late by ſo many, who profeſs themſelves at a loſs how to breed their children; and the early corruption of youth is now become ſo general a complaint, that he cannot be thought wholly impertinent, who brings the conſideration of this matter on the ſtage, and offers ſomething, if it be but to excite others, or afford matter of correction. For errours in education ſhould be leſs indulged than any: theſe, like faults in the firſt concoction, that are never mended in the ſecond or third, carry their afterwards-incorrigible taint with them, through all the parts and ſtations of life.

I am ſo far from being conceited of any thing I have here offered, that I ſhould not be ſorry, even for your ſake, if ſome one abler and fitter for ſuch a taſk, would in a juſt treatiſe of education, ſuited to our engliſh gentry, rectify the miſtakes I have made in this: it being much more deſirable to me, that young gentlemen ſhould be put into (that which every one ought to be ſolicitous about) the beſt way of being formed and inſtructed, than that my opinion ſhould be received concerning it. You will, however, in the mean time bear me witneſs, that the method here propoſed has had no ordinary effects upon a gentleman's ſon, it was not deſigned for. I will not ſay the good temper of the child did not very much contribute to it, but this I think, you and the parents are ſatisfied of, that a contrary uſage, according to the ordinary diſciplining of children, would not have mended that temper, nor have brought him to be in love with his book; to take a pleaſure in learning, and to deſire, as he does, to be taught more, than thoſe about him think fit always to teach him.

But

But my buſineſs is not to recommend this treatiſe to you, whoſe opinion of it I know already; nor it to the world, either by your opinion or patronage. The well educating of their children is ſo much the duty and concern of parents, and the welfare and proſperity of the nation ſo much depends on it, that I would have every one lay it ſeriouſly to heart; and after having well examined and diſtinguiſhed what fancy, cuſtom, or reaſon adviſes in the caſe, ſet his helping hand to promote every where that way of training up youth, with regard to their ſeveral conditions, which is the eaſieſt, ſhorteſt, and likelieſt to produce virtuous, uſeful, and able men in their diſtinct callings: though that moſt to be taken care of, is the gentleman's calling. For if thoſe of that rank are by their education once ſet right, they will quickly bring all the reſt into order.

I know not whether I have done more than ſhown my good wiſhes towards it in this ſhort diſcourſe; ſuch as it is the world now has it; and if there be any thing in it worth their acceptance, they owe their thanks to you for it. My affection to you gave the firſt riſe to it, and I am pleaſed, that I can leave to poſterity this mark of the friendſhip has been between us. For I know no greater pleaſure in this life, nor a better remembrance to be left behind one, than a long continued friendſhip, with an honeſt, uſeful, and worthy man, and lover of his country.

I am, SIR,

Your moſt humble

And moſt faithful ſervant,

March 7, 1690.

JOHN LOCKE.

SOME

THOUGHTS

CONCERNING

EDUCATION.

§ 1. A SOUND mind in a ſound body, is a ſhort, but full deſcription of a happy ſtate in this world; he that has theſe two, has little more to wiſh for; and he that wants either of them, will be but little the better for any thing elſe. Men's happineſs, or miſery, is moſt part of their own making. He whoſe mind directs not wiſely, will never take the right way; and he whoſe body is crazy and feeble, will never be able to advance in it. I confeſs, there are ſome men's conſtitutions of body and mind ſo vigorous, and well framed by nature, that they need not much aſſiſtance from others; but, by the ſtrength of their natural genius, they are, from their cradles, carried towards what is excellent; and, by the privilege of their happy conſtitutions, are able to do wonders. But examples of this kind are but few; and I think I may ſay, that, of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, uſeful or not, by their education. It is that which makes the great difference in mankind.

mankind. The little, or almoſt inſenſible, impreſſions on our tender infancies, have very important and laſting conſequences: and there it is, as in the fountains of ſome rivers, where a gentle application of the hand turns the flexible waters into channels, that make them take quite contrary courſes; and by this little direction, given them at firſt, in the ſource, they receive different tendencies, and arrive at laſt at very remote and diſtant places.

§ 2. I imagine the minds of children, as eaſily turned, this or that way, as water itſelf; and though this be the principal part, and our main care ſhould be about the inſide, yet the clay cottage is not to be neglected. I ſhall therefore begin with the caſe, and conſider firſt the health of the body, as that which perhaps you may rather expect, from that ſtudy I have been thought more peculiarly to have applied myſelf to; and that alſo, which will be ſooneſt diſpatched, as lying, if I gueſs not amiſs, in a very little compaſs. Health.

§ 3. How neceſſary health is to our buſineſs and happineſs; and how requiſite a ſtrong conſtitution, able to endure hardſhips and fatigue, is, to one that will make any figure in the world; is too obvious to need any proof.

§ 4. The conſideration I ſhall here have, of health, ſhall be, not what a phyſician ought to do, with a ſick or crazy child; but what the parents, without the help of phyſic, ſhould do for the preſervation and improvement of an healthy, or, at leaſt, not ſickly conſtitution, in their children: and this perhaps might be all diſpatched in this one ſhort rule, viz. that gentlemen ſhould uſe their children, as the honeſt farmers and ſubſtantial yeomen do theirs. But becauſe the mothers, poſſibly, may think this a little too hard, and the fathers, too ſhort, I ſhall explain myſelf more particularly; only laying down this, as a general and certain obſervation for the women to conſider, viz. that moſt children's conſtitutions are either ſpoiled, or at leaſt harmed, by cockering and tenderneſs. Tenderneſs.

§ 5. The firſt thing to be taken care of, is, that children be not too warmly clad or Warmth.

covered, winter or ſummer. The face, when we are born, is no leſs tender than any other part of the body: it is uſe alone hardens it, and makes it more able to endure the cold. And therefore the ſcythian philoſopher gave a very ſignificant anſwer to the athenian, who wondered how he could go naked in froſt and ſnow: "How," ſaid the ſcythian, "can you endure your "face expoſed to the ſharp winter air?" "My face "is uſed to it," ſaid the athenian. "Think me all "face," replied the ſcythian. Our bodies will endure any thing, that from the beginning they are accuſtomed to.

An eminent inſtance of this, though in the contrary exceſs of heat, being to our preſent purpoſe, to ſhow what uſe can do, I ſhall ſet down in the author's words, as I meet with it in a late ingenious voyage: * 'The 'heats, ſays he, are more violent in Malta, than in any 'part of Europe: they exceed thoſe of Rome itſelf, and 'are perfectly ſtifling; and ſo much the more, becauſe 'there are ſeldom any cooling breezes here. This 'makes the common people as black as gypſies: but 'yet the peaſants defy the ſun: they work on, in the 'hotteſt part of the day, without intermiſſion, or 'ſheltering themſelves from his ſcorching rays. This 'has convinced me that nature can bring itſelf to many 'things, which ſeem impoſſible, provided we accuſtom 'ourſelves from our infancy. The Malteſes do ſo, 'who harden the bodies of their children, and reconcile 'them to the heat, by making them go ſtark naked, 'without ſhirt, drawers, or any thing on their head, 'from their cradles, till they are ten years old.'

Give me leave, therefore, to adviſe you, not to fence too carefully againſt the cold of this our climate: there are thoſe in England, who wear the ſame cloaths winter and ſummer, and that without any inconvenience, or more ſenſe of cold than others find. But if the mother will needs have an allowance for froſt and ſnow, for fear of harm; and the father, for fear of cenſure; be ſure let not his winter-cloathing be too warm: and

* Nouveau Voyage du Levant, $\frac{1}{1}\frac{7}{7}\frac{0}{1}$.

amongſt

amongſt other things remember, that when nature has ſo well covered his head with hair, and ſtrengthened it with a year or two's age, that he can run about by day without a cap, it is beſt that by night a child ſhould alſo lie without one; there being nothing that more expoſes to head-ach, colds, catarrhs, coughs, and ſeveral other diſeaſes, than keeping the head warm.

§ 6. I have ſaid [he] here, becauſe the principal aim of my diſcourſe is, how a young gentleman ſhould be brought up from his infancy, which in all things will not ſo perfectly ſuit the education of daughters; though, where the difference of ſex requires different treatment, it will be no hard matter to diſtinguiſh.

§ 7. I would alſo adviſe his feet to be waſhed every day in cold water; and to have his ſhoes ſo thin, that they might leak and let in water, whenever he comes near it. Here, I fear, I ſhall have the miſtreſs, and maids too, againſt me. One will think it too filthy; and the other, perhaps, too much pains to make clean his ſtockings. But yet truth will have it, that his health is much more worth than all ſuch conſiderations, and ten times as much more. And he that conſiders how miſchievous and mortal a thing, taking wet in the feet is, to thoſe who have been bred nicely, will wiſh he had, with the poor people's children, gone bare-foot; who, by that means, come to be ſo reconciled by cuſtom, to wet their feet, that they take no more cold or harm by it, than if they were wet in their hands. And what is it, I pray, that makes this great difference between the hands and the feet in others, but only cuſtom? I doubt not, but if a man from his cradle had been always uſed to go bare-foot, whilſt his hands were conſtantly wrapped up in warm mittins, and covered with handſhoes, as the dutch call gloves; I doubt not, I ſay, but ſuch a cuſtom would make taking wet in his hands as dangerous to him, as now taking wet in their feet is to a great many others. The way to prevent this, is to have his ſhoes made ſo, as to leak water; and his feet waſhed conſtantly every day in cold water. It is recommendable for its cleanlineſs: but that, which I aim at in it, is health. And therefore I limit

Feet.

limit it not precisely to any time of the day. I have known it used every night, with very good success, and that, all the winter, without the omitting it so much as one night, in extreme cold weather: when thick ice covered the water, the child bathed his legs and feet in it; though he was of an age not big enough to rub and wipe them himself; and when he began this custom, was puling and very tender. But the great end being to harden those parts, by a frequent and familiar use of cold water, and thereby to prevent the mischiefs, that usually attend accidental taking wet in the feet, in those who are bred otherwise; I think it may be left to the prudence and convenience of the parents, to choose either night or morning. The time I deem indifferent, so the thing be effectually done. The health and hardiness procured by it, would be a good purchase at a much dearer rate. To which if I add the preventing of corns, that to some men would be a very valuable consideration. But begin first in the spring with luke-warm, and so colder and colder every time, till in a few days you come to perfectly cold water, and then continue it so, winter and summer. For it is to be observed in this, as in all other alterations from our ordinary way of living, the changes must be made by gentle and insensible degrees; and so we may bring our bodies to any thing, without pain, and without danger.

Alterations.

How fond mothers are like to receive this doctrine, is not hard to foresee. What can it be less, than to murder their tender babes, to use them thus? What! put their feet in cold water in frost and snow, when all one can do is little enough to keep them warm! A little to remove their fears by examples, without which the plainest reason is seldom hearkened to; Seneca tells us of himself, ep. 53 and 83, that he used to bathe himself in cold spring-water in the midst of winter. This, if he had not thought it not only tolerable, but healthy too, he would scarce have done, in an exuberant fortune, that could well have born the expence of a warm bath; and in an age (for he was then old) that would have excused greater indulgence. If we think his stoical

ſtoical principles led him to this ſeverity; let it be ſo, that this ſect reconciled cold water to his ſufferance: what made it agreeable to his health? for that was not impaired by this hard uſage. But what ſhall we ſay to Horace, who armed not himſelf with the reputation of any ſect, and leaſt of all affected ſtoical auſterities? yet he aſſures us, he was wont in the winter ſeaſon to bathe himſelf in cold water. But perhaps Italy will be thought much warmer than England, and the chillneſs of their waters not to come near ours in winter. If the rivers of Italy are warmer, thoſe of Germany and Poland are much colder, than any in this our country; and yet in theſe, the jews, both men and women, bathe all over, at all ſeaſons of the year, without any prejudice to their health. And every one is not apt to believe it is a miracle, or any peculiar virtue of St. Winifred's well, that makes the cold waters of that famous ſpring do no harm to the tender bodies that bathe in it. Every one is now full of the miracles done, by cold baths, on decayed and weak conſtitutions, for the recovery of health and ſtrength; and therefore they cannot be impracticable, or intolerable, for the improving and hardening the bodies of thoſe who are in better circumſtances.

If theſe examples of grown men be not thought yet to reach the caſe of children, but that they may be judged ſtill to be too tender and unable to bear ſuch uſage; let them examine what the germans of old, and the iriſh now do to them; and they will find that infants too, as tender as they are thought, may, without any danger, endure bathing, not only of their feet, but of their whole bodies in cold water. And there are, at this day, ladies in the highlands of Scotland, who uſe this diſcipline to their children, in the midſt of winter; and find that cold water does them no harm, even when there is ice in it.

Swimming.

§ 8. I ſhall not need here to mention ſwimming, when he is of an age able to learn, and has any one to teach him. It is that ſaves many a man's life: and the romans thought it ſo neceſſary, that they ranked it with letters; and it was the common phraſe to mark one ill-educated, and good for nothing;

nothing; that he had neither learned to read, nor to ſwim: "Nec literas didicit, nec natare." But beſides the gaining a ſkill, which may ſerve him at need; the advantages to health, by often bathing in cold water, during the heat of ſummer, are ſo many, that I think nothing need to be ſaid to encourage it; provided this one caution be uſed, that he never go into the water, when exerciſe has at all warmed him, or left any emotion in his blood or pulſe.

Air. § 9. Another thing, that is of great advantage to every one's health, but eſpecially children's, is, to be much in the open air, and very little, as may be, by the fire, even in winter. By this he will accuſtom himſelf alſo to heat and cold, ſhine and rain; all which if a man's body will not endure, it will ſerve him to very little purpoſe in this world: and when he is grown up, it is too late to begin to uſe him to it: it muſt be got early and by degrees. Thus the body may be brought to bear almoſt any thing. If I ſhould adviſe him to play in the wind and ſun without a hat, I doubt whether it could be born. There would a thouſand objections be made againſt it, which at laſt would amount to no more, in truth, than being ſun-burnt. And if my young maſter be to be kept always in the ſhade, and never expoſed to the ſun and wind, for fear of his complexion, it may be a good way to make him a beau, but not a man of buſineſs. And although greater regard be to be had to beauty in the daughters, yet I will take the liberty to ſay, that the more they are in the air, without prejudice to their faces, the ſtronger and healthier they will be; and the nearer they come to the hardſhips of their brothers in their education, the greater advantage will they receive from it, all the remaining part of their lives.

§ 10. Playing in the open air has but this one danger in it, that I know: and that is, that when he is hot with running up and down, he ſhould ſit or lie down on the cold or moiſt earth. This, I grant, and drinking cold drink, when they are hot with labour or exerciſe, brings more people to the grave, or to the brink of it, by fevers, and other diſeaſes, than any thing I know.

Theſe

Theſe miſchiefs are eaſily enough prevented, whilſt he is little, being then ſeldom out of ſight. And if during his childhood, he be conſtantly and rigorouſly kept from ſitting on the ground, or drinking any cold liquor, whilſt he is hot, the cuſtom of forbearing, grown into a habit, will help much to preſerve him, when he is no longer under his maid's or tutor's eye. This is all I think can be done in the caſe. For, as years increaſe, liberty muſt come with them; and, in a great many things, he muſt be truſted to his own conduct, ſince there cannot always be a guard upon him; except what you put into his own mind, by good principles and eſtabliſhed habits, which is the beſt and ſureſt, and therefore moſt to be taken care of. For, from repeated cautions and rules, ever ſo often inculcated, you are not to expect any thing, either in this, or any other caſe, farther than practice has eſtabliſhed them into habit. Habits.

§ 11. One thing the mention of the girls brings into my mind, which muſt not be forgot; and that is, that your ſon's cloaths be never made ſtrait, eſpecially about the breaſt. Let nature have ſcope to faſhion the body, as ſhe thinks beſt. She works of herſelf a great deal better and exacter, than we can direct her. And if women were themſelves to frame the bodies of their children in their wombs, as they often endeavour to mend their ſhapes, when they are out, we ſhould as certainly have no perfect children born, as we have few well-ſhaped, that are ſtrait-laced, or much tampered with. This conſideration ſhould methinks keep buſy people (I will not ſay ignorant nurſes and boddice-makers) from meddling in a matter they underſtand not; and they ſhould be afraid to put nature out of her way, in faſhioning the parts, when they know not how the leaſt and meaneſt is made. And yet I have ſeen ſo many inſtances of children receiving great harm from ſtrait lacing, that I cannot but conclude, there are other creatures, as well as monkies, who, little wiſer than they, deſtroy their young ones, by ſenſeleſs fondneſs, and too much embracing. Cloaths.

§ 12.

§ 12. Narrow breasts, short and stinking breath, ill lungs, and crookedness, are the natural and almost constant effects of hard boddice, and cloaths that pinch. That way of making slender waists, and fine shapes, serves but the more effectually to spoil them. Nor can there, indeed, but be disproportion in the parts, when the nourishment, prepared in the several offices of the body, cannot be distributed, as nature designs. And therefore, what wonder is it, if, it being laid where it can, or some part not so braced, it often makes a shoulder, or a hip, higher or bigger than its just proportion? It is generally known, that the women of China, (imagining I know not what kind of beauty in it) by bracing and binding them hard from their infancy, have very little feet. I saw lately a pair of china shoes, which I was told were for a grown woman; they were so exceedingly disproportioned to the feet of one of the same age, amongst us, that they would scarce have been big enough for one of our little girls. Besides this, it is observed, that their women are also very little, and short-lived; whereas the men are of the ordinary stature of other men, and live to a proportionable age. These defects in the female sex of that country, are by some imputed to the unreasonable binding of their feet; whereby the free circulation of the blood is hindered, and the growth and health of the whole body suffers. And how often do we see, that some small part of the foot being injured, by a wrench or a blow, the whole leg or thigh thereby loses its strength and nourishment, and dwindles away? How much greater inconveniencies may we expect, when the thorax, wherein is placed the heart and seat of life, is unnaturally compressed, and hindered from its due expansion?

Diet. § 13. As for his diet, it ought to be very plain and simple; and, if I might advise, flesh should be forborn, as long as he is in coats, or at least, till he is two or three years old. But whatever advantage this may be, to his present and future health and strength, I fear it will hardly be consented to, by parents, misled by the custom of eating too much flesh themselves;

ſelves; who will be apt to think their children, as they do themſelves, in danger to be ſtarved, if they have not fleſh, at leaſt twice a day. This I am ſure, children would breed their teeth with much leſs danger, be freer from diſeaſes, whilſt they were little, and lay the foundations of an healthy and ſtrong conſtitution much ſurer, if they were not crammed ſo much as they are, by fond mothers and fooliſh ſervants, and were kept wholly from fleſh, the firſt three or four years of their lives.

But if my young maſter muſt needs have fleſh, let it be but once a day, and of one ſort, at a meal. Plain beef, mutton, veal, &c. without other ſauce than hunger, is beſt: and great care ſhould be uſed, that he eat bread plentifully both alone and with every thing elſe. And whatever he eats, that is ſolid, make him chew it well. We engliſh are often negligent herein; from whence follows indigeſtion, and other great inconveniencies.

§ 14. For breakfaſt and ſupper, milk, milk-pottage, water-gruel, flummery, and twenty other things, that we are wont to make in England, are very fit for children: only in all theſe let care be taken, that they be plain, and without much mixture, and very ſparingly ſeaſoned with ſugar, or rather none at all: eſpecially all-ſpice, and other things, that may heat the blood, are carefully to be avoided. Be ſparing alſo of ſalt, in the ſeaſoning of all his victuals, and uſe him not to high-ſeaſoned meats. Our palates grow into a reliſh and liking of the ſeaſoning and cookery, which by cuſtom they are ſet to; and an over-much uſe of ſalt, beſides that it occaſions thirſt, and over-much drinking, has other ill-effects upon the body. I ſhould think that a good piece of well-made and well-baked brown bread, ſometimes with, and ſometimes without, butter or cheeſe, would be often the beſt breakfaſt for my young maſter. I am ſure it is as wholeſome, and will make him as ſtrong a man as greater delicacies; and if he be uſed to it, it will be as pleaſant to him. If he at any time calls for victuals between meals, uſe him to nothing but dry bread. If he be hungry, more than

than wanton, bread alone will down; and if he be not hungry, it is not fit he ſhould eat. By this you will obtain two good effects: 1. That by cuſtom he will come to be in love with bread; for, as I ſaid, our palates and ſtomachs too are pleaſed with the things we are uſed to. Another good you will gain hereby is, that you will not teach him to eat more nor oftener than nature requires. I do not think that all people's appetites are alike: ſome have naturally ſtronger, and ſome weaker ſtomachs. But this I think, that many are made gormands and gluttons by cuſtom, that were not ſo by nature: and I ſee, in ſome countries, men as luſty and ſtrong, that eat but two meals a day, as others that have ſet their ſtomachs by a conſtant uſage, like larums, to call on them for four or five. The romans uſually faſted till ſupper; the only ſet meal, even of thoſe who ate more than once a day: and thoſe who uſed breakfaſts, as ſome did at eight, ſome at ten, others at twelve of the clock, and ſome later, neither ate fleſh, nor had any thing made ready for them. Auguſtus, when the greateſt monarch on the earth, tells us, he took a bit of dry bread in his chariot. And Seneca in his 83d epiſtle, giving an account how he managed himſelf, even when he was old, and his age permitted indulgence, ſays, that he uſed to eat a piece of dry bread for his dinner, without the formality of ſitting to it: though his eſtate would have as well paid for a better meal (had health required it) as any ſubject's in England, were it doubled. The maſters of the world were bred up with this ſpare diet: and the young gentlemen of Rome felt no want of ſtrength or ſpirit, becauſe they ate but once a day. Or if it happened by chance, that any one could not faſt ſo long, as till ſupper, their only ſet meal; he took nothing but a bit of dry bread, or at moſt a few raiſins, or ſome ſuch ſlight thing with it, to ſtay his ſtomach. This part of temperance was found ſo neceſſary, both for health and buſineſs, that the cuſtom of only one meal a day held out againſt that prevailing luxury, which their eaſtern conqueſts and ſpoils had brought in amongſt them: and thoſe, who had given up their old frugal eating,

eating, and made feasts, yet began them not till the evening. And more than one set meal a day was thought so monstrous, that it was a reproach, as low down as Cæsar's time, to make an entertainment, or sit down to a full table, till towards sun-set. And therefore, if it would not be thought too severe, I should judge it most convenient, that my young master should have nothing, but bread too for breakfast. You cannot imagine of what force custom is; and I impute a great part of our diseases in England to our eating too much flesh, and too little bread.

Meals.

§ 15. As to his meals, I should think it best, that, as much as it can be conveniently avoided, they should not be kept constantly to an hour. For, when custom hath fixed his eating to certain stated periods, his stomach will expect victuals at the usual hour, and grow peevish if he passes it; either fretting itself into a troublesome excess, or flagging into a downright want of appetite. Therefore I would have no time kept constantly to, for his breakfast, dinner, and supper, but rather varied, almost every day. And if, betwixt these, which I call meals, he will eat, let him have, as often as he calls for it, good dry bread. If any one think this too hard and sparing a diet for a child, let them know, that a child will never starve, nor dwindle for want of nourishment, who, besides flesh at dinner, and spoon-meat, or some such other thing at supper, may have good bread and beer, as often as he has a stomach: for thus, upon second thoughts, I should judge it best for children to be ordered. The morning is generally designed for study, to which a full stomach is but an ill preparation. Dry bread, though the best nourishment, has the least temptation: and no-body would have a child crammed at breakfast, who has any regard to his mind or body, and would not have him dull and unhealthy. Nor let any one think this unsuitable to one of estate and condition. A gentleman, in any age, ought to be so bred, as to be fitted to bear arms, and be a soldier. But he that in this, breeds his son so, as if he designed him to sleep over his life, in the plenty and ease of a full for-

tune he intends to leave him, little conſiders the examples he has ſeen, or the age he lives in.

Drink. § 16. His drink ſhould be only ſmall beer; and that too he ſhould never be ſuffered to have between meals, but after he had eat a piece of bread. The reaſons why I ſay this are theſe:

§ 17. 1. More fevers and ſurfeits are got by people's drinking when they are hot, than by any one thing I know. Therefore, if by play he be hot and dry, bread will ill go down; and ſo, if he cannot have drink, but upon that condition, he will be forced to forbear. For, if he be very hot, he ſhould by no means drink. At leaſt, a good piece of bread firſt to be eaten, will gain time to warm the beer blood-hot, which then he may drink ſafely. If he be very dry, it will go down ſo warmed, and quench his thirſt better: and, if he will not drink it ſo warmed, abſtaining will not hurt him. Beſides, this will teach him to forbear, which is an habit of greateſt uſe for health of body and mind too.

§ 18. 2. Not being permitted to drink without eating, will prevent the cuſtom of having the cup often at his noſe; a dangerous beginning and preparation to good fellowſhip. Men often bring habitual hunger and thirſt on themſelves by cuſtom. And, if you pleaſe to try, you may, though he be weaned from it, bring him by uſe to ſuch a neceſſity of drinking in the night, that he will not be able to ſleep without it. It being the lullaby, uſed by nurſes, to ſtill crying children; I believe mothers generally find ſome difficulty to wean their children from drinking in the night, when they firſt take them home. Believe it, cuſtom prevails, as much by day as by night; and you may, if you pleaſe, bring any one to be thirſty every hour.

I once lived in a houſe, where, to appeaſe a froward child, they gave him drink, as often as he cried; ſo that he was conſtantly bibbing: and though he could not ſpeak, yet he drank more in twenty-four hours than I did. Try it when you pleaſe, you may with ſmall, as well as with ſtrong beer, drink yourſelf into a drought. The great thing to be minded in education

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is, what habits you ſettle: and therefore in this, as all other things, do not begin to make any thing cuſtomary, the practice whereof you would not have continue and increaſe. It is convenient for health and ſobriety, to drink no more than natural thirſt requires: and he that eats not ſalt meats, nor drinks ſtrong drink, will ſeldom thirſt between meals, unleſs he has been accuſtomed to ſuch unſeaſonable drinking. Habits.

§ 19. Above all, take great care that he ſeldom, if ever, taſte any wine, or ſtrong drink. There is nothing ſo ordinarily given children in England, and nothing ſo deſtructive to them. They ought never to drink any ſtrong liquor, but when they need it as a cordial, and the doctor preſcribes it. And in this caſe it is, that ſervants are moſt narrowly to be watched, and moſt ſeverely to be reprehended, when they tranſgreſs. Thoſe mean ſort of people, placing a great part of their happineſs in ſtrong drink, are always forward to make court to my young maſter, by offering him that which they love beſt themſelves: and, finding themſelves made merry by it, they fooliſhly think it will do the child no harm. This you are carefully to have your eye upon, and reſtrain with all the ſkill and induſtry you can: there being nothing, that lays a ſurer foundation of miſchief, both to body and mind, than children's being uſed to ſtrong drink; eſpecially to drink in private with the ſervants. Strong drink.

§ 20. Fruit makes one of the moſt difficult chapters in the government of health, eſpecially that of children. Our firſt parents ventured paradiſe for it: and it is no wonder our children cannot ſtand the temptation, though it coſt them their health. The regulation of this cannot come under any one general rule: for I am by no means of their mind, who would keep children almoſt wholly from fruit, as a thing totally unwholeſome for them: by which ſtrict way they make them but the more ravenous after it; and to eat good and bad, ripe or unripe, all that they can get, whenever they come at it. Melons, peaches, moſt ſorts of plums, and all ſorts of grapes in England, Fruit.

I think children ſhould be wholly kept from, as having a very tempting taſte, in a very unwholeſome juice; ſo that, if it were poſſible, they ſhould never ſo much as ſee them, or know there were any ſuch thing. But ſtrawberries, cherries, gooſe-berries, or currants, when thorough ripe, I think may be very ſafely allowed them, and that with a pretty liberal hand, if they be eaten with theſe cautions. 1. Not after meals, as we uſually do, when the ſtomach is already full of other food. But I think they ſhould be eaten rather before, or between meals, and children ſhould have them for their breakfaſts. 2. Bread eaten with them. 3. Perfectly ripe. If they are thus eaten, I imagine them rather conducing, than hurtful, to our health. Summer-fruits, being ſuitable to the hot ſeaſon of the year they come in, refreſh our ſtomachs, languiſhing aud fainting under it: and therefore I ſhould not be altogether ſo ſtrict in this point, as ſome are to their children; who being kept ſo very ſhort, inſtead of a moderate quantity of well-choſen fruit, which being allowed them, would content them, whenever they can get looſe, or bribe a ſervant to ſupply them, ſatisfy their longing with any traſh they can get, and eat to a ſurfeit.

Apples and pears too, which are thorough ripe, and have been gathered ſome time, I think may be ſafely eaten at any time, and in pretty large quantities; eſpecially apples, which never did any body hurt, that I have heard, after october.

Fruits alſo dried without ſugar I think very wholeſome. But ſweetmeats of all kinds are to be avoided; which, whether they do more harm to the maker or eater, is not eaſy to tell. This I am ſure, it is one of the moſt inconvenient ways of expence, that vanity hath yet found out; and ſo I leave them to the ladies.

Sleep. § 21. Of all that looks ſoft and effeminate, nothing is more to be indulged children than ſleep. In this alone they are to be permitted to have their full ſatisfaction; nothing contributing more to the growth and health of children, than ſleep. All that is to be regulated in it is, in what part of the twenty-four hours they ſhould take it: which will eaſily be reſolved,

ſolved, by only ſaying, that it is of great uſe to accuſtom them to riſe early in the morning. It is beſt ſo to do, for health: and he that, from his childhood, has by a ſettled cuſtom made riſing betimes eaſy and familiar to him, will not, when he is a man, waſte the beſt and moſt uſeful part of his life in drowzineſs and lying a-bed. If children therefore are to be called up early in the morning, it will follow of courſe, that they muſt go to bed betimes; whereby they will be accuſtomed to avoid the unhealthy and unſafe hours of debauchery, which are thoſe of the evenings: and they who keep good hours, ſeldom are guilty of any great diſorders. I do not ſay this, as if your ſon, when grown up, ſhould never be in company paſt eight, nor never chat over a glaſs of wine till midnight. You are now, by the accuſtoming of his tender years, to indiſpoſe him to thoſe inconveniencies as much as you can; and it will be no ſmall advantage, that contrary practice having made ſitting-up uneaſy to him, it will make him often avoid, and very ſeldom propoſe midnight revels. But if it ſhould not reach ſo far, but faſhion and company ſhould prevail, and make him live, as others do, above twenty, it is worth the while to accuſtom him to early riſing and early going to bed, between this and that; for the preſent improvement of his health, and other advantages.

Though I have ſaid, a large allowance of ſleep, even as much as they will take, ſhould be made to children when they are little; yet I do not mean, that it ſhould always be continued to them, in ſo large a proportion, and they ſuffered to indulge a drowzy lazineſs in their beds, as they grow up bigger. But whether they ſhould begin to be reſtrained at ſeven, or ten years old, or any other time, is impoſſible to be preciſely determined. Their tempers, ſtrength, and conſtitutions muſt be conſidered: but ſome time between ſeven and fourteen, if they are too great lovers of their beds, I think it may be ſeaſonable to begin to reduce them, by degrees, to about eight hours, which is generally reſt enough for healthy grown people. If you have accuſtomed him, as you ſhould do, to riſe conſtantly very early in the

morning, this fault of being too long in bed will eaſily be reformed, and moſt children will be forward enough to ſhorten that time themſelves, by coveting to ſit up with the company at night: though, if they be not looked after, they will be apt to take it out in the morning, which ſhould by no means be permitted. They ſhould conſtantly be called up, and made to riſe at their early hour; but great care ſhould be taken in waking them, that it be not done haſtily, nor with a loud or ſhrill voice, or any other ſudden violent noiſe. This often affrights children, and does them great harm. And ſound ſleep, thus broke off with ſudden alarms, is apt enough to diſcompoſe any one. When children are to be wakened out of their ſleep, be ſure to begin with a low call, and ſome gentle motion; and ſo draw them out of it by degrees, and give them none but kind words and uſage, till they are come perfectly to themſelves, and being quite dreſſed, you are ſure they are thoroughly awake. The being forced from their ſleep, how gently ſoever you do it, is pain enough to them: and care ſhould be taken not to add any other uneaſineſs to it, eſpecially ſuch as may terrify them.

Bed. § 22. Let his bed be hard, and rather quilts than feathers. Hard lodging ſtrengthens the parts; whereas being buried every night in feathers, melts and diſſolves the body, is often the cauſe of weakneſs, and the forerunner of an early grave. And, beſides the ſtone, which has often its riſe from this warm wrapping of the reins, ſeveral other indiſpoſitions, and that which is the root of them all, a tender weakly conſtitution, is very much owing to down-beds. Beſides, he that is uſed to hard lodging at home, will not miſs his ſleep (where he has moſt need of it) in his travels abroad, for want of his ſoft bed and his pillows laid in order. And therefore I think it would not be amiſs, to make his bed after different faſhions; ſometimes lay his head higher, ſometimes lower, that he may not feel every little change he muſt be ſure to meet with, who is not deſigned to lie always in my young maſter's bed at home, and to have his maid lay all things in print, and tuck him in warm. The great cordial of nature

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is sleep. He that misses that, will suffer by it; and he is very unfortunate, who can take his cordial only in his mother's fine gilt cup, and not in a wooden dish. He that can sleep soundly, takes the cordial: and it matters not, whether it be on a soft bed, or the hard boards. It is sleep only that is the thing necessary.

Costiveness. § 23. One thing more there is, which hath a great influence upon the health, and that is going to stool regularly; people that are very loose, have seldom strong thoughts, or strong bodies. But the cure of this, both by diet and medicine, being much more easy than the contrary evil, there needs not much to be said about it: for if it come to threaten, either by its violence, or duration, it will soon enough, and sometimes too soon, make a physician be sent for: and if it be moderate or short, it is commonly best to leave it to nature. On the other side, costiveness has too its ill effects, and is much harder to be dealt with by physic; purging medicines, which seem to give relief, rather increasing than removing the evil.

§ 24. It being an indisposition I had a particular reason to enquire into, and not finding the cure of it in books, I set my thoughts on work, believing that greater changes than that, might be made in our bodies, if we took the right course, and proceeded by rational steps.

1. Then I considered, that going to stool was the effect of certain motions of the body, especially of the peristaltic motion of the guts.

2. I considered, that several motions that were not perfectly voluntary, might yet, by use and constant application, be brought to be habitual, if by an unintermitted custom they were at certain seasons endeavoured to be constantly produced.

3. I had observed some men, who, by taking after supper a pipe of tobacco, never failed of a stool; and began to doubt with myself, whether it were not more custom, than the tobacco, that gave them the benefit of nature; or at least, if the tobacco did it, it was rather by exciting a vigorous motion in the guts, than

by any purging quality; for then it would have had other effects.

Having thus once got the opinion, that it was poſſible to make it habitual; the next thing was to conſider, what way and means were the likelieſt to obtain it.

4. Then I gueſſed, that if a man, after his firſt eating in the morning, would preſently ſolicit nature, and try whether he could ſtrain himſelf ſo as to obtain a ſtool, he might in time, by a conſtant application, bring it to be habitual.

§ 25. The reaſons that made me chooſe this time, were:

1. Becauſe the ſtomach being then empty, if it received any thing grateful to it, (for I would never, but in caſe of neceſſity, have any one eat, but what he likes, and when he has an appetite) it was apt to embrace it cloſe by a ſtrong conſtriction of its fibres; which conſtriction, I ſuppoſed, might probably be continued on in the guts, and ſo increaſe their periſtaltic motion; as we ſee in the ileus, that an inverted motion, being begun any where below, continues itſelf all the whole length, and makes even the ſtomach obey that irregular motion.

2. Becauſe when men eat, they uſually relax their thoughts; and the ſpirits, then free from other employments, are more vigorouſly diſtributed into the lower belly, which thereby contribute to the ſame effect.

3. Becauſe, whenever men have leiſure to eat, they have leiſure enough alſo to make ſo much court to madam Cloacina, as would be neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe; but elſe, in the variety of human affairs and accidents, it was impoſſible to affix it to any hour certain; whereby the cuſtom would be interrupted: whereas men in health ſeldom failing to eat once a day, though the hour be changed, the cuſtom might ſtill be preſerved.

§ 26. Upon theſe grounds, the experiment began to be tried, and I have known none, who have been ſteady in the proſecution of it, and taken care to go conſtantly to the neceſſary-houſe, after their firſt eating, whenever that

that happened, whether they found themſelves called on or no, and there endeavoured to put nature upon her duty; but in a few months they obtained their deſired ſucceſs, and brought themſelves to ſo regular an habit, that they ſeldom ever failed of a ſtool, after their firſt eating, unleſs it were by their own neglect. For, whether they have any motion or no, if they go to the place, and do their part, they are ſure to have nature very obedient.

§ 27. I would therefore adviſe, that this courſe ſhould be taken with a child every day, preſently after he has eaten his breakfaſt. Let him be ſet upon the ſtool, as if diſburdening were as much in his power, as filling his belly; and let not him or his maid know any thing to the contrary, but that it is ſo: and if he be forced to endeavour, by being hindered from his play, or eating again till he has been effectually at ſtool, or at leaſt done his utmoſt, I doubt not but in a little while it will become natural to him. For there is reaſon to ſuſpect that children being uſually intent on their play, and very heedleſs of any thing elſe, often let paſs thoſe motions of nature, when ſhe calls them but gently; and ſo they, neglecting the ſeaſonable offers, do by degrees bring themſelves into an habitual coſtiveneſs. That by this method coſtiveneſs may be prevented, I do more than gueſs: having known, by the conſtant practice of it for ſome time, a child brought to have a ſtool regularly after his breakfaſt, every morning.

§ 28. How far any grown people will think fit to make trial of it, muſt be left to them; though I cannot but ſay, that conſidering the many evils that come from that defect, of a requiſite eaſing of nature, I ſcarce know any thing more conducing to the preſervation of health than this is. Once in four and twenty hours, I think is enough; and no-body, I gueſs, will think it too much. And by this means it is to be obtained without phyſic, which commonly proves very ineffectual, in the cure of a ſettled and habitual coſtiveneſs.

Phyſic. § 29. This is all I have to trouble you with, concerning his management, in the ordinary courſe of his health. Perhaps it will be expected from me,

me, that I ſhould give ſome directions of phyſic, to prevent diſeaſes: for which, I have only this one, very ſacredly to be obſerved: never to give children any phyſic for prevention. The obſervation of what I have already adviſed, will, I ſuppoſe, do that better than the ladies diet-drinks, or apothecary's medicines. Have a great care of tampering that way, leſt, inſtead of preventing, you draw on diſeaſes. Nor even upon every little indiſpoſition is phyſic to be given, or the phyſician to be called to children; eſpecially if he be a buſy man, that will preſently fill their windows with gally-pots, and their ſtomachs with drugs. It is ſafer to leave them wholly to nature, than to put them into the hands of one forward to tamper, or that thinks children are to be cured in ordinary diſtempers, by any thing but diet, or by a method very little diſtant from it; it ſeeming ſuitable both to my reaſon and experience, that the tender conſtitutions of children ſhould have as little done to them as is poſſible, and as the abſolute neceſſity of the caſe requires. A little cold-ſtilled red poppy-water, which is the true ſurfeit-water, with eaſe, and abſtinence from fleſh, often puts an end to ſeveral diſtempers in the beginning, which, by too forward applications, might have been made luſty diſeaſes. When ſuch a gentle treatment will not ſtop the growing miſchief, nor hinder it from turning into a formed diſeaſe, it will be time to ſeek the advice of ſome ſober and diſcreet phyſician. In this part, I hope, I ſhall find an eaſy belief; and no-body can have a pretence to doubt the advice of one, who has ſpent ſome time in the ſtudy of phyſic, when he counſels you not to be too forward in making uſe of phyſic and phyſicians.

§ 30. And thus I have done with what concerns the body and health, which reduces itſelf to theſe few and eaſily obſervable rules. Plenty of open air, exerciſe, and ſleep; plain diet, no wine or ſtrong drink, and very little or no phyſic; not too warm and ſtreight cloathing; eſpecially the head and feet kept cold, and the feet often uſed to cold water and expoſed to wet.

Mind. § 31. Due care being had to keep the body in ſtrength and vigour, ſo that it may be able to

to obey and execute the orders of the mind; the next and principal buſineſs is, to ſet the mind right, that on all occaſions it may be diſpoſed to conſent to nothing, but what may be ſuitable to the dignity and excellency of a rational creature.

§ 32. If what I have ſaid in the beginning of this diſcourſe be true, as I do not doubt but it is, viz. that the difference to be found in the manners and abilities of men, is owing more to their education than to any thing elſe; we have reaſon to conclude, that great care is to be had of the forming children's minds, and giving them that ſeaſoning early, which ſhall influence their lives always after. For when they do well or ill, the praiſe or blame will be laid there: and when any thing is done awkwardly, the common ſaying will paſs upon them, that it is ſuitable to their breeding.

§ 33. As the ſtrength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardſhips, ſo alſo does that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to deny himſelf his own deſires, croſs his own inclinations, and purely follow what reaſon directs as beſt, though the appetite lean the other way.

Early.

§ 34. The great miſtake I have obſerved in people's breeding their children has been, that this has not been taken care enough of in its due ſeaſon; that the mind has not been made obedient to diſcipline, and pliant to reaſon, when at firſt it was moſt tender, moſt eaſy to be bowed. Parents being wiſely ordained by nature to love their children, are very apt, if reaſon watch not that natural affection very warily; are apt, I ſay, to let it run into fondneſs. They love their little ones, and it is their duty: but they often with them cheriſh their faults too. They muſt not be croſſed, forſooth; they muſt be permitted to have their wills in all things; and they being in their infancies not capable of great vices, their parents think they may ſafely enough indulge their little irregularities, and make themſelves ſport with that pretty perverſeneſs, which they think well enough becomes that innocent age. But to a fond parent, that would not have his child

child corrected for a perverſe trick, but excuſed it, ſaying it was a ſmall matter; Solon very well replied, "Aye, but cuſtom is a great one."

§ 35. The fondling muſt be taught to ſtrike, and call names; muſt have what he cries for, and do what he pleaſes. Thus parents, by humouring and cockering them when little, corrupt the principles of nature in their children, and wonder afterwards to taſte the bitter waters, when they themſelves have poiſoned the fountain. For when their children are grown up, and theſe ill habits with them; when they are now too big to be dandled, and their parents can no longer make uſe of them as playthings; then they complain, that the brats are untoward and perverſe; then they are offended to ſee them wilful, and are troubled with thoſe ill-humours, which they themſelves infuſed and fomented in them; and then, perhaps too late, would be glad to get out thoſe weeds which their own hands have planted, and which now have taken too deep root to be eaſily extirpated. For he that has been uſed to have his will in every thing, as long as he was in coats, why ſhould we think it ſtrange that he ſhould deſire it, and contend for it ſtill, when he is in breeches? Indeed, as he grows more towards a man, age ſhows his faults the more, ſo that there be few parents then ſo blind, as not to ſee them! few ſo inſenſible as not to feel the ill effects of their own indulgence. He had the will of his maid before he could ſpeak or go; he had the maſtery of his parents ever ſince he could prattle; and why, now he is grown up, is ſtronger and wiſer than he was then, why now of a ſudden muſt he be reſtrained and curbed? why muſt he at ſeven, fourteen, or twenty years old, loſe the privilege which the parent's indulgence, till then, ſo largely allowed him? Try it in a dog, or an horſe, or any other creature, and ſee whether the ill and reſty tricks they have learned when young, are eaſily to be mended when they are knit: and yet none of thoſe creatures are half ſo wilful and proud, or half ſo deſirous to be maſters of themſelves and others, as man.

§ 36. We are generally wiſe enough to begin with them, when they are very young; and diſcipline betimes thoſe

those other creatures we would make useful and good for somewhat. They are only our own offspring, that we neglect in this point; and having made them ill children, we foolishly expect they should be good men. For if the child must have grapes, or sugar-plums, when he has a mind to them, rather than make the poor baby cry, or be out of humour; why, when he is grown up, must he not be satisfied too, if his desires carry him to wine or women? They are objects as suitable to the longing of twenty-one or more years, as what he cried for, when little, was to the inclinations of a child. The having desires accommodated to the apprehensions and relish of those several ages, is not the fault; but the not having them subject to the rules and restraints of reason: the difference lies not in the having or not having appetites, but in the power to govern, and deny ourselves in them. He that is not used to submit his will to the reason of others, when he is young, will scarce hearken or submit to his own reason, when he is of an age to make use of it. And what kind of a man such a one is like to prove, is easy to foresee.

§ 37. These are oversights usually committed by those who seem to take the greatest care of their children's education. But, if we look into the common management of children, we shall have reason to wonder, in the great dissoluteness of manners, which the world complains of, that there are any footsteps at all left to virtue. I desire to know what vice can be named, which parents, and those about children, do not season them with, and drop into them the seeds of, as often as they are capable to receive them? I do not mean by the examples they give, and the patterns they set before them, which is encouragement enough; but that which I would take notice of here, is the downright teaching them vice, and actual putting them out of the way of virtue. Before they can go, they principle them with violence, revenge, and cruelty. "Give me a blow "that I may beat him," is a lesson, which most children every day hear: and it is thought nothing, because their hands have not strength enough to do any mischief.

But

But I aſk, does not this corrupt their minds? is not this the way of force and violence, that they are ſet in? and if they have been taught when little, to ſtrike and hurt others by proxy, and encouraged to rejoice in the harm they have brought upon them, and ſee them ſuffer; are they not prepared to do it, when they are ſtrong enough to be felt themſelves, and can ſtrike to ſome purpoſe?

The coverings of our bodies, which are for modeſty, warmth, and defence, are, by the folly or vice of parents, recommended to their children for other uſes. They are made matter of vanity and emulation. A child is ſet a longing after a new ſuit, for the finery of it: and when the little girl is tricked up in her new gown and commode, how can her mother do leſs than teach her to admire herſelf, by calling her, "her little "queen," and "her princeſs?" Thus the little ones are taught to be proud of their cloaths, before they can put them on. And why ſhould they not continue to value themſelves for this outſide faſhionableneſs of the taylor or tire-woman's making, when their parents have ſo early inſtructed them to do ſo?

Lying and equivocations, and excuſes little different from lying, are put into the mouths of young people, and commended in apprentices and children, whilſt they are for their maſter's or parent's advantage. And can it be thought that he, that finds the ſtraining of truth diſpenſed with, and encouraged, whilſt it is for his godly maſter's turn, will not make uſe of that privilege for himſelf, when it may be for his own profit?

Thoſe of the meaner ſort are hindered by the ſtreightneſs of their fortunes, from encouraging intemperance in their children, by the temptation of their diet, or invitations to eat or drink more than enough: but their own ill examples, whenever plenty comes in their way, ſhow that it is not the diſlike of drunkenneſs and gluttony that keeps them from exceſs, but want of materials. But if we look into the houſes of thoſe who are a little warmer in their fortunes, there eating and drinking are made ſo much the great buſineſs and happineſs of life, that children are thought neglected, if

if they have not their ſhare of it. Sauces, and ragouts, and foods diſguiſed by all the arts of cookery, muſt tempt their palates, when their bellies are full: and then, for fear the ſtomach ſhould be overcharged, a pretence is found for the other glaſs of wine, to help digeſtion, though it only ſerves to increaſe the ſurfeit.

Is my young maſter a little out of order? the firſt queſtion is, "What will my dear eat? what ſhall I get for thee?" Eating and drinking are inſtantly preſſed: and every body's invention is ſet on work to find out ſomething luſcious and delicate enough to prevail over that want of appetite, which nature has wiſely ordered in the beginning of diſtempers, as a defence againſt their increaſe; that, being freed from the ordinary labour of digeſting any new load in the ſtomach, ſhe may be at leiſure to correct and maſter the peccant humours.

And where children are ſo happy in the care of their parents, as by their prudence to be kept from the exceſs of their tables, to the ſobriety of a plain and ſimple diet; yet there too they are ſcarce to be preſerved from the contagion that poiſons the mind. Though by a diſcreet management, whilſt they are under tuition, their healths, perhaps, may be pretty well ſecured; yet their deſires muſt need yield to the leſſons, which every-where will be read to them upon this part of epicuriſm. The commendation that eating well has every-where, cannot fail to be a ſucceſsful incentive to natural appetite, and bring them quickly to the liking and expence of a faſhionable table. This ſhall have from every one, even the reprovers of vice, the title of living well. And what ſhall ſullen reaſon dare to ſay againſt the public teſtimony? or can it hope to be heard, if it ſhould call that luxury, which is ſo much owned, and univerſally practiſed by thoſe of the beſt quality?

This is now ſo grown a vice, and has ſo great ſupports, that I know not whether it do not put in for the name of virtue; and whether it will not be thought folly, or want of knowledge of the world, to open one's mouth againſt it. And truly I ſhould ſuſpect, that what I have here ſaid of it might be cenſured, as a little ſatire out of my way, did I not mention it with this view,

view, that it might awaken the care and watchfulneſs of parents in the education of their children; when they ſee how they are beſet on every ſide, not only with temptations, but inſtructors to vice, and that perhaps in thoſe they thought places of ſecurity.

I ſhall not dwell any longer on this ſubject; much leſs run over all the particulars, that would ſhow what pains are uſed to corrupt children, and inſtil principles of vice into them: but I deſire parents ſoberly to conſider, what irregularity or vice there is, which children are not viſibly taught; and whether it be not their duty and wiſdom to provide them other inſtructions.

Craving. § 38. It ſeems plain to me, that the principle of all virtue and excellency lies in a power of denying ourſelves the ſatisfaction of our own deſires, where reaſon does not authoriſe them. This power is to be got and improved by cuſtom, made eaſy and familiar by an early practice. If therefore I might be heard, I would adviſe, that, contrary to the ordinary way, children ſhould be uſed to ſubmit their deſires, and go without their longings, even from their very cradles. The very firſt thing they ſhould learn to know, ſhould be, that they were not to have any thing, becauſe it pleaſed them, but becauſe it was thought fit for them. If things ſuitable to their wants were ſupplied to them, ſo that they were never ſuffered to have what they once cried for, they would learn to be content without it; would never with bawling and peeviſhneſs contend for maſtery; nor be half ſo uneaſy to themſelves and others as they are, becauſe from the firſt beginning they are not thus handled. If they were never ſuffered to obtain their deſire by the impatience they expreſſed for it, they would no more cry for other things, than they do for the moon.

§ 39. I ſay not this, as if children were not to be indulged in any thing, or that I expected they ſhould, in hanging-ſleeves, have the reaſon and conduct of counſellors. I conſider them as children, who muſt be tenderly uſed, who muſt play, and have play-things. That which I mean is, that whenever they craved what was not fit for them to have, or do, they ſhould not be

permitted

permitted it, becauſe they were little and deſired it: nay, whatever they were importunate for, they ſhould be ſure, for that very reaſon, to be denied. I have ſeen children at a table, who, whatever was there, never aſked for any thing, but contentedly took what was given them: and at another place I have ſeen others cry for every thing they ſaw, muſt be ſerved out of every diſh, and that firſt too. What made this vaſt difference but this, that one was accuſtomed to have what they called or cried for, the other to go without it? The younger they are, the leſs, I think, are their unruly and diſorderly appetites to be complied with; and the leſs reaſon they have of their own, the more are they to be under the abſolute power and reſtraint of thoſe, in whoſe hands they are. From which I confeſs, it will follow, that none but diſcreet people ſhould be about them. If the world commonly does otherwiſe, I cannot help that. I am ſaying what I think ſhould be; which, if it were already in faſhion, I ſhould not need to trouble the world with a diſcourſe on this ſubject. But yet I doubt not but, when it is conſidered, there will be others of opinion with me, that the ſooner this way is begun with children, the eaſier it will be for them, and their governors too: and that this ought to be obſerved as an inviolable maxim, that whatever once is denied them, they are certainly not to obtain by crying or importunity; unleſs one has a mind to teach them to be impatient and troubleſome, by rewarding them for it, when they are ſo.

Early.

§ 40 Thoſe therefore that intend ever to govern their children, ſhould begin it whilſt they are very little; and look that they perfectly comply with the will of their parents. Would you have your ſon obedient to you, when paſt a child? Be ſure then to eſtabliſh the authority of a father, as ſoon as he is capable of ſubmiſſion, and can underſtand in whoſe power he is. If you would have him ſtand in awe of you, imprint it in his infancy; and, as he approaches more to a man, admit him nearer to your familiarity: ſo ſhall you have him your obedient ſubject (as is fit) whilſt he is a child, and your affectionate friend when

he is a man. For methinks they mightily misplace the treatment due to their children, who are indulgent and familiar when they are little, but severe to them, and keep them at a distance when they are grown up. For liberty and indulgence can do no good to children: their want of judgment makes them stand in need of restraint and discipline. And, on the contrary, imperiousness and severity is but an ill way of treating men, who have reason of their own to guide them, unless you have a mind to make your children, when grown up, weary of you; and secretly to say within themselves, "When will you die, father?"

§ 41. I imagine every one will judge it reasonable, that their children, when little, should look upon their parents as their lords, their absolute governors; and, as such, stand in awe of them: and that, when they come to riper years, they should look on them as their best, as their only sure friends: and, as such, love and reverence them. The way I have mentioned, if I mistake not, is the only one to obtain this. We must look upon our children, when grown up, to be like ourselves; with the same passions, the same desires. We would be thought rational creatures, and have our freedom; we love not to be uneasy under constant rebukes and brow-beatings; nor can we bear severe humours, and great distance, in those we converse with. Whoever has such treatment when he is a man, will look out other company, other friends, other conversation, with whom he can be at ease. If therefore a strict hand be kept over children from the beginning, they will in that age be tractable, and quietly submit to it, as never having known any other: and if, as they grow up to the use of reason, the rigour of government be, as they deserve it, gently relaxed, the father's brow more smoothed to them, and the distance by degrees abated: his former restraints will increase their love, when they find it was only a kindness for them, and a care to make them capable to deserve the favour of their parents, and the esteem of every body else.

§ 42. Thus much for the settling your authority over children in general. Fear and awe ought to give you the

the firſt power over their minds, and love and friendſhip in riper years to hold it: for the time muſt come, when they will be paſt the rod and correction; and then, if the love of you make them not obedient and dutiful; if the love of virtue and reputation keep them not in laudable courſes; I aſk, what hold will you have upon them, to turn them to it? Indeed, fear of having a ſcanty portion, if they diſpleaſe you, may make them ſlaves to your eſtate; but they will be never the leſs ill and wicked in private, and that reſtraint will not laſt always. Every man muſt ſome time or other be truſted to himſelf, and his own conduct; and he that is a good, a virtuous, and able man, muſt be made ſo within. And therefore, what he is to receive from education, what is to ſway and influence his life, muſt be ſomething put into him betimes: habits woven into the very principles of his nature; and not a counterfeit carriage, and diſſembled outſide, put on by fear, only to avoid the preſent anger of a father, who perhaps may diſinherit him.

Puniſhments.

§ 43. This being laid down in general, as the courſe ought to be taken, it is fit we come now to conſider the parts of the diſcipline to be uſed, a little more particularly. I have ſpoken ſo much of carrying a ſtrict hand over children, that perhaps I ſhall be ſuſpected of not conſidering enough what is due to their tender age and conſtitutions. But that opinion will vaniſh, when you have heard me a little farther. For I am very apt to think, that great ſeverity of puniſhment does but very little good; nay, great harm in education: and I believe it will be found, that, cæteris paribus, thoſe children who have been moſt chaſtiſed, ſeldom make the beſt men. All that I have hitherto contended for, is, that whatſoever rigour is neceſſary, it is more to be uſed, the younger children are; and, having by a due application wrought its effect, it is to be relaxed, and changed into a milder ſort of government.

Awe.

§ 44. A compliance, and ſupplenes of their wills, being by a ſteady hand introduced by parents, before children have memories to re-

tain the beginnings of it, will ſeem natural to them, and work afterwards in them, as if it were ſo; preventing all occaſions of ſtruggling, or repining. The only care is, that it be begun early, and inflexibly kept to, till awe and reſpect be grown familiar, and there appears not the leaſt reluctancy in the ſubmiſſion, and ready obedience of their minds. When this reverence is once thus eſtabliſhed, (which it muſt be early, or elſe it will coſt pains and blows to recover it, and the more, the longer it is deferred) it is by it, mixed ſtill with as much indulgence, as they made not an ill uſe of, and not by beating, chiding, or other ſervile puniſhments, they are for the future to be governed, as they grow up to more underſtanding.

Self-denial. § 45. That this is ſo, will be eaſily allowed, when it is but conſidered what is to be aimed at, in an ingenuous education; and upon what it turns.

1. He that has not a maſtery over his inclinations, he that knows not how to reſiſt the importunity of preſent pleaſure or pain, for the ſake of what reaſon tells him is fit to be done, wants the true principle of virtue and induſtry; and is in danger of never being good for any thing. This temper, therefore, ſo contrary to unguided nature, is to be got betimes; and this habit, as the true foundation of future ability and happineſs, is to be wrought into the mind, as early as may be, even from the firſt dawnings of any knowledge or apprehenſion in children; and ſo to be confirmed in them, by all the care and ways imaginable, by thoſe who have the overſight of their education.

Dejected. § 46. 2. On the other ſide, if the mind be curbed, and humbled too much in children; if their ſpirits be abaſed and broken much, by too ſtrict an hand over them; they loſe all their vigour and induſtry, and are in a worſe ſtate than the former. For extravagant young fellows, that have livelineſs and ſpirit, come ſometimes to be ſet right, and ſo make able and great men: but dejected minds, timorous and tame, and low ſpirits, are hardly ever to be raiſed, and very ſeldom attain to any thing. To avoid the danger that is on either hand is the great art: and he that has found

found a way how to keep up a child's ſpirit, eaſy, active, and free; and yet, at the ſame time, to reſtrain him from many things he has a mind to, and to draw him to things that are uneaſy to him; he, I ſay, that knows how to reconcile theſe ſeeming contradictions, has, in my opinion, got the true ſecret of education.

Beating.

§ 47. The uſual lazy and ſhort way by chaſtiſement, and the rod, which is the only inſtrument of government that tutors generally know, or ever think of, is the moſt unfit of any to be uſed in education; becauſe it tends to both thoſe miſchiefs; which, as we have ſhown, are the Scylla and Charybdis, which, on the one hand or the other, ruin all that miſcarry.

§ 48. 1. This kind of puniſhment contributes not at all to the maſtery of our natural propenſity to indulge corporal and preſent pleaſure, and to avoid pain at any rate; but rather encourages it; and thereby ſtrengthens that in us, which is the root, from whence ſpring all vicious actions and the irregularities of life. From what other motive, but of ſenſual pleaſure, and pain, does a child act, who drudges at his book againſt his inclination, or abſtains from eating unwholeſome fruit, that he takes pleaſure in, only out of fear of whipping? He in this only prefers the greater corporal pleaſure, or avoids the greater corporal pain. And what is it to govern his actions, and direct his conduct, by ſuch motives as theſe? what is it, I ſay, but to cheriſh that principle in him, which it is our buſineſs to root out and deſtroy? And therefore I cannot think any correction uſeful to a child, where the ſhame of ſuffering for having done amiſs does not work more upon him than the pain.

§ 49. 2. This ſort of correction naturally breeds an averſion to that which it is the tutor's buſineſs to create a liking to. How obvious is it to obſerve, that children come to hate things which were at firſt acceptable to them, when they find themſelves whipped, and chid, and teazed about them? And it is not to be wondered at in them; when grown men would not be able to be reconciled to any thing by ſuch ways. Who is there

that would not be diſguſted with any innocent recreation, in itſelf indifferent to him, if he ſhould with blows, or ill language, be hauled to it, when he had no mind? or be conſtantly ſo treated, for ſome circumſtances in his application to it? This is natural to be ſo. Offenſive circumſtances ordinarily infect innocent things, which they are joined with: and the very ſight of a cup, wherein any one uſes to take nauſeous phyſic, turns his ſtomach; ſo that nothing will reliſh well out of it, though the cup be ever ſo clean, and well-ſhaped, and of the richeſt materials.

§ 50. 3. Such a ſort of ſlaviſh diſcipline makes a ſlaviſh temper. The child ſubmits, and diſſembles obedience, whilſt the fear of the rod hangs over him; but when that is removed, and, by being out of ſight, he can promiſe himſelf impunity, he gives the greater ſcope to his natural inclination; which by this way is not at all altered, but on the contrary heightened and increaſed in him; and after ſuch reſtraint, breaks out uſually with the more violence. Or,

§ 51. 4. If ſeverity carried to the higheſt pitch does prevail, and works a cure upon the preſent unruly diſtemper, it is often bringing in the room of it worſe and more dangerous diſeaſe, by breaking the mind; and then, in the place of a diſorderly young fellow, you have a low-ſpirited moped creature: who, however with his unnatural ſobriety he may pleaſe ſilly people, who commend tame inactive children, becauſe they make no noiſe, nor give them any trouble; yet, at laſt, will probably prove as uncomfortable a thing to his friends, as he will be, all his life, an uſeleſs thing to himſelf and others.

Rewards. § 52. Beating then, and all other ſorts of ſlaviſh and corporal puniſhments, are not the diſcipline fit to be uſed in the education of thoſe who would have wiſe, good, and ingenuous men; and therefore very rarely to be applied, and that only on great occaſions, and caſes of extremity. On the other ſide, to flatter children by rewards of things that are pleaſant to them, is as carefully to be avoided. He that will give to his ſon apples, or ſugar-plums, or what elſe of this kind

kind he is moſt delighted with, to make him learn his book, does but authoriſe his love of pleaſure, and cocker up that dangerous propenſity, which he ought by all means to ſubdue and ſtifle in him. You can never hope to teach him to maſter it, whilſt you compound for the check you give his inclination in one place, by the ſatisfaction you propoſe to it in another. To make a good, a wiſe, and a virtuous man, it is fit he ſhould learn to croſs his appetite, and deny his inclination to riches, finery, or pleaſing his palate, &c. whenever his reaſon adviſes the contrary, and his duty requires it. But when you draw him to do any thing that is fit, by the offer of money; or reward the pains of learning his book, by the pleaſure of a luſcious morſel; when you promiſe him a lace-cravat, or a fine new ſuit, upon performance of ſome of his little taſks; what do you, by propoſing theſe as rewards, but allow them to be the good things he ſhould aim at, and thereby encourage his longing for them, and accuſtom him to place his happineſs in them? Thus people, to prevail with children to be induſtrious about their grammar, dancing, or ſome other ſuch matter, of no great moment to the happineſs or uſefulneſs of their lives, by miſapplied rewards and puniſhments, ſacrifice their virtue, invert the order of their education, and teach them luxury, pride, or covetouſneſs, &c. For in this way, flattering thoſe wrong inclinations, which they ſhould reſtrain and ſuppreſs, they lay the foundations of thoſe future vices, which cannot be avoided, but by curbing our deſires, and accuſtoming them early to ſubmit to reaſon.

§ 53. I ſay not this, that I would have children kept from the conveniencies or pleaſures of life, that are not injurious to their health or virtue: on the contrary, I would have their lives made as pleaſant, and as agreeable to them as may be, in a plentiful enjoyment of whatſoever might innocently delight them: provided it be with this caution, that they have thoſe enjoyments, only as the conſequences of the ſtate of eſteem and acceptation they are in with their parents and governors; but they ſhould never be offered or beſtowed on

them, as the reward of this or that particular performance, that they ſhow an averſion to, or to which they would not have applied themſelves without that temptation.

§ 54. But if you take away the rod on one hand, and theſe little encouragements, which they are taken with, on the other; how then (will you ſay) ſhall children be governed? Remove hope and fear, and there is an end of all diſcipline. I grant, that good and evil, reward and puniſhment, are the only motives to a rational creature; theſe are the ſpur and reins, whereby all mankind are ſet on work and guided, and therefore they are to be made uſe of to children too. For I adviſe their parents and governors always to carry this in their minds, that children are to be treated as rational creatures.

§ 55. Rewards, I grant, and puniſhments muſt be propoſed to children, if we intend to work upon them. The miſtake, I imagine, is, that thoſe that are generally made uſe of, are ill choſen. The pains and pleaſures of the body are, I think, of ill conſequence, when made the rewards and puniſhments whereby men would prevail on their children: for, as I ſaid before, they ſerve but to increaſe and ſtrengthen thoſe inclinations, which it is our buſineſs to ſubdue and maſter. What principle of virtue do you lay in a child, if you will redeem his deſires of one pleaſure by the propoſal of another? This is but to enlarge his appetite, and inſtruct it to wander. If a child cries for an unwholeſome and dangerous fruit, you purchaſe his quiet by giving him a leſs hurtful ſweet-meat. This perhaps may preſerve his health, but ſpoils his mind, and ſets that farther out of order. For here you only change the object; but flatter ſtill his appetite, and allow that muſt be ſatisfied, wherein, as I have ſhowed, lies the root of the miſchief: and till you bring him to be able to bear a denial of that ſatisfaction, the child may at preſent be quiet and orderly, but the diſeaſe is not cured. By this way of proceeding you foment and cheriſh in him that which is the ſpring, from whence all the evil flows; which will be ſure on the next occaſion to break out again with

with more violence, give him ſtronger longings, and you more trouble.

Reputation.

§ 56. The rewards and puniſhments then whereby we ſhould keep children in order, are quite of another kind; and of that force, that when we can get them once to work, the buſineſs, I think, is done, and the difficulty is over. Eſteem and diſgrace are, of all others, the moſt powerful incentives to the mind, when once it is brought to reliſh them. If you can once get into children a love of credit, and an apprehenſion of ſhame and diſgrace, you have put into them the true principle, which will conſtantly work, and incline them to the right. But it will be aſked, How ſhall this be done?

I confeſs, it does not, at firſt appearance, want ſome difficulty; but yet I think it worth our while to ſeek the ways (and practiſe them when found) to attain this, which I look on as the great ſecret of education.

§ 57. Firſt, children (earlier perhaps than we think) are very ſenſible of praiſe and commendation. They find a pleaſure in being eſteemed and valued, eſpecially by their parents, and thoſe whom they depend on. If therefore the father careſs and commend them, when they do well; ſhow a cold and neglectful countenance to them upon doing ill; and this accompanied by a like carriage of the mother, and all others that are about them; it will in a little time make them ſenſible of the difference: and this, if conſtantly obſerved, I doubt not but will of itſelf work more than threats or blows, which loſe their force, when once grown common, and are of no uſe when ſhame does not attend them; and therefore are to be forborn, and never to be uſed, but in the caſe hereafter-mentioned, when it is brought to extremity.

§ 58. But, ſecondly, to make the ſenſe of eſteem or diſgrace ſink the deeper, and be of the more weight, other agreeable or diſagreeable things ſhould conſtantly accompany theſe different ſtates; not as particular rewards and puniſhments of this or that particular action, but as neceſſarily belonging to, and conſtantly attending one, who by his carriage has brought himſelf into a ſtate

ſtate of diſgrace or commendation. By which way of treating them, children may as much as poſſible be brought to conceive, that thoſe that are commended and in eſteem for doing well, will neceſſarily be beloved and cheriſhed by every body, and have all other good things as a conſequence of it; and, on the other ſide, when any one by miſcarriage falls into diſ-eſteem, and cares not to preſerve his credit, he will unavoidably fall under neglect and contempt: and, in that ſtate, the want of whatever might ſatisfy or delight him, will follow. In this way the objects of their deſires are made aſſiſting to virtue; when a ſettled experience from the beginning teaches children, that the things they delight in, belong to, and are to be enjoyed by thoſe only, who are in a ſtate of reputation. If by theſe means you can come once to ſhame them out of their faults, (for beſides that, I would willingly have no puniſhment) and make them in love with the pleaſure of being well thought on, you may turn them as you pleaſe, and they will be in love with all the ways of virtue.

§ 59. The great difficulty here is, I imagine, from the folly and perverſeneſs of ſervants, who are hardly to be hindered from croſſing herein the deſign of the father and mother. Children, diſcountenanced by their parents for any fault, find uſually a refuge and relief in the careſſes of thoſe fooliſh flatterers, who thereby undo whatever the parents endeavour to eſtabliſh. When the father or mother looks ſour on the child, every body elſe ſhould put on the ſame coldneſs to him, and no-body give him countenance, till forgiveneſs aſked, and a reformation of his fault, has ſet him right again, and reſtored him to his former credit. If this were conſtantly obſerved, I gueſs there would be little need of blows or chiding: their own eaſe and ſatisfaction would quickly teach children to court commendation, and avoid doing that, which they found every body condemned, and they were ſure to ſuffer for, without being chid or beaten. This would teach them modeſty and ſhame; and they would quickly come to have a natural abhorrence for that, which they found made them

them ſlighted and neglected by every body. But how this inconvenience from ſervants is to be remedied, I muſt leave to parents care and conſideration. Only I think it of great importance; and that they are very happy, who can get diſcreet people about their children.

§ 60. Frequent beating or chiding is therefore carefully to be avoided; becauſe this ſort of correction never produces any good, farther than it ſerves to raiſe ſhame and abhorrence of the miſcarriage that brought it on them. And if the greateſt part of the trouble be not the ſenſe that they have done amiſs, and the apprehenſion that they have drawn on themſelves the juſt diſpleaſure of their beſt friends, the pain of whipping will work but an imperfect cure. It only patches up for the preſent, and ſkins it over, but reaches not to the bottom of the ſore. Ingenuous ſhame, and the apprehenſion of diſpleaſure, are the only true reſtraints: theſe alone ought to hold the reins, and keep the child in order. But corporal puniſhments muſt neceſſarily loſe that effect, and wear out the ſenſe of ſhame, where they frequently return. Shame in children has the ſame place that modeſty has in women; which cannot be kept, and often tranſgreſſed againſt. And as to the apprehenſion of diſpleaſure in the parents, they will come to be very inſignificant, if the marks of that diſpleaſure quickly ceaſe, and a few blows fully expiate. Parents ſhould well conſider, what faults in their children are weighty enough to deſerve the declaration of their anger: but when their diſpleaſure is once declared to a degree that carries any puniſhment with it, they ought not preſently to lay by the ſeverity of their brows, but to reſtore their children to their former grace with ſome difficulty; and delay a full reconciliation, till their conformity, and more than ordinary merit, make good their amendment. If this be not ſo ordered, puniſhment will by familiarity become a mere thing of courſe, and loſe all its influence: offending, being chaſtiſed, and then forgiven, will be thought as natural and neceſſary as noon, night, and morning, following one another. Shame.

§ 61.

Reputation. § 61. Concerning reputation, I shall only remark this one thing more of it: that, though it be not the true principle and measure of virtue, (for that is the knowledge of a man's duty, and the satisfaction it is to obey his Maker, in following the dictates of that light God has given him, with the hopes of acceptation and reward) yet it is that which comes nearest to it: and being the testimony and applause that other people's reason, as it were, by a common consent, gives to virtuous and well-ordered actions, it is the proper guide and encouragement of children, till they grow able to judge for themselves, and to find what is right by their own reason.

§ 62. This consideration may direct parents, how to manage themselves in reproving and commending their children. The rebukes and chiding, which their faults will sometimes make hardly to be avoided, should not only be in sober, grave, and unpassionate words, but also alone and in private: but the commendations children deserve they should receive before others. This doubles the reward, by spreading their praise; but the backwardness parents show in divulging their faults, will make them set a greater value on their credit themselves, and teach them to be the more careful to preserve the good opinion of others, whilst they think they have it: but when, being exposed to shame, by publishing their miscarriages, they give it up for lost, that check upon them is taken off; and they will be the less careful to preserve others good thoughts of them, the more they suspect that their reputation with them is already blemished.

Childishness. § 63. But if a right course be taken with children, there will not be so much need of the application of the common rewards and punishments, as we imagined, and as the general practice has established. For all their innocent folly, playing, and childish actions, are to be left perfectly free and unrestrained, as far as they can consist with the respect due to those that are present; and that with the greatest allowance. If these faults of their age, rather than of the children themselves, were, as they should be, left only

only to time, and imitation, and riper years to cure, children would escape a great deal of misapplied and useless correction; which either fails to overpower the natural disposition of their childhood, and so, by an ineffectual familiarity, makes correction in other necessary cases of less use; or else if it be of force to restrain the natural gaiety of that age, it serves only to spoil the temper both of body and mind. If the noise and bustle of their play prove at any time inconvenient, or unsuitable to the place or company they are in, (which can only be where their parents are) a look or a word from the father or mother, if they have established the authority they should, will be enough either to remove, or quiet them for that time. But this gamesome humour, which is wisely adapted by nature to their age and temper, should rather be encouraged, to keep up their spirits, and improve their strength and health, than curbed or restrained: and the chief art is to make all that they have to do, sport and play too.

Rules.

§ 64. And here give me leave to take notice of one thing I think a fault in the ordinary method of education; and that is, the charging of children's memories, upon all occasions, with rules and precepts, which they often do not understand, and are constantly as soon forgot as given. If it be some action you would have done, or done otherwise; whenever they forget, or do it aukwardly, make them do it over and over again, till they are perfect: whereby you will get these two advantages: first, to see whether it be an action they can do, or is fit to be expected of them. For sometimes children are bid to do things, which, upon trial, they are found not able to do; and had need be taught and exercised in, before they are required to do them. But it is much easier for a tutor to command, than to teach. Secondly, another thing got by it will be this, that by repeating the same action, till it be grown habitual in them, the performance will not depend on memory, or reflection, the concomitant of prudence and age, and not of childhood; but will be natural in them. Thus, bowing to a gentleman when he salutes him, and looking in his face when he speaks

ſpeaks to him, is by conſtant uſe as natural to a well-bred man, as breathing; it requires no thought, no reflection. Having this way cured in your child any fault, it is cured for ever: and thus, one by one, you may weed them out all, and plant what habits you pleaſe.

§ 65. I have ſeen parents ſo heap rules on their children, that it was impoſſible for the poor little ones to remember a tenth part of them, much leſs to obſerve them. However, they were either by words or blows corrected for the breach of thoſe multiplied and often very impertinent precepts. Whence it naturally followed, that the children minded not what was ſaid to them; when it was evident to them, that no attention they were capable of, was ſufficient to preſerve them from tranſgreſſion, and the rebukes which followed it.

Let therefore your rules to your ſon be as few as is poſſible, and rather fewer than more than ſeem abſolutely neceſſary. For if you burden him with many rules, one of theſe two things muſt neceſſarily follow, that either he muſt be very often puniſhed, which will be of ill conſequence, by making puniſhment too frequent and familiar; or elſe you muſt let the tranſgreſſions of ſome of your rules go unpuniſhed, whereby they will of courſe grow contemptible, and your authority become cheap to him. Make but few laws, but ſee they be well obſerved, when once made. Few years require but few laws; and as his age increaſes, when one rule is by practice well eſtabliſhed, you may add another.

§ 66. But pray remember, children are not to be taught by rules, which will be always ſlipping out of their memories. What you think neceſſary for them to do, ſettle in them by an indiſpenſable practice, as often as the occaſion returns; and, if it be poſſible, make occaſions. This will beget habits in them, which, being once eſtabliſhed, operate of themſelves eaſily and naturally, without the aſſiſtance of the memory. But here let me give two cautions: 1. The one is, that you keep them to the practice of what you would have grow into a habit in them, by

Habits.

kind

kind words and gentle admonitions, rather as minding them of what they forget, than by harſh rebukes and chiding, as if they were wilfully guilty. 2dly, Another thing you are to take care of, is, not to endeavour to ſettle too many habits at once, leſt by a variety you confound them, and ſo perfect none. When conſtant cuſtom has made any one thing eaſy and natural to them, and they practiſe it without reflection, you may then go on to another.

Practice.

This method of teaching children by a repeated practice, and the ſame action done over and over again, under the eye and direction of the tutor, till they have got the habit of doing it well, and not by relying on rules truſted to their memories; has ſo many advantages, which way ſoever we conſider it, that I cannot but wonder (if ill cuſtoms could be wondered at in any thing) how it could poſſibly be ſo much neglected. I ſhall name one more that comes now in my way. By this method we ſhall ſee, whether what is required of him be adapted to his capacity, and any way ſuited to the child's natural genius and conſtitution: for that too muſt be conſidered in a right education. We muſt not hope wholly to change their original tempers, nor make the gay penſive and grave, nor the melancholy ſportive, without ſpoiling them. God has ſtamped certain characters upon men's minds, which, like their ſhapes, may perhaps be a little mended; but can hardly be totally altered and tranſformed into the contrary.

He therefore, that is about children, ſhould well ſtudy their natures and aptitudes, and ſee, by often trials, what turn they eaſily take, and what becomes them; obſerve what their native ſtock is, how it may be improved, and what it is fit for: he ſhould conſider what they want, whether they be capable of having it wrought into them by induſtry, and incorporated there by practice; and whether it be worth while to endeavour it. For, in many caſes, all that we can do, or ſhould aim at, is, to make the beſt of what nature has given, to prevent the vices and faults to which ſuch a conſtitution is moſt inclined, and give it all the advantages

tages it is capable of. Every one's natural genius ſhould be carried as far as it could; but to attempt the putting another upon him, will we but labour in vain; and what is ſo plaiſtered on, will at beſt ſit but untowardly, and have always hanging to it the ungracefulneſs of conſtraint and affectation.

Affectation. Affectation is not, I confeſs, an early fault of childhood, or the product of untaught nature: it is of that ſort of weeds, which grow not in the wild uncultivated waſte, but in garden-plots, under the negligent hand, or unſkilful care of a gardener. Management and inſtruction, and ſome ſenſe of the neceſſity of breeding, are requiſite to make any one capable of affectation, which endeavours to correct natural defects, and has always the laudable aim of pleaſing, though it always miſſes it; and the more it labours to put on gracefulneſs, the farther it is from it. For this reaſon it is the more carefully to be watched, becauſe it is the proper fault of education; a perverted education indeed, but ſuch as young people often fall into, either by their own miſtake, or the ill conduct of thoſe about them.

He that will examine wherein that gracefulneſs lies, which always pleaſes, will find it ariſes from that natural coherence, which appears between the thing done, and ſuch a temper of mind, as cannot but be approved of as ſuitable to the occaſion. We cannot but be pleaſed with an humane, friendly, civil temper, wherever we meet with it. A mind free, and maſter of itſelf and all its actions, not low and narrow, not haughty and inſolent, not blemiſhed with any great defect; is what every one is taken with. The actions, which naturally flow from ſuch a well-formed mind, pleaſe us alſo, as the genuine marks of it; and being, as it were, natural emanations from the ſpirit and diſpoſition within, cannot but be eaſy and unconſtrained. This ſeems to me to be that beauty, which ſhines through ſome men's actions, ſets off all that they do, and takes with all they come near; when by a conſtant practice they have faſhioned their carriage, and made all thoſe little expreſſions of civility and reſpect, which

nature

nature or cuſtom has eſtabliſhed in converſation, ſo eaſy to themſelves, that they ſeem not artificial or ſtudied, but naturally to follow from a ſweetneſs of mind and a well-turned diſpoſition.

On the other ſide, affectation is an aukward and forced imitation of what ſhould be genuine and eaſy, wanting the beauty that accompanies what is natural; becauſe there is always a diſagreement between the outward action, and the mind within, one of theſe two ways: 1. Either when a man would outwardly put on a diſpoſition of mind, which then he really has not, but endeavours by a forced carriage to make ſhow of; yet ſo, that the conſtraint he is under, diſcovers itſelf: and thus men affect ſometimes to appear ſad, merry, or kind, when, in truth, they are not ſo.

2. The other is, when they do not endeavour to make ſhow of diſpoſitions of mind, which they have not, but to expreſs thoſe they have by a carriage not ſuited to them: and ſuch in converſation are all conſtrained motions, actions, words, or looks, which, though deſigned to ſhow either their reſpect or civility to the company, or their ſatisfaction and eaſineſs in it, are not yet natural nor genuine marks of the one or the other; but rather of ſome defect or miſtake within. Imitation of others, without diſcerning what is graceful in them, or what is peculiar to their characters, often makes a great part of this. But affectation of all kinds, whencefoever it proceeds, is always offenſive: becauſe we naturally hate whatever is counterfeit; and condemn thoſe who have nothing better to recommend themſelves by.

Plain and rough nature, left to itſelf, is much better than an artificial ungracefulneſs, and ſuch ſtudied ways of being ill-faſhioned. The want of an accompliſhment, or ſome defect in our behaviour, coming ſhort of the utmoſt gracefulneſs, often eſcapes obſervation and cenſure. But affectation in any part of our carriage, is lighting up a candle to our defects; and never fails to make us be taken notice of, either as wanting ſenſe, or wanting ſincerity. This governors ought the more diligently to look after; becauſe, as I above obſerved, it

is an acquired uglineſs, owing to miſtaken education; few being guilty of it, but thoſe who pretend to breeding, and would not be thought ignorant of what is faſhionable and becoming in converſation: and, if I miſtake not, it has often its riſe from the lazy admonitions of thoſe who give rules, and propoſe examples, without joining practice with their inſtructions, and making their pupils repeat the action in their ſight, that they may correct what is indecent or conſtrained in it, till it be perfected into an habitual and becoming eaſineſs.

Manners. § 67. Manners, as they call it, about which children are ſo often perplexed, and have ſo many goodly exhortations made them, by their wiſe maids and governeſſes, I think, are rather to be learned by example than rules; and then children, if kept out of ill company, will take a pride to behave themſelves prettily, after the faſhion of others, perceiving themſelves eſteemed and commended for it. But if, by a little negligence in this part, the boy ſhould not put off his hat, nor make legs very gracefully, a dancing-maſter will cure that defect, and wipe off all that plainneſs of nature, which the a-la-mode people call clownifhneſs. And ſince nothing appears to me to give children ſo much becoming confidence and behaviour, and ſo to raiſe them to the converſation of thoſe above their

Dancing. age, as dancing; I think they ſhould be taught to dance, as ſoon as they are capable of learning it. For, though this conſiſt only in outward gracefulneſs of motion, yet, I know not how, it gives children manly thoughts and carriage, more than any thing. But otherwiſe I would not have little children much tormented about punctilios, or niceties of breeding.

Never trouble yourſelf about thoſe faults in them, which you know age will cure. And therefore want of well-faſhioned civility in the carriage, whilſt civility is not wanting in the mind, (for there you muſt take care to plant it early) ſhould be the parents leaſt care, whilſt they are young. If his tender mind be filled with a veneration for his parents and teachers, which conſiſts in love and eſteem, and a fear to offend them; and with

with reſpect and good-will to all people; that reſpect will of itſelf teach thoſe ways of expreſſing it, which he obſerves moſt acceptable. Be ſure to keep up in him the principles of good-nature and kindneſs; make them as habitual as you can, by credit and commendation, and the good things accompanying that ſtate: and when they have taken root in his mind, and are ſettled there by a continued practice, fear not; the ornaments of converſation, and the outſide of faſhionable manners, will come in their due time, if, when they are removed out of their maid's care, they are put into the hands of a well-bred man to be their governor.

Whilſt they are very young, any careleſſneſs is to be born with in children, that carries not with it the marks of pride or ill-nature: but thoſe, whenever they appear in any action, are to be corrected immediately, by the ways abovementioned. What I have ſaid concerning manners, I would not have ſo underſtood, as if I meant that thoſe, who have the judgment to do it, ſhould not gently faſhion the motions and carriage of children, when they are very young. It would be of great advantage, if they had people about them, from their being firſt able to go, that had the ſkill, and would take the right way to do it. That which I complain of, is the wrong courſe that is uſually taken in this matter. Children who were never taught any ſuch thing as behaviour, are often (eſpecially when ſtrangers are preſent) chid for having ſome way or other failed in good manners, and have thereupon reproofs and precepts heaped upon them, concerning putting off their hats, or making of legs, &c. Though in this thoſe concerned pretend to correct the child, yet, in truth, for the moſt part, it is but to cover their own fame: and they lay the blame on the poor little ones, ſometimes paſſionately enough, to divert it from themſelves, for fear the by-ſtanders ſhould impute to their want of care and ſkill the child's ill behaviour.

For, as for the children themſelves, they are never one jot bettered by ſuch occaſional lectures: they at other times ſhould be ſhown what to do, and by reiterated actions be faſhioned before-hand into the practice

of what is fit and becoming; and not told, and talked to do upon the ſpot, what they have never been accuſtomed to, nor know how to do as they ſhould: to hare and rate them thus at every turn, is not to teach them, but to vex and torment them to no purpoſe. They ſhould be let alone, rather than chid for a fault, which is none of theirs, nor is in their power to mend for ſpeaking to. And it were much better their natural, childiſh negligence, or plainneſs, ſhould be left to the care of riper years, than that they ſhould frequently have rebukes miſplaced upon them, which neither do, nor can give them graceful motions. If their minds are well diſpoſed, and principled with inward civility, a great part of the roughneſs, which ſticks to the outſide for want of better teaching, time and obſervation will rub off, as they grow up, if they are bred in good company; but if in ill, all the rules in the world, all the correction imaginable, will not be able to poliſh them. For you muſt take this for a certain truth, that let them have what inſtructions you will, and ever ſo learned lectures of breeding daily inculcated into them, that which will moſt influence their carriage, will be the company they converſe with, and the faſhion of thoſe about them. Children (nay, and men too) do moſt by example. We are all a ſort of chameleons, that ſtill take a tincture from things near us: nor is it to be wondered at in children, who better underſtand what they ſee, than what they hear.

§ 68. I mentioned above, one great miſchief that came by ſervants to children, when by their flatteries they take off the edge and force of the parents rebukes, and ſo leſſen their authority. And here is another great inconvenience, which children receive from the ill examples which they meet with, amongſt the meaner ſervants.

They are wholly, if poſſible, to be kept from ſuch converſation: for the contagion of theſe ill precedents, both in civility and virtue, horribly infects children, as often as they come within reach of it. They frequently learn, from unbred, or debauched ſervants, ſuch language,

guage, untowardly tricks and vices, as otherwiſe they poſſibly would be ignorant of all their lives.

§ 69. It is a hard matter wholly to prevent this miſchief. You will have very good luck, if you never have a clowniſh or vicious ſervant, and if from them your children never get any infection. But yet, as much muſt be done towards it, as can be; and the children kept as much as may be * in the company of their parents, and thoſe to whoſe care they are committed. To this purpoſe, their being in their preſence ſhould be made eaſy to them: they ſhould be allowed the liberties and freedom ſuitable to their ages, and not be held under unneceſſary reſtraints, when in their parent's or governor's ſight. If it be a priſon to them, it is no wonder they ſhould not like it. They muſt not be hindered from being children, or from playing, or doing as children; but from doing ill. All other liberty is to be allowed them. Next, to make them in love with the company of their parents, they ſhould receive all their good things there, and from their hands. The ſervants ſhould be hindered from making court to them, by giving them ſtrong drink, wine, fruit, play-things, and other ſuch matters, which may make them in love with their converſation. Company.

§ 70. Having named company, I am almoſt ready to throw away my pen, and trouble you no farther on this ſubject. For ſince that does more than all precepts, rules, and inſtructions, methinks it is almoſt wholly in vain to make a long diſcourſe of other things, and to talk of that almoſt to no purpoſe. For you will be ready to ſay, "What ſhall I do with my ſon? If I "keep him always at home, he will be in danger to be "my young maſter; and if I ſend him abroad, how is "it poſſible to keep him from the contagion of rude-"neſs and vice, which is every-where ſo in faſhion?

* How much the Romans thought the education of their children a buſineſs that properly belonged to the parents themſelves, ſee in Suetonius, Auguſt. Sect. 64. Plutarch in vita Catonis Cenſoris; Diodorus Siculus, l. 2. cap. 3.

" In my houſe, he will perhaps be more innocent, but " more ignorant too of the world: wanting there " change of company, and being uſed conſtantly to " the ſame faces, he will, when he comes abroad, be a " ſheepiſh or conceited creature."

I confeſs, both ſides have their inconveniencies. Being abroad, it is true, will make him bolder, and better able to buſtle and ſhift amongſt boys of his own age; and the emulation of ſchool-fellows often puts life and induſtry into young lads. But till you can find a ſchool, wherein it is poſſible for the maſter to look after the manners of his ſcholars, and can ſhow as great effects of his care of forming their minds to virtue, and their carriage to good breeding, as of forming their tongues to the learned languages; you muſt confeſs, that you have a ſtrange value for words, when, preferring the languages of the ancient Greeks and Romans to that which made them ſuch brave men, you think it worth while to hazard your ſon's innocence and virtue, for a little Greek and Latin. For, as for that boldneſs and ſpirit, which lads get amongſt their play-fellows at ſchool, it has ordinarily ſuch a mixture of rudeneſs, and an ill-turned confidence, that thoſe miſbecoming and diſingenuous ways of ſhifting in the world muſt be unlearned, and all the tincture waſhed out again, to make way for better principles, and ſuch manners as make a truly worthy man. He that conſiders how diametrically oppoſite the ſkill of living well, and managing, as a man ſhould do, his affairs in the world, is to that malapertneſs, tricking, or violence, learnt among ſchool-boys, will think the faults of a privater education infinitely to be preferred to ſuch improvements; and will take care to preſerve his child's innocence and modeſty at home, as being nearer of kin, and more in the way of thoſe qualities, which make an uſeful and able man. Nor does any one find, or ſo much as ſuſpect, that that retirement and baſhfulneſs, which their daughters are brought up in, makes them leſs knowing or leſs able women. Converſation, when they come into the world, ſoon gives them a becoming aſſurance; and whatſoever, beyond that, there is of rough

rough and boiſterous, may in men be very well ſpared too: for courage and ſteadineſs, as I take it, lie not in roughneſs and ill breeding.

Virtue is harder to be got, than a knowledge of the world; and, if loſt in a young man, is ſeldom recovered. Sheepiſhneſs and ignorance of the world, the faults imputed to a private education, are neither the neceſſary conſequences of being bred at home; nor, if they were, are they incurable evils. Vice is the more ſtubborn, as well as the more dangerous evil of the two; and therefore, in the firſt place, to be fenced againſt. If that ſheepiſh ſoftneſs, which often enervates thoſe, who are bred like fondlings at home, be carefully to be avoided, it is principally ſo for virtue's ſake; for fear leſt ſuch a yielding temper ſhould be too ſuſceptible of vicious impreſſions, and expoſe the novice too eaſily to be corrupted. A young man, before he leaves the ſhelter of his father's houſe, and the guard of a tutor, ſhould be fortified with reſolution, and made acquainted with men, to ſecure his virtue; leſt he ſhould be led into ſome ruinous courſe, or fatal precipice, before he is ſufficiently acquainted with the dangers of converſation, and has ſteadineſs enough not to yield to every temptation. Were it not for this, a young man's baſhfulneſs, and ignorance of the world, would not ſo much need an early care. Converſation would cure it in a great meaſure; or, if that will not do it early enough, it is only a ſtronger reaſon for a good tutor at home. For, if pains be to be taken to give him a manly air and aſſurance betimes, it is chiefly as a fence to his virtue, when he goes into the world, under his own conduct.

It is prepoſterous, therefore, to ſacrifice his innocency to the attaining of confidence, and ſome little ſkill of buſtling for himſelf among others, by his converſation with ill-bred and vicious boys; when the chief uſe of that ſturdineſs, and ſtanding upon his own legs, is only for the preſervation of his virtue. For if confidence or cunning come once to mix with vice, and ſupport his miſcarriages, he is only the furer loſt; and you muſt undo again, and ſtrip him of that he has got

from his companions, or give him up to ruin. Boys will unavoidably be taught aſſurance by converſation with men, when they are brought into it; and that is time enough. Modeſty and ſubmiſſion, till then, better fits them for inſtruction: and therefore there needs not any great care to ſtock them with confidence beforehand. That which requires moſt time, pains, and aſſiduity, is to work into them the principles and practice of virtue and good breeding. This is the ſeaſoning they ſhould be prepared with, ſo as not eaſily to be got out again: this they had need to be well provided with. For converſation, when they come into the world, will add to their knowledge and aſſurance, but be too apt to take from their virtue; which therefore they ought to be plentifully ſtored with, and have that tincture ſunk deep into them.

How they ſhould be fitted for converſation, and entered into the world, when they are ripe for it, we ſhall conſider in another place. But how any one's being put into a mixed herd of unruly boys, and there learning to wrangle at trap, or rook at ſpan-farthing, fits him for civil converſation, or buſineſs, I do not ſee. And what qualities are ordinarily to be got from ſuch a troop of play-fellows, as ſchools uſually aſſemble together, from parents of all kinds, that a father ſhould ſo much covet it, is hard to divine. I am ſure, he who is able to be at the charge of a tutor, at home, may there give his ſon a more genteel carriage, more manly thoughts, and a ſenſe of what is worthy and becoming, with a greater proficiency in learning into the bargain, and ripen him up ſooner into a man; than any at ſchool can do. Not that I blame the ſchool-maſter in this, or think it to be laid to his charge. The difference is great between two or three pupils in the ſame houſe, and three or fourſcore boys lodged up and down. For, let the maſter's induſtry and ſkill be ever ſo great, it is impoſſible he ſhould have 50 or 100 ſcholars under his eye, any longer than they are in the ſchool together: nor can it be expected, that he ſhould inſtruct them ſucceſsfully in any thing but their books; the forming of their minds and manners requiring a conſtant atten-

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tion, and particular application to every ſingle boy; which is impoſſible in a numerous flock, and would be wholly in vain, (could he have time to ſtudy and correct every one's particular defects and wrong inclinations) when the lad was to be left to himſelf, or the prevailing infection of his fellows, the greateſt part of the four and twenty hours.

But fathers, obſerving that fortune is often moſt ſucceſsfully courted by bold and buſtling men, are glad to ſee their ſons pert and forward betimes; take it for an happy omen, that they will be thriving men, and look on the tricks they play their ſchool-fellows, or learn from them, as a proficiency in the art of living, and making their way through the world. But I muſt take the liberty to ſay, that he that lays the foundation of his ſon's fortune in virtue and good breeding, takes the only ſure and warrantable way. And it is not the waggeries or cheats practiſed among ſchool-boys, it is not their roughneſs one to another, nor the well-laid plots of robbing an orchard together, that makes an able man; but the principles of juſtice, generoſity, and ſobriety, joined with obſervation and induſtry, qualities which I judge ſchool-boys do not learn much of one another. And if a young gentleman, bred at home, be not taught more of them, than he could learn at ſchool, his father has made a very ill choice of a tutor. Take a boy from the top of a grammar-ſchool, and one of the ſame age, bred as he ſhould be in his father's family, and bring them into good company together; and then ſee which of the two will have the more manly carriage, and addreſs himſelf with the more becoming aſſurance to ſtrangers. Here I imagine the ſchool-boy's confidence will either fail or diſcredit him; and if it be ſuch as fits him only for the converſation of boys, he had better be without it.

Vice. Vice, if we may believe the general complaint, ripens ſo faſt now-a-days, and runs up to ſeed ſo early in young people, that it is impoſſible to keep a lad from the ſpreading contagion, if you will venture him abroad in the herd, and truſt to chance, or his own inclination, for the choice of his company at

at ſchool. By what fate vice has ſo thriven amongſt us theſe few years paſt, and by what hands it has been nurſed up into ſo uncontrolled a dominion, I ſhall leave to others to inquire. I wiſh that thoſe who complain of the great decay of chriſtian piety and virtue everywhere, and of learning and acquired improvements in the gentry of this generation, would conſider how to retrieve them in the next. This I am ſure, that, if the foundation of it be not laid in the education and principling of the youth, all other endeavours will be in vain. And if the innocence, ſobriety, and induſtry of thoſe who are coming up, be not taken care of and preſerved, it will be ridiculous to expect, that thoſe who are to ſucceed next on the ſtage, ſhould abound in that virtue, ability, and learning, which has hitherto made England conſiderable in the world. I was going to add courage too, though it has been looked on as the natural inheritance of Engliſhmen. What has been talked of ſome late actions at ſea, of a kind unknown to our anceſtors, gives me occaſion to ſay, that debauchery ſinks the courage of men; and when diſſoluteneſs has eaten out the ſenſe of true honour, bravery ſeldom ſtays long after it. And I think it impoſſible to find an inſtance of any nation, however renowned for their valour, who ever kept their credit in arms, or made themſelves redoubtable amongſt their neighbours, after corruption had once broke through, and diſſolved the reſtraint of diſcipline; and vice was grown to ſuch a head, that it durſt ſhow itſelf barefaced, without being out of countenance.

Virtue. It is virtue then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education; and not a forward pertneſs, or any little arts of ſhifting. All other conſiderations and accompliſhments ſhould give way, and be poſtponed, to this. This is the ſolid and ſubſtantial good, which tutors ſhould not only read lectures, and talk of; but the labour and art of education ſhould furniſh the mind with, and faſten there, and never ceaſe till the young man had a true reliſh of it, and placed his ſtrength, his glory, and his pleaſure in it.

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The more this advances, the eaſier way will be made for other accompliſhments in their turns. For he that is brought to ſubmit to virtue, will not be refractory, or reſty, in any thing that becomes him. And therefore I cannot but prefer breeding of a young gentleman at home in his father's ſight, under a good governor, as much the beſt and ſafeſt way to this great and main end of education; when it can be had, and is ordered as it ſhould be. Gentlemen's houſes are ſeldom without variety of company: they ſhould uſe their ſons to all the ſtrange faces that come there, and engage them in converſation with men of parts and breeding, as ſoon as they are capable of it. And why thoſe, who live in the country, ſhould not take them with them, when they make viſits of civility to their neighbours, I know not: this I am ſure, a father that breeds his ſon at home, has the opportunity to have him more in his own company, and there give him what encouragement he thinks fit; and can keep him better from the taint of ſervants, and the meaner ſort of people, than is poſſible to be done abroad. But what ſhall be reſolved in the caſe, muſt in great meaſure be left to the parents, to be determined by their circumſtances and conveniencies. Only I think it the worſt ſort of good huſbandry for a father not to ſtrain himſelf a little for his ſon's breeding; which, let his condition be what it will, is the beſt portion he can leave him. But if, after all, it ſhall be thought by ſome, that the breeding at home has too little company, and that at ordinary ſchools not ſuch as it ſhould be for a young gentleman; I think there might be ways found out to avoid the inconveniencies on the one ſide and the other. Company.

§ 71. Having under conſideration how great the influence of company is, and how prone we are all, eſpecially children, to imitation; I muſt here take the liberty to mind parents of this one thing, viz. that he that will have his ſon have a reſpect for him and his orders, muſt himſelf have a great reverence for his ſon. "Maxima debetur pueris reve-" rentia." You muſt do nothing before him, which Example.

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you would not have him imitate. If any thing escape you, which you would have pass for a fault in him, he will be sure to shelter himself under your example, and shelter himself so, as that it will not be easy to come at him to correct it in him the right way. If you punish him for what he sees you practise yourself, he will not think that severity to proceed from kindness in you, or carefulness to amend a fault in him; but will be apt to interpret it the peevishness and arbitrary imperiousness of a father, who, without any ground for it, would deny his son the liberty and pleasures he takes himself. Or if you assume to yourself the liberty you have taken, as a privilege belonging to riper years, to which a child must not aspire, you do but add new force to your example, and recommend the action the more powerfully to him. For you must always remember, that children affect to be men earlier than is thought: and they love breeches, not for their cut, or ease, but because the having them is a mark or a step towards manhood. What I say of the father's carriage before his children, must extend itself to all those who have any authority over them, or for whom he would have them have any respect.

Punishment. § 72. But to return to the business of rewards and punishments. All the actions of childishness, and unfashionable carriage, and whatever time and age will of itself be sure to reform, being (as I have said) exempt from the discipline of the rod, there will not be so much need of beating children, as is generally made use of. To which if we add learning to read, write, dance, foreign languages, &c. as under the same privilege, there will be but very rarely any occasion for blows or force in an ingenuous education. The right way to teach them those things, is, to give them a liking and inclination to what you propose to them to be learned, and that will engage their industry and application. This I think no hard matter to do, if children be handled as they should be, and the rewards and punishments above-mentioned be carefully applied, and with them these few rules observed in the method of instructing them.

§ 73.

§ 73. 1. None of the things they are to learn should ever be made a burden to them, or imposed on them as a task. Whatever is so proposed, presently becomes irksome: the mind takes an aversion to it, though before it were a thing of delight or indifferency. Let a child be but ordered to whip his top at a certain time every day, whether he has, or has not a mind to it; let this be but required of him as a duty, wherein he must spend so many hours morning and afternoon, and see whether he will not soon be weary of any play at this rate. Is it not so with grown men? What they do chearfully of themselves, do they not presently grow sick of, and can no more endure, as soon as they find it is expected of them as a duty? Children have as much a mind to show that they are free, that their own good actions come from themselves, that they are absolute and independent, as any of the proudest of you grown men, think of them as you please. Task.

§ 74. 2. As a consequence of this, they should seldom be put about doing even those things you have got an inclination in them to, but when they have a mind and disposition to it. He that loves reading, writing, music, &c. finds yet in himself certain seasons wherein those things have no relish to him: and, if at that time he forces himself to it, he only pothers and wearies himself to no purpose. So it is with children. This change of temper should be carefully observed in them, and the favourable seasons of aptitude and inclination be heedfully laid hold of: and if they are not often enough forward of themselves, a good disposition should be talked into them, before they be set upon any thing. This I think no hard matter for a discreet tutor to do, who has studied his pupil's temper, and will be at a little pains to fill his head with suitable ideas, such as may make him in love with the present business. By this means a great deal of time and tiring would be saved: for a child will learn three times as much when he is in tune, as he will with double the time and pains, when he goes awkwardly, or is dragged unwillingly to it. If this were Disposition.

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minded as it ſhould, children might be permitted to weary themſelves with play, and yet have time enough to learn what is ſuited to the capacity of each age. But no ſuch thing is conſidered in the ordinary way of education, nor can it well be. That rough diſcipline of the rod is built upon other principles, has no attraction in it, regards not what humour children are in, nor looks after favourable ſeaſons of inclination. And indeed it would be ridiculous, when compulſion and blows have raiſed an averſion in the child to his taſk, to expect he ſhould freely of his own accord leave his play, and with pleaſure court the occaſions of learning: whereas, were matters ordered right, learning any thing they ſhould be taught, might be made as much a recreation to their play, as their play is to their learning. The pains are equal on both ſides: nor is it that which troubles them; for they love to be buſy, and the change and variety is that which naturally delights them. The only odds is, in that which we call play they act at liberty, and employ their pains (whereof you may obſerve them never ſparing) freely; but what they are to learn, is forced upon them: they are called, compelled, and driven to it. This is that which at firſt entrance balks and cools them; they want their liberty: get them but to aſk their tutor to teach them, as they do often their play-fellows, inſtead of his calling upon them to learn; and they being ſatisfied that they act as freely in this, as they do in other things, they will go on with as much pleaſure in it, and it will not differ from their other ſports and play. By theſe ways, carefully purſued, a child may be brought to deſire to be taught any thing you have a mind he ſhould learn. The hardeſt part, I confeſs, is with the firſt or eldeſt; but when once he is ſet aright, it is eaſy by him to lead the reſt whither one will.

§ 75. Though it be paſt doubt, that the fitteſt time for children to learn any thing is, when their minds are in tune, and well diſpoſed to it; when neither flagging of ſpirit, nor intentneſs of thought upon ſomething elſe, makes them aukward and averſe; yet two things are to be taken care of: 1. that theſe ſeaſons either not being

being warily obſerved, and laid hold on, as often as they return; or elſe not returning as often as they ſhould; the improvement of the child be not thereby neglected, and ſo he be let grow into an habitual idleneſs, and confirmed in this indiſpoſition. 2. That though other things are ill learned when the mind is either indiſpoſed, or otherwiſe taken up; yet it is of great moment, and worth our endeavours, to teach the mind to get the maſtery over itſelf; and to be able, upon choice, to take itſelf off from the hot purſuit of one thing, and ſet itſelf upon another with facility and delight; or at any time to ſhake off its ſluggiſhneſs, and vigorouſly employ itſelf about what reaſon, or the advice of another, ſhall direct. This is to be done in children, by trying them ſometimes, when they are by lazineſs unbent, or by avocation bent another way, and endeavouring to make them buckle to the thing propoſed. If by this means the mind can get an habitual dominion over itſelf, lay by ideas or buſineſs, as occaſion requires, and betake itſelf to new and leſs acceptable employments, without reluctancy or diſcompoſure, it will be an advantage of more conſequence than latin or logic, or moſt of thoſe things children are uſually required to learn.

Compulſion.

§ 76. Children being more active and buſy in that age, than in any other part of their life, and being indifferent to any thing they can do, ſo they may be but doing; dancing and ſcotch-hoppers would be the ſame thing to them, were the encouragements and diſcouragements equal. But to things we would have them learn, the great and only diſcouragement I can obſerve, is, that they are called to it; it is made their buſineſs; they are teazed and chid about it, and do it with trembling and apprehenſion; or, when they come willingly to it, are kept too long at it, till they are quite tired: all which intrenches too much on that natural freedom they extremely affect. And it is that liberty alone, which gives the true reliſh and delight to their ordinary play-games. Turn the tables, and you will find, they will ſoon change their application; eſpecially if they ſee the examples of others, whom

whom they eſteem and think above themſelves. And if the things which they obſerve others to do, be ordered ſo that they inſinuate themſelves into them, as the privilege of an age or condition above theirs; then ambition, and the deſire ſtill to get forward, and higher, and to be like thoſe above them, will ſet them on work, and make them go on with vigour and pleaſure; pleaſure in what they have begun by their own deſire. In which way the enjoyment of their dearly beloved freedom will be no ſmall encouragement to them. To all which, if there be added the ſatisfaction of credit and reputation, I am apt to think, there will need no other ſpur to excite their application and aſſiduity, as much as is neceſſary. I confeſs, there needs patience and ſkill, gentleneſs and attention, and a prudent conduct to attain this at firſt. But why have you a tutor, if there needed no pains? But when this is once eſtabliſhed, all the reſt will follow more eaſily, than in any more ſevere and imperious diſcipline. And I think it no hard matter to gain this point; I am ſure it will not be, where children have no ill examples ſet before them. The great danger therefore, I apprehend is only from ſervants, and other ill-ordered children, or ſuch other vicious or fooliſh people, who ſpoil children, both by the ill pattern they ſet before them in their own ill manners, and by giving them together, the two things they ſhould never have at once; I mean, vicious pleaſures and commendation.

Chiding. § 77. As children ſhould very ſeldom be corrected by blows; ſo, I think, frequent, and eſpecially, paſſionate chiding, of almoſt as ill conſequence. It leſſens the authority of the parents, and the reſpect of the child: for I bid you ſtill remember, they diſtinguiſh early betwixt paſſion and reaſon: and as they cannot but have a reverence for what comes from the latter, ſo they quickly grow into a contempt of the former; or if it cauſes a preſent terrour, yet it ſoon wears off; and natural inclination will eaſily learn to ſlight ſuch ſcare-crows, which make a noiſe, but are not animated by reaſon. Children being to be reſtrained by the parents only in vicious (which, in their tender

tender years, are only a few) things, a look or nod only ought to correct them, when they do amiſs: or, if words are ſometimes to be uſed, they ought to be grave, kind, and ſober, repreſenting the ill, or unbecomingneſs of the faults, rather than a haſty rating of the child for it, which makes him not ſufficiently diſtinguiſh whether your diſlike be not more directed to him than his fault. Paſſionate chiding uſually carries rough and ill language with it, which has this further ill effect, that it teaches and juſtifies it in children: and the names that their parents or preceptors give them they will not be aſhamed or backward to beſtow on others, having ſo good authority for the uſe of them.

Obſtinacy.

§ 78. I foreſee here it will be objected to me: what then, will you have children never beaten, nor chid, for any fault? this will be to let looſe the reins to all kind of diſorder. Not ſo much as is imagined, if a right courſe has been taken in the firſt ſeaſoning of their minds, and implanting that awe of their parents above-mentioned. For beating, by conſtant obſervation, is found to do little good, where the ſmart of it is all the puniſhment is feared or felt in it; for the influence of that quickly wears out, with the memory of it. But yet there is one, and but one fault, for which, I think, children ſhould be beaten; and that is obſtinacy or rebellion. And in this too, I would have it ordered ſo, if it can be, that the ſhame of the whipping, and not the pain, ſhould be the greateſt part of the puniſhment. Shame of doing amiſs, and deſerving chaſtiſement, is the only true reſtraint belonging to virtue. The ſmart of the rod, if ſhame accompanies it not, ſoon ceaſes, and is forgotten, and will quickly, by uſe, loſe its terrour. I have known the children of a perſon of quality kept in awe, by the fear of having their ſhoes pulled off, as much as others by apprehenſions of a rod hanging over them. Some ſuch puniſhment I think better than beating; for it is ſhame of the fault, and the diſgrace that attends it, that they ſhould ſtand in fear of, rather than pain, if you would have them have a temper truly ingenuous. But ſtubbornneſs, and an obſtinate diſobedience, muſt

be maſtered with force and blows: for this there is no other remedy. Whatever particular action you bid him do, or forbear, you muſt be ſure to ſee yourſelf obeyed; no quarter, in this caſe, no reſiſtance. For when once it comes to be a trial of ſkill, a conteſt for maſtery betwixt you, as it is, if you command, and he refuſes; you muſt be ſure to carry it, whatever blows it coſts, if a nod or words will not prevail; unleſs, for ever after, you intend to live in obedience to your ſon. A prudent and kind mother, of my acquaintance, was, on ſuch an occaſion, forced to whip her little daughter, at her firſt coming home from nurſe, eight times ſucceſſively, the ſame morning, before ſhe could maſter her ſtubbornneſs, and obtain a compliance in a very eaſy and indifferent matter. If ſhe had left off ſooner, and ſtopped at the ſeventh whipping, ſhe had ſpoiled the child for ever; and, by her unprevailing blows, only confirmed her refractorineſs, very hardly afterwards to be cured: but wiſely perſiſting, till ſhe had bent her mind, and ſuppled her will, the only end of correction and chaſtiſement, ſhe eſtabliſhed her authority thoroughly in the very firſt occaſions, and had ever after a very ready compliance and obedience in all things from her daughter. For, as this was the firſt time, ſo, I think, it was the laſt too ſhe ever ſtruck her.

The pain of the rod, the firſt occaſion that requires it, continued and increaſed without leaving off, till it has thoroughly prevailed; ſhould firſt bend the mind, and ſettle the parents authority: and then gravity, mixed with kindneſs, ſhould for ever after keep it.

This, if well reflected on, would make people more wary in the uſe of the rod and the cudgel; and keep them from being ſo apt to think beating the ſafe and univerſal remedy, to be applied at random, on all occaſions. This is certain however, if it does no good, it does great harm; if it reaches not the mind, and makes not the will ſupple, it hardens the offender; and, whatever pain he has ſuffered for it, it does but endear to him his beloved ſtubbornneſs, which has got him this time the victory, and prepares him to conteſt and hope for it for the future. Thus, I doubt not, but by ill-ordered

ordered correction, many have been taught to be obſtinate and refractory, who otherwiſe would have been very pliant and tractable. For, if you puniſh a child ſo, as if it were only to revenge the paſt fault, which has raiſed your choler; what operation can this have upon his mind, which is the part to be amended? If there were no ſturdy humour or wilfulneſs mixed with his fault, there was nothing in it, that required the ſeverity of blows. A kind, or grave admonition is enough, to remedy the ſlips of frailty, forgetfulneſs, or inadvertency, and is as much as they will ſtand in need of. But, if there were a perverſeneſs in the will, if it were a deſigned, reſolved diſobedience, the puniſhment is not to be meaſured by the greatneſs or ſmallneſs of the matter wherein it appeared, but by the oppoſition it carries, and ſtands in, to that reſpect and ſubmiſſion that is due to the father's orders; which muſt always be rigorouſly exacted, and the blows by pauſes laid on, till they reach the mind, and you perceive the ſigns of a true ſorrow, ſhame, and purpoſe of obedience.

This, I confeſs, requires ſomething more than ſetting children a taſk, and whipping them without any more ado, if it be not done, and done to our fancy. This requires care, attention, obſervation, and a nice ſtudy of children's tempers, and weighing their faults well, before we come to this ſort of puniſhment. But is not that better, than always to have the rod in hand, as the only inſtrument of government; and, by frequent uſe of it, on all occaſions, miſapply and render inefficacious this laſt and uſeful remedy, where there is need of it? For, what elſe can be expected, when it is promiſcuouſly uſed upon every little ſlip? When a miſtake in concordance, or a wrong poſition in verſe, ſhall have the ſeverity of the laſh, in a well-tempered and induſtrious lad, as ſurely as a wilful crime in an obſtinate and perverſe offender; how can ſuch a way of correction be expected to do good on the mind, and ſet that right? which is the only thing to be looked after; and, when ſet right, brings all the reſt that you can deſire along with it.

§ 79. Where a wrong bent of the will wants not amendment, there can be no need of blows. All other faults, where the mind is rightly disposed, and refuses not the government and authority of the father or tutor, are but mistakes, and may often be over-looked; or, when they are taken notice of, need no other but the gentle remedies of advice, direction, and reproof; till the repeated and wilful neglect of those shows the fault to be in the mind, and that a manifest perverseness of the will lies at the root of their disobedience. But whenever obstinacy, which is an open defiance, appears, that cannot be winked at, or neglected, but must, in the first instance, be subdued and mastered; only care must be had, that we mistake not; and we must be sure it is obstinacy, and nothing else.

§ 80. But since the occasions of punishment, especially beating, are as much to be avoided as may be, I think it should not be often brought to this point. If the awe I spoke of be once got, a look will be sufficient in most cases. Nor indeed should the same carriage, seriousness, or application be expected from young children, as from those of riper growth. They must be permitted, as I said, the foolish and childish actions, suitable to their years, without taking notice of them; inadvertency, carelessness, and gaiety, is the character of that age. I think the severity I spoke of, is not to extend itself to such unseasonable restraints; nor is that hastily to be interpreted obstinacy or wilfulness, which is the natural product of their age or temper. In such miscarriages they are to be assisted, and helped towards an amendment, as weak people under a natural infirmity; which, though they are warned of, yet every relapse must not be counted a perfect neglect, and they presently treated as obstinate. Faults of frailty, as they should never be neglected, or let pass without minding; so, unless the will mix with them, they should never be exaggerated, or very sharply reproved; but with a gentle hand set right, as time and age permit. By this means, children will come to see what is in any miscarriage, that is chiefly offensive, and so learn to avoid it. This will encourage them to keep their wills right,

which

which is the great buſineſs; when they find, that it preſerves them from any great diſpleaſure; and that in all their other failings they meet with the kind concern and help, rather than the anger and paſſionate reproaches, of their tutor and parents. Keep them from vice, and vicious diſpoſitions, and ſuch a kind of behaviour in general will come, with every degree of their age, as is ſuitable to that age, and the company they ordinarily converſe with: and as they grow in years, they will grow in attention and application. But that your words may always carry weight and authority with them, if it ſhall happen, upon any occaſion, that you bid him leave off the doing of any even childiſh things, you muſt be ſure to carry the point, and not let him have the maſtery. But yet, I ſay, I would have the father ſeldom interpoſe his authority and command in theſe caſes, or in any other, but ſuch as have a tendency to vicious habits. I think there are better ways of prevailing with them; and a gentle perſuaſion in reaſoning (when the firſt point of ſubmiſſion to your will is got) will moſt times do much better.

Reaſoning.

§ 81. It will perhaps be wondered, that I mention reaſoning with children: and yet I cannot but think that the true way of dealing with them. They underſtand it as early as they do language; and, if I miſ-obſerve not, they love to be treated as rational creatures, ſooner than is imagined. It is a pride ſhould be cheriſhed in them, and, as much as can be, made the greateſt inſtrument to turn them by.

But when I talk of reaſoning, I do not intend any other, but ſuch as is ſuited to the child's capacity and apprehenſion. No-body can think a boy of three or ſeven years old ſhould be argued with, as a grown man. Long diſcourſes, and philoſophical reaſonings, at beſt, amaze and confound, but do not inſtruct, children. When I ſay therefore, that they muſt be treated as rational creatures, I mean, that you ſhould make them ſenſible, by the mildneſs of your carriage, and the compoſure, even in your correction of them, that what you do is reaſonable in you, and uſeful and neceſſary for them; and that it is not out of caprice, paſſion, or

fancy, that you command or forbid them any thing. This they are capable of underſtanding; and there is no virtue they ſhould be excited to, nor fault they ſhould be kept from, which I do not think they may be convinced of: but it muſt be by ſuch reaſons as their age and underſtanding are capable of, and thoſe propoſed always in very few and plain words. The foundations on which ſeveral duties are built, and the fountains of right and wrong, from which they ſpring, are not, perhaps, eaſily to be let into the minds of grown men, not uſed to abſtract their thoughts from common received opinions. Much leſs are children capable of reaſonings from remote principles. They cannot conceive the force of long deductions: the reaſons that move them muſt be obvious, and level to their thoughts, and ſuch as may (if I may ſo ſay) be felt and touched. But yet, if their age, temper, and inclinations, be conſidered, they will never want ſuch motives, as may be ſufficient to convince them. If there be no other more particular, yet theſe will always be intelligible, and of force, to deter them from any fault, fit to be taken notice of in them, viz. that it will be a diſcredit and diſgrace to them, and diſpleaſe you.

Examples.

§ 82. But, of all the ways whereby children are to be inſtructed, and their manners formed, the plaineſt, eaſieſt, and moſt efficacious, is to ſet before their eyes the examples of thoſe things you would have them do or avoid. Which, when they are pointed out to them, in the practice of perſons within their knowledge, with ſome reflections on their beauty or unbecomingneſs, are of more force to draw or deter their imitation, than any diſcourſes which can be made to them. Virtues and vices can by no words be ſo plainly ſet before their underſtandings, as the actions of other men will ſhow them, when you direct their obſervation, and bid them view this or that good or bad quality in their practice. And the beauty or uncomelineſs of many things, in good and ill breeding, will be better learnt, and make deeper impreſſions on them, in the examples of others, than from any rules or inſtructions can be given about them.

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This is a method to be uſed, not only whilſt they are young; but to be continued, even as long as they ſhall be under another's tuition or conduct. Nay, I know not whether it be not the beſt way to be uſed by a father, as long as he ſhall think fit, on any occaſion, to reform any thing he wiſhes mended in his ſon; nothing ſinking ſo gently, and ſo deep, into men's minds, as example. And what ill they either overlook, or indulge in themſelves, they cannot but diſlike, and be aſhamed of, when it is ſet before them in another.

§ 83. It may be doubted concerning whipping, when, as the laſt remedy, it comes to be neceſſary; at what times, and by whom it ſhould be done: whether preſently upon the committing the fault, whilſt it is yet freſh and hot; and whether parents themſelves ſhould beat their children. As to the firſt; I think it ſhould not be done preſently, leſt paſſion mingle with it; and ſo, though it exceed the juſt proportion, yet it loſes of its due weight: for even children diſcern when we do things in paſſion. But, as I ſaid before, that has moſt weight with them, that appears ſedately to come from their parents reaſon; and they are not without this diſtinction. Next, if you have any diſcreet ſervant capable of it, and has the place of governing your child (for if you have a tutor, there is no doubt) I think it is beſt the ſmart ſhould come more immediately from another's hand, though by the parent's order, who ſhould ſee it done; whereby the parent's authority will be preſerved, and the child's averſion, for the pain it ſuffers, rather be turned on the perſon that immediately inflicts it. For I would have a father ſeldom ſtrike his child, but upon very urgent neceſſity, and as the laſt remedy: and then perhaps it will be fit to do it ſo, that the child ſhould not quickly forget it. Whipping.

§ 84. But, as I ſaid before, beating is the worſt, and therefore the laſt, means to be uſed in the correction of children; and that only in caſes of extremity, after all gentler ways have been tried, and proved unſucceſsful: which, if well obſerved, there will be very ſeldom any need of blows. For, it not being to be imagined that

a child will often, if ever, dispute his father's present command in any particular instance; and the father not interposing his absolute authority, in peremptory rules, concerning either childish or indifferent actions, wherein his son is to have his liberty; or concerning his learning or improvement, wherein there is no compulsion to be used; there remains only the prohibition of some vicious actions, wherein a child is capable of obstinacy, and consequently can deserve beating: and so there will be but very few occasions of that discipline to be used by any one, who considers well, and orders his child's education as it should be. For the first seven years, what vices can a child be guilty of, but lying, or some ill-natured tricks; the repeated commission whereof, after his father's direct command against it, shall bring him into the condemnation of obstinacy, and the chastisement of the rod? If any vicious inclination in him be, in the first appearance and instances of it, treated as it should be, first, with your wonder; and then, if returning again a second time, discountenanced with the severe brow of the father, tutor, and all about him, and a treatment suitable to the state of discredit before-mentioned; and this continued till he be made sensible and ashamed of his fault; I imagine there will be no need of any other correction, nor ever any occasion to come to blows. The necessity of such chastisement is usually the consequence only of former indulgences or neglects. If vicious inclinations were watched from the beginning, and the first irregularities which they caused, corrected by those gentler ways, we should seldom have to do with more than one disorder at once; which would be easily set right without any stir or noise, and not require so harsh a discipline as beating. Thus, one by one, as they appeared, they might all be weeded out, without any signs or memory that ever they had been there. But we letting their faults (by indulging and humouring our little ones) grow up, till they are sturdy and numerous, and the deformity of them makes us ashamed and uneasy; we are fain to come to the plough and the harrow; the spade and the pick-ax must go deep

deep to come at the roots, and all the force, ſkill, and diligence we can uſe, is ſcarce enough to cleanſe the vitiated ſeed-plat, overgrown with weeds, and reſtore us the hopes of fruits to reward our pains in its ſeaſon.

§ 85. This courſe, if obſerved, will ſpare both father and child the trouble of repeated injunctions, and multiplied rules of doing and forbearing. For I am of opinion, that of thoſe actions, which tend to vicious habits, (which are thoſe alone that a father ſhould interpoſe his authority and commands in) none ſhould be forbidden children, till they are found guilty of them. For ſuch untimely prohibitions, if they do nothing worſe, do at leaſt ſo much towards teaching and allowing them, that they ſuppoſe that children may be guilty of them, who would poſſibly be ſafer in the ignorance of any ſuch faults. And the beſt remedy to ſtop them, is, as I have ſaid, to ſhow wonder and amazement at any ſuch action as hath a vicious tendency, when it is firſt taken notice of in a child. For example, when he is firſt found in a lye, or any ill-natured trick, the firſt remedy ſhould be, to talk to him of it as a ſtrange monſtrous matter, that it could not be imagined he would have done: and ſo ſhame him out of it.

§ 86. It will be (it is like) objected, that whatſoever I fancy of the tractableneſs of children, and the prevalency of thoſe ſofter ways of ſhame and commendation; yet there are many, who will never apply themſelves to their books, and to what they ought to learn, unleſs they are ſcourged to it. This, I fear, is nothing but the language of ordinary ſchools and faſhion, which have never ſuffered the other to be tried as it ſhould be, in places where it could be taken notice of. Why, elſe, does the learning of latin and greek need the rod, when french and italian need it not? Children learn to dance and fence without whipping: nay, arithmetic, drawing, &c. they apply themſelves well enough to, without beating: which would make one ſuſpect, that there is ſomething ſtrange, unnatural, and diſagreeable to that age, in the things required in grammar-ſchools, or in the methods uſed there, that children cannot be brought to, without the ſeverity of the laſh, and hardly

with that too; or elſe, that it is a miſtake, that thoſe tongues could not be taught them without beating.

§ 87. But let us ſuppoſe ſome ſo negligent or idle, that they will not be brought to learn by the gentle ways propoſed (for we muſt grant, that there will be children found of all tempers); yet it does not thence follow, that the rough diſcipline of the cudgel is to be uſed to all. Nor can any one be concluded unmanageable by the milder methods of government, till they have been thoroughly tried upon him; and, if they will not prevail with him to uſe his endeavours, and do what is in his power to do, we make no excuſes for the obſtinate: blows are the proper remedies for thoſe: but blows laid on, in a way different from the ordinary. He that wilfully neglects his book, and ſtubbornly refuſes any thing he can do, required of him by his father, expreſſing himſelf in a poſitive ſerious command, ſhould not be corrected with two or three angry laſhes, for not performing his taſk, and the ſame puniſhment repeated again and again, upon every the like default: but, when it is brought to that paſs, that wilfulneſs evidently ſhows itſelf, and makes blows neceſſary; I think the chaſtiſement ſhould be a little more ſedate, and a little more ſevere, and the whipping (mingled with admonition between) ſo continued, till the impreſſions of it, on the mind, were found legible in the face, voice, and ſubmiſſion of the child, not ſo ſenſible of the ſmart, as of the fault he has been guilty of, and melting in true ſorrow under it. If ſuch a correction as this, tried ſome few times at fit diſtances, and carried to the utmoſt ſeverity, with the viſible diſpleaſure of the father all the while, will not work the effect, turn the mind, and produce a future compliance; what can be hoped from blows, and to what purpoſe ſhould they be any more uſed? Beating, when you can expect no good from it, will look more like the fury of an enraged enemy, than the good-will of a compaſſionate friend; and ſuch chaſtiſement carries with it only provocation, without any proſpect of amendment. If it be any father's misfortune to have a ſon thus perverſe

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and untractable, I know not what more he can do but pray for him. But I imagine, if a right courſe be taken with children from the beginning, very few will be found to be ſuch; and when there are any ſuch inſtances, they are not to be the rule for the education of thoſe who are better natured, and may be managed with better uſage.

Tutor.

§ 88. If a tutor can be got, that, thinking himſelf in the father's place, charged with his care, and reliſhing theſe things, will at the beginning apply himſelf to put them in practice, he will afterwards find his work very eaſy: and you will, I gueſs, have your ſon in a little time a greater proficient in both learning and breeding, than perhaps you imagine. But let him by no means beat him, at any time, without your conſent and direction; at leaſt till you have experience of his diſcretion and temper. But yet, to keep up his authority with his pupil, beſides concealing that he has not the power of the rod, you muſt be ſure to uſe him with great reſpect yourſelf, and cauſe all your family to do ſo too. For you cannot expect your ſon ſhould have any regard for one, whom he ſees you, or his mother, or others ſlight. If you think him worthy of contempt, you have choſen amiſs; and if you ſhow any contempt of him, he will hardly eſcape it from your ſon: and whenever that happens, whatever worth he may have in himſelf, and abilities for this employment, they are all loſt to your child, and can afterwards never be made uſeful to him.

§ 89. As the father's example muſt teach the child reſpect for his tutor; ſo the tutor's example muſt lead the child into thoſe actions he would have him do. His practice muſt by no means croſs his precepts, unleſs he intend to ſet him wrong. It will be to no purpoſe for the tutor to talk of the reſtraint of the paſſions, whilſt any of his own are let looſe; and he will in vain endeavour to reform any vice or indecency in his pupil, which he allows in himſelf. Ill patterns are ſure to be followed more than good rules: and therefore he muſt alſo carefully preſerve him from the influence of ill precedents, eſpecially the moſt dangerous of all,

all, the examples of the servants; from whose company he is to be kept, not by prohibitions, for that will but give him an itch after it, but by other ways I have mentioned.

Governor. § 90. In all the whole business of education, there is nothing like to be less hearkened to, or harder to be well observed, than what I am now going to say; and that is, that children should, from their first beginning to talk, have some discreet, sober, nay wise person about them, whose care it should be to fashion them aright, and keep them from all ill, especially the infection of bad company. I think this province requires great sobriety, temperance, tenderness, diligence, and discretion; qualities hardly to be found united in persons, that are to be had for ordinary salaries: nor easily to be found any where. As to the charge of it, I think it will be the money best laid out that can be about our children; and therefore, though it may be expensive more than is ordinary, yet it cannot be thought dear. He that at any rate procures his child a good mind, well-principled, tempered to virtue and usefulness, and adorned with civility and good breeding, makes a better purchase for him, than if he had laid out the money for an addition of more earth to his former acres. Spare it in toys and play-games, in silk and ribbons, laces and other useless expences, as much as you please; but be not sparing in so necessary a part as this. It is not good husbandry to make his fortune rich, and his mind poor. I have often, with great admiration, seen people lavish it profusely in tricking up their children in fine cloaths, lodging, and feeding them sumptuously, allowing them more than enough of useless servants; and yet at the same time starve their minds, and not take sufficient care to cover that, which is the most shameful nakedness, viz. their natural wrong inclinations and ignorance. This I can look on as no other than a sacrificing to their own vanity; it showing more their pride, than true care of the good of their children. Whatsoever you employ to the advantage of your son's mind will show your true kindness, though it be to the

the leſſening of his eſtate. A wife and good man can hardly want either the opinion or reality of being great and happy. But he that is fooliſh or vicious, can be neither great nor happy, what eſtate ſoever you leave him: and I aſk you, whether there be not men in the world, whom you had rather have your ſon be, with 500l. per annum, than ſome other you know, with 5000l?

§ 91. The conſideration of charge ought not, therefore, to deter thoſe who are able: the great difficulty will be, where to find a proper perſon. For thoſe of ſmall age, parts, and virtue, are unfit for this employment: and thoſe that have greater, will hardly be got to undertake ſuch a charge. You muſt therefore look out early, and inquire every-where; for the world has people of all ſorts: and I remember, Montaigne ſays in one of his eſſays, that the learned Caſtalio was fain to make trenchers at Baſil, to keep himſelf from ſtarving, when his father would have given any money for ſuch a tutor for his ſon, and Caſtalio have willingly embraced ſuch an employment upon very reaſonable terms: but this was for want of intelligence.

§ 92. If you find it difficult to meet with ſuch a tutor as we deſire, you are not to wonder. I only can ſay, ſpare no care nor coſt to get ſuch an one. All things are to be had that way: and I dare aſſure you, that, if you can get a good one, you will never repent the charge; but will always have the ſatisfaction to think it the money, of all other, the beſt laid out. But be ſure take no-body upon friends, or charitable, no, nor bare great commendations. Nay, if you will do as you ought, the reputation of a ſober man, with a good ſtock of learning, (which is all uſually required in a tutor) will not be enough to ſerve your turn. In this choice be as curious, as you would be in that of a wife for him: for you muſt not think of trial, or changing afterwards; that will cauſe great inconvenience to you, and greater to your ſon. When I conſider the ſcruples and cautions I here lay in your way, methinks it looks as if I adviſed you to ſomething, which I would have offered at, but in effect not done. But he that ſhall conſider,

consider, how much the business of a tutor, rightly employed, lies out of the road; and how remote it is from the thoughts of many, even of those who propose to themselves this employment; will perhaps be of my mind, that one, fit to educate and form the mind of a young gentleman, is not every-where to be found; and that more than ordinary care is to be taken in the choice of him, or else you may fail of your end.

Tutor. § 93. The character of a sober man, and a scholar, is, as I have above observed, what every one expects in a tutor. This generally is thought enough, and is all that parents commonly look for. But when such an one has emptied out, into his pupil, all the latin and logic he has brought from the university, will that furniture make him a fine gentleman? Or can it be expected, that he should be better bred, better skilled in the world, better principled in the grounds and foundations of true virtue and generosity, than his young tutor is?

To form a young gentleman, as he should be, it is fit his governor should himself be well-bred, understand the ways of carriage, and measures of civility, in all the variety of persons, times and places; and keep his pupil, as much as his age requires, constantly to the observation of them. This is an art not to be learnt, nor taught by books: nothing can give it, but good company and observation joined together. The taylor may make his cloaths modish, and the dancing-master give fashion to his motions; yet neither of these, though they set off well, make a well-bred gentleman: no, though he have learning to boot; which, if not well managed, makes him more impertinent and intolerable in conversation. Breeding is that, which sets a gloss upon all his other good qualities, and renders them useful to him, in procuring him the esteem and good-will of all that he comes near. Without good breeding, his other accomplishments make him pass but for proud, conceited, vain, or foolish.

Courage, in an ill-bred man, has the air, and escapes not the opinion, of brutality: learning becomes pedantry; wit, buffoonery; plainness, rusticity; good-nature, fawning:

fawning: and there cannot be a good quality in him, which want of breeding will not warp, and disfigure to his disadvantage. Nay, virtue and parts, though they are allowed their due commendation, yet are not enough to procure a man a good reception, and make him welcome where-ever he comes. No-body contents himself with rough diamonds, and wears them so, who would appear with advantage. When they are polished and set, then they give a lustre. Good qualities are the substantial riches of the mind; but it is good breeding sets them off: and he that will be acceptable, must give beauty, as well as strength, to his actions. Solidity, or even usefulness, is not enough: a graceful way and fashion, in every thing, is that which gives the ornament and liking. And, in most cases, the manner of doing is of more consequence than the thing done; and upon that depends the satisfaction, or disgust, wherewith it is received. This therefore, which lies not in the putting off the hat, nor making of compliments, but in a due and free composure of language, looks, motion, posture, place, &c. suited to persons and occasions, and can be learned only by habit and use, though it be above the capacity of children, and little ones should not be perplexed about it; yet it ought to be begun, and in a good measure learned, by a young gentleman, whilst he is under a tutor, before he comes into the world upon his own legs; for then usually it is too late to hope to reform several habitual indecencies, which lie in little things. For the carriage is not as it should be, till it is become natural in every part; falling, as skilful musicians fingers do, into harmonious order, without care, and without thought. If in conversation a man's mind be taken up with a solicitous watchfulness about any part of his behaviour, instead of being mended by it, it will be constrained, uneasy, and ungraceful.

Besides, this part is most necessary to be formed by the hands and care of a governor: because, though the errours committed in breeding are the first that are taken notice of by others, yet they are the last that any one is told of. Not but that the malice of the world is forward

ward enough to tattle of them; but it is always out of his hearing, who ſhould make profit of their judgment, and reform himſelf by their cenſure. And indeed this is ſo nice a point to be meddled with, that even thoſe who are friends, and wiſh it were mended, ſcarce ever dare mention it, and tell thoſe they love, that they are guilty in ſuch or ſuch caſes of ill breeding. Errours in other things may often with civility be ſhown another; and it is no breach of good manners, or friendſhip, to ſet him right in other miſtakes: but good breeding itſelf allows not a man to touch upon this; or to inſinuate to another, that he is guilty of want of breeding. Such information can come only from thoſe who have authority over them: and from them too it comes very hardly and harſhly to a grown man; and, however ſoftened, goes but ill down with any one, who has lived ever ſo little in the world. Wherefore it is neceſſary, that this part ſhould be the governor's principal care; that an habitual gracefulneſs, and politeneſs in all his carriage, may be ſettled in his charge, as much as may be, before he goes out of his hands: and that he may not need advice in this point, when he has neither time nor diſpoſition to receive it, nor has any body left to give it him. The tutor therefore ought, in the firſt place, to be well-bred: and a young gentleman, who gets this one qualification from his governor, ſets out with great advantage; and will find, that this one accompliſhment will more open his way to him, get him more friends, and carry him farther in the world, than all the hard words, or real knowledge, he has got from the liberal arts, or his tutor's learned encyclopædia; not that thoſe ſhould be neglected, but by no means preferred, or ſuffered to thruſt out the other.

§ 94. Beſides being well-bred, the tutor ſhould know the world well; the ways, the humours, the follies, the cheats, the faults of the age he is fallen into, and particularly of the country he lives in. Theſe he ſhould be able to ſhow to his pupil, as he finds him capable; teach him ſkill in men, and their manners; pull off the maſk, which their ſeveral callings and pretences cover them with; and make his pupil diſcern what lies at the

the bottom, under ſuch appearances; that he may not, as unexperienced young men are apt to do, if they are unwarned, take one thing for another, judge by the outſide, and give himſelf up to ſhow, and the inſinuation of a fair carriage, or an obliging application. A governor ſhould teach his ſcholar to gueſs at, and beware of, the deſigns of men he hath to do with, neither with too much ſuſpicion, nor too much confidence; but, as the young man is by nature moſt inclined to either ſide, rectify him, and bend him the other way. He ſhould accuſtom him to make, as much as is poſſible, a true judgment of men by thoſe marks, which ſerve beſt to ſhow what they are, and give a proſpect into their inſide; which often ſhows itſelf in little things, eſpecially when they are not in parade, and upon their guard. He ſhould acquaint him with the true ſtate of the world, and diſpoſe him to think no man better or worſe, wiſer or fooliſher, than he really is. Thus, by ſafe and inſenſible degrees, he will paſs from a boy to a man; which is the moſt hazardous ſtep in all the whole courſe of life. This therefore ſhould be carefully watched, and a young man with great diligence handed over it; and not, as now uſually is done, be taken from a governor's conduct, and all at once thrown into the world under his own, not without manifeſt danger of immediate ſpoiling; there being nothing more frequent, than inſtances of the great looſeneſs, extravagancy, and debauchery, which young men have run into, as ſoon as they have been let looſe from a ſevere and ſtrict education: which, I think, may be chiefly imputed to their wrong way of breeding, eſpecially in this part; for, having been bred up in a great ignorance of what the world truly is, and finding it quite another thing, when they come into it, than what they were taught it ſhould be, and ſo imagined it was; are eaſily perſuaded, by other kind of tutors, which they are ſure to meet with, that the diſcipline they were kept under, and the lectures that were read to them, were but the formalities of education, and the reſtraints of childhood; that the freedom belonging to men, is to take their ſwing in a full enjoy-

ment of what was before forbidden them. They ſhow the young novice the world, full of faſhionable and glittering examples of this every-where, and he is preſently dazzled with them. My young maſter, failing not to be willing to ſhow himſelf a man, as much as any of the ſparks of his years, lets himſelf looſe to all the irregularities he finds in the moſt debauched; and thus courts credit and manlineſs, in the caſting off the modeſty and ſobriety he has till then been kept in; and thinks it brave, at his firſt ſetting out, to ſignalize himſelf in running counter to all the rules of virtue, which have been preached to him by his tutor.

The ſhowing him the world as really it is, before he comes wholly into it, is one of the beſt means, I think, to prevent this miſchief. He ſhould, by degrees, be informed of the vices in faſhion, and warned of the applications and deſigns of thoſe who will make it their buſineſs to corrupt him. He ſhould be told the arts they uſe, and the trains they lay; and now and then have ſet before him the tragical or ridiculous examples of thoſe who are ruining, or ruined, this way. The age is not like to want inſtances of this kind, which ſhould be made land-marks to him; that by the diſgraces, diſeaſes, beggary, and ſhame of hopeful young men, thus brought to ruin, he may be precautioned, and be made ſee, how thoſe join in the contempt and neglect of them that are undone, who, by pretences of friendſhip and reſpect, led them into it, and helped to prey upon them whilſt they were undoing; that he may ſee, before he buys it by a too dear experience, that thoſe who perſuade him not to follow the ſober advices he has received from his governors, and the counſel of his own reaſon, which they call being governed by others, do it only, that they may have the government of him themſelves; and make him believe, he goes like a man of himſelf, by his own conduct, and for his own pleaſure, when, in truth, he is wholly as a child, led by them into thoſe vices, which beſt ſerve their purpoſes. This is a knowledge, which, upon all occaſions, a tutor ſhould endeavour to inſtil,

inſtil, and by all methods try to make him comprehend, and thoroughly reliſh.

I know it is often ſaid, that to diſcover to a young man the vices of the age is to teach them him. That, I confeſs, is a good deal ſo, according as it is done; and therefore requires a diſcreet man of parts, who knows the world, and can judge of the temper, inclination, and weak ſide of his pupil. This farther is to be remembered, that it is not poſſible now (as perhaps formerly it was) to keep a young gentleman from vice, by a total ignorance of it; unleſs you will all his life mew him up in a cloſet, and never let him go into company. The longer he is kept thus hood-winked, the leſs he will ſee, when he comes abroad into open day-light, and be the more expoſed to be a prey to himſelf and others. And an old boy, at his firſt appearance, with all the gravity of his ivy-buſh about him, is ſure to draw on him the eyes and chirping of the whole town volery; amongſt which, there will not be wanting ſome birds of prey, that will preſently be on the wing for him.

The only fence againſt the world, is a thorough knowledge of it: into which a young gentleman ſhould be entered by degrees, as he can bear it; and the earlier the better, ſo he be in ſafe and ſkilful hands to guide him. The ſcene ſhould be gently opened, and his entrance made ſtep by ſtep, and the dangers pointed out that attend him, from the ſeveral degrees, tempers, deſigns, and clubs of men. He ſhould be prepared to be ſhocked by ſome, and careſſed by others; warned who are like to oppoſe, who to miſlead, who to undermine him, and who to ſerve him. He ſhould be inſtructed how to know and diſtinguiſh men; where he ſhould let them ſee, and when diſſemble the knowledge of them, and their aims and workings. And if he be too forward to venture upon his own ſtrength and ſkill, the perplexity and trouble of a miſadventure now and then, that reaches not his innocence, his health, or reputation, may not be an ill way to teach him more caution.

This, I confefs, containing one great part of wifdom, is not the product of fome fuperficial thoughts, or much reading; but the effect of experience and obfervation in a man, who has lived in the world with his eyes open, and converfed with men of all forts. And therefore I think it of moft value to be inftilled into a young man, upon all occafions which offer themfelves, that, when he comes to launch into the deep himfelf, he may not be like one at fea without a line, compafs, or fea-chart; but may have fome notice before-hand of the rocks and fhoals, the currents and quickfands, and know a little how to fteer, that he fink not, before he get experience. He that thinks not this of more moment to his fon, and for which he more needs a governor, than the languages and learned fciences, forgets of how much more ufe it is to judge right of men, and manage his affairs wifely with them, than to fpeak greek and latin, or argue in mood and figure; or to have his head filled with the abftrufe fpeculations of natural philofophy and metaphyfics; nay, than to be well verfed in greek and roman writers, though that be much better for a gentleman, than to be a good peripatetic or cartefian: becaufe thofe ancient authors obferved and painted mankind well, and give the beft light into that kind of knowledge. He that goes into the eaftern parts of Afia, will find able and acceptable men, without any of thefe: but without virtue, knowledge of the world, and civility, an accomplifhed and valuable man can be found no-where.

A great part of the learning now in fafhion in the fchools of Europe, and that goes ordinarily into the round of education, a gentleman may, in a good meafure, be unfurnifhed with, without any great difparagement to himfelf, or prejudice to his affairs. But prudence and good breeding are, in all the ftations and occurrences of life, neceffary; and moft young men fuffer in the want of them; and come rawer, and more aukward, into the world, than they fhould, for this very reafon; becaufe thefe qualities, which are, of all other, the moft neceffary to be taught, and ftand moft

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in need of the assistance and help of a teacher, are generally neglected, and thought but a slight, or no part of a tutor's business. Latin and learning make all the noise: and the main stress is laid upon his proficiency in things, a great part whereof belongs not to a gentleman's calling; which is to have the knowledge of a man of business, a carriage suitable to his rank, and to be eminent and useful in his country, according to his station. Whenever either spare hours from that, or an inclination to perfect himself in some parts of knowledge, which his tutor did but just enter him in, set him upon any study; the first rudiments of it, which he learned before, will open the way enough for his own industry to carry him as far as his fancy will prompt, or his parts enable him to go: or, if he thinks it may save his time and pains, to be helped over some difficulties by the hands of a master, he may then take a man that is perfectly well skilled in it, or choose such an one, as he thinks fittest for his purpose. But to initiate his pupil in any part of learning, as far as is necessary for a young man in the ordinary course of his studies, an ordinary skill in the governor is enough. Nor is it requisite that he should be a thorough scholar, or possess in perfection all those sciences, which it is convenient a young gentleman should have a taste of, in some general view, or short system. A gentleman, that would penetrate deeper, must do it by his own genius and industry afterwards: for no-body ever went far in knowledge, or became eminent in any of the sciences, by the discipline and constraint of a master.

The great work of a governor is to fashion the carriage, and form the mind; to settle in his pupil good habits, and the principles of virtue and wisdom; to give him, by little and little, a view of mankind; and work him into a love and imitation of what is excellent and praise-worthy; and, in the prosecution of it, to give him vigour, activity, and industry. The studies which he sets him upon, are but, as it were, the exercises of his faculties, and employment of his time, to keep him from sauntering and idleness, to teach him application, and accustom him to take pains, and

give him ſome little taſte of what his own induſtry muſt perfect. For who expects, that under a tutor a young gentleman ſhould be an accompliſhed critic, orator, or logician; go to the bottom of metaphyſics, natural philoſophy, or mathematics; or be a maſter in hiſtory or chronology? though ſomething of each of theſe is to be taught him: but it is only to open the door, that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an acquaintance, but not to dwell there: and a governor would be much blamed, that ſhould keep his pupil too long, and lead him too far in moſt of them. But of good breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, induſtry, and a love of reputation, he cannot have too much: and, if he have theſe, he will not long want what he needs or deſires of the other.

And, ſince it cannot be hoped he ſhould have time and ſtrength to learn all things, moſt pains ſhould be taken about that which is moſt neceſſary; and that principally looked after, which will be of moſt and frequenteſt uſe to him in the world.

Seneca complains of the contrary practice in his time: and yet the Burgerſdiciuſes and the Scheiblers did not ſwarm in thoſe days, as they do now in theſe. What would he have thought, if he had lived now, when the tutors think it their great buſineſs to fill the ſtudies and heads of their pupils with ſuch authors as theſe? He would have had much more reaſon to ſay, as he does, "Non vitæ, ſed ſcholæ diſcimus;" We learn not to live, but to diſpute; and our education fits us rather for the univerſity, than the world. But it is no wonder, if thoſe who make the faſhion, ſuit it to what they have, and not to what their pupils want. The faſhion being once eſtabliſhed, who can think it ſtrange, that in this, as well as in all other things, it ſhould prevail; and that the greateſt part of thoſe, who find their account in an eaſy ſubmiſſion to it, ſhould be ready to cry out hereſy, when any one departs from it? It is nevertheleſs matter of aſtoniſhment, that men of quality and parts ſhould ſuffer themſelves to be ſo far miſled by cuſtom and implicit faith. Reaſon, if conſulted with, would adviſe, that their children's time ſhould

ſhould be ſpent in acquiring what might be uſeful to them, when they come to be men, rather than to have their heads ſtuffed with a deal of traſh, a great part whereof they uſually never do (it is certain they never need to) think on again as long as they live; and ſo much of it, as does ſtick by them, they are only the worſe for. This is ſo well known, that I appeal to parents themſelves, who have been at coſt to have their young heirs taught it, whether it be not ridiculous for their ſons to have any tincture of that ſort of learning, when they come abroad into the world; whether any appearance of it would not leſſen and diſgrace them in company. And that certainly muſt be an admirable acquiſition, and deſerves well to make a part in education, which men are aſhamed of, where they are moſt concerned to ſhow their parts and breeding.

There is yet another reaſon, why politeneſs of manners, and knowledge of the world, ſhould principally be looked after in a tutor: and that is, becauſe a man of parts and years may enter a lad far enough in any of thoſe ſciences, which he has no deep inſight into himſelf. Books in theſe will be able to furniſh him, and give him light and precedency enough, to go before a young follower: but he will never be able to ſet another right in the knowledge of the world, and, above all, in breeding; who is a novice in them himſelf.

This is a knowledge he muſt have about him, worn into him by uſe and converſation, and a long forming himſelf by what he has obſerved to be practiſed and allowed in the beſt company. This, if he has it not of his own, is no-where to be borrowed, for the uſe of his pupil: or if he could find pertinent treatiſes of it in books, that would reach all the particulars of an engliſh gentleman's behaviour; his own ill-faſhioned example, if he be not well-bred himſelf, would ſpoil all his lectures; it being impoſſible, that any one ſhould come forth well-faſhioned out of unpoliſhed, ill-bred company.

I ſay this, not that I think ſuch a tutor is every day to be met with, or to be had at the ordinary rates: but that thoſe, who are able, may not be ſparing of inquiry

or coſt, in what is of ſo great moment; and that other parents, whoſe eſtates will not reach to greater ſalaries, may yet remember, what they ſhould principally have an eye to, in the choice of one, to whom they would commit the education of their children; and what part they ſhould chiefly look after themſelves, whilſt they are under their care, and as often as they come within their obſervation; and not think, that all lies in latin and french, or ſome dry ſyſtems of logic and philoſophy.

Familiarity. § 95. But to return to our method again. Though I have mentioned the ſeverity of the father's brow, and the awe ſettled thereby in the mind of children when young, as one main inſtrument, whereby their education is to be managed; yet I am far from being of an opinion, that it ſhould be continued all along to them: whilſt they are under the diſcipline and government of pupilage, I think it ſhould be relaxed, as faſt as their age, diſcretion, and good behaviour could allow it; even to that degree, that a father will do well, as his ſon grows up, and is capable of it, to talk familiarly with him; nay, aſk his advice, and conſult with him, about thoſe things wherein he has any knowledge or underſtanding. By this the father will gain two things, both of great moment. The one is, that it will put ſerious conſiderations into his ſon's thoughts, better than any rules or advices he can give him. The ſooner you treat him as a man, the ſooner he will begin to be one: and if you admit him into ſerious diſcourſes ſometimes with you, you will inſenſibly raiſe his mind above the uſual amuſements of youth, and thoſe trifling occupations which it is commonly waſted in. For it is eaſy to obſerve, that many young men continue longer in the thought and converſation of ſchool-boys, than otherwiſe they would, becauſe their parents keep them at that diſtance, and in that low rank, by all their carriage to them.

§ 96. Another thing of greater conſequence, which you will obtain by ſuch a way of treating him, will be his friendſhip. Many fathers, though they proportion to their ſons liberal allowances, according to their age and

and condition; yet they keep the knowledge of their eſtates and concerns from them with as much reſervedneſs, as if they were guarding a ſecret of ſtate from a ſpy or an enemy. This, if it looks not like jealouſy, yet it wants thoſe marks of kindneſs and intimacy, which a father ſhould ſhow to his ſon; and, no doubt, often hinders or abates that chearfulneſs and ſatisfaction, wherewith a ſon ſhould addreſs himſelf to, and rely upon, his father. And I cannot but often wonder to ſee fathers, who love their ſons very well, yet ſo order the matter, by a conſtant ſtiffneſs, and a mien of authority and diſtance to them all their lives, as if they were never to enjoy or have any comfort from thoſe they love beſt in the world, till they have loſt them by being removed into another. Nothing cements and eſtabliſhes friendſhip and good-will, ſo much as confident communication of concernments and affairs. Other kindneſſes, without this, leave ſtill ſome doubts; but when your ſon ſees you open your mind to him; when he finds, that you intereſt him in your affairs, as things you are willing ſhould, in their turn, come into his hands, he will be concerned for them as for his own; wait his ſeaſon with patience, and love you in the mean time, who keep him not at the diſtance of a ſtranger. This will alſo make him ſee, that the enjoyment you have, is not without care; which the more he is ſenſible of, the leſs will he envy you the poſſeſſion, and the more think himſelf happy under the management of ſo favourable a friend, and ſo careful a father. There is ſcarce any young man of ſo little thought, or ſo void of ſenſe, that would not be glad of a ſure friend, that he might have recourſe to, and freely conſult on occaſion. The reſervedneſs and diſtance that fathers keep, often deprive their ſons of that refuge, which would be of more advantage to them, than an hundred rebukes and chidings. Would your ſon engage in ſome frolic, or take a vagary; were it not much better he ſhould do it with, than without your knowledge? For ſince allowances for ſuch things muſt be made to young men, the more you know of his intrigues and deſigns, the better will you be able to prevent great miſchiefs; and,

and, by letting him ſee what is like to follow, take the right way of prevailing with him to avoid leſs inconveniencies. Would you have him open his heart to you, and aſk your advice? You muſt begin to do ſo with him firſt, and by your carriage beget that confidence.

§ 97. But whatever he conſults you about, unleſs it lead to ſome fatal and irremediable miſchief, be ſure you adviſe only as a friend of more experience; but with your advice mingle nothing of command or authority, nor more than you would to your equal, or a ſtranger. That would be to drive him for ever from any farther demanding, or receiving advantage from your counſel. You muſt conſider, that he is a young man, and has pleaſures and fancies, which you are paſſed. You muſt not expect his inclinations ſhould be juſt as yours, nor that at twenty he ſhould have the ſame thoughts you have at fifty. All that you can wiſh is, that ſince youth muſt have ſome liberty, ſome outleaps; they might be with the ingenuity of a ſon, and under the eye of a father, and then no very great harm can come of it. The way to obtain this, as I ſaid before, is (according as you find him capable) to talk with him about your affairs, propoſe matters to him familiarly; and aſk his advice; and when he ever lights on the right, follow it as his; and if it ſucceed well, let him have the commendation. This will not at all leſſen your authority, but increaſe his love and eſteem of you. Whilſt you keep your eſtate, the ſtaff will ſtill be in your own hands; and your authority the ſurer, the more it is ſtrengthened with confidence and kindneſs. For you have not that power you ought to have over him, till he comes to be more afraid of offending ſo good a friend, than of loſing ſome part of his future expectation.

§ 98. Familiarity of diſcourſe, if it can become a father to his ſon, may much more be condeſcended to by a tutor to his pupil. All their time together ſhould not be ſpent in reading of lectures, and magiſterially dictating to him what he is to obſerve and follow; hearing him in his turn, and uſing him to reaſon about what

what is propoſed, will make the rules go down the eaſier, and ſink the deeper, and will give him a liking to ſtudy and inſtruction: and he will then begin to value knowledge, when he ſees that it enables him to diſcourſe; and he finds the pleaſure and credit of bearing a part in the converſation, and of having his reaſons ſometimes approved and hearkened to. Particularly in morality, prudence, and breeding, caſes ſhould be put to him, and his judgment aſked: this opens the underſtanding better than maxims, how well ſoever explained; and ſettles the rules better in the memory for practice. This way lets things into the mind, which ſtick there, and retain their evidence with them; whereas words at beſt are faint repreſentations, being not ſo much as the true ſhadows of things, and are much ſooner forgotten. He will better comprehend the foundations and meaſures of decency and juſtice, and have livelier and more laſting impreſſions of what he ought to do, by giving his opinion on caſes propoſed, and reaſoning with his tutor on fit inſtances, than by giving a ſilent, negligent, ſleepy audience to his tutor's lectures; and much more than by captious logical diſputes, or ſet declamations of his own, upon any queſtion. The one ſets the thoughts upon wit, and falſe colours, and not upon truth: the other teaches fallacy, wrangling, and opiniatry; and they are both of them things that ſpoil the judgment, and put a man out of the way of right and fair reaſoning, and therefore carefully to be avoided by one who would improve himſelf, and be acceptable to others.

Reverence.

§ 99. When, by making your ſon ſenſible that he depends on you, and is in your power, you have eſtabliſhed your authority; and by being inflexibly ſevere in your carriage to him, when obſtinately perſiſting in any ill-natured trick which you have forbidden, eſpecially lying, you have imprinted on his mind that awe which is neceſſary; and on the other ſide, when (by permitting him the full liberty due to his age, and laying no reſtraint in your preſence to thoſe childiſh actions, and gaiety of carriage, which, whilſt he is very young, are as neceſſary to him as meat or ſleep) you have reconciled him to your

your company, and made him ſenſible of your care and love of him by indulgence and tenderneſs, eſpecially careſſing him on all occaſions wherein he does any thing well, and being kind to him, after a thouſand faſhions, ſuitable to his age, which nature teaches parents better than I can: when, I ſay, by theſe ways of tenderneſs and affection, which parents never want for their children, you have alſo planted in him a particular affection for you; he is then in the ſtate you could deſire, and you have formed in his mind that true reverence, which is always afterwards carefully to be continued and maintained in both parts of it, love and fear, as the great principles whereby you will always have hold upon him to turn his mind to the ways of virtue and honour.

Temper. § 100. When this foundation is once well laid, and you find this reverence begin to work in him, the next thing to be done is carefully to conſider his temper, and the particular conſtitution of his mind. Stubbornneſs, lying, and ill-natured actions, are not (as has been ſaid) to be permitted in him from the beginning, whatever his temper be: thoſe ſeeds of vices are not to be ſuffered to take any root, but muſt be carefully weeded out, as ſoon as ever they begin to ſhow themſelves in him; and your authority is to take place, and influence his mind from the very dawning of any knowledge in him, that it may operate as a natural principle, whereof he never perceived the beginning; never knew that it was, or could be otherwiſe. By this, if the reverence he owes you be eſtabliſhed early, it will always be ſacred to him; and it will be as hard for him to reſiſt it, as the principles of his nature.

§ 101. Having thus very early ſet up your authority, and, by the gentler applications of it, ſhamed him out of what leads towards an immoral habit; as ſoon as you have obſerved it in him, (for I would by no means have chiding uſed, much leſs blows, till obſtinacy and incorrigibleneſs make it abſolutely neceſſary) it will be fit to conſider which way the natural make of his mind inclines him. Some men, by the unalterable frame of their

their conſtitutions, are ſtout, others timorous; ſome confident, others modeſt, tractable or obſtinate, curious or careleſs, quick or ſlow. There are not more differences in men's faces, and the outward lineaments of their bodies, than there are in the makes and tempers of their minds; only there is this difference, that the diſtinguiſhing characters of the face, and the lineaments of the body, grow more plain and viſible with time and age, but the peculiar phyſiognomy of the mind is moſt diſcernible in children, before art and cunning have taught them to hide their deformities, and conceal their ill inclinations under a diſſembled outſide.

§ 102. Begin therefore betimes nicely to obſerve your ſon's temper; and that, when he is under leaſt reſtraint, in his play, and, as he thinks, out of your ſight. See what are his predominant paſſions, and prevailing inclinations; whether he be fierce or mild, bold or baſhful, compaſſionate or cruel, open or reſerved, &c. For as theſe are different in him, ſo are your methods to be different, and your authority muſt hence take meaſures to apply itſelf different ways to him. Theſe native propenſities, theſe prevalencies of conſtitution, are not to be cured by rules, or a direct conteſt; eſpecially thoſe of them that are the humbler and meaner ſort, which proceed from fear and lowneſs of ſpirit; though with art they may be much mended, and turned to good purpoſe. But this be ſure of, after all is done, the bias will always hang on that ſide where nature firſt placed it: and, if you carefully obſerve the characters of his mind now in the firſt ſcenes of his life, you will ever after be able to judge which way his thoughts lean, and what he aims at even hereafter, when, as he grows up, the plot thickens, and he puts on ſeveral ſhapes to act it.

Dominion.

§ 103. I told you before, that children love liberty; and therefore they ſhould be brought to do the things that are fit for them, without feeling any reſtraint laid upon them. I now tell you, they love ſomething more; and that is dominion: and this is the firſt original of moſt vicious habits, that are ordinary and

and natural. This love of power and dominion ſhows itſelf very early, and that in theſe two things.

§ 104. 1. We ſee children (as ſoon almoſt as they are born, I am ſure long before they can ſpeak) cry, grow peeviſh, ſullen, and out of humour, for nothing but to have their wills. They would have their deſires ſubmitted to by others; they contend for a ready compliance from all about them, eſpecially from thoſe that ſtand near or beneath them in age or degree, as ſoon as they come to conſider others with thoſe diſtinctions.

§ 105. 2. Another thing, wherein they ſhow their love of dominion, is their deſire to have things to be theirs; they would have property and poſſeſſion, pleaſing themſelves with the power which that ſeems to give, and the right they thereby have to diſpoſe of them as they pleaſe. He that has not obſerved theſe two humours working very betimes in children, has taken little notice of their actions: and he who thinks that theſe two roots of almoſt all the injuſtice and contention that ſo diſturb human life, are not early to be weeded out, and contrary habits introduced, neglects the proper ſeaſon to lay the foundations of a good and worthy man. To do this, I imagine, theſe following things may ſomewhat conduce.

Craving.

§ 106. 1. That a child ſhould never be ſuffered to have what he craves, much leſs what he cries for, I had ſaid, or ſo much as ſpeaks for. But that being apt to be miſunderſtood, and interpreted as if I meant a child ſhould never ſpeak to his parents for any thing, which will perhaps be thought to lay too great a curb on the minds of children, to the prejudice of that love and affection which ſhould be between them and their parents; I ſhall explain myſelf a little more particularly. It is fit that they ſhould have liberty to declare their wants to their parents, and that with all tenderneſs they ſhould be hearkened to, and ſupplied, at leaſt whilſt they are very little. But it is one thing to ſay, I am hungry; another to ſay, I would have roaſt-meat. Having declared their wants, their natural wants, the pain they feel from hunger, thirſt,

thirſt, cold, or any other neceſſity of nature, it is the duty of their parents, and thoſe about them, to relieve them; but children muſt leave it to the choice and ordering of their parents what they think propereſt for them, and how much; and muſt not be permitted to chooſe for themſelves; and ſay, I would have wine, or white-bread; the very naming of it ſhould make them loſe it.

§ 107. That which parents ſhould take care of here, is to diſtinguiſh between the wants of fancy and thoſe of nature; which Horace has well taught them to do in this verſe,

"Queis humana ſibi doleat natura negatis."

Thoſe are truly natural wants, which reaſon alone, without ſome other help, is not able to fence againſt, nor keep from diſturbing us. The pains of ſickneſs and hurts, hunger, thirſt and cold, want of ſleep and reſt, or relaxation of the part wearied with labour, are what all men feel, and the beſt diſpoſed mind cannot but be ſenſible of their uneaſineſs; and therefore ought, by fit applications, to ſeek their removal, though not with impatience, or over-great haſte, upon the firſt approaches of them, where delay does not threaten ſome irreparable harm. The pains that come from the neceſſities of nature, are monitors to us to beware of greater miſchiefs, which they are the forerunners of; and therefore they muſt not be wholly neglected, nor ſtrained too far. But yet, the more children can be inured to hardſhips of this kind, by a wiſe care to make them ſtronger in body and mind, the better it will be for them. I need not here give any caution to keep within the bounds of doing them good, and to take care, that what children are made to ſuffer ſhould neither break their ſpirits, nor injure their health; parents being but too apt of themſelves to incline, more than they ſhould, to the ſofter ſide.

But, whatever compliance the neceſſities of nature may require, the wants of fancy children ſhould never be gratified in, nor ſuffered to mention. The very ſpeaking for any ſuch thing ſhould make them loſe it. Clothes, when they need, they muſt have; but if they

ſneak

ſpeak for this ſtuff, or that colour, they ſhould be ſure to go without it. Not that I would have parents purpoſely croſs the deſires of their children in matters of indifferency: on the contrary, where their carriage deſerves it, and one is ſure it will not corrupt or effeminate their minds, and make them fond of trifles, I think, all things ſhould be contrived, as much as could be, to their ſatisfaction, that they might find the eaſe and pleaſure of doing well. The beſt for children is, that they ſhould not place any pleaſure in ſuch things at all, nor regulate their delight by their fancies; but be indifferent to all that nature has made ſo. This is what their parents and teachers ſhould chiefly aim at: but till this be obtained, all that I oppoſe here, is the liberty of aſking; which, in theſe things of conceit, ought to be reſtrained by a conſtant forfeiture annexed to it.

This may perhaps be thought a little too ſevere, by the natural indulgence of tender parents: but yet it is no more than neceſſary. For ſince the method I propoſe is to baniſh the rod, this reſtraint of their tongues will be of great uſe to ſettle that awe we have elſewhere ſpoken of, and to keep up in them the reſpect and reverence due to their parents. Next, it will teach them to keep in, and ſo maſter their inclinations. By this means they will be brought to learn the art of ſtifling their deſires, as ſoon as they riſe up in them, when they are eaſieſt to be ſubdued. For giving vent, gives life and ſtrength to our appetites; and he that has the confidence to turn his wiſhes into demands, will be but a little way from thinking he ought to obtain them. This I am ſure of, every one can more eaſily bear a denial from himſelf, than from any body elſe. They ſhould therefore be accuſtomed betimes to conſult and make uſe of their reaſon, before they give allowance to their inclinations. It is a great ſtep towards the maſtery of our deſires, to give this ſtop to them, and ſhut them up in ſilence. This habit, got by children, of ſtaying the forwardneſs of their fancies, and deliberating whether it be fit or no before they ſpeak, will be of no ſmall advantage to them in matters of greater conſequence

quence in the future courſe of their lives. For that which I cannot too often inculcate, is, that whatever the matter be, about which it is converſant, whether great or ſmall, the main (I had almoſt ſaid only) thing to be conſidered, in every action of a child, is, what influence it will have upon his mind; what habit it tends to, and is like to ſettle in him; how it will become him when he is bigger; and, if it be encouraged, whither it will lead him when he is grown up.

My meaning therefore is not, that children ſhould purpoſely be made uneaſy: this would reliſh too much of inhumanity and ill-nature, and be apt to infect them with it. They ſhould be brought to deny their appetites; and their minds, as well as bodies, be made vigorous, eaſy and ſtrong, by the cuſtom of having their inclinations in ſubjection, and their bodies exerciſed with hardſhips; but all this without giving them any mark or apprehenſion of ill-will towards them. The conſtant loſs of what they craved or carved to themſelves ſhould teach them modeſty, ſubmiſſion, and a power to forbear: but the rewarding their modeſty and ſilence, by giving them what they liked, ſhould alſo aſſure them of the love of thoſe who rigorouſly exacted this obedience. The contenting themſelves now, in the want of what they wiſhed for, is a virtue, that another time ſhould be rewarded with what is ſuited and acceptable to them; which ſhould be beſtowed on them, as if it were a natural conſequence of their good behaviour, and not a bargain about it. But you will loſe your labour, and, what is more, their love and reverence too, if they can receive from others what you deny them. This is to be kept very ſtanch, and carefully to be watched. And here the ſervants come again in my way.

Curioſity.

§ 108. If this be begun betimes, and they accuſtom themſelves early to ſilence their deſires, this uſeful habit will ſettle them; and, as they come to grow up in age and diſcretion, they may be allowed greater liberty; when reaſon comes to ſpeak in them, and not paſſion. For whenever reaſon would ſpeak, it ſhould be hearkened to. But, as they ſhould

never be heard, when they ſpeak for any particular thing they would have, unleſs it be firſt propoſed to them; ſo they ſhould always be heard, and fairly and kindly anſwered, when they aſk after any thing they would know, and deſire to be informed about. Curioſity ſhould be as carefully cheriſhed in children, as other appetites ſuppreſſed.

Recreation. However ſtrict a hand is to be kept upon all deſires of fancy, yet there is one caſe wherein fancy muſt be permitted to ſpeak, and be hearkened to alſo. Recreation is as neceſſary as labour or food: but becauſe there can be no recreation without delight, which depends not always on reaſon, but oftener on fancy, it muſt be permitted children not only to divert themſelves, but to do it after their own faſhion, provided it be innocently, and without prejudice to their health; and therefore in this caſe they ſhould not be denied, if they propoſed any particular kind of recreation; though I think, in a well-ordered education, they will ſeldom be brought to the neceſſity of aſking any ſuch liberty. Care ſhould be taken, that what is of advantage to them, they ſhould always do with delight; and, before they are wearied with one, they ſhould be timely diverted to ſome other uſeful employment. But if they are not yet brought to that degree of perfection, that one way of improvement can be made a recreation to them, they muſt be let looſe to the childiſh play they fancy; which they ſhould be weaned from, by being made forfeited of it: but from things of uſe, that they are employed in, they ſhould always be ſent away with an appetite; at leaſt be diſmiſſed before they are tired, and grow quite ſick of it; that ſo they may return to it again, as to a pleaſure that diverts them. For you muſt never think them ſet right, till they can find delight in the practice of laudable things; and the uſeful exerciſes of the body and mind, taking their turns, make their lives and improvement pleaſant in a continued train of recreations, wherein the wearied part is conſtantly relieved and refreſhed. Whether this can be done in every temper, or whether tutors and parents will be at the pains

pains, and have the diſcretion and patience to bring them to this, I know not; but that it may be done in moſt children, if a right courſe be taken to raiſe in them the deſire of credit, eſteem, and reputation, I do not at all doubt. And when they have ſo much true life put into them, they may freely be talked with, about what moſt delights them, and be directed, or let looſe to it; ſo that they may perceive that they are beloved and cheriſhed, and that thoſe under whoſe tuition they are, are not enemies to their ſatisfaction. Such a management will make them in love with the hand that directs them, and the virtue they are directed to.

This farther advantage may be made by a free liberty permitted them in their recreations, that it will diſcover their natural tempers, ſhow their inclinations and aptitudes; and thereby direct wiſe parents in the choice, both of the courſe of life and employment they ſhall deſign them for, and of fit remedies, in the mean time, to be applied to whatever bent of nature they may obſerve moſt likely to miſlead any of their children.

§ 109. 2. Children, who live together, often ſtrive for maſtery, whoſe wills ſhall carry it over the reſt: whoever begins the conteſt, ſhould be ſure to be croſſed in it. But not only that, but they ſhould be taught to have all the deference, complaiſance, and civility one for the other imaginable. This, when they ſee it procures them reſpect, love, and eſteem, and that they loſe no ſuperiority by it, they will take more pleaſure in, than in inſolent domineering; for ſo plainly is the other.

Complaints.

The accuſations of children one againſt another, which uſually are but the clamours of anger and revenge, deſiring aid, ſhould not be favourably received nor hearkened to. It weakens and effeminates their minds to ſuffer them to complain: and if they endure ſometimes croſſing or pain from others, without being permitted to think it ſtrange or intolerable, it will do them no harm to learn ſufferance, and harden them early. But, though you give no countenance to the complaints of the querulous, yet take care to curb the

inſolence and ill-nature of the injurious. When you obſerve it yourſelf, reprove it before the injured party: but if the complaint be of ſomething really worth your notice and prevention another time, then reprove the offender by himſelf alone, out of ſight of him that complained, and make him go and aſk pardon, and make reparation. Which coming thus, as it were, from himſelf, will be the more cheerfully performed, and more kindly received, the love ſtrengthened between them, and a cuſtom of civility grow familiar amongſt your children.

Liberality.

§ 110. 3. As to having and poſſeſſing of things, teach them to part with what they have, eaſily and freely to their friends; and let them find by experience, that the moſt liberal has always moſt plenty, with eſteem and commendation to boot, and they will quickly learn to practiſe it. This, I imagine, will make brothers and ſiſters kinder and civiller to one another, and conſequently to others, than twenty rules about good manners, with which children are ordinarily perplexed and cumbered. Covetouſneſs, and the deſire of having in our poſſeſſion, and under our dominion, more than we have need of, being the root of all evil, ſhould be early and carefully weeded out; and the contrary quality, or a readineſs to impart to others, implanted. This ſhould be encouraged by great commendation and credit, and conſtantly taking care, that he loſes nothing by his liberality. Let all the inſtances he gives of ſuch freeneſs be always repaid, and with intereſt; and let him ſenſibly perceive, that the kindneſs he ſhows to others is no ill huſbandry for himſelf; but that it brings a return of kindneſs, both from thoſe that receive it, and thoſe who look on. Make this a conteſt among children, who ſhall out-do one another this way. And by this means, by a conſtant practice, children having made it eaſy to themſelves to part with what they have, good-nature may be ſettled in them into an habit, and they may take pleaſure, and pique themſelves in being kind, liberal, and civil to others.

If

If liberality ought to be encouraged, certainly great care is to be taken that children tranſgreſs not the rules of juſtice: and whenever they do, they ſhould be ſet right; and, if there be occaſion for it, ſeverely rebuked. Juſtice.

Our firſt actions being guided more by ſelf-love than reaſon or reflection, it is no wonder that in children they ſhould be very apt to deviate from the juſt meaſures of right and wrong, which are in the mind the reſult of improved reaſon and ſerious meditation. This the more they are apt to miſtake, the more careful guard ought to be kept over them, and every the leaſt ſlip in this great ſocial virtue taken notice of and rectified; and that in things of the leaſt weight and moment, both to inſtruct their ignorance, and prevent ill habits, which, from ſmall beginnings, in pins and cherry-ſtones, will, if let alone, grow up to higher frauds, and be in danger to end at laſt in down-right hardened diſhoneſty. The firſt tendency to any injuſtice that appears, muſt be ſuppreſſed with a ſhow of wonder and abhorrency in the parents and governors. But becauſe children cannot well comprehend what injuſtice is, till they underſtand property, and how particular perſons come by it, the ſafeſt way to ſecure honeſty, is to lay the foundations of it early in liberality, and an eaſineſs to part with to others whatever they have, or like, themſelves. This may be taught them early, before they have language and underſtanding enough to form diſtinct notions of property, and to know what is theirs by a peculiar right excluſive of others. And ſince children ſeldom have any thing but by gift, and that for the moſt part from their parents, they may be at firſt taught not to take or keep any thing, but what is given them by thoſe whom they take to have a power over it; and, as their capacities enlarge, other rules and caſes of juſtice, and rights concerning "meum" and "tuum," may be propoſed and inculcated. If any act of injuſtice in them appears to proceed, not from miſtake, but perverſeneſs in their wills, when a gentle rebuke and ſhame will not reform this irregular and covetous inclination, rougher remedies

muſt be applied: and it is but for the father or tutor to take and keep from them ſomething that they value, and think their own; or order ſome body elſe to do it; and by ſuch inſtances make them ſenſible, what little advantage they are like to make, by poſſeſſing themſelves unjuſtly of what is another's, whilſt there are in the world ſtronger and more men than they. But if an ingenuous deteſtation of this ſhameful vice be but carefully and early inſtilled into them, as I think it may, that is the true and genuine method to obviate this crime; and will be a better guard againſt diſhoneſty, than any conſiderations drawn from intereſt; habits working more conſtantly, and with greater facility, than reaſon: which, when we have moſt need of it, is ſeldom fairly conſulted, and more rarely obeyed.

Crying. § 111. Crying is a fault that ſhould not be tolerated in children; not only for the unpleaſant and unbecoming noiſe it fills the houſe with, but for more conſiderable reaſons, in reference to the children themſelves; which is to be our aim in education.

Their crying is of two ſorts; either ſtubborn and domineering, or querulous and whining.

1. Their crying is very often a ſtriving for maſtery, and an open declaration of their inſolence or obſtinacy: when they have not the power to obtain their deſire, they will, by their clamour and ſobbing, maintain their title and right to it. This is an avowed continuing of their claim, and a ſort of remonſtrance againſt the oppreſſion and injuſtice of thoſe who deny them what they have a mind to.

§ 112. 2. Sometimes their crying is the effect of pain or true ſorrow, and a bemoaning themſelves under it.

Theſe two, if carefully obſerved, may, by the mien, looks, and actions, and particularly by the tone of their crying, be eaſily diſtinguiſhed; but neither of them muſt be ſuffered, much leſs encouraged.

1. The obſtinate or ſtomachful crying ſhould by no means be permitted; becauſe it is but another way of flattering their deſires, and encouraging thoſe paſſions, which it is our main buſineſs to ſubdue: and if it be,

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as often it is, upon the receiving any correction, it quite defeats all the good effects of it; for any chastisement, which leaves them in this declared opposition, only serves to makes them worse. The restraints and punishments laid on children are all misapplied and lost, as far as they do not prevail over their wills, teach them to submit their passions, and make their minds supple and pliant to what their parents reason advises them now, and so prepare them to obey what their own reason shall advise hereafter. But if, in any thing wherein they are crossed, they may be suffered to go away crying, they confirm themselves in their desires, and cherish the ill humour, with a declaration of their right, and a resolution to satisfy their inclinations the first opportunity. This therefore is another argument against the frequent use of blows: for, whenever you come to that extremity, it is not enough to whip or beat them; you must do it, till you find you have subdued their minds; till with submission and patience they yield to the correction; which you shall best discover by their crying, and their ceasing from it upon your bidding. Without this, the beating of children is but a passionate tyranny over them: and it is mere cruelty, and not correction, to put their bodies in pain, without doing their minds any good. As this gives us a reason, why children should seldom be corrected, so it also prevents their being so. For if, whenever they are chastised, it were done thus without passion, soberly and yet effectually too, laying on the blows and smart, not furiously and all at once, but slowly, with reasoning between, and with observation how it wrought, stopping when it had made them pliant, penitent, and yielding; they would seldom need the like punishment again, being made careful to avoid the fault that deserved it. Besides, by this means, as the punishment would not be lost, for being too little, and not effectual; so it would be kept from being too much, if we gave off as soon as we perceived that it reached the mind, and that was betered. For, since the chiding or beating of children should be always the least that possibly may be, that which is laid

on in the heat of anger, ſeldom obſerves that meaſure; but is commonly more than it ſhould be, though it prove leſs than enough.

§ 113. 2. Many children are apt to cry, upon any little pain they ſuffer; and the leaſt harm that befals them, puts them into complaints and bawling. This few children avoid: for it being the firſt and natural way to declare their ſufferings or wants, before they can ſpeak, the compaſſion that is thought due to that tender age, fooliſhly encourages, and continues it in them long after they can ſpeak. It is the duty, I confeſs, of thoſe about children, to compaſſionate them, whenever they ſuffer any hurt; but not to ſhow it in pitying them. Help and eaſe them the beſt you can, but by no means bemoan them. This ſoftens their minds, and makes them yield to the little harms that happen to them; whereby they ſink deeper into that part which alone feels, and make larger wounds there, than otherwiſe they would. They ſhould be hardened againſt all ſufferings, eſpecially of the body, and have no tenderneſs but what riſes from an ingenuous ſhame and a quick ſenſe of reputation. The many inconveniencies this life is expoſed to require we ſhould not be too ſenſible of every little hurt. What our minds yield not to, makes but a ſlight impreſſion, and does us but very little harm; it is the ſuffering of our ſpirits that gives and continues the pain. This brawneſs and inſenſibility of mind, is the beſt armour we can have againſt the common evils and accidents of life; and being a temper that is to be got by exerciſe and cuſtom, more than any other way, the practice of it ſhould be begun betimes, and happy is he that is taught it early. That effeminacy of ſpirit, which is to be prevented or cured, and which nothing, that I know, ſo much increaſes in children as crying; ſo nothing, on the other ſide, ſo much checks and reſtrains, as their being hindered from that ſort of complaining. In the little harms they ſuffer, from knocks and falls, they ſhould not be pitied for falling, but bid do ſo again; which, beſides that it ſtops their crying, is a better way to cure their heedleſſneſs, and prevent their tumbling

tumbling another time, than either chiding or bemoaning them. But, let the hurts they receive be what they will, ſtop their crying, and that will give them more quiet and eaſe at preſent, and harden them for the future.

§ 114. The former ſort of crying requires ſeverity to ſilence it; and where a look, or a poſitive command, will not do it, blows muſt: for it proceeding from pride, obſtinacy, and ſtomach, the will, where the fault lies, muſt be bent, and made to comply, by a rigour ſufficient to maſter it: but this latter, being ordinarily from ſoftneſs of mind, a quite contrary cauſe, ought to be treated with a gentler hand. Perſuaſion, or diverting the thoughts another way, or laughing at their whining, may perhaps be at firſt the proper method. But for this, the circumſtances of the thing, and the particular temper of the child, muſt be conſidered: no certain invariable rules can be given about it; but it muſt be left to the prudence of the parents or tutor. But this I think I may ſay in general, that there ſhould be a conſtant diſcountenancing of this ſort of crying alſo; and that the father, by his authority, ſhould always ſtop it, mixing a greater degree of roughneſs in his looks or words, proportionably as the child is of a greater age, or a ſturdier temper; but always let it be enough to ſilence their whimpering, and put an end to the diſorder.

Fool-hardineſs.

§ 115. Cowardice and courage are ſo nearly related to the fore-mentioned tempers, that it may not be amiſs here to take notice of them. Fear is a paſſion, that, if rightly governed, has its uſe. And though ſelf-love ſeldom fails to keep it watchful and high enough in us, yet there may be an exceſs on the daring ſide; fool-hardineſs and inſenſibility of danger being as little reaſonable, as trembling and ſhrinking at the approach of every little evil. Fear was given us as a monitor to quicken our induſtry, and keep us upon our guard againſt the approaches of evil: and therefore to have no apprehenſion of miſchief at hand, not to make a juſt eſtimate of the danger, but heedleſsly to run into it, be the hazard

hazard what it will, without considering of what use or consequence it may be; is not the resolution of a rational creature, but brutish fury. Those who have children of this temper, have nothing to do, but a little to awaken their reason, which self-preservation will quickly dispose them to hearken to; unless (which is usually the case) some other passion hurries them on headlong, without sense, and without consideration. A dislike of evil is so natural to mankind, that nobody, I think, can be without fear of it; fear being nothing but an uneasiness under the apprehension of that coming upon us which we dislike. And therefore, whenever any one runs into danger, we may say it is under the conduct of ignorance, or the command of some more imperious passion, nobody being so much an enemy to himself, as to come within the reach of evil out of free choice, and court danger for danger's sake. If it be therefore pride, vain-glory, or rage, that silences a child's fear, or makes him not hearken to its advice, those are by fit means to be abated, that a little consideration may allay his heat, and make him bethink himself whether this attempt be worth the venture. But this being a fault that children are not so often guilty of, I shall not be more particular in its cure. Weakness of spirit is the more common defect, and therefore will require the greater care.

Fortitude is the guard and support of the other virtues; and without courage a man will scarce keep steady to his duty, and fill up the character of a truly worthy man.

Courage.

Courage, that makes us bear up against dangers that we fear, and evils that we feel, is of great use in an estate, as ours is in this life, exposed to assaults on all hands: and therefore it is very advisable to get children into this armour as early as we can. Natural temper, I confess, does here a great deal: but even where that is defective, and the heart is in itself weak and timorous, it may, by a right management, be brought to a better resolution. What is to be done to prevent breaking children's spirits by frightful apprehensions instilled into them when young, or bemoaning

bemoaning themſelves under every little ſuffering, I have already taken notice. How to harden their tempers, and raiſe their courage, if we find them too much ſubject to fear, is farther to be conſidered.

True fortitude I take to be the quiet poſſeſſion of a man's ſelf, and an undiſturbed doing his duty, whatever evil befets, or danger lies in his way. This there are ſo few men attain to, that we are not to expect it from children. But yet ſomething may be done; and a wiſe conduct, by inſenſible degrees, may carry them farther than one expects.

The neglect of this great care of them, whilſt they are young, is the reaſon, perhaps, why there are ſo few that have this virtue, in its full latitude, when they are men. I ſhould not ſay this in a nation ſo naturally brave as ours is, did I think, that true fortitude required nothing but courage in the field, and a contempt of life in the face of an enemy. This, I confeſs, is not the leaſt part of it, nor can be denied the laurels and honours always juſtly due to the valour of thoſe who venture their lives for their country. But yet this is not all: dangers attack us in other places beſides the field of battle; and though death be the king of terrours, yet pain, diſgrace, and poverty, have frightful looks, able to diſcompoſe moſt men, whom they ſeem ready to ſeize on: and there are thoſe who contemn ſome of theſe, and yet are heartily frighted with the other. True fortitude is prepared for dangers of all kinds, and unmoved, whatſoever evil it be that threatens: I do not mean unmoved with any fear at all. Where danger ſhows itſelf, apprehenſion cannot, without ſtupidity, be wanting. Where danger is, ſenſe of danger ſhould be; and ſo much fear as ſhould keep us awake, and excite our attention, induſtry, and vigour; but not diſturb the calm uſe of our reaſon, nor hinder the execution of what that dictates.

The firſt ſtep to get this noble and manly ſteadineſs, is, what I have above mentioned, carefully to keep children from frights of all kinds, when they are young. Let not any fearful apprehenſions be talked into them, nor terrible objects ſurprize them. This often ſo

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ſhatters and diſcompoſes the ſpirits, that they never recover it again; but, during their whole life, upon the firſt ſuggeſtion, or appearance of any terrifying idea, are ſcattered and confounded; the body is enervated, and the mind diſturbed, and the man ſcarce himſelf, or capable of any compoſed or rational action.

Cowardice. Whether this be from an habitual motion of the animal ſpirits, introduced by the firſt ſtrong impreſſion; or from the alteration of the conſtitution, by ſome more unaccountable way; this is certain, that ſo it is. Inſtances of ſuch, who in a weak, timorous mind have born, all their whole lives through, the effects of a fright when they were young, are every-where to be ſeen; and therefore, as much as may be, to be prevented.

The next thing is, by gentle degrees, to accuſtom children to thoſe things they are too much afraid of. But here great caution is to be uſed, that you do not make too much haſte, nor attempt this cure too early, for fear leſt you increaſe the miſchief inſtead of remedying it. Little ones in arms may be eaſily kept out of the way of terrifying objects, and, till they can talk and underſtand what is ſaid to them, are ſcarce capable of that reaſoning and diſcourſe, which ſhould be uſed to let them know there is no harm in thoſe frightful objects, which we would make them familiar with, and do, to that purpoſe, by gentle degrees, bring nearer and nearer to them. And therefore it is ſeldom there is need of any application to them of this kind, till after they can run about and talk. But yet, if it ſhould happen, that infants ſhould have taken offence at any thing which cannot be eaſily kept out of their way; and that they ſhow marks of terrour, as often as it comes in ſight; all the allays of fright, by diverting their thoughts, or mixing pleaſant and agreeable appearances with it, muſt be uſed, till it be grown familiar and inoffenſive to them.

I think we may obſerve, that when children are firſt born, all objects of ſight, that do not hurt the eyes, are indifferent to them; and they are no more afraid of a blackamoor, or a lion, than of their nurſe, or a cat.

cat. What is it then, that afterwards, in certain mixtures of ſhape and colour, comes to affright them? Nothing but the apprehenſions of harm, that accompanies thoſe things. Did a child ſuck every day a new nurſe, I make account it would be no more affrighted with the change of faces at ſix months old, than at ſixty. The reaſon then, why it will not come to a ſtranger, is, becauſe, having been accuſtomed to receive its food and kind uſage only from one or two that are about it, the child apprehends, by coming into the arms of a ſtranger, the being taken from what delights and feeds it, and every moment ſupplies its wants, which it often feels, and therefore fears when the nurſe is away.

Timorouſneſs.

The only thing we naturally are afraid of, is pain, or loſs of pleaſure. And becauſe theſe are not annexed to any ſhape, colour, or ſize of viſible objects, we are frighted with none of them, till either we have felt pain from them, or have notions put into us, that they will do us harm. The pleaſant brightneſs and luſtre of flame and fire ſo delights children, that at firſt they always deſire to be handling of it: but when conſtant experience has convinced them, by the exquiſite pain it has put them to, how cruel and unmerciful it is, they are afraid to touch it, and carefully avoid it. This being the ground of fear, it is not hard to find whence it ariſes, and how it is to be cured in all miſtaken objects of terrour: and when the mind is confirmed againſt them, and has got a maſtery over itſelf, and its uſual fears, in lighter occaſions, it is in good preparation to meet more real dangers. Your child ſhrieks, and runs away at the ſight of a frog, let another catch it, and lay it down at a good diſtance from him: at firſt accuſtom him to look upon it; when he can do that, then to come nearer to it, and ſee it leap without emotion; then to touch it lightly, when it is held faſt in another's hand; and ſo on, till he can come to handle it as confidently as a butterfly, or a ſparrow. By the ſame way any other vain terrours may be removed, if care be taken that you go not too faſt, and puſh not the child on to a new degree

degree of assurance, till he be thoroughly confirmed in the former. And thus the young soldier is to be trained on to the warfare of life; wherein care is to be taken, that more things be not represented as dangerous, than really are so; and then, that whatever you observe him to be more frighted at than he should, you be sure to toll him on to, by insensible degrees, till he at last, quitting his fears, masters the difficulty, and comes off with applause. Successes of this kind, often repeated, will make him find, that evils are not always so certain, or so great, as our fears represent them; and that the way to avoid them is not to run away, or be discomposed, dejected, and deterred by fear, where either our credit, or duty, requires us to go on.

Hardiness. But, since the great foundation of fear in children is pain, the way to harden and fortify children against fear and danger, is to accustom them to suffer pain. This, it is possible, will be thought, by kind parents, a very unnatural thing towards their children; and by most, unreasonable, to endeavour to reconcile any one to the sense of pain, by bringing it upon him. It will be said, it may perhaps give the child an aversion for him that makes him suffer; but can never recommend to him suffering itself. This is a strange method. You will not have children whipped and punished for their faults; but you would have them tormented for doing well, or for tormenting's sake. I doubt not but such objections as these will be made, and I shall be thought inconsistent with myself, or fantastical, in proposing it. I confess, it is a thing to be managed with great discretion; and therefore it falls not out amiss, that it will not be received or relished, but by those who consider well, and look into the reason of things. I would not have children much beaten for their faults, because I would not have them think bodily pain the greatest punishment; and I would have them, when they do well, be sometimes put in pain, for the same reason, that they might be accustomed to bear it without looking on it as the greatest evil. How much education may reconcile young people to pain and sufferance, the examples

examples of Sparta do ſufficiently ſhow: and they who have once brought themſelves not to think bodily pain the greateſt of evils, or that which they ought to ſtand moſt in fear of, have made no ſmall advance towards virtue. But I am not ſo fooliſh to propoſe the Lacedæmonian diſcipline in our age or conſtitution: but yet I do ſay, that inuring children gently to ſuffer ſome degrees of pain without ſhrinking, is a way to gain firmneſs to their minds, and lay a foundation for courage and reſolution in the future part of their lives.

Not to bemoan them, or permit them to bemoan themſelves, on every little pain they ſuffer, is the firſt ſtep to be made. But of this I have ſpoken elſewhere.

The next thing is, ſometimes deſignedly to put them in pain: but care muſt be taken that this be done when the child is in good humour, and ſatisfied of the goodwill and kindneſs of him that hurts him, at the time that he does it. There muſt no marks of anger or diſpleaſure on the one ſide, nor compaſſion or repenting on the other, go along with it; and it muſt be ſure to be no more than the child can bear, without repining or taking it amiſs, or for a puniſhment. Managed by theſe degrees, and with ſuch circumſtances, I have ſeen a child run away laughing, with good ſmart blows of a wand on his back, who would have cried for an unkind word, and have been very ſenſible of the chaſtiſement of a cold look, from the ſame perſon. Satisfy a child, by a conſtant courſe of your care and kindneſs, that you perfectly love him; and he may by degrees be accuſtomed to bear very painful and rough uſage from you, without flinching or complaining: and this we ſee children do every day in play one with another. The ſofter you find your child is, the more you are to ſeek occaſions at fit times thus to harden him. The great art in this is to begin with what is but very little painful, and to proceed by inſenſible degrees, when you are playing, and in good humour with him, and ſpeaking well of him: and when you have once got him to think himſelf made amends for his ſuffering, by the praiſe given him for his courage; when he

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can take a pride in giving such marks of his manliness, and can prefer the reputation of being brave and stout, to the avoiding a little pain, or the shrinking under it; you need not despair in time, and by the assistance of his growing reason, to master his timorousness, and mend the weakness of his constitution. As he grows bigger, he is to be set upon bolder attempts than his natural temper carries him to; and whenever he is observed to flinch from what one has reason to think he would come off well in, if he had but courage to undertake; that he should be assisted in at first, and by degrees shamed to, till at last practice has given more assurance, and with it a mastery, which must be rewarded with great praise, and the good opinion of others, for his performance. When by these steps he has got resolution enough not to be deterred from what he ought to do, by the apprehension of danger; when fear does not, in sudden or hazardous occurrences, discompose his mind, set his body a trembling, and make him unfit for action, or run away from it; he has then the courage of a rational creature; and such an hardiness we should endeavour by custom and use to bring children to, as proper occasions come in our way.

Cruelty. § 116. One thing I have frequently observed in children, that, when they have got possession of any poor creature, they are apt to use it ill; they often torment and treat very roughly young birds, butterflies, and such other poor animals, which fall into their hands, and that with a seeming kind of pleasure. This, I think, should be watched in them; and if they incline to any such cruelty, they should be taught the contrary usage; for the custom of tormenting and killing of beasts will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men; and they who delight in the suffering and destruction of inferiour creatures, will not be apt to be very compassionate or benign to those of their own kind. Our practice takes notice of this, in the exclusion of butchers from juries of life and death. Children should from the beginning be bred up in an abhorrence of killing or tormenting any living creature, and be taught not to spoil or destroy any thing, unless

unleſs it be for the preſervation or advantage of ſome other that is nobler. And truly, if the preſervation of all mankind, as much as in him lies, were every one's perſuaſion, as indeed it is every one's duty, and the true principle to regulate our religion, politics, and morality by, the world would be much quieter, and better-natured, than it is. But to return to our preſent buſineſs; I cannot but commend both the kindneſs and prudence of a mother I knew, who was wont always to indulge her daughters, when any of them deſired dogs, ſquirrels, birds, or any ſuch things, as young girls uſe to be delighted with: but then, when they had them, they muſt be ſure to keep them well, and look diligently after them, that they wanted nothing, or were not ill uſed; for, if they were negligent in their care of them, it was counted a great fault, which often forfeited their poſſeſſion; or at leaſt they failed not to be rebuked for it, whereby they were early taught diligence and good-nature. And indeed I think people ſhould be accuſtomed, from their cradles, to be tender to all ſenſible creatures, and to ſpoil or waſte nothing at all.

This delight they take in doing of miſchief (whereby I mean ſpoiling of any thing to no purpoſe, but more eſpecially the pleaſure they take to put any thing in pain that is capable of it) I cannot perſuade myſelf to be any other than a foreign and introduced diſpoſition, an habit borrowed from cuſtom and converſation. People teach children to ſtrike, and laugh when they hurt, or ſee harm come to others; and they have the examples of moſt about them to confirm them in it. All the entertainment of talk and hiſtory is of nothing almoſt but fighting and killing; and the honour and renown that is beſtowed on conquerors, (who for the moſt part are but the great butchers of mankind) farther miſlead growing youths, who by this means come to think ſlaughter the laudable buſineſs of mankind, and the moſt heroic of virtues. By theſe ſteps unnatural cruelty is planted in us; and what humanity abhors, cuſtom reconciles and recommends to us, by laying it in the way to honour. Thus, by faſhion and

opinion, that comes to be a pleasure, which in itself neither is, nor can be any. This ought carefully to be watched, and early remedied, so as to settle and cherish the contrary and more natural temper of benignity and compassion in the room of it; but still by the same gentle methods, which are to be applied to the other two faults before-mentioned. It may not perhaps be unreasonable here to add this farther caution, viz. that the mischiefs or harms that come by play, inadvertency, or ignorance, and were not known to be harms, or designed for mischief's sake, though they may perhaps be sometimes of considerable damage, yet are not at all, or but very gently, to be taken notice of. For this, I think, I cannot too often inculcate, that whatever miscarriage a child is guilty of, and whatever be the consequence of it, the thing to be regarded in taking notice of it, is only what root it springs from, and what habit it is like to establish; and to that the correction ought to be directed, and the child not to suffer any punishment for any harm which may have come by his play or inadvertency. The faults to be amended lie in the mind; and if they are such as either age will cure, or no ill habits will follow from, the present action, whatever displeasing circumstances it may have, is to be passed by without any animadversion.

§ 117. Another way to instil sentiments of humanity, and to keep them lively in young folks, will be, to accustom them to civility, in their language and deportment towards their inferiours, and the meaner sort of people, particularly servants. It is not unusual to observe the children, in gentlemen's families, treat the servants of the house with domineering words, names of contempt, and an imperious carriage; as if they were of another race, and species beneath them. Whether ill example, the advantage of fortune, or their natural vanity, inspire this haughtiness, it should be prevented, or weeded out; and a gentle, courteous, affable carriage towards the lower ranks of men, placed in the room of it. No part of their superiority will be hereby lost, but the distinction increased, and their authority strengthened, when love in inferiours is joined

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to outward reſpect, and an eſteem of the perſon has a ſhare in their ſubmiſſion; and domeſtics will pay a more ready and chearful ſervice, when they find themſelves not ſpurned, becauſe fortune has laid them below the level of others, at their maſter's feet. Children ſhould not be ſuffered to loſe the conſideration of human nature in the ſhufflings of outward conditions: the more they have, the better-humoured they ſhould be taught to be, and the more compaſſionate and gentle to thoſe of their brethren, who are placed lower, and have ſcantier portions. If they are ſuffered from their cradles to treat men ill and rudely, becauſe, by their father's title, they think they have a little power over them; at beſt it is ill-bred; and, if care be not taken, will, by degrees, nurſe up their natural pride into an habitual contempt of thoſe beneath them: and where will that probably end, but in oppreſſion and cruelty?

Curioſity.

§ 118. Curioſity in children (which I had occaſion juſt to mention, § 108) is but an appetite after knowledge, and therefore ought to be encouraged in them, not only as a good ſign, but as the great inſtrument nature has provided, to remove that ignorance they were born with, and which without this buſy inquiſitiveneſs will make them dull and uſeleſs creatures. The ways to encourage it, and keep it active and buſy, are, I ſuppoſe, theſe following:

1. Not to check or diſcountenance any inquiries he ſhall make, nor ſuffer them to be laughed at; but to anſwer all his queſtions, and explain the matters he deſires to know, ſo as to make them as much intelligible to him, as ſuits the capacity of his age and knowledge. But confound not his underſtanding with explications or notions that are above it, or with the variety or number of things that are not to his preſent purpoſe. Mark what it is his mind aims at in the queſtion, and not what words he expreſſes it in: and, when you have informed and ſatisfied him in that, you ſhall ſee how his thoughts will enlarge themſelves, and how by fit anſwers he may be led on farther than perhaps you could imagine. For knowledge is grateful to the underſtanding, as light to the eyes: children are pleaſed

and delighted with it exceedingly, especially if they see that their inquiries are regarded, and that their desire of knowing is encouraged and commended. And I doubt not but one great reason, why many children abandon themselves wholly to silly sports, and trifle away all their time insipidly, is, because they have found their curiosity baulked, and their inquiries neglected. But had they been treated with more kindness and respect, and their questions answered, as they should, to their satisfaction, I doubt not but they would have taken more pleasure in learning, and improving their knowledge, wherein there would be still newness and variety, which is what they are delighted with, than in returning over and over to the same play and play-things.

§ 119. 2. To this serious answering their questions, and informing their understandings in what they desire, as if it were a matter that needed it, should be added some peculiar ways of commendation. Let others, whom they esteem, be told before their faces of the knowledge they have in such and such things; and since we are all, even from our cradles, vain and proud creatures, let their vanity be flattered with things that will do them good; and let their pride set them on work on something which may turn to their advantage. Upon this ground you shall find, that there cannot be a greater spur to the attaining what you would have the elder learn and know himself, than to set him upon teaching it his younger brothers and sisters.

§ 120. 3. As children's inquiries are not to be slighted, so also great care is to be taken, that they never receive deceitful and illuding answers. They easily perceive when they are slighted or deceived, and quickly learn the trick of neglect, dissimulation, and falsehood, which they observe others to make use of. We are not to intrench upon truth in any conversation, but least of all with children; since, if we play false with them, we not only deceive their expectation, and hinder their knowledge, but corrupt their innocence, and teach them the worst of vices. They are travellers newly arrived in a strange country, of which they know

know nothing: we ſhould therefore make conſcience not to miſlead them. And though their queſtions ſeem ſometimes not very material, yet they ſhould be ſeriouſly anſwered; for however they may appear to us (to whom they are long ſince known) inquiries not worth the making, they are of moment to thoſe who are wholly ignorant. Children are ſtrangers to all we are acquainted with; and all the things they meet with, are at firſt unknown to them, as they once were to us: and happy are they who meet with civil people, that will comply with their ignorance, and help them to get out of it.

If you or I now ſhould be ſet down in Japan, with all our prudence and knowledge about us, a conceit whereof makes us perhaps ſo apt to ſlight the thoughts and inquiries of children; ſhould we, I ſay, be ſet down in Japan, we ſhould, no doubt, (if we would inform ourſelves of what is there to be known) aſk a thouſand queſtions, which, to a ſupercilious or inconſiderate Japaneſe, would ſeem very idle and impertinent; though to us they would be very material, and of importance to be reſolved; and we ſhould be glad to find a man ſo complaiſant and courteous, as to ſatisfy our demands, and inſtruct our ignorance.

When any new thing comes in their way, children uſually aſk the common queſtion of a ſtranger, What is it? whereby they ordinarily mean nothing but the name; and therefore to tell them how it is called, is uſually the proper anſwer to that demand. The next queſtion uſually is, What is it for? And to this it ſhould be anſwered truly and directly: the uſe of the thing ſhould be told, and the way explained, how it ſerves to ſuch a purpoſe, as far as their capacities can comprehend it; and ſo of any other circumſtances they ſhall aſk about it; not turning them going, till you have given them all the ſatisfaction they are capable of, and ſo leading them by your anſwers into farther queſtions. And perhaps to a grown man ſuch converſation will not be altogether ſo idle and inſignificant, as we are apt to imagine. The native and untaught ſuggeſtions of inquiſitive children do often offer things that

may ſet a conſidering man's thoughts on work. And I think there is frequently more to be learned from the unexpected queſtions of a child, than the diſcourſes of men, who talk in a road, according to the notions they have borrowed, and the prejudices of their education.

§ 121. 4. Perhaps it may not ſometimes be amiſs to excite their curioſity, by bringing ſtrange and new things in their way, on purpoſe to engage their inquiry, and give them occaſion to inform themſelves about them; and if by chance their curioſity leads them to aſk what they ſhould not know, it is a great deal better to tell them plainly, that it is a thing that belongs not to them to know, than to pop them off with a falſhood, or a frivolous anſwer.

§ 122. Pertneſs, that appears ſometimes ſo early, proceeds from a principle that ſeldom accompanies a ſtrong conſtitution of body, or ripens into a ſtrong judgment of mind. If it were deſireable to have a child a more briſk talker, I believe there might be ways found to make him ſo; but, I ſuppoſe, a wiſe father had rather that his ſon ſhould be able and uſeful, when a man, than pretty company, and a diverſion to others, whilſt a child; though, if that too were to be conſidered, I think I may ſay, there is not ſo much pleaſure to have a child prattle agreeably, as to reaſon well. Encourage therefore his inquiſitiveneſs all you can, by ſatisfying his demands, and informing his judgment, as far as it is capable. When his reaſons are any way tolerable, let him find the credit and commendation of them; and when they are quite out of the way, let him, without being laughed at for his miſtake, be gently put into the right; and, if he ſhow a forwardneſs to be reaſoning about things that come in his way, take care, as much as you can, that no-body check this inclination in him, or miſlead it by captious or fallacious ways of talking with him: for, when all is done, this, as the higheſt and moſt important faculty of our minds, deſerves the greateſt care and attention in cultivating it; the right improvement and exerciſe of

of our reaſon being the higheſt perfection that a man can attain to in this life.

§ 123. Contrary to this buſy inquiſitive temper, there is ſometimes obſervable in children a liſtleſs careleſſneſs, a want of regard to any thing, and a ſort of trifling, even at their buſineſs. Sauntering. This ſauntering humour I look on as one of the worſt qualities can appear in a child, as well as one of the hardeſt to be cured, where it is natural. But, it being liable to be miſtaken in ſome caſes, care muſt be taken to make a right judgment concerning that trifling at their books or buſineſs, which may ſometimes be complained of in a child. Upon the firſt ſuſpicion a father has, that his ſon is of a ſauntering temper, he muſt carefully obſerve him, whether he be liſtleſs and indifferent in all his actions, or whether in ſome things alone he be ſlow and ſluggiſh, but in others vigorous and eager: for though he find that he does loiter at his book, and let a good deal of the time he ſpends in his chamber or ſtudy run idly away, he muſt not preſently conclude, that this is from a ſauntering humour in his temper; it may be childiſhneſs, and a preferring ſomething to his ſtudy, which his thoughts run on; and he diſlikes his book, as is natural, becauſe it is forced upon him as a taſk. To know this perfectly, you muſt watch him at play, when he is out of his place and time of ſtudy, following his own inclinations; and ſee there, whether he be ſtirring and active; whether he deſigns any thing, and with labour and eagerneſs purſues it, till he has accompliſhed what he aimed at; or whether he lazily and liſtleſsly dreams away his time. If this ſloth be only when he is about his book, I think it may be eaſily cured; if it be in his temper, it will require a little more pains and attention to remedy it.

§ 124. If you are ſatisfied, by his earneſtneſs at play, or any thing elſe he ſets his mind on, in the intervals between his hours of buſineſs, that he is not of himſelf inclined to lazineſs, but that only want of reliſh of his book makes him negligent and ſluggiſh in his application to it; the firſt ſtep is to try, by talking to him kindly of the folly and inconvenience of it, whereby

he loſes a good part of his time, which he might have for his diverſion: but be ſure to talk calmly and kindly, and not much at firſt, but only theſe plain reaſons in ſhort. If this prevails, you have gained the point in the moſt deſireable way, which is that of reaſon and kindneſs. If this ſofter application prevails not, try to ſhame him out of it, by laughing at him for it, aſking every day, when he comes to table, if there be no ſtrangers there, "how long he was that day about "his buſineſs?" And if he has not done it, in the time he might be well ſuppoſed to have diſpatched it, expoſe and turn him into ridicule for it; but mix no chiding, only put on a pretty cold brow towards him, and keep it till he reform; and let his mother, tutor, and all about him, do ſo too. If this work not the effect you deſire, then tell him, "he ſhall be no longer "troubled with a tutor to take care of his education: "you will not be at the charge to have him ſpend his "time idly with him: but ſince he prefers this or that "[whatever play he delights in] to his book, that only "he ſhall do;" and ſo in earneſt ſet him to work on his beloved play, and keep him ſteadily, and in earneſt to it, morning and afternoon, till he be fully ſurfeited, and would, at any rate, change it for ſome hours at his book again: but when you thus ſet him his taſk of play, you muſt be ſure to look after him yourſelf, or ſet ſomebody elſe to do it, that may conſtantly ſee him employed in it, and that he be not permitted to be idle at that too. I ſay, yourſelf look after him; for it is worth the father's while, whatever buſineſs he has, to beſtow two or three days upon his ſon, to cure ſo great a miſchief as his ſauntering at his buſineſs.

§ 125. This is what I propoſe, if it be idleneſs, not from his general temper, but a peculiar or acquired averſion to learning, which you muſt be careful to examine and diſtinguiſh. But, though you have your eyes upon him, to watch what he does with the time which he has at his own diſpoſal, yet you muſt not let him perceive that you, or any body elſe do ſo; for that may hinder him from following his own inclination, which he being full of, and not daring, for fear of you,

to

to profecute what his head and heart are ſet upon, he may neglect all other things, which then he reliſhes not, and ſo may ſeem to be idle and liſtleſs; when, in truth, it is nothing but being intent on that, which the fear of your eye or knowledge keeps him from executing. To be clear in this point, the obſervation muſt be made when you are out of the way, and he not ſo much as under the reſtraint of a ſuſpicion that any body has an eye upon him. In thoſe ſeaſons of perfect freedom, let ſomebody, you can truſt, mark how he ſpends his time, whether he inactively loiters it away, when, without any check, he is left to his own inclination. Thus, by his employing of ſuch times of liberty, you will eaſily diſcern whether it be liſtleſſneſs in his temper, or averſion to his book, that makes him ſaunter away his time of ſtudy.

§ 126. If ſome defect in his conſtitution has caſt a damp on his mind, and he be naturally liſtleſs and dreaming, this unpromiſing diſpoſition is none of the eaſieſt to be dealt with; becauſe, generally carrying with it an unconcernedneſs for the future, it wants the two great ſprings of action, foreſight and deſire; which, how to plant and increaſe, where nature has given a cold and contrary temper, will be the queſtion. As ſoon as you are ſatisfied that this is the caſe, you muſt carefully inquire whether there be nothing he delights in; inform yourſelf, what it is he is moſt pleaſed with; and if you can find any particular tendency his mind hath, increaſe it all you can, and make uſe of that to ſet him on work, and to excite his induſtry. If he loves praiſe, or play, or fine clothes, &c. or, on the other ſide, dreads pain, diſgrace, or your diſpleaſure, &c. whatever it be that he loves moſt, except it be ſloth, (for that will never ſet him on work) let that be made uſe of to quicken him, and make him beſtir himſelf: for in this liſtleſs temper you are not to fear an exceſs of appetite (as in all other caſes) by cheriſhing it. It is that which you want, and therefore muſt labour to raiſe and increaſe; for, where there is no deſire, there will be no induſtry.

§ 127.

§ 127. If you have not hold enough upon him this way, to ſtir up vigour and activity in him, you muſt employ him in ſome conſtant bodily labour, whereby he may get an habit of doing ſomething: the keeping him hard to ſome ſtudy, were the better way to get him an habit of exerciſing and applying his mind. But, becauſe this is an inviſible attention, and no-body can tell when he is, or is not idle at it, you muſt find bodily employments for him, which he muſt be conſtantly buſied in, and kept to; and, if they have ſome little hardſhip and ſhame in them, it may not be the worſe, that they may the ſooner weary him, and make him deſire to return to his book: but be ſure, when you exchange his book for his other labour, ſet him ſuch a taſk, to be done in ſuch a time, as may allow him no opportunity to be idle. Only, after you have by this way brought him to be attentive and induſtrious at his book, you may, upon his diſpatching his ſtudy within the time ſet him, give him, as a reward, ſome reſpite from his other labour; which you may diminiſh, as you find him grow more and more ſteady in his application; and, at laſt, wholly take off, when his ſauntering at his book is cured.

Compulſion.

§ 128. We formerly obſerved, that variety and freedom was that which delighted children, and recommended their plays to them; and that therefore their book, or any thing we would have them learn, ſhould not be enjoined them as buſineſs. This their parents, tutors and teachers, are apt to forget; and their impatience to have them buſied in what is fit for them to do, ſuffers them not to deceive them into it: but, by the repeated injunctions they meet with, children quickly diſtinguiſh between what is required of them, and what not. When this miſtake has once made his book uneaſy to him, the cure is to be applied at the other end. And ſince it will be then too late to endeavour to make it a play to him, you muſt take the contrary courſe; obſerve what play he is moſt delighted with; enjoin that, and make him play ſo many hours every day, not as a puniſhment for playing, but as if it were

were the buſineſs required of him. This, if I miſtake not, will, in a few days, make him ſo weary of his moſt beloved ſport, that he will prefer his book, or any thing, to it, eſpecially if it may redeem him from any part of the taſk of play is ſet him; and he may be ſuffered to employ ſome part of the time deſtined to his taſk of play in his book, or ſuch other exerciſe as is really uſeful to him. This I at leaſt think a better cure than that forbidding (which uſually increaſes the deſire) or any other puniſhment ſhould be made uſe of to remedy it; for, when you have once glutted his appetite, (which may ſafely be done in all things but eating and drinking) and made him ſurfeit of what you would have him avoid, you have put into him a principle of averſion, and you need not ſo much fear afterwards his longing for the ſame thing again.

§ 129. This, I think, is ſufficiently evident, that children generally hate to be idle: all the care then is, that their buſy humour ſhould be conſtantly employed in ſomething of uſe to them; which if you will attain, you muſt make what you would have them do, a recreation to them, and not a buſineſs. The way to do this, ſo that they may not perceive you have any hand in it, is this propoſed here, viz. to make them weary of that which you would not have them do, by enjoining and making them, under ſome pretence or other, do it till they are ſurfeited. For example; Does your ſon play at top and ſcourge too much? Enjoin him to play ſo many hours every day, and look that he do it; and you ſhall ſee he will quickly be ſick of it, and willing to leave it. By this means, making the recreations you diſlike, a buſineſs to him, he will of himſelf, with delight, betake himſelf to thoſe things you would have him do, eſpecially if they be propoſed as rewards for having performed his taſk in that play which is commanded him. For, if he be ordered every day to whip his top, ſo long as to make him ſufficiently weary, do you not think he will apply himſelf with eagerneſs to his book, and wiſh for it, if you promiſe it him as a reward of having whipped his top luſtily, quite out all the time that is ſet him? Children, in the things they

they do, if they comport with their age, find little difference, fo they may be doing: the eſteem they have for one thing above another, they borrow from others; ſo that what thoſe about them make to be a reward to them, will really be ſo. By this art, it is in their governor's choice, whether ſcotch-hoppers ſhall reward their dancing, or dancing their ſcotch-hoppers; whether peg-top, or reading, playing at trap, or ſtudying the globes, ſhall be more acceptable and pleaſing to them; all that they deſire being to be buſy, and buſy, as they imagine, in things of their own choice, and which they receive as favours from their parents, or others for whom they have a reſpect, and with whom they would be in credit. A ſet of children thus ordered, and kept from the ill example of others, would, all of them, I ſuppoſe, with as much earneſtneſs and delight, learn to read, write, and what elſe one would have them, as others do their ordinary plays: and the eldeſt being thus entered, and this made the faſhion of the place, it would be as impoſſible to hinder them from learning the one, as it is ordinarily to keep them from the other.

Play-games. § 130. Play-things, I think, children ſhould have, and of divers ſorts; but ſtill to be in the cuſtody of their tutors, or ſomebody elſe, whereof the child ſhould have in his power but one at once, and ſhould not be ſuffered to have another, but when he reſtored that: this teaches them, betimes, to be careful of not loſing or ſpoiling the things they have; whereas plenty and variety, in their own keeping, makes them wanton and careleſs, and teaches them from the beginning to be ſquanderers and waſters. Theſe, I confeſs, are little things, and ſuch as will ſeem beneath the care of a governor; but nothing that may form children's minds is to be overlooked and neglected; and whatſoever introduces habits, and ſettles cuſtoms in them, deſerves the care and attention of their governors, and is not a ſmall thing in its conſequences.

One thing more about children's play-things may be worth their parents care: though it be agreed they ſhould

ſhould have of ſeveral ſorts, yet, I think, they ſhould have none bought for them. This will hinder that great variety they are often overcharged with, which ſerves only to teach the mind to wander after change and ſuperfluity, to be unquiet, and perpetually ſtretching itſelf after ſomething more ſtill, though it knows not what, and never to be ſatisfied with what it hath. The court that is made to people of condition in ſuch kind of preſents to their children, does the little ones great harm; by it they are taught pride, vanity, and covetouſneſs, almoſt before they can ſpeak; and I have known a young child ſo diſtracted with the number and variety of his play-games, that he tired his maid every day to look them over; and was ſo accuſtomed to abundance, that he never thought he had enough, but was always aſking, What more? What more? What new thing ſhall I have? A good introduction to moderate deſires, and the ready way to make a contented happy man!

How then ſhall they have the play-games you allow them, if none muſt be bought for them? I anſwer, they ſhould make them themſelves, or at leaſt endeavour it, and ſet themſelves about it; till then they ſhould have none, and till then, they will want none of any great artifice. A ſmooth pebble, a piece of paper, the mother's bunch of keys, or any thing they cannot hurt themſelves with, ſerves as much to divert little children, as thoſe more chargeable and curious toys from the ſhops, which are preſently put out of order and broken. Children are never dull or out of humour for want of ſuch play-things, unleſs they have been uſed to them: when they are little, whatever occurs ſerves the turn; and as they grow bigger, if they are not ſtored by the expenſive folly of others, they will make them themſelves. Indeed, when they once begin to ſet themſelves to work about any of their inventions, they ſhould be taught and aſſiſted; but ſhould have nothing whilſt they lazily ſit ſtill, expecting to be furniſhed from other hands without employing their own: and if you help them where they are at a ſtand, it will more endear you to them,

than

than any chargeable toys you ſhall buy for them. Play-things which are above their ſkill to make, as tops, gigs, battledores, and the like, which are to be uſed with labour, ſhould, indeed, be procured them: theſe, it is convenient, they ſhould have, not for variety, but exerciſe; but theſe, too, ſhould be given them as bare as might be. If they had a top, the ſcourge-ſtick and leather-ſtrap ſhould be left to their own making and fitting. If they ſit gaping to have ſuch things drop into their mouths, they ſhould go without them. This will accuſtom them to ſeek for what they want in themſelves, and in their own endeavours; whereby they will be taught moderation in their deſires, application, induſtry, thought, contrivance, and good huſbandry; qualities that will be uſeful to them when they are men, and therefore cannot be learned too ſoon, nor fixed too deep. All the plays and diverſions of children ſhould be directed towards good and uſeful habits, or elſe they will introduce ill ones. Whatever they do, leaves ſome impreſſion on that tender age, and from thence they receive a tendency to good or evil: and whatever hath ſuch an influence, ought not to be neglected.

Lying.

§ 131. Lying is ſo ready and cheap a cover for any miſcarriage, and ſo much in faſhion amongſt all ſorts of people, that a child can hardly avoid obſerving the uſe is made of it on all occaſions, and ſo can ſcarce be kept, without great care, from getting into it. But it is ſo ill a quality, and the mother of ſo many ill ones, that ſpawn from it, and take ſhelter under it, that a child ſhould be brought up in the greateſt abhorrence of it imaginable: it ſhould be always (when occaſionally it comes to be mentioned) ſpoken of before him with the utmoſt deteſtation, as a quality ſo wholly inconſiſtent with the name and character of a gentleman, that no-body of any credit can bear the imputation of a lye; a mark that is judged the utmoſt diſgrace, which debaſes a man to the loweſt degree of a ſhameful meanneſs, and ranks him with the moſt contemptible part of mankind, and the abhorred raſcality; and is not to be endured in any one, who would converſe with people of condition, or have any eſteem

eſteem or reputation in the world. The firſt time he is found in a lye, it ſhould rather be wondered at, as a monſtrous thing in him, than reproved as an ordinary fault. If that keeps him not from relapſing, the next time he muſt be ſharply rebuked, and fall into the ſtate of great diſpleaſure of his father and mother, and all about him, who take notice of it. And if this way work not the cure, you muſt come to blows; for, after he has been thus warned, a premeditated lye muſt always be looked upon as obſtinacy, and never be permitted to eſcape unpuniſhed.

Excuſes.

§ 132. Children, afraid to have their faults ſeen in their naked colours, will, like the reſt of the ſons of Adam, be apt to make excuſes. This is a fault uſually bordering upon, and leading to untruth, and is not to be indulged in them; but yet it ought to be cured rather with ſhame than roughneſs. If therefore, when a child is queſtioned for any thing, his firſt anſwer be an excuſe, warn him ſoberly to tell the truth, ; and then, if he perſiſts to ſhuffle it off with a falſhood, he muſt be chaſtiſed; but, if he directly confeſs, you muſt commend his ingenuity, and pardon the fault, be it what it will; and pardon it ſo, that you never ſo much as reproach him with it, or mention it to him again: for, if you would have him in love with ingenuity, and by a conſtant practice make it habitual to him, you muſt take care that it never procure him the leaſt inconvenience; but, on the contrary, his own confeſſion, bringing always with it perfect impunity, ſhould be, beſides, encouraged by ſome marks of approbation. If his excuſe be ſuch at any time, that you cannot prove it to have any falſhood in it, let it paſs for true, and be ſure not to ſhow any ſuſpicion of it. Let him keep up his reputation with you as high as is poſſible; for, when once he finds he has loſt that, you have loſt a great and your beſt hold upon him. Therefore let him not think he has the character of a lyar with you, as long as you can avoid it without flattering him in it. Thus ſome ſlips in truth may be overlooked. But, after he has once been corrected for a lye, you muſt be ſure never after to pardon it in him, when-

whenever you find, and take notice to him, that he is guilty of it: for it being a fault, which he has been forbid, and may, unleſs he be wilful, avoid, the repeating of it is perfect perverſeneſs, and muſt have the chaſtiſement due to that offence.

§ 133. This is what I have thought, concerning the general method of educating a young gentleman; which, though I am apt to ſuppoſe may have ſome influence on the whole courſe of his education, yet I am far from imagining it contains all thoſe particulars which his growing years, or peculiar temper, may require. But this being premiſed in general, we ſhall, in the next place, deſcend to a more particular conſideration of the ſeveral parts of his education.

§ 134. That which every gentleman (that takes any care of his education) deſires for his ſon, beſides the eſtate he leaves him, is contained (I ſuppoſe) in theſe four things, virtue, wiſdom, breeding, and learning. I will not trouble myſelf whether theſe names do not ſome of them ſometimes ſtand for the ſame thing, or really include one another. It ſerves my turn here to follow the popular uſe of theſe words, which, I preſume, is clear enough to make me be underſtood, and I hope there will be no difficulty to comprehend my meaning.

§ 135. I place virtue as the firſt and moſt neceſſary of thoſe endowments that belong to a man or a gentleman, as abſolutely requiſite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himſelf. Without that, I think, he will be happy neither in this, nor the other world.

God. § 136. As the foundation of this, there ought very early to be imprinted on his mind a true notion of God, as of the independent ſupreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our good, who loves us, and gives us all things: and, conſequent to this, inſtil into him a love and reverence of this ſupreme Being. This is enough to begin with, without going to explain this matter any farther, for fear, leſt by talking too early to him of ſpirits, and being unſeaſonably forward to make him

him underſtand the incomprehenſible nature of that infinite Being, his head be either filled with falſe, or perplexed with unintelligible notions of him. Let him only be told upon occaſion, that God made and governs all things, hears and ſees every thing, and does all manner of good to thoſe that love and obey him. You will find, that, being told of ſuch a God, other thoughts will be apt to riſe up faſt enough in his mind about him; which, as you obſerve them to have any miſtakes, you muſt ſet right. And I think it would be better, if men generally reſted in ſuch an idea of God, without being too curious in their notions about a Being, which all muſt acknowledge incomprehenſible; whereby many, who have not ſtrength and clearneſs of thought to diſtinguiſh between what they can, and what they cannot know, run themſelves into ſuperſtition or atheiſm, making God like themſelves, or (becauſe they cannot comprehend any thing elſe) none at all. And I am apt to think the keeping children conſtantly morning and evening to acts of devotion to God, as to their Maker, Preſerver, and Benefactor, in ſome plain and ſhort form of prayer, ſuitable to their age and capacity, will be of much more uſe to them in religion, knowledge, and virtue, than to diſtract their thoughts with curious inquiries into his inſcrutable eſſence and being.

Spirits.

§ 137. Having by gentle degrees, as you find him capable of it, ſettled ſuch an idea of God in his mind, and taught him to pray to him, and praiſe him as the Author of his being, and of all the good he does or can enjoy, forbear any diſcourſe of other ſpirits, till the mention of them coming in his way, upon occaſion hereafter to be ſet down, and his reading the ſcripture-hiſtory, put him upon that inquiry.

Goblins.

§ 138. But even then, and always whilſt he is young, be ſure to preſerve his tender mind from all impreſſions and notions of ſpirits and goblins, or any fearful apprehenſions in the dark. This he will be in danger of from the indiſcretion of ſervants, whoſe uſual method is to awe children, and keep them in ſub-

jection, by telling them of raw-head and bloody-bones, and such other names, as carry with them the ideas of something terrible and hurtful, which they have reason to be afraid of, when alone, especially in the dark. This must be carefully prevented; for though by this foolish way they may keep them from little faults, yet the remedy is much worse than the disease; and there are stamped upon their imaginations, ideas that follow them with terrour and affrightment. Such bug-bear thoughts, once got into the tender minds of children, and being set on with a strong impression from the dread that accompanies such apprehensions, sink deep, and fasten themselves so, as not easily, if ever, to be got out again; and, whilst they are there, frequently haunt them with strange visions, making children dastards when alone, and afraid of their shadows and darkness all their lives after. I have had those complain to me, when men, who had been thus used when young; that, though their reason corrected the wrong ideas they had taken in, and they were satisfied, that there was no cause to fear invisible beings more in the dark, than in the light; yet that these notions were apt still, upon any occasion, to start up first in their prepossessed fancies, and not to be removed without some pains. And, to let you see how lasting frightful images are, that take place in the mind early, I shall here tell you a pretty remarkable, but true story: there was in a town in the west a man of a disturbed brain, whom the boys used to teize, when he came in their way: this fellow one day, seeing in the street one of those lads that used to vex him, stepped into a cutler's shop he was near, and, there seizing on a naked sword, made after the boy, who, seeing him coming so armed, betook himself to his feet, and ran for his life, and by good luck had strength and heels enough to reach his father's house, before the madman could get up to him: the door was only latched; and, when he had the latch in his hand, he turned about his head to see how near his pursuer was, who was at the entrance of the porch, with his sword up ready to strike; and he had just time to get in and clap-to the door,

door, to avoid the blow, which, though his body eſcaped, his mind did not. This frightening idea made ſo deep an impreſſion there, that it laſted many years, if not all his life after; for telling this ſtory when he was a man, he ſaid, that after that time till then, he never went in at that door (that he could remember) at any time, without looking back, whatever buſineſs he had in his head, or how little ſoever, before he came thither, he thought of this madman.

If children were let alone, they would be no more afraid in the dark, than in broad ſun-ſhine; they would in their turns as much welcome the one for ſleep, as the other to play in: there ſhould be no diſtinction made to them, by any diſcourſe, of more danger, or terrible things in the one than the other. But, if the folly of any one about them ſhould do them this harm, and make them think there is any difference between being in the dark and winking, you muſt get it out of their minds as ſoon as you can; and let them know, that God, who made all things good for them, made the night, that they might ſleep the better and the quieter; and that they being under his protection, there is nothing in the dark to hurt them. What is to be known more of God and good ſpirits, is to be deferred till the time we ſhall hereafter mention; and of evil ſpirits, it will be well if you can keep him from wrong fancies about them, till he is ripe for that ſort of knowledge.

§ 139. Having laid the foundations of virtue in a true notion of a God, ſuch as the creed wiſely teaches, as far as his age is capable, and by accuſtoming him to pray to him; the next thing to be taken care of, is to keep him exactly to ſpeaking of truth, and by all the ways imaginable inclining him to be good-natured. Let him know, that twenty faults are ſooner to be forgiven, than the ſtraining of truth, to cover any one by an excuſe: and to teach him betimes to love and be good-natured to others, is to lay early the true foundation of an honeſt man; all injuſtice generally ſpringing from too great love of ourſelves, and too little of others.

Truth.

Good-nature.

This is all I shall say of this matter in general, and is enough for laying the first foundations of virtue in a child. As he grows up, the tendency of his natural inclination must be observed; which, as it inclines him, more than is convenient, on one or the other side, from the right path of virtue, ought to have proper remedies applied; for few of Adam's children are so happy, as not to be born with some bias in their natural temper, which it is the business of education either to take off, or counterbalance: but to enter into particulars of this, would be beyond the design of this short treatise of education. I intend not a discourse of all the virtues and vices, and how each virtue is to be attained, and every particular vice by its peculiar remedies cured; though I have mentioned some of the most ordinary faults, and the ways to be used in correcting them.

Wisdom. § 140. Wisdom I take, in the popular acceptation, for a man's managing his business ably, and with fore-sight, in this world. This is the product of a good natural temper, application of mind and experience together, and so above the reach of children. The greatest thing that in them can be done towards it, is to hinder them, as much as may be, from being cunning; which, being the ape of wisdom, is the most distant from it that can be: and, as an ape, for the likeness it has to a man, wanting what really should make him so, is by so much the uglier; cunning is only the want of understanding; which, because it cannot compass its ends by direct ways, would do it by a trick and circumvention; and the mischief of it is, a cunning trick helps but once, but hinders ever after. No cover was ever made either so big, or so fine, as to hide itself. Nobody was ever so cunning, as to conceal their being so: and, when they are once discovered, every body is shy, every body distrustful of crafty men; and all the world forwardly join to oppose and defeat them: whilst the open, fair, wise man has every body to make way for him, and goes directly to his business. To accustom a child to have true notions of things, and not to be satisfied till he has them; to raise his mind to great

great and worthy thoughts; and to keep him at a diſtance from falſhood, and cunning, which has always a broad mixture of falſhood in it; is the fitteſt preparation of a child for wiſdom. The reſt, which is to be learned from time, experience, and obſervation, and an acquaintance with men, their tempers and deſigns, is not to be expected in the ignorance and inadvertency of childhood, or the inconſiderate heat and unwarineſs of youth: all that can be done towards it, during this unripe age, is, as I have ſaid, to accuſtom them to truth and ſincerity; to a ſubmiſſion to reaſon; and, as much as may be, to reflection on their own actions.

§ 141. The next good quality belonging to a gentleman, is good breeding. There are two ſorts of ill breeding; the one, a ſheepiſh baſhfulneſs; and the other, a miſbecoming negligence and diſreſpect in our carriage; both which are avoided, by duly obſerving this one rule, Not to think meanly of ourſelves, and not to think meanly of others. Breeding.

§ 142. The firſt part of this rule muſt not be underſtood in oppoſition to humility, but to aſſurance. We ought not to think ſo well of ourſelves, as to ſtand upon our own value; and aſſume to ourſelves a preference before others, becauſe of any advantage we may imagine we have over them; but modeſtly to take what is offered, when it is our due. But yet we ought to think ſo well of ourſelves, as to perform thoſe actions which are incumbent on, and expected of us, without diſcompoſure or diſorder, in whoſe preſence ſoever we are, keeping that reſpect and diſtance which is due to every one's rank and quality. There is often in people, eſpecially children, a clowniſh ſhamefacedneſs before ſtrangers, or thoſe above them; they are confounded in their thoughts, words, and looks, and ſo loſe themſelves in that confuſion, as not to be able to do any thing, or at leaſt not to do it with that freedom and gracefulneſs which pleaſes and makes them acceptable. The only cure for this, as for any other miſcarriage, is by uſe to introduce the contrary habit. But ſince we cannot accuſtom ourſelves to converſe with ſtrangers, and perſons of quality, without being in their company,

nothing can cure this part of ill-breeding, but change and variety of company, and that of persons above us.

§ 143. As the before-mentioned consists in too great a concern how to behave ourselves towards others, so the other part of ill-breeding lies in the appearance of too little care of pleasing or showing respect to those we have to do with. To avoid this these two things are requisite: first, a disposition of the mind not to offend others; and, secondly, the most acceptable and agreeable way of expressing that disposition. From the one, men are called civil; from the other, well-fashioned. The latter of these is that decency and gracefulness of looks, voice, words, motions, gestures, and of all the whole outward demeanour, which takes in company, and makes those with whom we may converse easy and well-pleased. This is, as it were, the language, whereby that internal civility of the mind is expressed; which, as other languages are, being very much governed by the fashion and custom of every country, must, in the rules and practice of it, be learned chiefly from observation, and the carriage of those who are allowed to be exactly well-bred. The other part, which lies deeper than the outside, is that general good-will and regard for all people, which makes any one have a care not to show, in his carriage, any contempt, disrespect, or neglect of them; but to express, according to the fashion and way of that country, a respect and value for them, according to their rank and condition. It is a disposition of the mind that shows itself in the carriage, whereby a man avoids making any one uneasy in conversation.

I shall take notice of four qualities, that are most directly opposite to this first and most taking of all the social virtues. And from some one of these four it is, that incivility commonly has its rise. I shall set them down, that children may be preserved or recovered from their ill influence.

Roughness. 1. The first is, a natural roughness, which makes a man uncomplaisant to others, so that he has no deference for their inclinations, tempers, or conditions. It is the sure badge of a clown, not

not to mind what pleaſes or diſpleaſes thoſe he is with; and yet one may often find a man, in faſhionable clothes, give an unbounded ſwing to his own humour, and ſuffer it to juſtle or over-run any one that ſtands in its way, with a perfect indifferency how they take it. This is a brutality that every one ſees and abhors, and no-body can be eaſy with: and therefore this finds no place in any one, who would be thought to have the leaſt tincture of good-breeding. For the very end and buſineſs of good-breeding is to ſupple the natural ſtiffneſs, and ſo ſoften men's tempers, that they may bend to a compliance, and accommodate themſelves to thoſe they have to do with.

Contempt.

2. Contempt, or want of due reſpect, diſcovered either in looks, words, or geſture: this, from whomſoever it comes, brings always uneaſineſs with it; for no-body can contentedly bear being ſlighted.

Cenſoriouſneſs.

3. Cenſoriouſneſs, and finding fault with others, has a direct oppoſition to civility. Men, whatever they are, or are not guilty of, would not have their faults diſplayed, and ſet in open view and broad day-light, before their own, or other people's eyes. Blemiſhes affixed to any one, always carry ſhame with them: and the diſcovery, or even bare imputation of any defect, is not born without ſome uneaſineſs. Raillery is the moſt refined way of expoſing the faults of others; but, becauſe it is uſually done with wit and good language, and gives entertainment to the company, people are led into a miſtake, and, where it keeps within fair bounds, there is no incivility in it: and ſo the pleaſantry of this ſort of converſation often introduces it amongſt people of the better rank; and ſuch talkers are favourably heard, and generally applauded by the laughter of the by-ſtanders on their ſide: but they ought to conſider, that the entertainment of the reſt of the company is at the coſt of that one, who is ſet out in their burleſque colours, who therefore is not without uneaſineſs, unleſs the ſubject, for which he is rallied, be really in itſelf matter of commendation; for then

Raillery.

the pleaſant images and repreſentations, which make the raillery, carrying praiſe as well as ſport with them, the rallied perſon alſo finds his account, and takes part in the diverſion. But, becauſe the nice management of ſo nice and tickliſh a buſineſs, wherein a little ſlip may ſpoil all, is not every body's talent, I think thoſe, who would ſecure themſelves from provoking others, eſpecially all young people, ſhould carefully abſtain from raillery; which, by a ſmall miſtake, or any wrong turn, may leave upon the mind of thoſe, who are made uneaſy by it, the laſting memory of having been piquantly, though wittily, taunted for ſomething cenſurable in them.

Contradiction. Beſides raillery, contradiction is a kind of cenſoriouſneſs, wherein ill-breeding often ſhows itſelf. Complaiſance does not require that we ſhould always admit all the reaſonings or relations that the company is entertained with; no, nor ſilently let paſs all that is vented in our hearing. The oppoſing the opinions, and rectifying the miſtakes of others, is what truth and charity ſometimes require of us, and civility does not oppoſe, if it be done with due caution and care of circumſtances. But there are ſome people, that one may obſerve poſſeſſed, as it were, with the ſpirit of contradiction, that ſteadily, and without regard to right or wrong, oppoſe ſome one, or perhaps every one of the company, whatever they ſay. This is ſo viſible and outrageous a way of cenſuring, that no-body can avoid thinking himſelf injured by it. All oppoſition to what another man has ſaid, is ſo apt to be ſuſpected of cenſoriouſneſs, and is ſo ſeldom received without ſome ſort of humiliation, that it ought to be made in the gentleſt manner, and ſofteſt words can be found; and ſuch as, with the whole deportment, may expreſs no forwardneſs to contradict. All marks of reſpect and good-will ought to accompany it, that, whilſt we gain the argument, we may not loſe the eſteem of thoſe that hear us.

Captiouſneſs. 4. Captiouſneſs is another fault oppoſite to civility, not only becauſe it often produces miſbecoming and provoking expreſ-

ſions

ſions and carriage, but becauſe it is a tacit accuſation and reproach of ſome incivility, taken notice of in thoſe whom we are angry with. Such a ſuſpicion, or intimation, cannot be born by any one without uneaſineſs. Beſides, one angry body diſcompoſes the whole company, and the harmony ceaſes upon any ſuch jarring.

The happineſs, that all men ſo ſteadily purſue, conſiſting in pleaſure, it is eaſy to ſee why the civil are more acceptable than the uſeful. The ability, ſincerity, and good intention, of a man of weight and worth, or a real friend, ſeldom atones for the uneaſineſs, that is produced by his grave and ſolid repreſentations. Power and riches, nay virtue itſelf, are valued only as conducing to our happineſs; and therefore he recommends himſelf ill to another, as aiming at his happineſs, who, in the ſervices he does him, makes him uneaſy in the manner of doing them. He that knows how to make thoſe he converſes with eaſy, without debaſing himſelf to low and ſervile flattery, has found the true art of living in the world, and being both welcome and valued every-where. Civility therefore is what, in the firſt place, ſhould with great care be made habitual to children and young people.

Breeding.

§ 144. There is another fault in good manners, and that is, exceſs of ceremony, and an obſtinate perſiſting to force upon another what is not his due, and what he cannot take without folly or ſhame. This ſeems rather a deſign to expoſe, than oblige; or, at leaſt, looks like a conteſt for maſtery; and, at beſt, is but troubleſome, and ſo can be no part of good breeding, which has no other uſe or end, but to make people eaſy and ſatisfied in their converſation with us. This is a fault few young people are apt to fall into; but yet, if they are ever guilty of it, or are ſuſpected to incline that way, they ſhould be told of it, and warned of this miſtaken civility. The thing they ſhould endeavour and aim at in converſation, ſhould be to ſhow reſpect, eſteem, and good-will, by paying to every one that common ceremony and regard, which is in civility due to them. To do this, without a ſuſpicion

picion of flattery, diſſimulation, or meanneſs, is a great ſkill, which good ſenſe, reaſon, and good company, can only teach; but is of ſo much uſe in civil life, that it is well worth the ſtudying.

§ 145. Though the managing ourſelves well in this part of our behaviour has the name of good breeding, as if peculiarly the effect of education; yet, as I have ſaid, young children ſhould not be much perplexed about it; I mean, about putting off their hats, and making legs modiſhly. Teach them humility, and to be good-natured, if you can, and this ſort of manners will not be wanting: civility being, in truth, nothing but a care not to ſhow any ſlighting, or contempt, of any one in converſation. What are the moſt allowed and eſteemed ways of expreſſing this, we have above obſerved. It is as peculiar and different, in ſeveral countries of the world, as their languages; and therefore, if it be rightly conſidered, rules and diſcourſes, made to children about it, are as uſeleſs and impertinent, as it would be, now and then, to give a rule or two of the ſpaniſh tongue, to one that converſes only with engliſhmen. Be as buſy as you pleaſe with diſcourſes of civility to your ſon; ſuch as is his company, ſuch will be his manners. A ploughman of your neighbourhood, that has never been out of his pariſh, read what lectures you pleaſe to him, will be as ſoon in his language, as his carriage, a courtier; that is, in neither will be more polite, than thoſe he uſes to converſe with: and therefore of this no other care can be taken, till he be of an age to have a tutor put to him, who muſt not fail to be a well-bred man. And, in good earneſt, if I were to ſpeak my mind freely, ſo children do nothing out of obſtinacy, pride, and ill-nature, it is no great matter how they put off their hats, or make legs. If you can teach them to love and reſpect other people, they will, as their age requires it, find ways to expreſs it acceptably to every one, according to the faſhions they have been uſed to: and, as to their motions, and carriage of their bodies, a dancing-maſter, as has been ſaid, when it is fit, will teach them what is moſt becoming. In the mean time, when they

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are young, people expect not that children ſhould be over-mindful of theſe ceremonies; careleſſneſs is allowed to that age, and becomes them as well as compliments do grown people: or, at leaſt, if ſome very nice people will think it a fault, I am ſure it is a fault that ſhould be over-looked, and left to time, a tutor, and converſation, to cure: and therefore I think it not worth your while to have your ſon (as I often ſee children are) moleſted or chid about it; but where there is pride, or ill-nature, appearing in his carriage, there he muſt be perſuaded, or ſhamed, out of it.

Though children, when little, ſhould not be much perplexed with rules and ceremonious parts of breeding; yet there is a ſort of unmannerlineſs very apt to grow up with young people, if not early reſtrained; and that is a forwardneſs to interrupt others that are ſpeaking, and to ſtop them with ſome contradiction. Whether the cuſtom of diſputing, and the reputation of parts and learning uſually given to it, as if it were the only ſtandard and evidence of knowledge, make young men ſo forward to watch occaſions to correct others in their diſcourſe, and not to ſlip any opportunity of ſhowing their talents; ſo it is, that I have found ſcholars moſt blamed in this point. There cannot be a greater rudeneſs, than to interrupt another in the current of his diſcourſe; for, if there be not impertinent folly in anſwering a man before we know what he will ſay, yet it is a plain declaration, that we are weary to hear him talk any longer; and have a diſeſteem of what he ſays; which we, judging not fit to entertain the company, deſire them to give audience to us, who have ſomething to produce worth their attention. This ſhows a very great diſreſpect, and cannot but be offenſive; and yet, this is what almoſt all interruption conſtantly carries with it. To which, if there be added, as is uſual, a correcting of any miſtake, or a contradiction of what has been ſaid, it is a mark of yet greater pride and ſelf-conceitedneſs, when we thus intrude ourſelves for teachers, and take upon us, either to ſet another right in his ſtory, or ſhow the miſtakes of his judgment.

Interruption.

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I do not say this, that I think there should be no difference of opinions in conversation, nor opposition in men's discourses: this would be to take away the greatest advantage of society, and the improvements that are to be made by ingenious company; where the light is to be got from the opposite arguings of men of parts, showing the different sides of things, and their various aspects and probabilities, would be quite lost, if every one were obliged to assent to, and say after the first speaker. It is not the owning one's dissent from another that I speak against, but the manner of doing it. Young men should be taught not to be forward to interpose their opinions, unless asked, or when others have done, and are silent; and then only by way of inquiry, not instruction. The positive asserting, and the magisterial air, should be avoided; and when a general pause of the whole company affords an opportunity, they may modestly put in their question as learners.

This becoming decency will not cloud their parts, nor weaken the strength of their reason; but bespeak the more favourable attention, and give what they say the greater advantage. An ill argument, or ordinary observation, thus introduced, with some civil preface of deference and respect to the opinions of others, will procure them more credit and esteem, than the sharpest wit, or profoundest science, with a rough, insolent, or noisy management; which always shocks the hearers, and leaves an ill opinion of the man, though he get the better of it in the argument.

This therefore should be carefully watched in young people, stopped in the beginning, and the contrary habit introduced in all their conversation: and the rather, because forwardness to talk, frequent interruptions in arguing, and loud wrangling, are too often observable amongst grown people, even of rank amongst us. The indians, whom we call barbarous, observe much more decency and civility in their discourses and conversation, giving one another a fair silent hearing, till they have quite done; and then answering them calmly, and without noise or passion. And if it be not

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ſo in this civilized part of the world, we muſt impute it to a neglect in education, which has not yet reformed this ancient piece of barbarity amongſt us. Was it not, think you, an entertaining ſpectacle, to ſee two ladies of quality accidentally ſeated on the oppoſite ſides of a room, ſet round with company, fall into a diſpute, and grow ſo eager in it, that in the heat of their controverſy, edging by degrees their chairs forwards, they were in a little time got up cloſe to one another in the middle of the room; where they for a good while managed the diſpute as fiercely as two game-cocks in the pit, without minding or taking any notice of the circle, which could not all the while forbear ſmiling? This I was told by a perſon of quality, who was preſent at the combat, and did not omit to reflect upon the indecencies, that warmth in diſpute often runs people into; which, ſince cuſtom makes too frequent, education ſhould take the more care of. There is no-body but condemns this in others, though they overlook it in themſelves: and many, who are ſenſible of it in themſelves, and reſolve againſt it, cannot yet get rid of an ill cuſtom, which neglect in their education has ſuffered to ſettle into an habit. Diſpute.

§ 146. What has been above ſaid concerning company, would, perhaps, if it were well reflected on, give us a larger proſpect, and let us ſee how much farther its influence reaches. It is not the modes of civility alone, that are imprinted by converſation; the tincture of company ſinks deeper than the outſide; and poſſibly, if a true eſtimate were made of the morality and religions of the world, we ſhould find, that the far greater part of mankind received even thoſe opinions and ceremonies they would die for, rather from the faſhions of their countries, and the conſtant practice of thoſe about them, than from any conviction of their reaſons. I mention this only to let you ſee of what moment I think company is to your ſon in all the parts of his life, and therefore how much that one part is to be weighed and provided for, Company.

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it being of greater force to work upon him, than all you can do beſides.

Learning. § 147. You will wonder, perhaps, that I put learning laſt, eſpecially if I tell you I think it the leaſt part. This may ſeem ſtrange in the mouth of a bookiſh man: and this making uſually the chief, if not only buſtle and ſtir about children, this being almoſt that alone, which is thought on, when people talk of education, makes it the greater paradox. When I conſider what a-do is made about a little latin and greek, how many years are ſpent in it, and what a noiſe and buſineſs it makes to no purpoſe, I can hardly forbear thinking, that the parents of children ſtill live in fear of the ſchoolmaſter's rod, which they look on as the only inſtrument of education; as if a language or two were its whole buſineſs. How elſe is it poſſible, that a child ſhould be chained to the oar ſeven, eight, or ten of the beſt years of his life, to get a language or two, which I think might be had at a great deal cheaper rate of pains and time, and be learned almoſt in playing?

Forgive me therefore, if I ſay, I cannot with patience think, that a young gentleman ſhould be put into the herd, and be driven with a whip and ſcourge, as if he were to run the gantlet through the ſeveral claſſes, "ad capiendum ingenii cultum." "What then, ſay "you, would you not have him write and read? Shall "he be more ignorant than the clerk of our pariſh, "who takes Hopkins and Sternhold for the beſt poets "in the world, whom yet he makes worſe than they "are, by his ill reading?" Not ſo, not ſo faſt, I beſeech you. Reading, and writing, and learning, I allow to be neceſſary, but yet not the chief buſineſs. I imagine you would think him a very fooliſh fellow, that ſhould not value a virtuous, or a wiſe man, infinitely before a great ſcholar. Not but that I think learning a great help to both, in well-diſpoſed minds; but yet it muſt be confeſſed alſo, that in others not ſo diſpoſed, it helps them only to be the more fooliſh, or worſe men. I ſay this, that, when you conſider of the breed-

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ing of your ſon, and are looking out for a ſchool-maſter, or a tutor, you would not have (as is uſual) latin and logic only in your thoughts. Learning muſt be had, but in the ſecond place, as ſubſervient only to greater qualities. Seek out ſome-body, that may know how diſcreetly to frame his manners: place him in hands, where you may, as much as poſſible, ſecure his innocence, cheriſh and nurſe up the good, and gently correct and weed out any bad inclinations, and ſettle in him good habits. This is the main point; and this being provided for, learning may be had into the bargain; and that, as I think, at a very eaſy rate, by methods that may be thought on.

Reading.

§ 148. When he can talk, it is time he ſhould begin to learn to read. But as to this, give me leave here to inculcate again what is very apt to be forgotten, viz. that a great care is to be taken, that it be never made as a buſineſs to him, nor he look on it as a taſk. We naturally, as I ſaid, even from our cradles, love liberty, and have therefore an averſion to many things, for no other reaſon, but becauſe they are injoined us. I have always had a fancy, that learning might be made a play and recreation to children; and that they might be brought to deſire to be taught, if it were propoſed to them as a thing of honour, credit, delight, and recreation, or as a reward for doing ſomething elſe, and if they were never chid or corrected for the neglect of it. That which confirms me in this opinion, is, that amongſt the Portugueſe, it is ſo much a faſhion and emulation amongſt their children to learn to read and write, that they cannot hinder them from it: they will learn it one from another, and are as intent on it as if it were forbid them. I remember, that being at a friend's houſe, whoſe younger ſon, a child in coats, was not eaſily brought to his book (being taught to read at home by his mother); I adviſed to try another way, than requiring it of him as his duty. We therefore, in a diſcourſe on purpoſe amongſt ourſelves, in his hearing, but without taking any notice of him, declared, that it was the privilege and advantage of heirs and elder brothers, to be ſcholars; that this made

made them fine gentlemen, and beloved by every body: and that for younger brothers, it was a favour to admit them to breeding; to be taught to read and write, was more than came to their ſhare; they might be ignorant bumpkins and clowns, if they pleaſed. This ſo wrought upon the child, that afterwards he deſired to be taught; would come himſelf to his mother to learn; and would not let his maid be quiet, till ſhe heard him his leſſon. I doubt not but ſome way like this might be taken with other children; and, when their tempers are found, ſome thoughts be inſtilled into them, that might ſet them upon deſiring of learning themſelves, and make them ſeek it, as another ſort of play or recreation. But then, as I ſaid before, it muſt never be impoſed as a taſk, nor made a trouble to them. There may be dice, and play-things, with the letters on them, to teach children the alphabet by playing; and twenty other ways may be found, ſuitable to their particular tempers, to make this kind of learning a ſport to them.

§ 149. Thus children may be cozened into a knowledge of the letters; be taught to read, without perceiving it to be any thing but a ſport, and play themſelves into that which others are whipped for. Children ſhould not have any thing like work, or ſerious, laid on them; neither their minds nor bodies will bear it. It injures their healths; and their being forced and tied down to their books, in an age at enmity with all ſuch reſtraint, has, I doubt not, been the reaſon why a great many have hated books and learning all their lives after: it is like a ſurfeit, that leaves an averſion behind, not to be removed.

§ 150. I have therefore thought, that if play-things were fitted to this purpoſe, as they are uſually to none, contrivances might be made to teach children to read, whilſt they thought they were only playing. For example; What if an ivory-ball were made like that of the royal-oak lottery, with thirty-two ſides, or one rather of twenty-four or twenty-five ſides; and upon ſeveral of thoſe ſides paſted on an A, upon ſeveral others B, on others C, and on others D? I would have you begin with

with but these four letters, or perhaps only two at first; and when he is perfect in them, then add another; and so on, till each side having one letter, there be on it the whole alphabet. This I would have others play with before him, it being as good a sort of play to lay a stake who shall first throw an A or B, as who upon dice shall throw six or seven. This being a play amongst you, tempt him not to it, lest you make it business; for I would not have him understand it is any thing but a play of older people, and I doubt not but he will take to it of himself. And that he may have the more reason to think it is a play, that he is sometimes in favour admitted to; when the play is done, the ball should be laid up safe out of his reach, that so it may not, by his having it in his keeping at any time, grow stale to him.

§ 151. To keep up his eagerness to it, let him think it a game belonging to those above him: and when by this means he knows the letters, by changing them into syllables, he may learn to read, without knowing how he did so, and never have any chiding or trouble about it, nor fall out with books, because of the hard usage and vexation they have caused him. Children, if you observe them, take abundance of pains to learn several games, which, if they should be enjoined them, they would abhor as a task, and business. I know a person of great quality (more yet to be honoured for his learning and virtue, than for his rank and high place) who, by pasting on the six vowels, (for in our language Y is one) on the six sides of a die, and the remaining eighteen consonants on the sides of three other dice, has made this a play for his children, that he shall win, who, at one cast, throws most words on these four dice; whereby his eldest son, yet in coats, has played himself into spelling, with great eagerness, and without once having been chid for it, or forced to it.

§ 152. I have seen little girls exercise whole hours together, and take abundance of pains to be expert at dibstones, as they call it. Whilst I have been looking on, I have thought it wanted only some good contrivance to make them employ all that industry about

ſomething that might be more uſeful to them; and methinks it is only the fault and negligence of elder people, that it is not ſo. Children are much leſs apt to be idle than men; and men are to be blamed, if ſome part of that buſy humour be not turned to uſeful things; which might be made uſually as delightful to them as thoſe they are employed in, if men would be but half ſo forward to lead the way, as theſe little apes would be to follow. I imagine ſome wiſe Portugueſe heretofore began this faſhion amongſt the children of his country, where I have been told, as I ſaid, it is impoſſible to hinder the children from learning to read and write: and in ſome parts of France they teach one another to ſing and dance from the cradle.

§ 153. The letters paſted upon the ſides of the dice, or polygon, were beſt to be of the ſize of thoſe of the folio bible to begin with, and none of them capital letters; when once he can read what is printed in ſuch letters, he will not long be ignorant of the great ones: and in the beginning he ſhould not be perplexed with variety. With this die alſo, you might have a play juſt like the royal-oak, which would be another variety; and play for cherries, or apples, &c.

§ 154. Beſides theſe, twenty other plays might be invented, depending on letters, which thoſe, who like this way, may eaſily contrive, and get made to this uſe, if they will. But the four dice above-mentioned I think ſo eaſy and uſeful, that it will be hard to find any better, and there will be ſcarce need of any other.

§ 155. Thus much for learning to read, which let him never be driven to, nor chid for; cheat him into it if you can, but make it not a buſineſs for him. It is better it be a year later before he can read, than that he ſhould this way get an averſion to learning. If you have any conteſts with him, let it be in matters of moment, of truth, and good-nature; but lay no taſk on him about A B C. Uſe your ſkill to make his will ſupple and pliant to reaſon: teach him to love credit and commendation; to abhor being thought ill or meanly of, eſpecially by you and his mother; and then the reſt will come all eaſily. But, I think, if you will

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do that, you must not shackle and tie him up with rules about indifferent matters, nor rebuke him for every little fault, or perhaps some, that to others would seem great ones. But of this I have said enough already.

§ 156. When by these gentle ways he begins to be able to read, some easy pleasant book, suited to his capacity, should be put into his hands, wherein the entertainment, that he finds, might draw him on, and reward his pains in reading; and yet not such as should fill his head with perfectly useless trumpery, or lay the principles of vice and folly. To this purpose I think Æsop's fables the best, which being stories apt to delight and entertain a child, may yet afford useful reflections to a grown man; and if his memory retain them all his life after, he will not repent to find them there, amongst his manly thoughts, and serious business. If his Æsop has pictures in it, it will entertain him much the better, and encourage him to read, when it carries the increase of knowledge with it: for such visible objects children hear talked of in vain, and without any satisfaction, whilst they have no ideas of them; those ideas being not to be had from sounds, but from the things themselves, or their pictures. And therefore, I think, as soon as he begins to spell, as many pictures of animals should be got him as can be found, with the printed names to them, which at the same time will invite him to read, and afford him matter of inquiry and knowledge. Reynard the fox is another book, I think, may be made use of to the same purpose. And if those about him will talk to him often about the stories he has read, and hear him tell them, it will, besides other advantages, add encouragement and delight to his reading, when he finds there is some use and pleasure in it. These baits seem wholly neglected in the ordinary method; and it is usually long before learners find any use or pleasure in reading, which may tempt them to it, and so take books only for fashionable amusements, or impertinent troubles, good for nothing.

§ 157. The Lord's prayer, the creed, and ten commandments, it is necessary he should learn perfectly by heart; but, I think, not by reading them himself in

his primer, but by somebody's repeating them to him, even before he can read. But learning by heart, and learning to read, should not, I think, be mixed, and so one made to clog the other. But his learning to read should be made as little trouble or business to him as might be.

What other books there are in english of the kind of those above-mentioned, fit to engage the liking of children, and tempt them to read, I do not know; but am apt to think, that children, being generally delivered over to the method of schools, where the fear of the rod is to inforce, and not any pleasure of the employment to invite, them to learn; this sort of useful books, amongst the number of silly ones that are of all sorts, have yet had the fate to be neglected; and nothing that I know has been considered of this kind out of the ordinary road of the horn-book, primer, psalter, Testament, and Bible.

§ 158. As for the Bible, which children are usually employed in, to exercise and improve their talent in reading, I think the promiscuous reading of it, though by chapters as they lie in order, is so far from being of any advantage to children, either for the perfecting their reading, or principling their religion, that perhaps a worse could not be found. For what pleasure or encouragement can it be to a child, to exercise himself in reading those parts of a book where he understands nothing? And how little are the law of Moses, the Song of Solomon, the prophecies in the Old, and the epistles and apocalypse in the New Testament, suited to a child's capacity? And though the history of the evangelists, and the Acts, have something easier; yet, taken all together, it is very disproportional to the understanding of childhood. I grant, that the principles of religion are to be drawn from thence, and in the words of the scripture; yet none should be proposed to a child, but such as are suited to a child's capacity and notions. But it is far from this to read through the whole Bible, and that for reading's sake. And what an odd jumble of thoughts must a child have in his head, if he have any at all, such as he should have con-

concerning religion, who in his tender age reads all the parts of the Bible indifferently, as the word of God, without any other diſtinction! I am apt to think, that this, in ſome men, has been the very reaſon why they never had clear and diſtinct thoughts of it all their life-time.

§ 159. And now I am by chance fallen on this ſubject, give me leave to ſay, that there are ſome parts of the ſcripture, which may be proper to be put into the hands of a child to engage him to read; ſuch as are the ſtory of Joſeph and his brethren, of David and Goliath, of David and Jonathan, &c. and others, that he ſhould be made to read for his inſtruction; as that, "What "you would have others do unto you, do you the ſame "unto them;" and ſuch other eaſy and plain moral rules, which, being fitly choſen, might often be made uſe of, both for reading and inſtruction together; and ſo often read, till they are thoroughly fixed in his memory; and then afterwards, as he grows ripe for them, may in their turns, on fit occaſions, be inculcated as the ſtanding and ſacred rules of his life and actions. But the reading of the whole ſcripture indifferently, is what I think very inconvenient for children, till, after having been made acquainted with the plaineſt fundamental parts of it, they have got ſome kind of general view of what they ought principally to believe and practiſe, which yet, I think, they ought to receive in the very words of the ſcripture, and not in ſuch as men, prepoſſeſſed by ſyſtems and analogies, are apt in this caſe to make uſe of, and force upon them. Dr. Worthington, to avoid this, has made a catechiſm, which has all its anſwers in the preciſe words of the ſcripture, a thing of good example, and ſuch a ſound form of words, as no chriſtian can except againſt, as not fit for his child to learn. Of this, as ſoon as he can ſay the Lord's prayer, creed, and ten commandments by heart, it may be fit for him to learn a queſtion every day, or every week, as his underſtanding is able to receive, and his memory to retain them. And, when he has this catechiſm perfectly by heart, ſo as readily and roundly to anſwer to any queſtion in the

whole book, it may be convenient to lodge in his mind the remaining moral rules, ſcattered up and down in the Bible, as the beſt exerciſe of his memory, and that which may be always a rule to him, ready at hand, in the whole conduct of his life.

Writing. § 160. When he can read Engliſh well, it will be ſeaſonable to enter him in writing. And here the firſt thing ſhould be taught him, is to hold his pen right; and this he ſhould be perfect in, before he ſhould be ſuffered to put it to paper: for not only children, but any body elſe, that would do any thing well, ſhould never be put upon too much of it at once, or be ſet to perfect themſelves in two parts of an action at the ſame time, if they can poſſibly be ſeparated. I think the italian way of holding the pen between the thumb and the fore-finger alone may be beſt; but in this you ſhould conſult ſome good writing-maſter, or any other perſon who writes well, and quick. When he has learned to hold his pen right, in the next place he ſhould learn how to lay his paper, and place his arm and body to it. Theſe practices being got over, the way to teach him to write without much trouble, is to get a plate graved with the characters of ſuch a hand as you like beſt: but you muſt remember to have them a pretty deal bigger than he ſhould ordinarily write; for every one naturally comes by degrees to write a leſs hand than he at firſt was taught, but never a bigger. Such a plate being graved, let ſeveral ſheets of good writing-paper be printed off with red ink, which he has nothing to do but to go over with a good pen filled with black ink, which will quickly bring his hand to the formation of thoſe characters, being at firſt ſhowed where to begin, and how to form every letter. And when he can do that well, he muſt then exerciſe on fair paper; and ſo may eaſily be brought to write the hand you deſire.

Drawing. § 161. When he can write well, and quick, I think it may be convenient, not only to continue the exerciſe of his hand in writing, but alſo to improve the uſe of it farther in drawing, a thing very uſeful to a gentleman on ſeveral occaſions, but

but especially if he travel, as that which helps a man often to express, in a few lines well put together, what a whole sheet of paper in writing would not be able to represent and make intelligible. How many buildings may a man see, how many machines and habits meet with, the ideas whereof would be easily retained and communicated by a little skill in drawing; which, being committed to words, are in danger to be lost, or at best but ill retained in the most exact descriptions? I do not mean that I would have your son a perfect painter; to be that to any tolerable degree, will require more time than a young gentleman can spare from his other improvements of greater moment; but so much insight into perspective, and skill in drawing, as will enable him to represent tolerably on paper any thing he sees, except faces, may, I think, be got in a little time, especially if he have a genius to it: but where that is wanting, unless it be in the things absolutely necessary, it is better to let him pass them by quietly, than to vex him about them to no purpose: and therefore in this, as in all other things not absolutely necessary, the rule holds, "Nihil invitâ Minervâ."

Short-hand.

¶ 1. Short-hand, an art, as I have been told, known only in England, may perhaps be thought worth the learning, both for dispatch in what men write for their own memory, and concealment of what they would not have lie open to every eye. For he that has once learned any sort of character, may easily vary it to his own private use or fancy, and with more contraction suit it to the business he would employ it in. Mr. Rich's, the best contrived of any I have seen, may, as I think, by one who knows and considers grammar well, be made much easier and shorter. But, for the learning this compendious way of writing, there will be no need hastily to look out a master; it will be early enough, when any convenient opportunity offers itself, at any time after his hand is well settled in fair and quick writing. For boys have but little use of short-hand, and should by no means practise it, till they write perfectly well, and have thoroughly fixed the habit of doing so.

French. § 162. As ſoon as he can ſpeak engliſh, it is time for him to learn ſome other language: this no-body doubts of, when french is propoſed. And the reaſon is, becauſe people are accuſtomed to the right way of teaching that language, which is by talking it into children in conſtant converſation, and not by grammatical rules. The latin tongue would eaſily be taught the ſame way, if his tutor, being conſtantly with him, would talk nothing elſe to him, and make him anſwer ſtill in the ſame language. But becauſe french is a living language, and to be uſed more in ſpeaking, that ſhould be firſt learned, that the yet pliant organs of ſpeech might be accuſtomed to a due formation of thoſe ſounds, and he get the habit of pronouncing french well, which is the harder to be done, the longer it is delayed.

Latin. § 163. When he can ſpeak and read french well, which in this method is uſually in a year or two, he ſhould proceed to latin, which it is a wonder parents, when they have had the experiment in french, ſhould not think ought to be learned the ſame way, by talking and reading. Only care is to be taken, whilſt he is learning theſe foreign languages, by ſpeaking and reading nothing elſe with his tutor, that he do not forget to read engliſh, which may be preſerved by his mother, or ſome body elſe, hearing him read ſome choſen parts of the ſcripture or other engliſh book, every day.

§ 164. Latin I look upon as abſolutely neceſſary to a gentleman; and indeed cuſtom, which prevails over every thing, has made it ſo much a part of education, that even thoſe children are whipped to it, and made ſpend many hours of their precious time uneaſily in latin, who, after they are once gone from ſchool, are never to have more to do with it, as long as they live. Can there be any thing more ridiculous, than that a father ſhould waſte his own money, and his ſon's time, in ſetting him to learn the roman language, when, at the ſame time, he deſigns him for a trade, wherein he, having no uſe of latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought from ſchool, and which it is ten to one

one he abhors for the ill usage it procured him? Could it be believed, unless we had every-where amongst us examples of it, that a child should be forced to learn the rudiments of a language, which he is never to use in the course of life that he is designed to, and neglect all the while the writing a good hand, and casting accounts, which are of great advantage in all conditions of life, and to most trades indispensably necessary? But though these qualifications, requisite to trade and commerce, and the business of the world, are seldom or never to be had at grammar-schools; yet thither not only gentlemen send their younger sons intended for trades, but even tradesmen and farmers fail not to send their children, though they have neither intention nor ability to make them scholars. If you ask them, why they do this? they think it as strange a question, as if you should ask them why they go to church? Custom serves for reason, and has, to those that take it for reason, so consecrated this method, that it is almost religiously observed by them; and they stick to it, as if their children had scarce an orthodox education, unless they learned Lilly's grammar.

§ 165. But how necessary soever latin be to some, and is thought to be to others, to whom it is of no manner of use or service, yet the ordinary way of learning it in a grammar-school, is that, which having had thoughts about, I cannot be forward to encourage. The reasons against it are so evident and cogent, that they have prevailed with some intelligent persons to quit the ordinary road, not without success, though the method made use of was not exactly that which I imagine the easiest, and in short is this: to trouble the child with no grammar at all, but to have latin, as english has been, without the perplexity of rules, talked into him; for, if you will consider it, latin is no more unknown to a child, when he comes into the world, than english: and yet he learns english without master, rule, or grammar; and so might he latin too, as Tully did, if he had somebody always to talk to him in this language. And when we so often see a frenchwoman teach an english girl to speak and read french perfectly,

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in a year or two, without any rule of grammar, or any thing elſe, but prattling to her; I cannot but wonder, how gentlemen have been overſeen this way for their ſons, and thought them more dull or incapable than their daughters.

§ 166. If therefore a man could be got, who, himſelf ſpeaking good latin, would always be about your ſon, talk conſtantly to him, and ſuffer him to ſpeak or read nothing elſe, this will be the true and genuine way, and that which I would propoſe, not only as the eaſieſt and beſt, wherein a child might, without pains or chiding, get a language, which others are wont to be whipped for at ſchool, ſix or ſeven years together; but alſo as that, wherein at the ſame time he might have his mind and manners formed, and he be inſtructed to boot in ſeveral ſciences, ſuch as are a good part of geography, aſtronomy, chronology, anatomy, beſides ſome parts of hiſtory, and all other parts of knowledge of things, that fall under the ſenſes, and require little more than memory. For there, if we would take the true way, our knowledge ſhould begin, and in thoſe things be laid the foundation; and not in the abſtract notions of logic and metaphyſics, which are fitter to amuſe, than inform the underſtanding, in its firſt ſetting out towards knowledge. When young men have had their heads employed a while in thoſe abſtract ſpeculations, without finding the ſucceſs and improvement, or that uſe of them which they expected, they are apt to have mean thoughts, either of learning, or themſelves; they are tempted to quit their ſtudies, and throw away their books, as containing nothing but hard words, and empty ſounds; or elſe to conclude, that if there be any real knowledge in them, they themſelves have not underſtandings capable of it. That this is ſo, perhaps I could aſſure you upon my own experience. Amongſt other things to be learned by a young gentleman in this method, whilſt others of his age are wholly taken up with latin and languages, I may alſo ſet down geometry for one, having known a young gentleman, bred ſomething after this way, able to demonſtrate ſeveral propoſitions in Euclid, before he was thirteen.

§ 167.

§ 167. But if such a man cannot be got, who speaks good latin, and, being able to instruct your son in all these parts of knowledge, will undertake it by this method; the next best is to have him taught as near this way as may be, which is by taking some easy and pleasant book, such as Æsop's fables, and writing the english translation (made as literal as it can be) in one line, and the latin words, which answer each of them, just over it in another. These let him read every day over and over again, till he perfectly understands the latin; and then go on to another fable, till he be also perfect in that, not omitting what he is already perfect in, but sometimes reviewing that, to keep it in his memory. And when he comes to write, let these be set him for copies; which, with the exercise of his hand, will also advance him in latin. This being a more imperfect way than by talking latin unto him, the formation of the verbs first, and afterwards the declensions of the nouns and pronouns perfectly learnt by heart, may facilitate his acquaintance with the genius and manner of the latin tongue, which varies the signification of verbs and nouns, not as the modern languages do, by particles prefixed, but by changing the last syllables. More than this of grammar I think he need not have, till he can read himself "Sanctii Minerva," with Scioppius and Perizonius's notes.

In teaching of children this too, I think, it is to be observed, that in most cases, where they stick, they are not to be farther puzzled, by putting them upon finding it out themselves; as by asking such questions as these, viz. Which is the nominative case in the sentence they are to construe? or demanding what "aufero" signifies, to lead them to the knowledge what "abstulere" signifies, &c. when they cannot readily tell. This wastes time only in disturbing them; for whilst they are learning, and applying themselves with attention, they are to be kept in good humour, and every thing made easy to them, and as pleasant as possible. Therefore, wherever they are at a stand, and are willing to go forwards, help them presently over the difficulty without any rebuke or chiding: remembering

bering that, where harſher ways are taken, they are the effect only of pride and peeviſhneſs in the teacher, who expects children ſhould inſtantly be maſters of as much as he knows: whereas he ſhould rather conſider, that his buſineſs is to ſettle in them habits, not angrily to inculcate rules, which ſerve for little in the conduct of our lives; at leaſt are of no uſe to children, who forget them as ſoon as given. In ſciences where their reaſon is to be exerciſed, I will not deny, but this method may ſometimes be varied, and difficulties propoſed on purpoſe to excite induſtry, and accuſtom the mind to employ its whole ſtrength and ſagacity in reaſoning. But yet, I gueſs, this is not to be done to children whilſt very young; nor at their entrance upon any ſort of knowledge: then every thing of itſelf is difficult, and the great uſe and ſkill of a teacher is to make all as eaſy as he can. But particularly in learning of languages there is leaſt occaſion for poſing of children. For languages being to be learned by rote, cuſtom, and memory, are then ſpoken in greateſt perfection, when all rules of grammar are utterly forgotten. I grant the grammar of a language is ſometimes very carefully to be ſtudied: but it is only to be ſtudied by a grown man, when he applies himſelf to the underſtanding of any language critically, which is ſeldom the buſineſs of any but profeſſed ſcholars. This, I think, will be agreed to, that, if a gentleman be to ſtudy any language, it ought to be that of his own country, that he may underſtand the language, which he has conſtant uſe of, with the utmoſt accuracy.

There is yet a farther reaſon, why maſters and teachers ſhould raiſe no difficulties to their ſcholars; but, on the contrary, ſhould ſmooth their way, and readily help them forwards, where they find them ſtop. Children's minds are narrow and weak, and uſually ſuſceptible but of one thought at once. Whatever is in a child's head, fills it for the time, eſpecially if ſet on with any paſſion. It ſhould therefore be the ſkill and art of the teacher, to clear their heads of all other thoughts, whilſt they are learning of any thing, the better to make room for what he would inſtil into them, that it

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may be received with attention and application, without which it leaves no impreſſion. The natural temper of children diſpoſes their minds to wander. Novelty alone takes them; whatever that preſents, they are preſently eager to have a taſte of, and are as ſoon ſatiated with it. They quickly grow weary of the ſame thing, and ſo have almoſt their whole delight in change and variety. It is a contradiction to the natural ſtate of childhood, for them to fix their fleeting thoughts. Whether this be owing to the temper of their brains, or the quickneſs or inſtability of their animal ſpirits, over which the mind has not yet got a full command; this is viſible, that it is a pain to children to keep their thoughts ſteady to any thing. A laſting continued attention is one of the hardeſt taſks can be impoſed on them: and therefore, he that requires their application, ſhould endeavour to make what he propoſes as grateful and agreeable as poſſible; at leaſt, he ought to take care not to join any diſpleaſing or frightful idea with it. If they come not to their books with ſome kind of liking and reliſh, it is no wonder their thoughts ſhould be perpetually ſhifting from what diſguſts them, and ſeek better entertainment in more pleaſing objects, after which they will unavoidably be gadding.

It is, I know, the uſual method of tutors, to endeavour to procure attention in their ſcholars, and to fix their minds to the buſineſs in hand, by rebukes and corrections, if they find them ever ſo little wandering. But ſuch treatment is ſure to produce the quite contrary effect. Paſſionate words or blows from the tutor fill the child's mind with terrour and affrightment, which immediately takes it wholly up, and leaves no room for other impreſſions. I believe there is nobody, that reads this, but may recollect, what diſorder haſty or imperious words from his parents or teachers have cauſed in his thoughts; how for the time it has turned his brains, ſo that he ſcarce knew what was ſaid by, or to him: he preſently loſt the ſight of what he was upon; his mind was filled with diſorder and confuſion, and in that ſtate was no longer capable of attention to any thing elſe.

It is true, parents and governors ought to ſettle and eſtabliſh their authority, by an awe over the minds of thoſe under their tuition; and to rule them by that: but when they have got an aſcendant over them, they ſhould uſe it with great moderation, and not make themſelves ſuch ſcarecrows, that their ſcholars ſhould always tremble in their ſight. Such an auſterity may make their government eaſy to themſelves, but of very little uſe to their pupils. It is impoſſible children ſhould learn any thing, whilſt their thoughts are poſſeſſed and diſturbed with any paſſion, eſpecially fear, which makes the ſtrongeſt impreſſion on their yet tender and weak ſpirits. Keep the mind in an eaſy calm temper, when you would have it receive your inſtructions, or any increaſe of knowledge. It is as impoſſible to draw fair and regular characters on a trembling mind, as on a ſhaking paper.

The great ſkill of a teacher is to get and keep the attention of his ſcholar: whilſt he has that, he is ſure to advance as faſt as the learner's abilities will carry him; and without that, all his buſtle and pother will be to little or no purpoſe. To attain this, he ſhould make the child comprehend (as much as may be) the uſefulneſs of what he teaches him; and let him ſee, by what he has learned, that he can do ſomething which he could not do before; ſomething which gives him ſome power and real advantage above others, who are ignorant of it. To this he ſhould add ſweetneſs in all his inſtructions; and by a certain tenderneſs in his whole carriage, make the child ſenſible that he loves him, and deſigns nothing but his good; the only way to beget love in the child, which will make him hearken to his leſſons, and reliſh what he teaches him.

Nothing but obſtinacy ſhould meet with any imperiouſneſs or rough uſage. All other faults ſhould be corrected with a gentle hand; and kind encouraging words will work better and more effectually upon a willing mind, and even prevent a good deal of that perverſeneſs, which rough and imperious uſage often produces in well-diſpoſed and generous minds. It is true, obſtinacy and wilful neglects muſt be maſtered,

even though it coſt blows to do it: but I am apt to think perverſeneſs in the pupils is often the effect of frowardneſs in the tutor; and that moſt children would ſeldom have deſerved blows, if needleſs and miſapplied roughneſs had not taught them ill-nature, and given them an averſion to their teacher, and all that comes from him.

Inadvertency, forgetfulneſs, unſteadineſs, and wandering of thought, are the natural faults of childhood: and therefore, when they are not obſerved to be wilful, are to be mentioned ſoftly, and gained upon by time. If every ſlip of this kind produces anger and rating, the occaſions of rebuke and corrections will return ſo often, that the tutor will be a conſtant terrour and uneaſineſs to his pupils; which one thing is enough to hinder their profiting by his leſſons, and to defeat all his methods of inſtruction.

Let the awe he has got upon their minds be ſo tempered with the conſtant marks of tenderneſs and goodwill, that affection may ſpur them to their duty, and make them find a pleaſure in complying with his dictates. This will bring them with ſatisfaction to their tutor; make them hearken to him, as to one who is their friend, that cheriſhes them, and takes pains for their good; this will keep their thoughts eaſy and free, whilſt they are with him, the only temper wherein the mind is capable of receiving new informations, and of admitting into itſelf thoſe impreſſions, which if not taken and retained, all that they and their teacher do together is loſt labour; there is much uneaſineſs, and little learning.

§ 168. When, by this way of interlining latin and engliſh one with another, he has got a moderate knowledge of the latin tongue, he may then be advanced a little farther to the reading of ſome other eaſy latin book, ſuch as Juſtin, or Eutropius; and to make the reading and underſtanding of it the leſs tedious, and difficult to him, let him help himſelf, if he pleaſe, with the engliſh tranſlation. Nor let the objection, that he will then know it only by rote, fright any one. This, when well conſidered, is not of any moment againſt, but

but plainly for, this way of learning a language; for languages are only to be learned by rote; and a man, who does not ſpeak engliſh or latin perfectly by rote, ſo that having thought of the thing he would ſpeak of, his tongue of courſe, without thought of rule of grammar, falls into the proper expreſſion and idiom of that language, does not ſpeak it well, nor is maſter of it. And I would fain have any one name to me that tongue, that any one can learn or ſpeak as he ſhould do, by the rules of grammar. Languages were made not by rules or art, but by accident, and the common uſe of the people. And he that will ſpeak them well, has no other rule but that; nor any thing to truſt to but his memory, and the habit of ſpeaking after the faſhion learned from thoſe that are allowed to ſpeak properly, which, in other words, is only to ſpeak by rote.

Grammar. It will poſſibly be aſked here, Is grammar then of no uſe? And have thoſe who have taken ſo much pains in reducing ſeveral languages to rules and obſervations, who have writ ſo much about declenſions and conjugations, about concords and ſyntaxis, loſt their labour, and been learned to no purpoſe? I ſay not ſo; grammar has its place too. But this I think I may ſay, there is more ſtir a great deal made with it than there needs, and thoſe are tormented about it, to whom it does not at all belong; I mean children, at the age wherein they are uſually perplexed with it in grammar-ſchools.

There is nothing more evident, than that languages learned by rote ſerve well enough for the common affairs of life, and ordinary commerce. Nay, perſons of quality of the ſofter ſex, and ſuch of them as have ſpent their time in well-bred company, ſhow us, that this plain natural way, without the leaſt ſtudy or knowledge of grammar, can carry them to a great degree of elegancy and politeneſs in their language: and there are ladies who, without knowing what tenſes and participles, adverbs and prepoſitions are, ſpeak as properly, and as correctly, (they might take it for an ill compliment, if I ſaid as any country ſchool-maſter) as moſt gentlemen who have been bred up in the ordinary methods

methods of grammar-ſchools. Grammar therefore we ſee may be ſpared in ſome caſes. The queſtion then will be, To whom ſhould it be taught, and when? To this I anſwer,

1. Men learn languages for the ordinary intercourſe of ſociety, and communication of thoughts in common life, without any farther deſign in their uſe of them. And for this purpoſe the original way of learning a language by converſation not only ſerves well enough, but is to be preferred, as the moſt expedite, proper, and natural. Therefore to this uſe of language one may anſwer, that grammar is not neceſſary. This ſo many of my readers muſt be forced to allow, as underſtand what I here ſay, and who, converſing with others, underſtand them without having ever been taught the grammar of the engliſh tongue: which I ſuppoſe is the caſe of incomparably the greateſt part of engliſhmen; of whom I have never yet known any one who learned his mother-tongue by rules.

2. Others there are, the greateſt part of whoſe buſineſs in this world is to be done with their tongues, and with their pens; and to thoſe it is convenient, if not neceſſary, that they ſhould ſpeak properly and correctly, whereby they may let their thoughts into other men's minds, the more eaſily, and with the greater impreſſion. Upon this account it is, that any ſort of ſpeaking, ſo as will make him be underſtood, is not thought enough for a gentleman. He ought to ſtudy grammar, amongſt the other helps of ſpeaking well; but it muſt be the grammar of his own tongue, of the language he uſes, that he may underſtand his own country ſpeech nicely, and ſpeak it properly, without ſhocking the ears of thoſe it is addreſſed to with ſoleciſms and offenſive irregularities. And to this purpoſe grammar is neceſſary: but it is the grammar only of their own proper tongues, and to thoſe only who would take pains in cultivating their language, and in perfecting their ſtyles. Whether all gentlemen ſhould not do this, I leave to be conſidered, ſince the want of propriety, and grammatical exactneſs, is thought very miſbecoming one of that rank, and uſually draws on one guilty of ſuch faults

the cenſure of having had a lower breeding, and worſe company, than ſuits with his quality. If this be ſo, (as I ſuppoſe it is) it will be matter of wonder, why young gentlemen are forced to learn the grammars of foreign and dead languages, and are never once told of the grammar of their own tongues: they do not ſo much as know there is any ſuch thing, much leſs is it made their buſineſs to be inſtructed in it. Nor is their own language ever propoſed to them as worthy their care and cultivating, though they have daily uſe of it, and are not ſeldom in the future courſe of their lives judged of, by their handſome or aukward way of expreſſing themſelves in it. Whereas the languages whoſe grammars they have been ſo much employed in, are ſuch as probably they ſhall ſcarce ever ſpeak or write; or, if upon occaſion this ſhould happen, they ſhall be excuſed for the miſtakes and faults they make in it. Would not a chineſe, who took notice of this way of breeding, be apt to imagine, that all our young gentlemen were deſigned to be teachers and profeſſors of the dead languages of foreign countries, and not to be men of buſineſs in their own?

3. There is a third ſort of men, who apply themſelves to two or three foreign, dead (and which amongſt us are called the learned) languages, make them their ſtudy, and pique themſelves upon their ſkill in them. No doubt thoſe who propoſe to themſelves the learning of any language with this view, and would be critically exact in it, ought carefully to ſtudy the grammar of it. I would not be miſtaken here, as if this were to undervalue greek and latin: I grant theſe are languages of great uſe and excellency; and a man can have no place amongſt the learned, in this part of the world, who is a ſtranger to them. But the knowledge a gentleman would ordinarily draw for his uſe, out of the roman and greek writers, I think he may attain without ſtudying the grammars of thoſe tongues, and, by bare reading, may come to underſtand them ſufficiently for all his purpoſes. How much farther he ſhall at any time be concerned to look into the grammar and critical niceties of either of theſe tongues, he himſelf will

will be able to determine, when he comes to propoſe to himſelf the ſtudy of any thing that ſhall require it. Which brings me to the other part of the inquiry, viz.

" When grammar ſhould be taught?"

To which, upon the premiſed grounds, the anſwer is obvious, viz.

That, if grammar ought to be taught at any time, it muſt be to one that can ſpeak the language already: how elſe can he be taught the grammar of it? This, at leaſt, is evident from the practice of the wiſe and learned nations amongſt the ancients. They made it a part of education to cultivate their own, not foreign tongues. The greeks counted all other nations barbarous, and had a contempt for their languages. And, though the greek learning grew in credit amongſt the romans, towards the end of their commonwealth, yet it was the roman tongue that was made the ſtudy of their youth: their own language they were to make uſe of, and therefore it was their own language they were inſtructed and exerciſed in.

But more particularly to determine the proper ſeaſon for grammar; I do not ſee how it can reaſonably be made any one's ſtudy, but as an introduction to rhetoric: when it is thought time to put any one upon the care of poliſhing his tongue, and of ſpeaking better than the illiterate, then is the time for him to be inſtructed in the rules of grammar, and not before. For grammar being to teach men not to ſpeak, but to ſpeak correctly, and according to the exact rules of the tongue, which is one part of elegancy, there is little uſe of the one to him that has no need of the other; where rhetoric is not neceſſary, grammar may be ſpared. I know not why any one ſhould waſte his time, and beat his head about the latin grammar, who does not intend to be a critic, or make ſpeeches, and write diſpatches in it. When any one finds in himſelf a neceſſity or diſpoſition to ſtudy any foreign language to the bottom, and to be nicely exact in the knowledge of it, it will be time enough to take a grammatical ſurvey of it. If his uſe of it be only to underſtand ſome books writ in it, without a critical knowledge of the tongue itſelf,

reading alone, as I have said, will attain this end, without charging the mind with the multiplied rules and intricacies of grammar.

§ 169. For the exercise of his writing, let him sometimes translate latin into english: but the learning of latin being nothing but the learning of words, a very unpleasant business both to young and old, join as much other real knowledge with it as you can, beginning still with that which lies most obvious to the senses; such as is the knowledge of minerals, plants, and animals, and particularly timber and fruit-trees, their parts and ways of propagation, wherein a great deal may be taught a child, which will not be useless to the man. But more especially geography, astronomy, and anatomy. But, whatever you are teaching him, have a care still, that you do not clog him with too much at once; or make any thing his business but downright virtue, or reprove him for any thing but vice, or some apparent tendency to it.

§ 170. But, if, after all, his fate be to go to school to get the latin tongue, it will be in vain to talk to you concerning the method I think best to be observed in schools. You must submit to that you find there, not expect to have it changed for your son; but yet by all means obtain, if you can, that he be not employed in making latin themes and declamations, and, least of all, verses of any kind. You may insist on it, if it will do any good, that you have no design to make him either a latin orator or poet, but barely would have him understand perfectly a latin author; and that you observe those who teach any of the modern languages, and that with success, never amuse their scholars to make speeches or verses either in french or italian, their business being language barely, and not invention.

Themes.

§ 171. But to tell you, a little more fully, why I would not have him exercised in making of themes and verses: 1. As to themes, they have, I confess, the pretence of something useful, which is to teach people to speak handsomely and well on any subject; which, if it could be attained this way, I own, would be a great advantage;

advantage; there being nothing more becoming a gentleman, nor more useful in all the occurrences of life, than to be able, on any occasion, to speak well, and to the purpose. But this I say, that the making of themes, as is usual in schools, helps not one jot towards it: for do but consider what it is in making a theme that a young lad is employed about; it is to make a speech on some latin saying, as "Omnia vincit amor," or "Non licet in bello bis peccare," &c. And here the poor lad, who wants knowledge of those things he is to speak of, which is to be had only from time and observation, must set his invention on the rack, to say something where he knows nothing, which is a sort of ægyptian tyranny, to bid them make bricks who have not yet any of the materials. And therefore it is usual, in such cases, for the poor children to go to those of higher forms with this petition, "Pray give me a little "sense;" which, whether it be more reasonable or more ridiculous, is not easy to determine. Before a man can be in any capacity to speak on any subject, it is necessary he be acquainted with it; or else it is as foolish to set him to discourse of it, as to set a blind man to talk of colours, or a deaf man of music. And would you not think him a little cracked who would require another to make an argument on a moot-point, who understands nothing of our laws? And what, I pray, do school-boys understand concerning those matters, which are used to be proposed to them in their themes, as subjects to discourse on, to whet and exercise their fancies?

§ 172. In the next place, consider the language that their themes are made in: it is latin, a language foreign in their country, and long since dead every-where; a language which your son, it is a thousand to one, shall never have an occasion once to make a speech in as long as he lives, after he comes to be a man; and a language, wherein the manner of expressing one's self is so far different from our's, that to be perfect in that, would very little improve the purity and facility of his english style. Besides that, there is now so little room or use for set speeches in our own language in any part of our

engliſh buſineſs, that I can ſee no pretence for this ſort of exerciſe in our ſchools; unleſs it can be ſuppoſed, that the making of ſet latin ſpeeches ſhould be the way to teach men to ſpeak well in engliſh extempore. The way to that I ſhould think rather to be this: that there ſhould be propoſed to young gentlemen rational and uſeful queſtions, ſuited to their age and capacities, and on ſubjects not wholly unknown to them, nor out of their way: ſuch as theſe, when they are ripe for exerciſes of this nature, they ſhould, extempore or after a little meditation upon the ſpot, ſpeak to, without penning of any thing. For I aſk, if he will examine the effects of this way of learning to ſpeak well, who ſpeak beſt in any buſineſs, when occaſion calls them to it upon any debate; either thoſe who have accuſtomed themſelves to compoſe and write down before-hand what they would ſay; or thoſe, who thinking only of the matter, to underſtand that as well as they can, uſe themſelves only to ſpeak extempore? And he that ſhall judge by this, will be little apt to think, that the accuſtoming him to ſtudied ſpeeches, and ſet compoſitions, is the way to fit a young gentleman for buſineſs.

§ 173. But perhaps we ſhall be told, it is to improve and perfect them in the latin tongue. It is true, that is their proper buſineſs at ſchool; but the making of themes is not the way to it: that perplexes their brains, about invention of things to be ſaid, not about the ſignification of words to be learnt; and, when they are making a theme, it is thoughts they ſearch and ſweat for, and not language. But the learning and maſtery of a tongue, being uneaſy and unpleaſant enough in itſelf, ſhould not be cumbered with any other difficulties, as is done in this way of proceeding. In fine, if boys invention be to be quickened by ſuch exerciſe, let them make themes in engliſh, where they have facility, and a command of words, and will better ſee what kind of thoughts they have, when put into their own language: and, if the latin tongue be to be learned, let it be done in the eaſieſt way, without toiling and diſguſting the mind by ſo uneaſy an employment as that of making ſpeeches joined to it.

§ 174.

§ 174. If these may be any reasons against children's making latin themes at school, I have much more to say, and of more weight, against their making verses of any sort: for, if he has no genius to poetry, it is the most unreasonable thing in the world to torment a child, and waste his time about that which can never succeed; and, if he have a poetic vein, it is to me the strangest thing in the world, that the father should desire or suffer it to be cherished or improved. Methinks the parents should labour to have it stifled and suppressed as much as may be; and I know not what reason a father can have to wish his son a poet, who does not desire to have him bid defiance to all other callings and business: which is not yet the worst of the case; for if he proves a successful rhymer, and gets once the reputation of a wit, I desire it may be considered, what company and places he is like to spend his time in, nay, and estate too: for it is very seldom seen, that any one discovers mines of gold or silver in Parnassus. It is a pleasant air, but a barren soil; and there are very few instances of those who have added to their patrimony by any thing they have reaped from thence. Poetry and gaming, which usually go together, are alike in this too, that they seldom bring any advantage, but to those who have nothing else to live on. Men of estates almost constantly go away losers; and it is well if they escape at a cheaper rate than their whole estates, or the greatest part of them. If therefore you would not have your son the fiddle to every jovial company, without whom the sparks could not relish their wine, nor know how to pass an afternoon idly; if you would not have him waste his time and estate to divert others, and contemn the dirty acres left him by his ancestors, I do not think you will much care he should be a poet, or that his school-master should enter him in versifying. But yet, if any one will think poetry a desireable quality in his son, and that the study of it would raise his fancy and parts, he must needs yet confess, that, to that end, reading the excellent greek and roman poets, is of more use than making bad verses of his own, in a language Verses.

that is not his own. And he, whose design it is to excel in english poetry, would not, I guess, think the way to it were to make his first essays in latin verses.

Memoriter. § 175. Another thing, very ordinary in the vulgar method of grammar-schools, there is, of which I see no use at all, unless it be to baulk young lads in the way to learning languages, which, in my opinion, should be made as easy and pleasant as may be; and that which was painful in it, as much as possible, quite removed. That which I mean, and here complain of, is, their being forced to learn by heart great parcels of the authors which are taught them; wherein I can discover no advantage at all, especially to the business they are upon. Languages are to be learnt only by reading and talking, and not by scraps of authors got by heart; which when a man's head is stuffed with, he has got the just furniture of a pedant, and it is the ready way to make him one, than which there is nothing less becoming a gentleman. For what can be more ridiculous, than to mix the rich and handsome thoughts and sayings of others with a deal of poor stuff of his own; which is thereby the more exposed; and has no other grace in it, nor will otherwise recommend the speaker, than a thread-bare russet-coat would, that was set off with large patches of scarlet and glittering brocade? Indeed, where a passage comes in the way, whose matter is worth remembrance, and the expression of it very close and excellent, (as there are many such in the ancient authors) it may not be amiss to lodge it in the minds of young scholars, and with such admirable strokes of those great masters sometimes exercise the memories of school-boys: but their learning of their lessons by heart, as they happen to fall out in their books without choice or distinction, I know not what it serves for, but to mispend their time and pains, and give them a disgust and aversion to their books, wherein they find nothing but useless trouble.

§ 176. I hear it is said, that children should be employed in getting things by heart, to exercise and improve their memories. I could wish this were said with as

as much authority of reaſon, as it is with forwardneſs of aſſurance; and that this practice were eſtabliſhed upon good obſervation, more than old cuſtom; for it is evident, that ſtrength of memory is owing to an happy conſtitution, and not to any habitual improvement got by exerciſe. It is true, what the mind is intent upon, and for fear of letting it ſlip, often imprints afreſh on itſelf by frequent reflection, that it is apt to retain, but ſtill according to its own natural ſtrength of retention. An impreſſion made on bees-wax or lead will not laſt ſo long as on braſs or ſteel. Indeed, if it be renewed often, it may laſt the longer; but every new reflecting on it is a new impreſſion, and it is from thence one is to reckon, if one would know how long the mind retains it. But the learning pages of latin by heart, no more fits the memory for retention of any thing elſe, than the graving of one ſentence in lead, makes it the more capable of retaining firmly any other characters. If ſuch a ſort of exerciſe of the memory were able to give it ſtrength, and improve our parts, players of all other people muſt needs have the beſt memories, and be the beſt company: but whether the ſcraps they have got into their head this way, make them remember other things the better; and whether their parts be improved proportionably to the pains they have taken in getting by heart other ſayings; experience will ſhow. Memory is ſo neceſſary to all parts and conditions of life, and ſo little is to be done without it, that we are not to fear it ſhould grow dull and uſeleſs for want of exerciſe, if exerciſe would make it grow ſtronger. But I fear this faculty of the mind is not capable of much help and amendment in general, by any exerciſe or endeavour of ours, at leaſt not by that uſed upon this pretence in grammar-ſchools. And if Xerxes was able to call every common ſoldier by his name, in his army, that conſiſted of no leſs than an hundred thouſand men, I think it may be gueſſed, he got not this wonderful ability by learning his leſſons by heart, when he was a boy. This method of exerciſing and improving the memory by toilſome repetitions, without book, of what they read, is, I think, little uſed in the education of princes;

princes; which, if it had that advantage talked of, ſhould be as little neglected in them, as in the meaneſt ſchool-boys: princes having as much need of good memories as any men living, and have generally an equal ſhare in this faculty with other men: though it has never been taken care of this way. What the mind is intent upon, and careful of, that it remembers beſt, and for the reaſon above-mentioned: to which if method and order be joined, all is done, I think, that can be, for the help of a weak memory; and he that will take any other way to do it, eſpecially that of charging it with a train of other people's words, which he that learns cares not for; will, I gueſs, ſcarce find the profit anſwer half the time and pains employed in it.

I do not mean hereby, that there ſhould be no exerciſe given to children's memories. I think their memories ſhould be employed, but not in learning by rote whole pages out of books, which, the leſſon being once ſaid, and that taſk over, are delivered up again to oblivion, and neglected for ever. This mends neither the memory nor the mind. What they ſhould learn by heart out of authors, I have above-mentioned: and ſuch wiſe and uſeful ſentences being once given in charge to their memories, they ſhould never be ſuffered to forget again, but be often called to account for them: whereby, beſides the uſe thoſe ſayings may be to them in their future life, as ſo many good rules and obſervations; they will be taught to reflect often, and bethink themſelves what they have to remember, which is the only way to make the memory quick and uſeful. The cuſtom of frequent reflection will keep their minds from running adrift, and call their thoughts home from uſeleſs inattentive roving: and therefore, I think, it may do well to give them ſomething every day to remember; but ſomething ſtill, that is in itſelf worth the remembering, and what you would never have out of mind, whenever you call, or they themſelves ſearch for it. This will oblige them often to turn their thoughts inwards, than which you cannot with them a better intellectual habit.

§ 177.

§ 177. But under whoſe care ſoever a child is put to be taught, during the tender and flexible years of his life, this is certain, it ſhould be one who thinks latin and language the leaſt part of education; one, who knowing how much virtue, and a well-tempered ſoul, is to be preferred to any ſort of learning or language, makes it his chief buſineſs to form the mind of his ſcholars, and give that a right diſpoſition: which, if once got, though all the reſt ſhould be neglected, would, in due time, produce all the reſt; and which if it be not got, and ſettled, ſo as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages and ſciences, and all the other accompliſhments of education, will be to no purpoſe, but to make the worſe or more dangerous man. And indeed, whatever ſtir there is made about getting of latin, as the great and difficult buſineſs; his mother may teach it him herſelf, if ſhe will but ſpend two or three hours in a day with him, and make him read the evangeliſts in latin to her: for ſhe need but buy a latin teſtament, and having got ſomebody to mark the laſt ſyllable but one, where it is long, in words above two ſyllables, (which is enough to regulate her pronunciation, and accenting the words) read daily in the goſpels; and then let her avoid underſtanding them in latin, if ſhe can. And when ſhe underſtands the evangeliſts in latin, let her, in the ſame manner, read Æſop's fables, and ſo proceed on to Eutropius, Juſtin, and other ſuch books. I do not mention this, as an imagination of what I fancy may do, but as of a thing I have known done, and the latin tongue, with eaſe, got this way. Latin.

But to return to what I was ſaying: he that takes on him the charge of bringing up young men, eſpecially young gentlemen, ſhould have ſomething more in him than latin, more than even a knowledge in the liberal ſciences; he ſhould be a perſon of eminent virtue and prudence, and with good ſenſe have good humour, and the ſkill to carry himſelf with gravity, eaſe, and kindneſs, in a conſtant converſation with his pupils. But of this I have ſpoken at large in another place.

§ 178.

Geography. § 178. At the same time that he is learning french and latin, a child, as has been said, may also be entered in arithmetic, geography, chronology, history, and geometry too. For if these be taught him in french or latin, when he begins once to understand either of these tongues, he will get a knowledge in these sciences, and the language to-boot.

Geography, I think, should be begun with; for the learning of the figure of the globe, the situation and boundaries of the four parts of the world, and that of particular kingdoms and countries, being only an exercise of the eyes and memory, a child with pleasure will learn and retain them: and this is so certain, that I now live in the house with a child, whom his mother has so well instructed this way in geography, that he knew the limits of the four parts of the world, could readily point, being asked, to any country upon the globe, or any county in the map of England; knew all the great rivers, promontories, straits, and bays in the world, and could find the longitude and latitude of any place, before he was six years old. These things, that he will thus learn by sight, and have by rote in his memory, are not all, I confess, that he is to learn upon the globes. But yet it is a good step and preparation to it, and will make the remainder much easier, when his judgment is grown ripe enough for it: besides that, it gets so much time now, and by the pleasure of knowing things, leads him on insensibly to the gaining of languages.

§ 179. When he has the natural parts of the globe well fixed in his memory, it may then be time to begin arithmetic. By the natural parts of the globe, I mean several positions of the parts of the earth and sea, under different names and distinctions of countries; not coming yet to those artificial and imaginary lines, which have been invented, and are only supposed, for the better improvement of that science.

Arithmetic. § 180. Arithmetic is the easiest, and consequently the first sort of abstract reasoning, which the mind commonly bears, or accustoms itself

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to: and is of ſo general uſe in all parts of life and buſineſs, that ſcarce any thing is to be done without it. This is certain, a man cannot have too much of it, nor too perfectly; he ſhould therefore begin to be exerciſed in counting, as ſoon, and as far, as he is capable of it; and do ſomething in it every day, till he is maſter of the art of numbers. When he underſtands addition and ſubtraction, he may then be advanced farther in geography, and after he is acquainted with the poles, zones, parallel circles, and meridians, be taught longitude and latitude, and by them be made to underſtand the uſe of maps, and by the numbers placed on their ſides, to know the reſpective ſituation of countries, and how to find them out on the terreſtrial globe. Which when he can readily do, he may then be entered in the celeſtial; and there going over all the circles again, with a more particular obſervation of the ecliptic or zodiac, to fix them all very clearly and diſtinctly in his mind, he may be taught the figure and poſition of the ſeveral conſtellations, which may be ſhowed him firſt upon the globe, and then in the heavens. Aſtronomy.

When that is done, and he knows pretty well the conſtellations of this our hemiſphere, it may be time to give him ſome notions of this our planetary world, and to that purpoſe it may not be amiſs to make him a draught of the copernican ſyſtem; and therein explain to him the ſituation of the planets, their reſpective diſtances from the ſun, the centre of their revolutions. This will prepare him to underſtand the motion and theory of the planets, the moſt eaſy and natural way. For, ſince aſtronomers no longer doubt of the motion of the planets about the ſun, it is fit he ſhould proceed upon that hypotheſis, which is not only the ſimpleſt and leaſt perplexed for a learner, but alſo the likelieſt to be true in itſelf. But in this, as in all other parts of inſtruction, great care muſt be taken with children, to begin with that which is plain and ſimple, and to teach them as little as can be at once, and ſettle that well in their heads, before you proceed to the next, or any thing new in that ſcience. Give them firſt one

ſimple

ſimple idea, and ſee that they take it right, and perfectly comprehend it, before you go any farther; and then add ſome other ſimple idea, which lies next in your way to what you aim at; and ſo proceeding by gentle and inſenſible ſteps, children, without confuſion and amazement, will have their underſtandings opened, and their thoughts extended, farther than could have been expected. And when any one has learned any thing himſelf, there is no ſuch way to fix it in his memory, and to encourage him to go on, as to ſet him to teach it others.

Geometry. § 181. When he has once got ſuch an acquaintance with the globes, as is above-mentioned, he may be fit to be tried a little in geometry; wherein I think the ſix firſt books of Euclid enough for him to be taught. For I am in ſome doubt, whether more to a man of buſineſs be neceſſary or uſeful; at leaſt if he have a genius and inclination to it, being entered ſo far by his tutor, he will be able to go on of himſelf without a teacher.

The globes therefore muſt be ſtudied, and that diligently, and, I think, may be begun betimes, if the tutor will but be careful to diſtinguiſh what the child is capable of knowing, and what not; for which this may be a rule, that perhaps will go a pretty way, (viz.) that children may be taught any thing that falls under their ſenſes, eſpecially their ſight, as far as their memories only are exercised: and thus a child very young may learn, which is the æquator, which the meridian, &c. which Europe, and which England, upon the globes, as ſoon almoſt as he knows the rooms of the houſe he lives in; if care be taken not to teach him too much at once, nor to ſet him upon a new part, till that, which he is upon, be perfectly learned and fixed in his memory.

Chronology. § 182. With geography, chronology ought to go hand in hand; I mean the general part of it, ſo that he may have in his mind a view of the whole current of time, and the ſeveral conſiderable epochs that are made uſe of in hiſtory. Without theſe two, hiſtory, which is the great miſtreſs of prudence and

and civil knowledge; and ought to be the proper ſtudy of a gentleman, or man of buſineſs in the world; without geography and chronology, I ſay, hiſtory will be very ill retained, and very little uſeful; but be only a jumble of matters of fact, confuſedly heaped together without order or inſtruction. It is by theſe two that the actions of mankind are ranked into their proper places of times and countries; under which circumſtances, they are not only much eaſier kept in the memory, but, in that natural order, are only capable to afford thoſe obſervations, which make a man the better and the abler for reading them.

§ 183. When I ſpeak of chronology as a ſcience he ſhould be perfect in, I do not mean the little controverſies that are in it. Theſe are endleſs, and moſt of them of ſo little importance to a gentleman, as not to deſerve to be inquired into, were they capable of an eaſy deciſion. And therefore all that learned noiſe and duſt of the chronologiſt is wholly to be avoided. The moſt uſeful book I have ſeen in that part of learning, is a ſmall treatiſe of Strauchius, which is printed in twelves, under the title of "Breviarium Chronologi-"cum," out of which may be ſelected all that is neceſſary to be taught a young gentleman concerning chronology; for all that is in that treatiſe a learner need not be cumbered with. He has in him the moſt remarkable or uſual epochs reduced all to that of the julian period, which is the eaſieſt, and plaineſt, and ſureſt method, that can be made uſe of in chronology. To this treatiſe of Strauchius, Helvicus's tables may be added, as a book to be turned to on all occaſions.

§ 184. As nothing teaches, ſo nothing delights, more than hiſtory. The firſt of theſe recommends it to the ſtudy of grown men; the latter makes me think it the fitteſt for a young lad, who, as ſoon as he is inſtructed in chronology, and acquainted with the ſeveral epochs in uſe in this part of the world, and can reduce them to the julian period, ſhould then have ſome latin hiſtory put into his hand. The choice ſhould be directed by the eaſineſs of the ſtyle; for where-ever he begins, chronology will keep it from con- *Hiſtory.*

confusion; and the pleasantness of the subject inviting him to read, the language will insensibly be got, without that terrible vexation and uneasiness, which children suffer where they are put into books beyond their capacity, such as are the roman orators and poets, only to learn the roman language. When he has by reading mastered the easier, such perhaps as Justin, Eutropius, Quintus Curtius, &c. the next degree to these will give him no great trouble: and thus, by a gradual progress from the plainest and easiest historians, he may at last come to read the most difficult and sublime of the latin authors, such as are Tully, Virgil, and Horace.

Ethics. § 185. The knowledge of virtue, all along from the beginning, in all the instances he is capable of, being taught him, more by practice than rules; and the love of reputation, instead of satisfying his appetite, being made habitual in him; I know not whether he should read any other discourses of morality, but what he finds in the bible; or have any system of ethics put into his hand, till he can read Tully's Offices, not as a school-boy to learn latin, but as one that would be informed in the principles and precepts of virtue, for the conduct of his life.

Civil law. § 186. When he has pretty well digested Tully's Offices, and added to it "Puffendorf de officio hominis & civis," it may be seasonable to set him upon "Grotius de jure belli & pacis," or, which perhaps is the better of the two, "Puffendorf de jure naturali & gentium," wherein he will be instructed in the natural rights of men, and the original and foundations of society, and the duties resulting from thence. This general part of civil law and history are studies which a gentleman should not barely touch at, but constantly dwell upon, and never have done with. A virtuous and well-behaved young man, that is well versed in the general part of the civil law, (which concerns not the chicane of private cases, but the affairs and intercourse of civilized nations in general, grounded upon principles of reason) understands latin well, and can write a good hand, one may turn loose

looſe into the world, with great aſſurance that he will find employment and eſteem every-where.

Law.

§ 187. It would be ſtrange to ſuppoſe an engliſh gentleman ſhould be ignorant of the law of his country. This, whatever ſtation he is in, is ſo requiſite, that, from a juſtice of the peace to a miniſter of ſtate, I know no place he can well fill without it. I do not mean the chicane or wrangling and captious part of the law; a gentleman whoſe buſineſs is to ſeek the true meaſures of right and wrong, and not the arts how to avoid doing the one, and ſecure himſelf in doing the other, ought to be as far from ſuch a ſtudy of the law, as he is concerned diligently to apply himſelf to that wherein he may be ſerviceable to his country. And to that purpoſe I think the right way for a gentleman to ſtudy our law, which he does not deſign for his calling, is to take a view of our engliſh conſtitution and government, in the ancient books of the common law, and ſome more modern writers, who out of them have given an account of this government. And having got a true idea of that, then to read our hiſtory, and with it join in every king's reign the laws then made. This will give an inſight into the reaſon of our ſtatutes, and ſhow the true ground upon which they came to be made, and what weight they ought to have.

Rhetoric. Logic.

§ 188. Rhetoric and logic being the arts that in the ordinary method uſually follow immediately after grammar, it may perhaps be wondered, that I have ſaid ſo little of them. The reaſon is, becauſe of the little advantage young people receive by them; for I have ſeldom or never obſerved any one to get the ſkill of reaſoning well, or ſpeaking handſomely, by ſtudying thoſe rules which pretend to teach it: and therefore I would have a young gentleman take a view of them in the ſhorteſt ſyſtems could be found, without dwelling long on the contemplation and ſtudy of thoſe formalities. Right reaſoning is founded on ſomething elſe than the predicaments and predicables, and does not conſiſt in talking in mode and figure itſelf. But it is beſides my preſent buſineſs to enlarge

upon this ſpeculation. To come therefore to what we have in hand; if you would have your ſon reaſon well, let him read Chillingworth; and if you would have him ſpeak well, let him be converſant in Tully, to give him the true idea of eloquence; and let him read thoſe things that are well writ in engliſh, to perfect his ſtyle in the purity of our language.

§ 189. If the uſe and end of right reaſoning be to have right notions, and a right judgment of things; to diſtinguiſh betwixt truth and falſhood, right and wrong, and to act accordingly; be ſure not to let your ſon be bred up in the art and formality of diſputing, either practiſing it himſelf, or admiring it in others; unleſs, inſtead of an able man, you deſire to have him an inſignificant wrangler, opiniatre in diſcourſe, and priding himſelf in contradicting others; or, which is worſe, queſtioning every thing, and thinking there is no ſuch thing as truth to be ſought, but only victory, in diſputing. There cannot be any thing ſo diſingenuous, ſo miſbecoming a gentleman, or any one who pretends to be a rational creature, as not to yield to plain reaſon, and the conviction of clear arguments. Is there any thing more inconſiſtent with civil converſation, and the end of all debate, than not to take an anſwer, though ever ſo full and ſatisfactory; but ſtill to go on with the diſpute, as long as equivocal ſounds can furniſh [a "medius terminus"] a term to wrangle with on the one ſide, or a diſtinction on the other? Whether pertinent or impertinent, ſenſe or nonſenſe, agreeing with, or contrary to, what he had ſaid before, it matters not. For this, in ſhort, is the way and perfection of logical diſputes, that the opponent never takes any anſwer, nor the reſpondent ever yields to any argument. This neither of them muſt do, whatever becomes of truth or knowledge, unleſs he will paſs for a poor baffled wretch, and lie under the diſgrace of not being able to maintain whatever he has once affirmed, which is the great aim and glory in diſputing. Truth is to be found and ſupported by a mature and due conſideration of things themſelves, and not by artificial terms and ways of arguing: theſe lead not men ſo much into

into the discovery of truth, as into a captious and fallacious use of doubtful words, which is the most useless and most offensive way of talking, and such as least suits a gentleman or a lover of truth of any thing in the world.

There can scarce be a greater defect in a gentleman, than not to express himself well, either in writing or speaking. But yet, I think, I may ask my reader, Whether he doth not know a great many, who live upon their estates, and so, with the name, should have the qualities of gentlemen, who cannot so much as tell a story as they should, much less speak clearly and persuasively in any business? This I think not to be so much their fault, as the fault of their education; for I must, without partiality, do my countrymen this right, that where they apply themselves, I see none of their neighbours outgo them. They have been taught rhetoric, but yet never taught how to express themselves handsomely with their tongues, or pens, in the language they are always to use; as if the names of the figures, that embellished the discourses of those who understood the art of speaking, were the very art and skill of speaking well. This, as all other things of practice, is to be learned not by a few or a great many rules given, but by exercise and application, according to good rules, or rather patterns, till habits are got, and a facility of doing it well.

Style.

Agreeable hereunto, perhaps it might not be amiss to make children, as soon as they are capable of it, often to tell a story of any thing they know; and to correct at first the most remarkable fault they are guilty of, in their way of putting it together. When that fault is cured, then to show them the next, and so on, till, one after another, all, at least the gross ones, are mended. When they can tell tales pretty well, then it may be time to make them write them. The fables of Æsop, the only book almost that I know fit for children, may afford them matter for this exercise of writing english, as well as for reading and translating, to enter them in the latin tongue. When they are got past the faults of grammar, and can join in a continued

coherent diſcourſe the ſeveral parts of a ſtory, without bald and unhandſome forms of tranſition (as is uſual) often repeated; he that deſires to perfect them yet farther in this, which is the firſt ſtep to ſpeaking well, and needs no invention, may have recourſe to Tully; and by putting in practice thoſe rules, which that maſter of eloquence gives in his firſt book "De Inven-"tione," § 20. make them know wherein the ſkill and graces of an handſome narrative, according to the ſeveral ſubjects and deſigns of it, lie. Of each of which rules fit examples may be found out, and therein they may be ſhown how others have practiſed them. The ancient claſſic authors afford plenty of ſuch examples, which they ſhould be made not only to tranſlate, but have ſet before them as patterns for their daily imitation.

When they underſtand how to write engliſh with due connexion, propriety, and order, and are pretty well maſters of a tolerable narrative ſtyle, they may be advanced to writing of letters; wherein they ſhould not be put upon any ſtrains of wit or compliment, but taught to expreſs their own plain eaſy ſenſe, without any incoherence, confuſion, or roughneſs. And when they are perfect in this, they may, to raiſe their thoughts, have ſet before them the example of Voiture's, for the entertainment of their friends at a diſtance, with letters of compliment, mirth, raillery, or diverſion; and Tully's epiſtles, as the beſt pattern, whether for buſineſs or converſation. The writing of letters has ſo much to do in all the occurrences of human life, that no gentleman can avoid ſhowing himſelf in this kind of writing: occaſions will daily force him to make this uſe of his pen, which, beſides the conſequences, that, in his affairs, his well or ill managing of it often draws after it, always lays him open to a ſeverer examination of his breeding, ſenſe, and abilities, than oral diſcourſes; whoſe tranſient faults, dying for the moſt part with the ſound that gives them life, and ſo not ſubject to a ſtrict review, more eaſily eſcape obſervation and cenſure.

Letters.

Had

Had the methods of education been directed to their right end, one would have thought this, ſo neceſſary a part, could not have been neglected, whilſt themes and verſes in latin, of no uſe at all, were, ſo conſtantly every-where, preſſed, to the racking of children's inventions beyond their ſtrength, and hindering their cheerful progreſs in learning the tongues, by unnatural difficulties. But cuſtom has ſo ordained it, and who dares diſobey? And would it not be very unreaſonable to require of a learned country ſchool-maſter, (who has all the tropes and figures in Farnaby's rhetoric at his fingers ends) to teach his ſcholar to expreſs himſelf handſomely in engliſh, when it appears to be ſo little his buſineſs or thought, that the boy's mother (deſpiſed, it is like, as illiterate, for not having read a ſyſtem of logic and rhetoric) outdoes him in it? Engliſh.

To write and ſpeak correctly, gives a grace, and gains a favourable attention to what one has to ſay: and, ſince it is engliſh that an engliſh gentleman will have conſtant uſe of, that is the language he ſhould chiefly cultivate, and wherein moſt care ſhould be taken to poliſh and perfect his ſtyle. To ſpeak or write better latin than engliſh, may make a man be talked of; but he would find it more to his purpoſe to expreſs himſelf well in his own tongue, that he uſes every moment, than to have the vain commendation of others for a very inſignificant quality. This I find univerſally neglected, and no care taken any-where to improve young men in their own language, that they may thoroughly underſtand and be maſters of it. If any one among us have a facility or purity more than ordinary in his mother-tongue, it is owing to chance, or his genius, or any thing, rather than to his education, or any care of his teacher. To mind what engliſh his pupil ſpeaks or writes, is below the dignity of one bred up amongſt greek and latin, though he have but little of them himſelf. Theſe are the learned languages, fit only for learned men to meddle with and teach; engliſh is the language of the illiterate vulgar; though yet we ſee the policy of ſome of our neighbours hath not

thought it beneath the public care to promote and reward the improvement of their own language. Poliſhing and enriching their tongue, is no ſmall buſineſs amongſt them; it hath colleges and ſtipends appointed it, and there is raiſed amongſt them a great ambition and emulation of writing correctly: and we ſee what they are come to by it, and how far they have ſpread one of the worſt languages, poſſibly, in this part of the world, if we look upon it as it was in ſome few reigns backwards, whatever it be now. The great men amongſt the romans were daily exerciſing themſelves in their own language; and we find yet upon record the names of orators, who taught ſome of their emperors latin, though it were their mother-tongue.

It is plain the greeks were yet more nice in theirs; all other ſpeech was barbarous to them but their own, and no foreign language appears to have been ſtudied or valued amongſt that learned and acute people; though it be paſt doubt, that they borrowed their learning and philoſophy from abroad.

I am not here ſpeaking againſt greek and latin; I think they ought to be ſtudied, and the latin, at leaſt, underſtood well, by every gentleman. But whatever foreign languages a young man meddles with, (and the more he knows, the better) that which he ſhould critically ſtudy, and labour to get a facility, clearneſs, and elegancy to expreſs himſelf in, ſhould be his own, and to this purpoſe he ſhould daily be exerciſed in it.

Natural Philoſophy.

§ 190. Natural philoſophy, as a ſpeculative ſcience, I imagine, we have none; and perhaps I may think I have reaſon to ſay, we never ſhall be able to make a ſcience of it. The works of nature are contrived by a wiſdom, and operate by ways, too far ſurpaſſing our faculties to diſcover, or capacities to conceive, for us ever to be able to reduce them into a ſcience. Natural philoſophy being the knowledge of the principles, properties, and operations of things, as they are in themſelves, I imagine there are two parts of it, one comprehending ſpirits, with their nature and qualities; and the other bodies. The firſt of theſe is uſually referred to metaphyſics: but

under

under what title ſoever the conſideration of ſpirits comes, I think it ought to go before the ſtudy of matter and body, not as a ſcience that can be methodized into a ſyſtem, and treated of, upon principles of knowledge; but as an enlargement of our minds towards a truer and fuller comprehenſion of the intellectual world, to which we are led both by reaſon and revelation. And ſince the cleareſt and largeſt diſcoveries we have of other ſpirits, beſides God and our own ſouls, is imparted to us from heaven by revelation, I think the information, that at leaſt young people ſhould have of them, ſhould be taken from that revelation. To this purpoſe, I conclude, it would be well, if there were made a good hiſtory of the Bible for young people to read; wherein if every thing that is fit to be put into it, were laid down in its due order of time, and ſeveral things omitted, which are ſuited only to riper age; that confuſion, which is uſually produced by promiſcuous reading of the ſcripture, as it lies now bound up in our Bibles, would be avoided; and alſo this other good obtained, that by reading of it conſtantly, there would be inſtilled into the minds of children a notion and belief of ſpirits, they having ſo much to do, in all the tranſactions of that hiſtory, which will be a good preparation to the ſtudy of bodies. For, without the notion and allowance of ſpirit, our philoſophy will be lame and defective in one main part of it, when it leaves out the contemplation of the moſt excellent and powerful part of the creation.

§ 191. Of this hiſtory of the Bible, I think too it would be well, if there were a ſhort and plain epitome made, containing the chief and moſt material heads for children to be converſant in, as ſoon as they can read. This, though it will lead them early into ſome notion of ſpirits, yet is not contrary to what I ſaid above, that I would not have children troubled, whilſt young, with notions of ſpirits; whereby my meaning was, that I think it inconvenient, that their yet tender minds ſhould receive early impreſſions of goblins, ſpectres, and apparitions, wherewith their maids, and thoſe about them,

are apt to fright them into a compliance of their orders, which often proves a great inconvenience to them all their lives after, by subjecting their minds to frights, fearful apprehensions, weakness, and superstition; which, when coming abroad into the world and conversation, they grow weary and ashamed of; it not seldom happens, that to make, as they think, a thorough cure, and ease themselves of a load, which has sat so heavy on them, they throw away the thoughts of all spirits together, and so run into the other, but worse extreme.

§ 192. The reason why I would have this premised to the study of bodies, and the doctrine of the scriptures well imbibed, before young men be entered in natural philosophy, is, because matter being a thing that all our senses are constantly conversant with, it is so apt to possess the mind, and exclude all other beings but matter, that prejudice, grounded on such principles, often leaves no room for the admittance of spirits, or the allowing any such things as immaterial beings, " in " rerum naturâ;" when yet it is evident, that by mere matter and motion, none of the great phænomena of nature can be resolved: to instance but in that common one of gravity, which I think impossible to be explained by any natural operation of matter, or any other law of motion, but the positive will of a superiour Being so ordering it. And therefore since the deluge cannot be well explained, without admitting something out of the ordinary course of nature, I propose it to be considered, whether God's altering the centre of gravity in the earth for a time, (a thing as intelligible as gravity itself, which perhaps a little variation of causes, unknown to us, would produce) will not more easily account for Noah's flood, than any hypothesis yet made use of, to solve it. I hear the great objection to this is, that it would produce but a partial deluge. But the alteration of the centre of gravity once allowed, it is no hard matter to conceive, that the divine power might make the centre of gravity, placed at a due distance from the centre of the earth, move round it in a convenient space of time; whereby the flood would become universal,

verſal, and, as I think, anſwer all the phænomena of the deluge, as delivered by Moſes, at an eaſier rate than thoſe many hard ſuppoſitions that are made uſe of, to explain it. But this is not a place for that argument, which is here only mentioned by the bye, to ſhow the neceſſity of having recourſe to ſomething beyond bare matter, and its motion, in the explication of nature; to which the notions of ſpirits, and their power, as delivered in the bible, where ſo much is attributed to their operation, may be a fit preparative; reſerving to a fitter opportunity a fuller explication of this hypotheſis, and the application of it to all the parts of the deluge, and any difficulties that can be ſuppoſed in the hiſtory of the flood, as recorded in the ſcripture.

§ 193. But to return to the ſtudy of natural philoſophy: though the world be full of ſyſtems of it, yet I cannot ſay, I know any one which can be taught a young man as a ſcience, wherein he may be ſure to find truth and certainty, which is what all ſciences give an expectation of. I do not hence conclude, that none of them are to be read; it is neceſſary for a gentleman, in this learned age, to look into ſome of them to fit himſelf for converſation: but whether that of Des Cartes be put into his hands, as that which is the moſt in faſhion, or it be thought fit to give him a ſhort view of that and ſeveral others alſo; I think the ſyſtems of natural philoſophy, that have obtained in this part of the world, are to be read more to know the hypotheſes, and to underſtand the terms and ways of talking of the ſeveral ſects, than with hopes to gain thereby a comprehenſive ſcientifical and ſatisfactory knowledge of the works of nature: only this may be ſaid, that the modern corpuſcularians talk, in moſt things, more intelligibly than the peripatetics, who poſſeſſed the ſchools immediately before them. He that would look farther back, and acquaint himſelf with the ſeveral opinions of the ancients, may conſult Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem; wherein that very learned author hath, with ſuch accurateneſs and judgment, collected and explained the opinions of the greek philoſophers, that what

what principles they built on, and what were the chief hypotheſes that divided them, is better to be ſeen in him, than any where elſe that I know. But I would not deter any one from the ſtudy of nature, becauſe all the knowledge we have, or poſſibly can have of it, cannot be brought into a ſcience. There are very many things in it, that are convenient and neceſſary to be known to a gentleman; and a great many other, that will abundantly reward the pains of the curious with delight and advantage. But theſe, I think, are rather to be found amongſt ſuch writers, as have employed themſelves in making rational experiments and obſervations, than in ſtarting barely ſpeculative ſyſtems. Such writings, therefore, as many of Mr. Boyle's are, with others that have writ of huſbandry, planting, gardening, and the like, may be fit for a gentleman, when he has a little acquainted himſelf with ſome of the ſyſtems of natural philoſophy in faſhion.

§ 194. Though the ſyſtems of phyſics, that I have met with, afford little encouragement to look for certainty, or ſcience, in any treatiſe, which ſhall pretend to give us a body of natural philoſophy from the firſt principles of bodies in general; yet the incomparable Mr. Newton has ſhown, how far mathematics, applied to ſome parts of nature, may, upon principles that matter of fact juſtify, carry us in the knowledge of ſome, as I may ſo call them, particular provinces of the incomprehenſible univerſe. And if others could give us ſo good and clear an account of other parts of nature, as he has of this our planetary world, and the moſt conſiderable phænomena obſervable in it, in his admirable book "Philoſophiæ naturalis Principia mathematica," we might in time hope to be furniſhed with more true and certain knowledge in ſeveral parts of this ſtupendous machine, than hitherto we could have expected. And though there are very few that have mathematics enough to underſtand his demonſtrations; yet the moſt accurate mathematicians, who have examined them, allowing them to be ſuch, his book will deſerve to be read, and give no ſmall light and pleaſure to thoſe, who, willing to underſtand the motions,

tions, properties, and operations of the great maſſes of matter in this our ſolar ſyſtem, will but carefully mind his concluſions, which may be depended on as propoſitions well proved.

Greek.

§ 195. This is, in ſhort, what I have thought concerning a young gentleman's ſtudies; wherein it will poſſibly be wondered, that I ſhould omit greek, ſince amongſt the grecians is to be found the original, as it were, and foundation of all that learning which we have in this part of the world. I grant it ſo; and will add, that no man can paſs for a ſcholar, that is ignorant of the greek tongue. But I am not here conſidering the education of a profeſſed ſcholar, but of a gentleman, to whom latin and french, as the world now goes, is by every one acknowledged to be neceſſary. When he comes to be a man, if he has a mind to carry his ſtudies farther, and look into the greek learning, he will then eaſily get that tongue himſelf; and if he has not that inclination, his learning of it under a tutor, will be but loſt labour, and much of his time and pains ſpent in that, which will be neglected and thrown away as ſoon as he is at liberty. For how many are there of an hundred, even amongſt ſcholars themſelves, who retain the greek they carried from ſchool; or ever improve it to a familiar reading, and perfect underſtanding of greek authors?

To conclude this part, which concerns a young gentleman's ſtudies; his tutor ſhould remember, that his buſineſs is not ſo much to teach him all that is knowable, as to raiſe in him a love and eſteem of knowledge; and to put him in the right way of knowing and improving himſelf, when he has a mind to it.

The thoughts of a judicious author on the ſubject of languages, I ſhall here give the reader, as near as I can, in his own way of expreſſing them. He ſays * "One can ſcarce burden children too much with the "knowledge of languages. They are uſeful to men of "all conditions, and they equally open them the en-"trance, either to the moſt profound, or the more

* La Bruyere Mœurs de ce Siecle, p. 577, 662.

"eaſy

" eaſy and entertaining parts of learning. If this " irkſome ſtudy be put off to a little more advanced " age, young men either have not reſolution enough to " apply to it out of choice, or ſteadineſs to carry it " on. And if any one has the gift of perſeverance, it " is not without the inconvenience of ſpending that " time upon languages, which is deſtined to other " uſes: and he confines to the ſtudy of words that age " of his life that is above it, and requires things; at " leaſt, it is the loſing the beſt and beautifulleſt ſeaſon " of one's life. This large foundation of languages " cannot be well laid, but when every thing makes an " eaſy and deep impreſſion on the mind; when the " memory is freſh, ready, and tenacious; when the " head and heart are as yet free from cares, paſſions " and deſigns; and thoſe, on whom the child depends, " have authority enough to keep him cloſe to a long- " continued application. I am perſuaded that the ſmall " number of truly learned, and the multitude of ſuper- " ficial pretenders, is owing to the neglect of this."

I think every body will agree with this obſerving gentleman, that languages are the proper ſtudy of our firſt years. But it is to be conſidered by the parents and tutors, what tongues it is fit the child ſhould learn. For it muſt be confeſſed, that it is fruitleſs pains, and loſs of time, to learn a language, which, in the courſe of life that he is deſigned to, he is never like to make uſe of; or which one may gueſs by his temper, he will wholly neglect and loſe again, as ſoon as an approach to manhood, ſetting him free from a governor, ſhall put him into the hands of his own inclination; which is not likely to allot any of his time to the cultivating the learned tongues; or diſpoſe him to mind any other language, but what daily uſe, or ſome particular neceſſity, ſhall force upon him.

But yet for the ſake of thoſe who are deſigned to be ſcholars, I will add, what the ſame author ſubjoins, to make good his foregoing remark. It will deſerve to be conſidered by all who deſire to be truly learned, and therefore may be a fit rule for tutors to inculcate, and leave with their pupils, to guide their future ſtudies:

" The

" The ſtudy, ſays he, of the original text can never " be ſufficiently recommended. It is the ſhorteſt, " ſureſt, and moſt agreeable way to all ſorts of learn- " ing. Draw from the ſpring-head, and take not " things at ſecond-hand. Let the writings of the " great maſters be never laid aſide; dwell upon them, " ſettle them in your mind, and cite them upon occa- " ſion; make it your buſineſs thoroughly to under- " ſtand them in their full extent, and all their circum- " ſtances: acquaint yourſelf fully with the principles " of original authors; bring them to a conſiſtency, " and then do you yourſelf make your deductions. In " this ſtate were the firſt commentators, and do not " you reſt till you bring yourſelf to the ſame. Con- " tent not yourſelf with thoſe borrowed lights, nor " guide yourſelf by their views, but where your own " fails you, and leaves you in the dark. Their expli- " cations are not yours, and will give you the ſlip. " On the contrary, your own obſervations are the pro- " duct of your own mind, where they will abide, and " be ready at hand upon all occaſions in converſe, con- " ſultation, and diſpute. Loſe not the pleaſure it is " to ſee that you were not ſtopped in your reading, but " by difficulties that are invincible; where the com- " mentators and ſcholiaſts themſelves are at a ſtand, " and have nothing to ſay; thoſe copious expoſitors of " other places, who, with a vain and pompous over- " flow of learning, poured out on paſſages plain and " eaſy in themſelves, are very free of their words and " pains, where there is no need. Convince yourſelf " fully by thus ordering your ſtudies, that it is nothing " but men's lazineſs, which hath encouraged pedantry " to cram, rather than enrich libraries, and to bury " good authors under heaps of notes and commenta- " ries; and you will perceive, that ſloth herein hath " acted againſt itſelf, and its own intereſt, by multi- " plying reading and inquiries, and increaſing the pains " it endeavoured to avoid."

This though it may ſeem to concern none but direct ſcholars, is of ſo great moment for the right ordering of their education and ſtudies, that I hope I ſhall not be

be blamed for inserting of it here, especially if it be considered, that it may be of use to gentlemen too, when at any time they have a mind to go deeper than the surface, and get to themselves a solid, satisfactory, and masterly insight in any part of learning.

Method. Order and constancy are said to make the great difference between one man and another; this I am sure, nothing so much clears a learner's way, helps him so much on in it, and makes him go so easy and so far in any inquiry, as a good method. His governor should take pains to make him sensible of this, accustom him to order, and teach him method in all the applications of his thoughts; show him wherein it lies, and the advantages of it; acquaint him with the several sorts of it, either from general to particulars, or from particulars to what is more general; exercise him in both of them; and make him see, in what cases each different method is most proper, and to what ends it best serves.

In history the order of time should govern; in philosophical inquiries, that of nature, which in all progression is to go from the place one is then in, to that which joins and lies next to it; and so it is in the mind, from the knowledge it stands possessed of already, to that which lies next, and is coherent to it; and so on to what it aims at, by the simplest and most uncompounded parts it can divide the matter into. To this purpose, it will be of great use to his pupil to accustom him to distinguish well, that is, to have distinct notions, where-ever the mind can find any real difference; but as carefully to avoid distinctions in terms, where he has not distinct and different clear ideas.

§ 196. Besides what is to be had from study and books, there are other accomplishments necessary for a gentleman, to be got by exercise, and to which time is to be allowed, and for which masters must be had.

Dancing. Dancing being that which gives graceful motions all the life, and, above all things, manliness and a becoming confidence to young children, I think it cannot be learned too early, after they are once of an age and strength capable of it. But you must

muſt be ſure to have a good maſter, that knows, and can teach, what is graceful and becoming, and what gives a freedom and eaſineſs to all the motions of the body. One that teaches not this, is worſe than none at all; natural unfaſhionableneſs being much better than apiſh, affected poſtures; and I think it much more paſſable to put off the hat, and make a leg, like an honeſt country gentleman, than like an ill-faſhioned dancing-maſter. For, as for the jigging part, and the figures of dances, I count that little or nothing, farther than as it tends to perfect graceful carriage.

Muſic.

§ 197. Muſic is thought to have ſome affinity with dancing, and a good hand, upon ſome inſtruments, is by many people mightily valued. But it waſtes ſo much of a young man's time, to gain but a moderate ſkill in it; and engages often in ſuch odd company, that many think it much better ſpared: and I have, amongſt men of parts and buſineſs, ſo ſeldom heard any one commended or eſteemed for having an excellency in muſic, that amongſt all thoſe things, that ever came into the liſt of accompliſhments, I think I may give it the laſt place. Our ſhort lives will not ſerve us for the attainment of all things; nor can our minds be always intent on ſomething to be learned. The weakneſs of our conſtitutions, both of mind and body, requires that we ſhould be often unbent: and he that will make a good uſe of any part of his life, muſt allow a large portion of it to recreation. At leaſt this muſt not be denied to young people, unleſs, whilſt you with too much haſte make them old, you have the diſpleaſure to ſet them in their graves, or a ſecond childhood, ſooner than you could wiſh. And therefore I think, that the time and pains allotted to ſerious improvements, ſhould be employed about things of moſt uſe and conſequence, and that too in the methods the moſt eaſy and ſhort, that could be at any rate obtained; and perhaps, as I have above ſaid, it would be none of the leaſt ſecrets of education, to make the exerciſes in the body and the mind, the recreation one to another. I doubt not but that ſomething might be done in it, by a prudent man, that would well conſider

ſider the temper and inclination of his pupil. For he that is wearied either with ſtudy or dancing, does not deſire preſently to go to ſleep; but to do ſomething elſe which may divert and delight him. But this muſt be always remembered, that nothing can come into the account of recreation, that is not done with delight.

§ 198. Fencing, and riding the great horſe, are looked upon as ſo neceſſary parts of breeding, that it would be thought a great omiſſion to neglect them: the latter of the two being for the moſt part to be learned only in great towns, is one of the beſt exerciſes for health, which is to be had in thoſe places of eaſe and luxury; and, upon that account, makes a fit part of a young gentleman's employment, during his abode there. And, as far as it conduces to give a man a firm and graceful ſeat on horſeback, and to make him able to teach his horſe to ſtop, and turn quick, and to reſt on his haunches, is of uſe to a gentleman both in peace and war. But, whether it be of moment enough to be made a buſineſs of, and deſerve to take up more of his time, than ſhould barely for his health be employed, at due intervals, in ſome ſuch vigorous exerciſe, I ſhall leave to the diſcretion of parents and tutors; who will do well to remember, in all the parts of education, that moſt time and application is to be beſtowed on that, which is like to be of greateſt conſequence, and frequenteſt uſe, in the ordinary courſe and occurrences of that life the young man is deſigned for.

Fencing. § 199. As for fencing, it ſeems to me a good exerciſe for health, but dangerous to the life, the confidence of their ſkill being apt to engage in quarrels thoſe that think they have learned to uſe their ſwords. This preſumption makes them often more touchy than needs, on points of honour, and ſlight or no provocations. Young men in their warm blood are forward to think they have in vain learned to fence, if they never ſhow their ſkill and courage in a duel; and they ſeem to have reaſon. But how many ſad tragedies that reaſon has been the occaſion of, the tears of many a mother can witneſs. A man that cannot fence, will be more careful to keep out of bullies and

and gameſters company, and will not be half ſo apt to ſtand upon punctilios, nor to give affronts, or fiercely juſtify them when given, which is that which uſually makes the quarrel. And when a man is in the field, a moderate ſkill in fencing rather expoſes him to the ſword of his enemy, than ſecures him from it. And certainly a man of courage, who cannot fence at all, and therefore will put all upon one thruſt, and not ſtand parrying, has the odds againſt a moderate fencer, eſpecially if he has ſkill in wreſtling. And therefore, if any proviſion be to be made againſt ſuch accidents, and a man be to prepare his ſon for duels, I had much rather mine ſhould be a good wreſtler, than an ordinary fencer; which is the moſt a gentleman can attain to in it, unleſs he will be conſtantly in the fencing ſchool, and every day exerciſing. But ſince fencing, and riding the great-horſe, are ſo generally looked upon as neceſſary qualifications in the breeding of a gentleman, it will be hard wholly to deny any one of that rank theſe marks of diſtinction. I ſhall leave it therefore to the father, to conſider, how far the temper of his ſon, and the ſtation he is like to be in, will allow or encourage him to comply with faſhions, which, having very little to do with civil life, were yet formerly unknown to the moſt warlike nations; and ſeem to have added little of force or courage to thoſe who have received them: unleſs we will think martial ſkill or proweſs have been improved by duelling, with which fencing came into, and with which, I preſume, it will go out of the world.

§ 200. Theſe are my preſent thoughts concerning learning and accompliſhments. The great buſineſs of all is virtue and wiſdom.

"Nullum numen abeſt, ſi ſit prudentia."

Teach him to get a maſtery over his inclinations, and ſubmit his appetite to reaſon. This being obtained, and by conſtant practice ſettled into habit, the hardeſt part of the taſk is over. To bring a young man to this, I know nothing which ſo much contributes, as

the love of praiſe and commendation, which ſhould therefore be inſtilled into him by all arts imaginable. Make his mind as ſenſible of credit and ſhame as may be: and when you have done that, you have put a principle into him, which will influence his actions, when you are not by; to which the fear of a little ſmart of a rod is not comparable; and which will be the proper ſtock, whereon afterwards to graft the true principles of morality and religion.

Trade. § 201. I have one thing more to add, which as ſoon as I mention, I ſhall run the danger of being ſuſpected to have forgot what I am about, and what I have above written concerning education, all tending towards a gentleman's calling, with which a trade ſeems wholly to be inconſiſtent. And yet, I cannot forbear to ſay, I would have him learn a trade, a manual trade; nay, two or three, but one more particularly.

§ 202. The buſy inclination of children being always to be directed to ſomething that may be uſeful to them, the advantages propoſed from what they are ſet about may be conſidered of two kinds; 1. Where the ſkill itſelf, that is got by exerciſe, is worth the having. Thus ſkill not only in languages, and learned ſciences, but in painting, turning, gardening, tempering and working in iron, and all other uſeful arts, is worth the having. 2. Where the exerciſe itſelf, without any conſideration, is neceſſary or uſeful for health. Knowledge in ſome things is ſo neceſſary to be got by children, whilſt they are young, that ſome part of their time is to be allotted to their improvement in them, though thoſe employments contribute nothing at all to their health: ſuch are reading, and writing, and all other ſedentary ſtudies, for the cultivating of the mind, which unavoidably take up a great part of gentlemen's time, quite from their cradles. Other manual arts, which are both got and exerciſed by labour, do many of them, by that exerciſe, not only increaſe our dexterity and ſkill, but contribute to our health too; eſpecially ſuch as employ us in the open air. In theſe, then, health and improvement may be joined together;

and of these should some fit ones be chosen, to be made the recreations of one, whose chief business is with books and study. In this choice, the age and inclination of the person is to be considered, and constraint always to be avoided in bringing him to it. For command and force may often create, but can never cure an aversion; and whatever any one is brought to by compulsion, he will leave as soon as he can, and be little profited, and less recreated by, whilst he is at it.

Painting.

§ 203. That which of all others would please me best, would be a painter, were there not an argument or two against it, not easy to be answered. First, ill painting is one of the worst things in the world; and to attain a tolerable degree of skill in it, requires too much of a man's time. If he has a natural inclination to it, it will endanger the neglect of all other more useful studies, to give way to that; and if he have no inclination to it, all the time, pains, and money shall be employed in it, will be thrown away to no purpose. Another reason why I am not for painting in a gentleman, is, because it is a sedentary recreation, which more employs the mind than the body. A gentleman's more serious employment, I look on to be study; and when that demands relaxation and refreshment, it should be in some exercise of the body, which unbends the thought, and confirms the health and strength. For these two reasons I am not for painting.

Gardening. Joiner.

§ 204. In the next place, for a country gentleman, I should propose one, or rather both these; viz. gardening or husbandry in general, and working in wood, as a carpenter, joiner, or turner; these being fit and healthy recreations for a man of study or business. For since the mind endures not to be constantly employed in the same thing or way; and sedentary or studious men should have some exercise, that at the same time might divert their minds, and employ their bodies; I know none that could do it better for a country gentleman, than these two, the one of them affording him exercise, when the weather or season keeps him from the other. Besides that, by being skilled in the one of them, he will

be able to govern and teach his gardener; by the other, contrive and make a great many things both of delight and uſe: though theſe I propoſe not as the chief ends of his labour, but as temptations to it; diverſion from his other more ſerious thoughts and employments, by uſeful and healthy manual exerciſe, being what I chiefly aim at in it.

§ 205. The great men among the ancients underſtood very well how to reconcile manual labour with affairs of ſtate, and thought it no leſſening to their dignity, to make the one the recreation to the other. That indeed which ſeems moſt generally to have employed and diverted their ſpare hours, was agriculture. Gideon amongſt the jews was taken from threſhing, as well as Cincinnatus amongſt the romans, from the plough, to command the armies of their countries againſt their enemies; and it is plain their dexterous handling of the flail, or the plough, and being good workmen with theſe tools, did not hinder their ſkill in arms, nor make them leſs able in the arts of war or government. They were great captains and ſtateſmen, as well as huſbandmen. Cato major, who had with great reputation born all the great offices of the commonwealth, has left us an evidence under his own hand, how much he was verſed in country affairs; and, as I remember, Cyrus thought gardening ſo little beneath the dignity and grandeur of a throne, that he ſhowed Xenophon a large field of fruit-trees, all of his own planting. The records of antiquity, both amongſt jews and gentiles, are full of inſtances of this kind, if it were neceſſary to recommend uſeful recreations by examples.

Recreation. § 206. Nor let it be thought, that I miſtake, when I call theſe or the like exerciſes of manual arts, diverſions or recreations: for recreation is not being idle, (as every one may obſerve) but eaſing the wearied part by change of buſineſs: and he that thinks diverſion may not lie in hard and painful labour, forgets the early riſing, hard riding, heat, cold and hunger of huntſmen, which is yet known to be the conſtant recreation of men of the greateſt condition. Delving, planting, inoculating, or any the like profitable

able employments, would be no less a diversion, than any of the idle sports in fashion, if men could but be brought to delight in them, which custom and skill in a trade will quickly bring any one to do. And I doubt not but there are to be found those, who, being frequently called to cards, or any other play, by those they could not refuse, have been more tired with these recreations, than with any the most serious employment of life: though the play has been such as they have naturally had no aversion to, and with which they could willingly sometimes divert themselves.

§ 207. Play, wherein persons of condition, especially ladies, waste so much of their time, is a plain instance to me, that men cannot be perfectly idle; they must be doing something. For how else could they sit so many hours toiling at that, which generally gives more vexation than delight to people, whilst they are actually engaged in it? It is certain, gaming leaves no satisfaction behind it to those who reflect when it is over; and it no way profits either body or mind: as to their estates, if it strike so deep as to concern them, it is a trade then, and not a recreation, wherein few, that have any thing else to live on, thrive; and, at best, a thriving gamester has but a poor trade on it, who fills his pockets at the price of his reputation.

Recreation belongs not to people who are strangers to business, and are not wasted and wearied with the employment of their calling. The skill should be, so to order their time of recreation, that it may relax and refresh the part that has been exercised, and is tired; and yet do something, which, besides the present delight and ease, may produce what will afterwards be profitable. It has been nothing but the vanity and pride of greatness and riches, that has brought unprofitable and dangerous pastimes (as they are called) into fashion, and persuaded people into a belief, that the learning or putting their hands to any thing that was useful, could not be a diversion fit for a gentleman. This has been that which has given cards, dice, and drinking, so much credit in the world; and a great many throw away their spare hours in them, through

the prevalency of cuſtom, and want of ſome better employment to fill up the vacancy of leiſure, more than from any real delight is to be found in them. They cannot bear the dead weight of unemployed time lying upon their hands, nor the uneaſineſs it is to do nothing at all; and having never learned any laudable manual art, wherewith to divert themſelves, they have recourſe to thoſe fooliſh or ill ways in uſe, to help off their time, which a rational man, till corrupted by cuſtom, could find very little pleaſure in.

§ 208. I ſay not this, that I would never have a young gentleman accommodate himſelf to the innocent diverſions in faſhion, amongſt thoſe of his age and condition. I am ſo far from having him auſtere and moroſe to that degree, that I would perſuade him to more than ordinary complaiſance for all the gaieties and diverſions of thoſe he converſes with, and be averſe or teſty in nothing they ſhould deſire of him, that might become a gentleman, and an honeſt man: though, as to cards and dice, I think the ſafeſt and beſt way is never to learn any play upon them, and ſo to be incapacitated for thoſe dangerous temptations, and incroaching waſters of uſeful time. But allowance being made for idle and jovial converſation, and all faſhionable becoming recreations; I ſay, a young man will have time enough, from his ſerious and main buſineſs, to learn almoſt any trade. It is for want of application, and not of leiſure, that men are not ſkilful in more arts than one; and an hour in a day, conſtantly employed in ſuch a way of diverſion, will carry a man in a ſhort time a great deal farther than he can imagine: which, if it were of no other uſe but to drive the common, vicious, uſeleſs, and dangerous paſtimes out of faſhion, and to ſhow there was no need of them, would deſerve to be encouraged. If men from their youth were weaned from that fauntering humour, wherein ſome, out of cuſtom, let a good part of their lives run uſeleſly away, without either buſineſs or recreation; they would find time enough to acquire dexterity and ſkill in hundreds of things, which, though remote from their proper callings, would not at all interfere with them.

Trade.

them. And therefore, I think, for this, as well as other reaſons before-mentioned, a lazy, liſtleſs humour, that idly dreams away the days, is of all others the leaſt to be indulged, or permitted in young people. It is the proper ſtate of one ſick, and out of order in his health, and is tolerable in no-body elſe, of what age or condition ſoever.

§ 209. To the arts abovementioned may be added perfuming, varniſhing, graving, and ſeveral ſorts of working in iron, braſs, and ſilver: and if, as it happens to moſt young gentlemen, that a conſiderable part of his time be ſpent in a great town, he may learn to cut, poliſh, and ſet precious ſtones, or employ himſelf in grinding and poliſhing optical glaſſes. Amongſt the great variety there is of ingenious manual arts, it will be impoſſible that no one ſhould be found to pleaſe and delight him, unleſs he be either idle or debauched, which is not to be ſuppoſed in a right way of education. And ſince he cannot be always employed in ſtudy, reading, and converſation, there will be many an hour, beſides what his exerciſes will take up, which, if not ſpent this way, will be ſpent worſe. For, I conclude, a young man will ſeldom deſire to ſit perfectly ſtill and idle; or if he does, it is a fault that ought to be mended.

§ 210. But if his miſtaken parents, frightened with the diſgraceful names of mechanic and trade, ſhall have an averſion to any thing of this kind in their children; yet there is one thing relating to trade, which, when they conſider, they will think abſolutely neceſſary for their ſons to learn.

Merchants accounts. Merchants accounts, though a ſcience not likely to help a gentleman to get an eſtate, yet poſſibly there is not any thing of more uſe and efficacy to make him preſerve the eſtate he has. It is ſeldom obſerved, that he who keeps an account of his income and expences, and thereby has conſtantly under view the courſe of his domeſtic affairs, lets them run to ruin; and I doubt not but many a man gets behind-hand, before he is aware, or runs further on, when he is once in, for want of this care, or the ſkill

to do it. I would therefore advise all gentlemen to learn perfectly merchants accounts, and not to think it is a skill that belongs not to them, because it has received its name from, and has been chiefly practised by, men of traffic.

§ 211. When my young master has once got the skill of keeping accounts, (which is a business of reason more than arithmetic) perhaps it will not be amiss, that his father from thenceforth require him to do it in all his concernments. Not that I would have him set down every pint of wine, or play, that costs him money; the general name of expences will serve for such things well enough: nor would I have his father look so narrowly into these accounts, as to take occasion from thence to criticise on his expences. He must remember, that he himself was once a young man, and not forget the thoughts he had then, nor the right his son has to have the same, and to have allowance made for them. If therefore I would have the young gentleman obliged to keep an account, it is not at all to have that way a check upon his expences, (for what the father allows him, he ought to let him be fully master of) but only, that he might be brought early into the custom of doing it, and that it might be made familiar and habitual to him betimes, which will be so useful and necessary to be constantly practised through the whole course of his life. A noble venetian, whose son wallowed in the plenty of his father's riches, finding his son's expences grow very high and extravagant, ordered his cashier to let him have, for the future, no more money than what he should count when he received it. This one would think no great restraint to a young gentleman's expences, who could freely have as much money as he would tell. But yet this, to one, who was used to nothing but the pursuit of his pleasures, proved a very great trouble, which at last ended in this sober and advantageous reflection: "If it be so "much pains to me, barely to count the money I would "spend; what labour and pains did it cost my ances-"tors, not only to count, but get it?" This rational thought, suggested by this little pains imposed upon him,

him, wrought so effectually upon his mind, that it made him take up, and from that time forwards prove a good husband. This at least every body must allow, that nothing is likelier to keep a man within compass, than the having constantly before his eyes the state of his affairs, in a regular course of account.

§ 212. The last part usually in education, is travel, which is commonly thought to finish the work, and complete the gentleman. I confess, travel into foreign countries has great advantages; but the time usually chosen to send young men abroad, is, I think, of all other, that which renders them least capable of reaping those advantages. Those which are proposed, as to the main of them, may be reduced to these two: first, language; secondly, an improvement in wisdom and prudence, by seeing men, and conversing with people of tempers, customs, and ways of living, different from one another, and especially from those of his parish and neighbourhood. But from sixteen to one and twenty, which is the ordinary time of travel, men are, of all their lives, the least suited to these improvements. The first season to get foreign languages, and form the tongue to their true accents, I should think, should be from seven to fourteen or sixteen; and then too a tutor with them is useful and necessary, who may, with those languages, teach them other things. But to put them out of their parents view, at a great distance, under a governor, when they think themselves too much men to be governed by others, and yet have not prudence and experience enough to govern themselves: what is it but to expose them to all the greatest dangers of their whole life, when they have the least fence and guard against them? Till that boiling boisterous part of life comes on, it may be hoped the tutor may have some authority; neither the stubbornness of age, nor the temptation or examples of others can take him from his tutor's conduct, till fifteen or sixteen: but then, when he begins to consort himself with men, and thinks himself one; when he comes to relish, and pride himself in, manly vices, and thinks it a shame to be any longer under the control and

Travel.

and conduct of another: what can be hoped from even the moſt careful and diſcreet governor, when neither he has power to compel, nor his pupil a diſpoſition to be perſuaded; but, on the contrary, has the advice of warm blood, and prevailing faſhion, to hearken to the temptations of his companions, juſt as wiſe as himſelf, rather than to the perſuaſions of his tutor, who is now looked on as the enemy to his freedom? And when is a man ſo like to miſcarry, as when at the ſame time he is both raw and unruly? This is the ſeaſon of all his life, that moſt requires the eye and authority of his parents and friends, to govern it. The flexibleneſs of the former part of a man's age, not yet grown up to be headſtrong, makes it more governable and ſafe; and, in the after-part, reaſon and foreſight begin a little to take place, and mind a man of his ſafety and improvement. The time therefore I ſhould think the fitteſt for a young gentleman to be ſent abroad, would be, either when he is younger, under a tutor, whom he might be the better for; or when he is ſome years older, without a governor; when he is of age to govern himſelf, and make obſervations of what he finds in other countries worthy his notice, and that might be of uſe to him after his return: and when too, being thoroughly acquainted with the laws and faſhions, the natural and moral advantages and defects of his own country, he has ſomething to exchange with thoſe abroad, from whoſe converſation he hoped to reap any knowledge.

§ 213. The ordering of travel otherwiſe, is that, I imagine, which makes ſo many young gentlemen come back ſo little improved by it. And if they do bring home with them any knowledge of the places and people they have ſeen, it is often an admiration of the worſt and vaineſt practices they met with abroad; retaining a reliſh and memory of thoſe things, wherein their liberty took its firſt ſwing, rather than of what ſhould make them better and wiſer after their return. And indeed, how can it be otherwiſe, going abroad at the age they do, under the care of another, who is to provide their neceſſaries, and make their obſervations

for

for them? Thus, under the ſhelter and pretence of a governor, thinking themſelves excuſed from ſtanding upon their own legs, or being accountable for their own conduct, they very ſeldom trouble themſelves with inquiries, or making uſeful obſervations of their own. Their thoughts run after play and pleaſure, wherein they take it as a leſſening to be controlled; but ſeldom trouble themſelves to examine the deſigns, obſerve the addreſs, and conſider the arts, tempers, and inclinations of men they meet with; that ſo they may know how to comport themſelves towards them. Here he that travels with them, is to ſkreen them, get them out, when they have run themſelves into the briars; and in all their miſcarriages be anſwerable for them.

§ 214. I confeſs, the knowledge of men is ſo great a ſkill, that it is not to be expected a young man ſhould preſently be perfect in it. But yet his going abroad is to little purpoſe, if travel does not ſometimes open his eyes, make him cautious and wary, and accuſtom him to look beyond the outſide, and, under the inoffenſive guard of a civil and obliging carriage, keep himſelf free and ſafe in his converſation with ſtrangers, and all ſorts of people, without forfeiting their good opinion. He that is ſent out to travel at the age, and with the thoughts, of a man deſigning to improve himſelf, may get into the converſation and acquaintance of perſons of condition where he comes: which, though a thing of moſt advantage to a gentleman that travels; yet I aſk, amongſt our young men that go abroad under tutors, What one is there of an hundred, that ever viſits any perſon of quality? much leſs makes an acquaintance with ſuch, from whoſe converſation he may learn what is good breeding in that country, and what is worth obſervation in it; though from ſuch perſons it is, one may learn more in one day, than in a year's rambling from one inn to another. Nor indeed is it to be wondered; for men of worth and parts will not eaſily admit the familiarity of boys, who yet need the care of a tutor: though a young gentleman and ſtranger, appearing like a man, and ſhowing a deſire to inform himſelf in the cuſtoms, manners, laws, and government

ment of the country he is in, will find welcome assistance and entertainment amongst the best and most knowing persons every-where, who will be ready to receive, encourage, and countenance any ingenious and inquisitive foreigner.

§ 215. This, how true soever it be, will not, I fear, alter the custom, which has cast the time of travel upon the worst part of a man's life; but for reasons not taken from their improvement. The young lad must not be ventured abroad at eight or ten, for fear of what may happen to the tender child, though he then runs ten times less risque than at sixteen or eighteen. Nor must he stay at home till that dangerous heady age be over, because he must be back again by one and twenty, to marry and propagate. The father cannot stay any longer for the portion, nor the mother for a new set of babies to play with: and so my young master, whatever comes on it, must have a wife looked out for him, by that time he is of age; though it would be no prejudice to his strength, his parts, or his issue, if it were respited for some time, and he had leave to get, in years and knowledge, the start a little of his children, who are often found to tread too near upon the heels of their fathers, to the no great satisfaction either of son or father. But the young gentleman being got within view of matrimony, it is time to leave him to his mistress.

Conclusion. § 216. Though I am now come to a conclusion of what obvious remarks have suggested to me concerning education, I would not have it thought, that I look on it as a just treatise on this subject. There are a thousand other things that may need consideration; especially if one should take in the various tempers, different inclinations, and particular defaults, that are to be found in children; and prescribe proper remedies. The variety is so great, that it would require a volume; nor would that reach it. Each man's mind has some peculiarity, as well as his face, that distinguishes him from all others; and there are possibly scarce two children, who can be conducted by exactly the same method. Besides that, I think a prince, a no-

a nobleman, and an ordinary gentleman's ſon, ſhould have different ways of breeding. But having had here only ſome general views, in reference to the main end and aims in education, and thoſe deſigned for a gentleman's ſon, whom, being then very little, I conſidered only as white paper, or wax, to be moulded and faſhioned as one pleaſes; I have touched little more than thoſe heads, which I judged neceſſary for the breeding of a young gentleman of his condition in general; and have now publiſhed theſe my occaſional thoughts, with this hope, that, though this be far from being a complete treatiſe on this ſubject, or ſuch as that every one may find what will juſt fit his child in it; yet it may give ſome ſmall light to thoſe, whoſe concern for their dear little ones makes them ſo irregularly bold, that they dare venture to conſult their own reaſon, in the education of their children, rather than wholly to rely upon old cuſtom.

POST-

POSTHUMOUS

WORKS

OF

JOHN LOCKE, Esq.

VIZ.

I. Of the Conduct of the Understanding.

II. An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of seeing all Things in God.

III. A Discourse of Miracles.

IV.* Part of a fourth Letter for Toleration.

V. Memoirs relating to the Life of Anthony, first Earl of Shaftesbury.

* This Letter, to preserve a Connexion of the Subject, is in this Edition carried to the former three Letters on Toleration, in the fifth Volume; as is the Treatise of the Conduct of the Understanding to the End of the Essay of Human Understanding in the second.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

READER.

THE enſuing treatiſes are true and genuine remains of the deceaſed author, whoſe name they bear; but, for the greateſt part, received not his laſt hand, being in a great meaſure, little more than ſudden views, intended to be afterwards reviſed and farther looked into; but by ſickneſs, intervention of buſineſs, or preferable inquiries, happened to be thruſt aſide, and ſo lay neglected.

The "conduct of the underſtanding" he always thought to be a ſubject very well worth conſideration. As any miſcarriages, in that point, accidentally came into his mind, he uſed ſometimes to ſet them down in writing, with thoſe remedies, that he could then think of. This method, though it makes not that haſte to the end, which one could wiſh, yet perhaps is the only one, that can be followed in the caſe; it being here, as in phyſic, impoſſible for a phyſician to deſcribe a diſeaſe, or ſeek remedies for it, till he comes to meet with it. Such particulars of this kind, as occurred to the author, at a time of leiſure, he, as is before ſaid, ſet down in writing; intending, if he had lived, to have reduced them into order and method, and to have made a complete treatiſe; whereas now it is only a collection of caſual obſervations, ſufficient to make men ſee ſome faults in the conduct of their underſtanding, and ſuſpect there may be more, and may, perhaps, ſerve to excite others to inquire farther into it, than the author hath done.

" The examination of P. Malebranche's opinion, of " ſeeing all things in God," ſhows it to be a very groundleſs notion, and was not publiſhed by the author, becauſe he looked upon it to be an opinion that would not ſpread, but was like to die of itſelf, or at leaſt to do no great harm.

" The diſcourſe of miracles" was writ for his own ſatisfaction, and never went beyond the firſt draught, and was occaſioned by his reading " Mr. Fleetwood's " eſſay on miracles," and the letter writ to him on that ſubject.

" The fourth letter for toleration" is imperfect, was begun by the author, a little before his death, but never finiſhed. It was deſigned for an anſwer to a book intitled, " A ſecond letter to the author of the three " letters for toleration" &c. which was writ againſt the author's third letter for toleration, about twelve years after the ſaid third letter had been publiſhed.

" The memoirs of the late earl of Shafteſbury" are only certain particular facts, ſet down in writing by the author, as they occurred to his memory; if time and health would have permitted him, he had gone on farther, and from ſuch materials have collected and compiled an hiſtory of that noble peer.

AN

AN

EXAMINATION

OF

P. MALEBRANCHE'S

OPINION

OF

SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD.

1. THE acute and ingenious author of the Recherche de la Verité, among a great many very fine thoughts, judicious reaſonings, and uncommon reflections, has in that treatiſe ſtarted the notion of "ſeeing "all things in God," as the beſt way to explain the nature and manner of the ideas in our underſtanding. The deſire I had to have my unaffected ignorance removed, has made it neceſſary for me to ſee whether this hypotheſis, when examined, and the parts of it put together, can be thought to cure our ignorance, or is intelligible and ſatisfactory to one who would not deceive himſelf, take words for things, and think he knows what he knows not.

2. This I obſerve at the entrance, that P. Malebranche* having enumerated, and in the following chapters ſhowed the difficulties of the other ways, whereby he thinks human underſtanding may be at-

* Recherche de la Verité, l. 3. p. 2. c. 1.

tempted to be explained, and how insufficient they are to give a satisfactory account of the ideas we have, erects this of "seeing all things in God" upon their ruin, as the true, because it is impossible to find a better. Which argument, so far being only "argumentum ad ignorantiam," loses all its force as soon as we consider the weakness of our minds, and the narrowness of our capacities, and have but humility enough to allow, that there may be many things which we cannot fully comprehend, and that God is not bound in all he does to subject his ways of operation to the scrutiny of our thoughts, and confine himself to do nothing but what we must comprehend. And it will very little help to cure my ignorance, that this is the best of four or five hypotheses proposed, which are all defective; if this too has in it what is inconsistent with itself, or unintelligible to me.

3. The P. Malebranche's Recherche de la Verité, l. 3. p. 2. c. 1, tells us, that whatever the mind perceives "must be actually present and intimately united "to it." That the things that the mind perceives are its own sensations, imaginations, or notions; which, being in the soul the modifications of it, need no ideas to represent them. But all things exteriour to the soul we cannot perceive but by the intervention of ideas, supposing that the things themselves cannot be intimately united to the soul. But because spiritual things may possibly be united to the soul, therefore he thinks it probable that they can discover themselves immediately without ideas; though of this he doubts, because he believes not there is any substance purely intelligible but that of God; and that though spirits can possibly unite themselves to our minds; yet at present we cannot entirely know them. But he speaks here principally of material things, which he says certainly cannot unite themselves to our souls in such a manner, as is necessary that it should perceive them; because, being extended, the soul not being so, there is no proportion between them.

4. This is the sum of his doctrine contained in the first chapter of the second part of the third book, as far

far as I can comprehend it; wherein, I confeſs, there are many expreſſions, which carrying with them, to my mind, no clear ideas, are like to remove but little of my ignorance by their ſounds. v. g. "What it is "to be intimately united to the ſoul;" what it is for two ſouls or ſpirits to be intimately united: for intimate union being an idea taken from bodies, when the parts of one get within the ſurface of the other, and touch their inward parts; what is the idea of intimate union, I muſt have, between two beings that have neither of them any extenſion or ſurface? And if it be not ſo explained as to give me a clear idea of that union, it will make me underſtand very little more of the nature of the ideas in my mind, when it is ſaid I ſee them in God, who being "intimately united to the ſoul" exhibits them to it; than when it is only ſaid they are by the appointment of God produced in the mind by certain motions of our bodies, to which our minds are united. Which, however imperfect a way of explaining this matter, will ſtill be as good as any other that does not by clear ideas remove my ignorance of the manner of my perception.

5. But he ſays that "certainly material things can-"not unite themſelves to our ſouls." Our bodies are united to our ſouls, yes; but, ſays he, not after "a "manner which is neceſſary that the ſoul may perceive "them." Explain this manner of union, and ſhow wherein the difference conſiſts betwixt the union neceſſary and not neceſſary to perception, and then I ſhall confeſs this difficulty removed.

The reaſon that he gives why "material things can-"not be united to our ſouls after a manner" that is neceſſary to the ſoul's perceiving them, is this; viz. That "material things being extended, and the ſoul "not, there is no proportion between them." This, if it ſhows any thing, ſhows only that a ſoul and a body cannot be united, becauſe one has ſurface to be united by, and the other none. But it ſhows not why ſoul, united to a body as ours is, cannot, by that body, have the idea of a triangle excited in it, as well as by being united to God (between whom and the ſoul there is as

little proportion, as between any creature immaterial or material and the ſoul) ſee in God the idea of a triangle that is in him, ſince we cannot conceive a triangle, whether ſeen in matter, or in God, to be without extenſion.

6. He ſays, "There is no ſubſtance purely intelligible but that of God." Here again I muſt confeſs myſelf in the dark, having no notion at all of the "ſubſtance of God;" nor being able to conceive how his is more intelligible than any other ſubſtance.

7. One thing more there is, which, I confeſs, ſtumbles me in the very foundation of this hypotheſis, which ſtands thus: we cannot "perceive" any thing but what is "intimately united to the ſoul." The reaſon why ſome things (viz. material) cannot be "intimately united "to the ſoul," is, becauſe "there is no proportion be-"tween the ſoul and them." If this be a good reaſon, it follows, that the greater the proportion there is between the ſoul and any other being, the better and more intimately they can be united. Now then I aſk, whether there be a greater proportion between God, an infinite being, and the ſoul, or between finite created ſpirits and the ſoul? And yet the author ſays, that "he believes that "there is no ſubſtance purely intelligible but that of "God," and that "we cannot intirely know created ſpi-"rits at preſent." Make this out upon your principles of "intimate union" and "proportion," and then they will be of ſome uſe to the clearing of your hypotheſis, otherwiſe "intimate union" and "proportion" are only ſounds ſerving to amuſe, not inſtruct us.

8. In the cloſe of this chapter he enumerates the ſeveral ways whereby he thinks we come by ideas, and compares them ſeverally with his own way. Which how much more intelligible it is than either of thoſe, the following chapters will ſhow; to which I ſhall proceed, when I have obſerved that it ſeems a bold determination, when he ſays, that it muſt be one of theſe ways, and we can ſee objects no other. Which aſſertion muſt be built on this good opinion of our capacities, that God cannot make the creatures operate, but in ways conceivable to us. That we cannot diſcourſe and reaſon about them farther than we conceive, is a great truth:

truth: and it would be well if we would not, but would ingenuouſly own the ſhortneſs of our ſight where we do not ſee. To ſay there can be no other, becauſe we conceive no other, does not, I confeſs, much inſtruct. And if I ſhould ſay, that it is poſſible God has made our ſouls ſo, and ſo united them to our bodies, that, upon certain motions made in our bodies by external objects, the ſoul ſhould have ſuch or ſuch perceptions or ideas, though in a way inconceivable to us; this perhaps would appear as true and as inſtructive a propoſition as what is ſo poſitively laid down.

9. Though the peripatetic doctrine* of the ſpecies does not at all ſatisfy me, yet I think it were not hard to ſhow, that it is as eaſy to account for the difficulties he charges on it, as for thoſe his own hypotheſis is laden with. But it being not my buſineſs to defend what I do not underſtand, nor to prefer the learned gibberiſh of the ſchools, to what is yet unintelligible to me in P. M. I ſhall only take notice of ſo much of his objections, as concerns what I gueſs to be the truth. Though I do not think any material ſpecies, carrying the reſemblance of things by a continual flux from the body we perceive, bring the perception of them to our ſenſes; yet I think the perception we have of bodies at a diſtance from ours, may be accounted for, as far as we are capable of underſtanding it, by the motion of particles of matter coming from them and ſtriking on our organs. In feeling and taſting there is immediate contact. Sound is not unintelligibly explained by a vibrating motion communicated to the medium, and the effluvia of odorous bodies will, without any great difficulties, account for ſmells. And therefore P. M. makes his objections only againſt viſible ſpecies, as the moſt difficult to be explained by material cauſes, as indeed they are. But he that ſhall allow extreme ſmallneſs in the particles of light, and exceeding ſwiftneſs in their motion; and the great poroſity that muſt be granted in bodies, if we compare gold, which wants them not,

* Recherche de Verité, l. 3. pt. 2. c. 2.

with air, the medium wherein the rays of light come to our eyes, and that of a million of rays that rebound from any visible area of any body, perhaps the $\frac{1}{1000}$ or $\frac{1}{10000}$ part coming to the eye, are enough to move the retina sufficiently to cause a sensation in the mind; will not find any great difficulty in the objections which are brought from the impenetrability of matter, and these rays ruffling and breaking one another in the medium which is full of them. As to what is said, that from one point we can see a great number of objects, that is no objection against the species, or visible appearances of bodies, being brought into the eye by the rays of light; for the bottom of the eye or retina, which, in regard of these rays, is the place of vision, is far from being a point. Nor is it true, that though the eye be in any one place; yet that the sight is performed in one point; i. e. that the rays that bring those visible species do all meet in a point; for they cause their distinct sensations, by striking on distinct parts of the retina, as is plain in optics; and the figure they paint there must be of some considerable bigness, since it takes up on the retina an area whose diameter is at least thirty seconds of a circle, whereof the circumference is in the retina, and the centre somewhere in the crystalline; as a little skill in optics will manifest to any one that considers, that few eyes can perceive an object less than thirty minutes of a circle, whereof the eye is the centre. And he that will but reflect on that seeming odd experiment of seeing only the two outward ones of three bits of paper stuck up against a wall, at about half a foot, or a foot one from another, without seeing the middle one at all, whilst his eye remains fixed in the same posture, must confess that vision is not made in a point, when it is plain, that looking with one eye there is always one part between the extremes of the area that we see, which is not seen at the same time that we perceive the extremes of it; though the looking with two eyes, or the quick turning of the axis of the eye to the part we would distinctly view, when we look but with one, does not let us take notice of it.

10. What

10. What I have here said I think sufficient to make intelligible, how by material rays of light visible species may be brought into the eye, notwithstanding any of P. M.'s objections against so much of material causes, as my hypothesis is concerned in. But when by this means an image is made on the retina, how we see it, I conceive no more than when I am told we see it in God. How we see it, is, I confess, what I understand not in the one or in the other, only it appears to me more difficult to conceive a distinct visible image in the uniform invariable essence of God, than in variously modifiable matter; but the manner how I see either, still escapes my comprehension. Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I understand; and motions from thence continued to the brain may be conceived, and that these produce ideas in our minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensible. This I can resolve only into the good pleasure of God, whose ways are past finding out. And, I think, I know it as well when I am told these are ideas that the motion of the animal spirits, by a law established by God, produces in me; as when I am told they are ideas I see in God. The ideas it is certain I have, and God both ways is the original cause of my having them; but the manner how I come by them, how it is that I perceive, I confess I understand not; though it be plain motion has to do in the producing of them: and motion so modified, is appointed to be the cause of our having them; as appears by the curious and artificial structure of the eye, accommodated to all the rules of refraction and dioptrics, that so visible objects might be exactly and regularly painted on the bottom of the eye.

11. The change of bigness in the ideas of visible objects, by distance and optic-glasses, which is the next argument he uses against visible species, is a good argument against them, as supposed by the peripatetics; but when considered, would persuade one that we see the figures and magnitudes of things rather in the bottom of our eyes than in God: the idea we have of them and their grandeur being still proportioned to the bigness of the area, on e bottom of our eyes, that is affected by the rays which paint the image there; and we

may

may be ſaid to ſee the picture in the retina, as, when it is pricked, we are truly ſaid to feel the pain in our finger.

12. In the next place where he ſays, that when we look on a cube "we ſee all its ſides equal." This, I think, is a miſtake; and I have in another place ſhown, how the idea we have from a regular ſolid, is not the true idea of that ſolid, but ſuch an one as by cuſtom (as the name of it does) ſerves to excite our judgment to form ſuch an one.

13. What he ſays of ſeeing an object ſeveral millions of leagues, the very ſame inſtant that it is uncovered, I think may be ſhown to be a miſtake in matter of fact. For by obſervations made on the ſatellites of Jupiter, it is diſcovered that light is ſucceſſively propagated, and is about ten minutes coming from the ſun to us.

14. By what I have ſaid, I think it may be underſtood how we may conceive, that from remote objects material cauſes may reach our ſenſes, and therein produce ſeveral motions that may be the cauſes of ideas in us; notwithſtanding what P. M. has ſaid in this ſecond chapter againſt material ſpecies. I confeſs his arguments are good againſt thoſe ſpecies as uſually underſtood by the peripatetics: but, ſince my principles have been ſaid to be conformable to the ariſtotelian philoſophy, I have endeavoured to remove the difficulties it is charged with, as far as my opinion is concerned in them.

15. His third chapter is to confute the "opinion of "thoſe who think our minds have a power to produce "the ideas of things on which they would think, and "that they are excited to produce them by the impreſ-"ſions which objects make on the body." One who thinks ideas are nothing but perceptions of the mind annexed to certain motions of the body by the will of God, who hath ordered ſuch perceptions always to accompany ſuch motions, though we know not how they are produced; does in effect conceive thoſe ideas or perceptions to be only paſſions of the mind, when produced in it, whether we will or no, by external objects. But he conceives them to be a mixture of action

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and paſſion when the mind attends to them, or revives them in the memory. Whether the ſoul has ſuch a power as this, we ſhall perhaps have occaſion to conſider hereafter; and this power our author does not deny, ſince in this very chapter he ſays, "When we "conceive a ſquare by pure underſtanding, we can yet "imagine it; i. e. perceive it in ourſelves by tracing "an image of it on the brain." Here then he allows the ſoul power to trace images on the brain, and perceive them. This, to me, is matter of new perplexity in his hypotheſis; for if the ſoul be ſo united to the brain as to trace images on it, and perceive them, I do not ſee how this conſiſts with what he ſays a little before in the firſt chapter, viz. "that certainly mate-"rial things cannot be united to our ſouls after a man-"ner neceſſary to its perceiving them."

16. That which is ſaid about objects exciting ideas in us by motion; and our reviving the ideas we have once got in our memories, does not, I confeſs, fully explain the manner how it is done. In this I frankly avow my ignorance, and ſhould be glad to find in him any thing that would clear it to me; but in his explications I find theſe difficulties which I cannot get over.

17. The mind cannot produce ideas, ſays he, becauſe they are "real ſpiritual beings," i. e. ſubſtances; for ſo is the concluſion of that paragraph, where he mentions it as an abſurdity to think they are "annihilated "when they are not preſent to the mind." And the whole force of this argument would perſuade one to underſtand him ſo; though I do not remember that he any where ſpeaks it out, or in direct terms calls them ſubſtances.

18. I ſhall here only take notice how inconceivable it is to me, that a ſpiritual, i. e. an unextended ſubſtance ſhould repreſent to the mind an extended figure, v. g. a triangle of unequal ſides, or two triangles of different magnitudes. Next, ſuppoſing I could conceive an unextended ſubſtance to repreſent a figure, or be the idea of a figure, the difficulty ſtill remains to conceive how it is my ſoul ſees it. Let this ſubſtantial being be ever ſo ſure, and the picture ever ſo clear; yet how we

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ſee it, is to me inconceivable. Intimate union, were it as intelligible of two unextended ſubſtances, as of two bodies, would not yet reach perception, which is ſomething beyond union. But yet a little lower he agrees, that an idea " is not a ſubſtance," but yet affirms, it is " a ſpiritual thing:" this " ſpiritual " thing" therefore muſt either be a " ſpiritual ſub- " ſtance," or a mode of a ſpiritual ſubſtance, or a relation; for beſides theſe I have no conception of any thing. And if any ſhall tell me it is a " mode," it muſt be a mode of the ſubſtance of God; which, beſides that it will be ſtrange to mention any modes in the ſimple eſſence of God; whoſoever ſhall propoſe any ſuch modes, as a way to explain the nature of our ideas, propoſes to me ſomething inconceivable, as a means to conceive what I do not yet know; and ſo bating a new phraſe, teaches me nothing, but leaves me as much in the dark as one can be where he conceives nothing. So that ſuppoſing ideas real ſpiritual things ever ſo much, if they are neither ſubſtances nor modes, let them be what they will, I am no more inſtructed in their nature, than when I am told they are perceptions, ſuch as I find them. And I appeal to my reader, whether that hypotheſis be to be preferred for its eaſineſs to be underſtood, which is explained by real beings, that are neither ſubſtances nor modes.

19. In the fourth chapter he proves, that we do not ſee objects by ideas that are created with us; becauſe the ideas we have even of one very ſimple figure, v. g. a triangle, are not infinite, though there may be infinite triangles. What this proves I will not here examine; but the reaſon he gives being built on his hypotheſes, I cannot get over, and that is, that, " it is not for " want of ideas, or that infinite is not preſent to us, " but it is only for want of capacity and extenſion of " our ſouls, becauſe the extenſion of our ſpirits is very " narrow and limited." To have a limited extenſion, is to have ſome extenſion which agrees but ill with what is before ſaid of our ſouls, that they " have no " extenſion." By what he ſays here and in other places, one would think he were to be underſtood, as if

if the ſoul, being but a ſmall extenſion, could not at once receive all the ideas conceivable in infinite ſpace, becauſe but a little part of that infinite ſpace can be applied to the ſoul at once. To conceive thus of the ſoul's intimate union with an infinite being, and by that union receiving of ideas, leads one as naturally into as groſs thoughts, as a country maid would have of an infinite butter-print, in which was engraven figures of all ſorts and ſizes, the ſeveral parts whereof being, as there was occaſion, applied to her lump of butter, left on it the figure or idea there was preſent need of. But whether any one would thus explain our ideas, I will not ſay, only I know not well how to underſtand what he ſays here, with what he ſays before of union, in a better ſenſe.

20. He farther ſays, that had we a magazine of all ideas that are neceſſary for ſeeing things, they would be of no uſe, ſince the mind could not know which to chooſe, and ſet before itſelf to ſee the ſun. What he here means by the ſun is hard to conceive, and according to his hypotheſis of "ſeeing all things in God," how can he know that there is any ſuch real being in the world as the ſun? Did he ever ſee the ſun? No, but on occaſion of the preſence of the ſun to his eyes, he has ſeen the idea of the ſun in God, which God has exhibited to him; but the ſun, becauſe it cannot be united to his ſoul, he cannot ſee. How then does he know that there is a ſun which he never ſaw? And ſince God does all things by the moſt compendious ways, what need is there that God ſhould make a ſun that we might ſee its idea in him when he pleaſed to exhibit it, when this might as well be done without any real ſun at all.

21. He farther ſays, that God does not actually produce in us as many new ideas as we every moment perceive different things. Whether he has proved this or no, I will not examine.

22. But he ſays, that "we have at all times actually "in ourſelves the ideas of all things." Then we have always actually in ourſelves the ideas of all triangles, which was but now denied, "but we have them con-

"fuſedly."

" fuſedly." If we ſee them in God, and they are not in him confuſedly, I do not underſtand how we can ſee them in God confuſedly.

23. In the fifth chapter he tells us " all things are " in God," even the moſt corporeal and earthly, but " after a manner altogether ſpiritual, and which we " cannot comprehend." Here therefore he and I are alike ignorant of theſe good words; " material things " are in God after a ſpiritual manner," ſignifying nothing to either of us; and " ſpiritual manner," ſignifies no more but this, that material things are in God immaterially. This and the like are ways of ſpeaking, which our vanity has found out to cover, not remove our ignorance. But " material things are in God," becauſe " their ideas are in God, and thoſe ideas which " God had of them before the world was created, are " not at all different from himſelf." This ſeems to me to come very near ſaying, not only that there is variety in God, ſince we ſee variety in what " is not " different from himſelf;" but that material things are God, or a part of him; which, though I do not think to be what our author deſigns; yet thus I fear he muſt be forced to talk, who thinks he knows God's underſtanding ſo much better than his own, that he will make uſe of the divine intellect to explain the human.

24. In the ſixth chapter he comes more particularly to explain his own doctrine, where firſt he ſays, " the " ideas of all beings are in God." Let it be ſo, God has the idea of a triangle, of a horſe, of a river, juſt as we have; for hitherto this ſignifies no more, for we ſee them as they are in him; and ſo the ideas that are in him, are the ideas we perceive. Thus far I then underſtand God hath the ſame ideas we have. This tells us indeed that there are ideas, which was agreed before, and I think no-body denies, but tells me not yet what they are.

25. Having ſaid that they are in God, the next thing he tells us is, that we " can ſee them in God." His proof, that " our ſouls can ſee them in God, is becauſe " God is moſt ſtraitly united to our ſouls by his pre- " ſence, inſomuch that one may ſay, God is the place

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" of ſpirits, as ſpaces are the places of bodies;" in which there is not, I confeſs, one word that I can underſtand. For, firſt, in what ſenſe can he ſay, that " ſpaces are the places of bodies;" when he makes body and ſpace, or extenſion, to be the ſame thing. So that I do no more underſtand what he means, when he ſays, " ſpaces are the places of bodies," than if he had ſaid, bodies are the places of bodies. But when this ſimile is applied to God and ſpirits, it makes this ſaying, that " God is the place of ſpirits," either to be merely metaphorical, and ſo ſignifies literally nothing, or elſe being literal, makes us conceive that ſpirits move up and down, and have their diſtances and intervals in God, as bodies have in ſpace. When I am told in which of theſe ſenſes he is to be underſtood, I ſhall be able to ſee how far it helps us to underſtand the nature of ideas. But is not God as ſtraitly united to bodies as to ſpirits? For he is alſo preſent, even where they are, but yet they ſee not theſe ideas in him. He therefore adds, " that the ſoul can ſee in God the " works of God, ſuppoſing God would diſcover to it " what there is in him to repreſent them," viz. the ideas that are in him. Union therefore is not the cauſe of this ſeeing; for the ſoul may be united to God, and yet not ſee the ideas are in him, till he " diſcover" them to it; ſo that, after all, I am but where I was. I have ideas, that I know; but I would know what they are; and to that I am yet only told, that " I ſee " them in God." I aſk how I ſee them in God? And it is anſwered, by my " intimate union" with God, for he is every-where preſent. I anſwer, if that were enough, bodies are alſo intimately united with God, for he is every-where preſent; beſides, if that were enough, I ſhould ſee all the ideas that are in God. No, but only thoſe that he pleaſes to " diſcover." Tell me wherein this diſcovery lies, beſides barely making me ſee them, and you explain the manner of my having ideas: otherwiſe all that has been ſaid amounts to no more but this, that I have thoſe ideas that it pleaſes God I ſhould have, but by ways that I know not; and of this mind I was before, and am not got one jot farther.

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26. In the next paragraph he calls them " beings, " repreſentative beings." But whether theſe beings are ſubſtances, modes, or relations, I am not told; and ſo by being told they are ſpiritual beings, I know no more but that they are ſomething, I know not what, and that I knew before.

27. To explain this matter a little farther, he adds, " It muſt be obſerved, that it cannot be concluded, " that ſouls ſee the eſſence of God, in that they ſee all " things in God; becauſe what they ſee is very imper- " fect, and God is very perfect. They ſee matter divi- " ſible, figured, &c. and in God there is nothing divi- " ſible and figured: for God is all being, becauſe he is " infinite, and comprehends all things; but he is not " any being in particular. Whereas what we ſee is but " ſome one or more beings in particular; and we do " not at all comprehend that perfect ſimplicity of God " which contains all beings. Moreover, one may ſay, " that we do not ſo much ſee the ideas of things, as " the things themſelves, which the ideas repreſent. " For when, for example, one ſees a ſquare, one ſays " not that one ſees the idea of a ſquare, which is united " to the ſoul, but only the ſquare that is without." I do not pretend not to be ſhort-ſighted; but if I am not duller than ordinary, this paragraph ſhows, that P. M. himſelf is at a ſtand in this matter, and comprehends not what it is we ſee in God, or how. Chap. fourth, he ſays, in expreſs words, that " it is neceſſary " that at all times we ſhould have actually in ourſelves " the ideas of all things." And in this very chapter, a little lower, he ſays, that " all beings are preſent to " our minds," and that we have " general ideas ante- " cedent to particular." And, chap. 8th. that we are never without the " general idea of being:" and yet here he ſays, " that which we ſee" is but " one or " more beings in particular." And after having taken a great deal of pains to prove, that " we cannot poſ- " ſibly ſee things in themſelves, but only ideas;" here he tells us " we do not ſo much ſee the ideas of things " as the things themſelves." In this uncertainty of the author what it is we ſee, I am to be excuſed if my eyes

eyes see not more clearly in his hypothesis than he himself does.

28. He farther tells us, in this sixth chapter, that "we see all beings, because God wills that that which "is in him that represents them should be discovered "to us." This tells us only, that there are ideas of things in God, and that we see them when he pleases to discover them; but what does this show us more of the nature of those ideas, or of the discovery of them, wherein that consists, than he that says, without pretending to know what they are, or how they are made, that ideas are in our minds when God pleases to produce them there, by such motions as he has appointed to do it? The next argument for our "seeing all things in "God," is in these words; "but the strongest of all "the reasons is the manner in which the mind per-"ceives all things: it is evident, and all the world "knows it by experience, that when we would think "of any thing in particular, we at first cast our view "upon all beings, and afterwards we apply ourselves "to the consideration of the object which we desire to "think on." This argument has no other effect on me, but to make me doubt the more of the truth of this doctrine. First, because this, which he calls the "strongest reason of all," is built upon matter of fact, which I cannot find to be so in myself. I do not observe, that when I would think of a triangle, I first think of "all beings;" whether these words "all "beings" be to be taken here in their proper sense, or very improperly for "being" in general. Nor do I think my country neighbours do so, when they first wake in the morning, who, I imagine, do not find it impossible to think of a lame horse they have, or their blighted corn, till they have run over in their minds "all beings" that are, and then pitch on dapple; or else begin to think of "being" in general, which is "being" abstracted from all its inferiour species, before they come to think of the fly in their sheep, or the tares in their corn. For I am apt to think that the greatest part of mankind very seldom, if ever at all, think of "being" in general, i. e. abstracted from all

its inferiour ſpecies and individuals. But taking it to be ſo, that a carrier when he would think of a remedy for his galled horſe, or a foot-boy for an excuſe for ſome fault he has committed, begins with caſting his eye upon all things; how does this make out the concluſion? Therefore " we can deſire to ſee all objects, " whence it follows that all beings are preſent to our " minds." Which preſence ſignifies that we ſee them, or elſe it ſignifies nothing at all. They are all actually always ſeen by us; which, how true, let every one judge.

29. The words wherein he purſues this argument ſtand thus, " Now it is indubitable that we cannot " deſire to ſee any particular object without ſeeing it " already, although confuſedly, and in general. So " that being able to deſire to ſee all beings, ſometimes " one, ſometimes another, it is certain that all beings " are preſent to our ſpirits; and it ſeems all beings " could not be preſent to our ſpirits, but becauſe God " is preſent to them, i. e. he that contains all things in " the ſimplicity of his being." I muſt leave it to others to judge how far it is blameable in me; but ſo it is, that I cannot make to myſelf the links of this chain to hang together; and methinks if a man would have ſtudied obſcurity, he could not have writ more unintelligibly than this. " We can deſire to ſee all " beings, ſometimes one, ſometimes another; there- " fore we do already ſee all things, becauſe we cannot " deſire to ſee any particular object, but what we ſee " already confuſedly and in general." The diſcourſe here is about ideas, which he ſays are real things, and we ſee in God. In taking this along with me, to make it prove any thing to his purpoſe, the argument muſt, as it ſeems to me, ſtand thus: we can deſire to have all ideas, ſometimes one, ſometimes another; therefore we have already all ideas, becauſe we cannot deſire to have any particular idea, but what we have already " con- " fuſedly" and " in general." What can be meant here by having any " particular" idea " confuſedly " and in general," I confeſs I cannot conceive, unleſs it be a capacity in us to have them; and in that ſenſe the

the whole argument amounts to no more but this: we have all ideas, becauſe we are capable of having all ideas; and ſo proves not at all that we actually have them by being united to God, who " contains them " all in the ſimplicity of his being." That any thing elſe is, or can be meant by it, I do not ſee; for that which we deſire to ſee, being nothing but what we ſee already, (for if it can be any elſe, the argument falls and proves nothing) and that which we deſire to ſee, being, as we are told here, ſomething particular, " ſometimes one thing, ſometimes another;" that which we do ſee muſt be particular too; but how to ſee a particular thing in general, is paſt my comprehenſion. I cannot conceive how a blind man has the particular idea of ſcarlet confuſedly or in general, when he has it not at all; and yet that he might deſire to have it, I cannot doubt, no more than I doubt that I can deſire to perceive, or to have the ideas of thoſe things that God has prepared for thoſe that love him, " though they be ſuch as eye hath not ſeen, nor ear " hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of " man to conceive," ſuch as I have yet no idea of. He who deſires to know what creatures are in Jupiter, or what God hath prepared for them that love him, hath, it is true, a ſuppoſition that there is ſomething in Jupiter, or in the place of the bleſſed; but if that be to have the particular ideas of things there, enough to ſay that we ſee them already, no-body can be ignorant of any thing. He that has ſeen one thing hath ſeen all things; for he has got the general idea of ſomething. But this is not, I confeſs, ſufficient to convince me, that hereby we ſee all things " in the ſimplicity of " God's being," which comprehends all things. For if the ideas I ſee are all, as our author tells us, real beings in him, it is plain they muſt be ſo many real diſtinct beings in him; and if we ſee them in him, we muſt ſee them as they are, diſtinct particular things, and ſo ſhall not ſee them confuſedly and in general. And what it is to ſee any idea (to which I do not give a name) confuſedly, is what I do not well underſtand. What I ſee I ſee, and the idea I ſee is diſtinct from

all others that are not the same with it: besides, I see them as they are in God, and as he shows them me. Are they in God confusedly? Or does he show them me confusedly?

30. Secondly, This "seeing of all things," because we "can desire to see all things," he makes a proof that "they are present" to our minds; and if they "be present, they can no ways be present but by the "presence of God, who contains them all in the simpli-"city of his being." This reasoning seems to be founded on this, that the reason of seeing all things, is their being present to our minds; because God, in whom they are, is present. This, though the foundation he seems to build on, is liable to a very natural objection, which is, that then we should actually always see all things, because in God, who is present, they are all actually present to the mind. This he has endeavoured to obviate, by saying we see all the ideas in God, which he is pleased "to discover to us;" which indeed is an answer to this objection; but such an one as overturns his whole hypothesis, and renders it useless, and as unintelligible as any of those he has for that reason laid aside. He pretends to explain to us how we come to perceive any thing, and that is by having the ideas of them present in our minds; for the soul cannot perceive things at a distance, or remote from it. And those ideas are present to the mind, only because God, in whom they are, is present to the mind. This so far hangs together, and is of a piece. But when after this I am told, that their presence is not enough to make them be seen, but God must do something farther to discover them to me, I am as much in the dark as I was at first: and all this talk of their presence in my mind explains nothing of the way wherein I perceive them, nor ever will, till he also makes me understand, what God does more than make them present to my mind, when he discovers them to me. For I think nobody denies, I am sure I affirm, that the ideas we have, are in our minds by the will and power of God, though in a way that we conceive not, nor are able to comprehend. God, says our author, is strictly united to the

the ſoul, and ſo the ideas of things too. But yet that preſence or union of theirs is not enough to make them ſeen, but God muſt ſhow or exhibit them; and what does God do more than make them preſent to the mind when he ſhows them? Of that there is nothing ſaid to help me over this difficulty, but that when God ſhows them, we ſee them; which in ſhort ſeems to me to ſay only thus much, that when we have theſe ideas we have them, and we owe the having of them to our Maker; which is to ſay no more than I do with my ignorance. We have the ideas of figures and colours by the operation of exteriour objects on our ſenſes, when the ſun ſhows them us; but how the ſun ſhows them us, or how the light of the ſun produces them in us; what, and how the alteration is made in our ſouls; I know not: nor does it appear, by any thing our author ſays, that he knows any more what God does when he ſhows them us, or what it is that is done upon our minds, ſince the preſence of them to our minds, he confeſſes, does it not.

31. Thirdly, One thing more is incomprehenſible to me in this matter, and that is, how the "ſimplicity "of God's being" ſhould contain in it a variety of real beings, ſo that the ſoul can diſcern them in him diſtinctly one from another? it being ſaid, chap. 5th. That the ideas in God "are not different from God "himſelf." This ſeems to me to expreſs a ſimplicity made up of variety, a thing I cannot underſtand. God I believe to be a ſimple being, that by his wiſdom knows all things, and by his power can do all things; but how he does it, I think myſelf leſs able to comprehend, than to contain the ocean in my hand, or graſp the univerſe with my ſpan. "Ideas "are real beings," you ſay; if ſo, it is evident they muſt be diſtinct "real beings;" for there is nothing more certain than that there are diſtinct ideas; and they are in God, in whom we ſee them. There they are then actually diſtinct, or elſe we could not ſee them diſtinct in him. Now theſe diſtinct real beings that are in God, are they either parts, or modifications of the Deity, or comprehended in him as things in a place? For beſides theſe three, I think we can ſcarce think of

another way wherein we can conceive them to be in him, ſo that we can ſee them. For to ſay they are in him " eminentèr," is to ſay they are not in him actually and really to be ſeen; but only if they are in him " eminentèr," and we ſee them only in him, we can be ſaid to ſee them only " eminentèr" too. So that though it cannot be denied that God ſees and knows all things; yet when we ſay we ſee all things in him, it is but a metaphorical expreſſion to cover our ignorance, in a way that pretends to explain our knowledge; ſeeing things in God ſignifying no more than that we perceive them we know not how.

32. He farther adds, That he " does not believe " that one can well give an account of the manner " wherein the mind knows many abſtract and general " truths, but by the preſence of him who can enlighten " the mind after a thouſand different faſhions." It is not to be denied that God can enlighten our minds after a thouſand different faſhions; and it cannot alſo be denied, that thoſe thouſand different faſhions may be ſuch, as we comprehend not one of them. The queſtion is, whether this talk of ſeeing all things in God does make us clearly, or at all, comprehend one of them; if it did ſo to me, I ſhould gratefully acknowledge that then I was ignorant of nine hundred and ninety-nine of the thouſand, whereas I muſt yet confeſs myſelf ignorant of them all.

33. The next paragraph, if it proves any thing, ſeems to me to prove that the idea we have of God is God himſelf, it being ſomething, as he ſays, " uncreated." The ideas that men have of God are ſo very different, that it would be very hard to ſay it was God himſelf. Nor does it avail to ſay they would all have the ſame, if they would apply their minds to the contemplation of him; for this being brought here to prove that God is preſent in all men's minds, and that therefore they ſee him, it muſt alſo, in my apprehenſion, prove that he being immutably the ſame, and they ſeeing him, muſt needs ſee him all alike.

34. In the next ſection we are told that we have " not only the idea of infinite, but before that of finite."

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This being a thing of experience, every one must examine himself; and it being my misfortune to find it otherwise in myself, this argument, of course, is like to have the less effect on me, who therefore cannot so easily admit the inference, viz. "That the mind perceives not one thing, but in the idea it has of infinite." And I cannot but believe many a child can tell twenty, have the idea of a square trencher, or a round plate, and have the distinct clear ideas of two and three, long before he has any idea of "infinite" at all.

35. The last argument which he tells us is a demonstration that we see all things in God, is this; "God "has made all things for himself; but if God made a "spirit or mind, and gave it the sun for its idea, or "the immediate object of its knowledge, God would "have made that spirit or mind for the sun, and not "for himself." The natural inference from this argument seems to me to be this, therefore God has given himself for the idea, or immediate object of the knowledge of all human minds. But experience too manifestly contradicting this, our author hath made another conclusion, and says thus, "It is necessary then that "the light which he gives the mind, should make us "know something that is in him," v. g. Because "all "things that come from God cannot be but for God." Therefore a covetous man sees in God the money, and a persian the sun that he worships; and thus God is the "immediate object" of the minds, both of the one and the other. I confess this demonstration is lost on me, and I cannot see the force of it. All things, it is true, are made for God, i. e. for his glory; and he will be glorified even by those rational beings, who would not apply their faculties to the knowledge of him.

36. But the next paragraph explains this: "God "could not then make a soul for to know his works, "were it not that that soul sees God after a fashion in "seeing his works:" just "after such a fashion," that if he never saw more of him, he would never know any thing of a God, nor believe there was any such being. A child, as soon as he is born, sees a candle, or before

he can ſpeak, the ball he plays with; theſe he "ſees "in God" whom he has yet no notion of. Whether this be enough to make us ſay that the mind is made for God, and this be the proof of it, other people muſt judge for themſelves. I muſt own that if this were the knowledge of God, which intelligent beings were made for, I do not ſee but they might be made for the knowledge of God without knowing any thing of him; and thoſe that deny him, were made for the knowledge of him. Therefore I am not convinced of the truth of what follows, that "we do not ſee any one thing, but by "the natural knowledge which we have of God." Which ſeems to me a quite contrary way of arguing to what the apoſtle uſes, where he ſays, that "the invi- "ſible things of God are ſeen by the viſible things "he has made." For it ſeems to me a quite contrary way of arguing, to ſay we ſee the Creator in, or by the creatures, and we ſee the creatures in the Creator. The apoſtle begins our knowledge in the creatures, which lead us to the knowledge of God, if we will make uſe of our reaſon: our author begins our knowledge in God, and by that leads us to the creatures.

37. But to confirm his argument, he ſays, "all the "particular ideas we have of the creatures are but "limitations of the idea of the Creator." As for example, I have the idea of the ſolidity of matter, and of the motion of body, what is the idea of God that either of theſe limits? And, when I think of the number ten, I do not ſee how that any way concerns or limits the idea of God.

38. The diſtinction he makes a little lower between "ſentiment" and "idea," does not at all clear to me, but cloud, his doctrine. His words are, "It muſt be "obſerved, that I do not ſay that we have the ſenti- "ment of material things in God, but that it is from "God that acts in us; for God knows ſenſible things, "but feels them not. When we perceive any ſenſible "thing, there is in our perception ſentiment and pure "idea." If by "ſentiment," which is the word he uſes in french, he means the act of ſenſation, or the operation of the ſoul in perceiving; and by "pure "idea," the immediate object of that perception, which

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is the definition of ideas he gives us here in the firſt chapter; there is ſome foundation for it, taking ideas for real beings or ſubſtances. But, taken thus, I cannot ſee how it can be avoided, but that we muſt be ſaid to ſmell a roſe in God, as well as to ſee a roſe in God; and the ſcent of the roſe that we ſmell, as well as the colour and figure of the roſe that we ſee, muſt be in God; which ſeems not to be his ſenſe here, and does not well agree with what he ſays concerning the ideas we ſee in God, which I ſhall conſider in its due place. If by "ſentiment" here he means ſomething that is neither the act of perception nor the idea perceived, I confeſs I know not what it is, nor have any conception at all of it. When we ſee and ſmell a violet, we perceive the figure, colour, and ſcent of that flower. Here I cannot but aſk whether all theſe three are "pure "ideas," or all "ſentiments?" If they are all "ideas," then according to his doctrine they are all in God; and then it will follow, that as I ſee the figure of the violet in God; ſo alſo I ſee the colour of it, and ſmell the ſcent of it in God, which way of ſpeaking he does not allow, nor can I blame him. For it ſhows a little too plainly the abſurdity of that doctrine, if he ſhould ſay we ſmell a violet, taſte wormwood, or feel cold in God; and yet I can find no reaſon why the action of one of our ſenſes is applied only to God, when we uſe them all as well as our eyes in receiving ideas. If the figure, colour, and ſmell are all of them "ſentiments," then they are none of them in God, and ſo this whole buſineſs of ſeeing in God is out of doors. If (as by what he ſays in his Eclairciſſements it appears to me to be his meaning) the figure of the violet be to be taken for an "idea," but its "colour" and "ſmell" for ſentiments: I confeſs it puzzles me to know by what rule it is, that in a violet the purple colour, whereof whilſt I write this I ſeem to have as clear an idea in my mind as of its figure, is not as much an idea as the figure of it; eſpecially, ſince he tells me in the firſt chapter here, which is concerning the nature of ideas, that "by this word "idea he underſtands here nothing elſe, but what is "the

" the immediate or neareſt object of the mind when it " perceives any thing."

39. The " ſentiment," ſays he in the next words, " is a modification of our ſoul." This word " modi- " fication" here, that comes in for explication, ſeems to me to ſignify nothing more than the word to be explained by it; v. g. I ſee the purple colour of a violet, this, ſays he, is " ſentiment:" I deſire to know what " ſentiment" is; that, ſays he, is a " modification of " the ſoul." I take the word, and deſire to ſee what I can conceive by it concerning my ſoul; and here, I confeſs, I can conceive nothing more, but that I have the idea of purple in my mind, which I had not before, without being able to apprehend any thing the mind does or ſuffers in this, beſides barely having the idea of purple; and ſo the good word " modification" ſignifies nothing to me more than I knew before; v. g. that I have now the idea of purple in it, which I had not ſome minutes ſince. So that though they ſay ſenſations are modifications of the mind; yet having no manner of idea what that modification of the mind is, diſtinct from that very ſenſation, v. g. the ſenſation of a red colour or a bitter taſte: it is plain this explication amounts to no more than that a ſenſation is a ſenſation, and the ſenſation of red or bitter is the ſenſation of " red" or " bitter;" for if I have no other idea, when I ſay it is a modification of the mind, than when I ſay it is the ſenſation of " red" or " bitter," it is plain ſenſation and modification ſtand both for the ſame idea, and ſo are but two names of one and the ſame thing. But to examine their doctrine of modification a little farther. Different ſentiments are different modifications of the mind. The mind or ſoul that perceives, is one immaterial indiviſible ſubſtance. Now I ſee the white and black on this paper, I hear one ſinging in the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I ſit by, and I taſte an apple I am eating, and all this at the ſame time. Now I aſk, take " modifica- " tion" for what you pleaſe, can the ſame unextended indiviſible ſubſtance have different, nay inconſiſtent and oppoſite (as theſe of white and black muſt be) modi-

modifications at the same time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one for black, another for white, and another for red ideas, and so of the rest of those infinite sensations which we have in sorts and degrees; all which we can distinctly perceive, and so are distinct ideas, some whereof are opposite, as heat and cold, which yet a man may feel at the same time? I was ignorant before how sensation was performed in us, this they call an explanation of it. Must I say now I understand it better? If this be to cure one's ignorance, it is a very slight disease, and the charm of two or three insignificant words will at any time remove it; "probatum est." But let it signify what it will, when I recollect the figure of one of the leaves of a violet, is not that a new modification of my soul, as well as when I think of its purple colour? Does my mind do or suffer nothing anew when I see that figure in God?

40. The idea of that figure, you say, is in God; let it be so, but it may be there, and I not see it, that is allowed; when I come to see it, which I did not before, is there no new modification, as you call it, of my mind? If there be, then seeing of figure in God, as well as having the idea of purple, is "a modification "of the mind," and this distinction signifies nothing. If seeing that figure in God now, which a minute or two since I did not see at all, be no new modification or alteration in my mind, no different action or passion from what was before, there is no difference made in my apprehensions between seeing and not seeing. The ideas of figures, our author says, are in God, and are real beings in God; and God being united to the mind, these are also united to it. This all seems to me to have something very obscure and inconceivable in it, when I come to examine particulars; but let it be granted to be as clear as any one would suppose it; yet it reaches not the main difficulty, which is in "seeing." How after all do I see? The ideas are in God, they are real things, they are intimately united to my mind, because God is so, but yet I do not see them. How at last after all this preparation, which hitherto is ineffectual,

effectual, do I come to see them? And to that I am told, " when God is pleased to discover them to me." This in good earnest seems to me to be nothing but going a great way about to come to the same place, and this learned circuit, thus set out, brings me at last no farther than this, that I see or perceive, or have ideas when it pleases God I should, but in a way I cannot comprehend; and this I thought without all this ado.

41. This " sentiment" he tells us in the next words, " it is God causes in us, and he can cause it in us, al- " though he has it not, because he sees in the idea that " he has of our soul, that it is capable of them." This I take to be said to show the difference between " sentiments" and " ideas" in us. V. g. " figures" and " numbers" are ideas, and they are in God. " Colours" and " smells," &c. are " sentiments" in us, and not ideas in God. First, as to ourselves I ask, why, when I recollect in my memory a violet, the purple colour as well as figure is not an idea in me? The making then the picture of any visible thing in my mind, as of a landscape I have seen, composed of figure and colour, the colour is not an idea, but the figure is an idea, and the colour a " sentiment." Every one I allow may use his words as he pleases; but if it be to instruct others, he must, when he uses two words where others use but one, show some ground of the distinction. And I do not find but the colour of the marigold I now think of, is as much " the immediate object of " my mind," as its figure; and so according to his definition is an " idea." Next as to God, I ask, whether, before the creation of the world, the idea of the whole marigold colour as well as figure was not in God? " God," says he, " can cause those sentiments " in us, because he sees in the idea that he has of our " soul, that it is capable of them." God, before he created any soul, knew all that he would make it capable of. He resolved to make it capable of having the perception of the colour as well as figure of a marigold; he had then the idea of that colour that he resolved to make it capable of, or else he made it capable (with reverence let it be spoken) of he knew not what: and

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if he knew what it ſhould be capable of, he had the idea of what he knew; for before the creation there was nothing but God, and the ideas he had. It is true, the colour of that flower is not actually in God, no more is its figure actually in God; but we that can conſider no other underſtanding, but in analogy to our own, cannot conceive otherwiſe but as the ideas of the figure, colour, and ſituation of the leaves of a marigold are in our minds, when we think of that flower in the night when we ſee it not; ſo it was in the thoughts of God before he made that flower. And thus we conceive him to have the idea of the ſmell of a violet, of the taſte of ſugar, the ſound of a lute or trumpet, and of the pain and pleaſure that accompany any of theſe or other ſenſations which he deſigned we ſhould feel, though he never felt any of them, as we have the ideas of the taſte of a cherry in winter, or of the pain of a burn when it is over. This is what I think we conceive of the ideas of God, which we muſt allow to have diſtinctly repreſented to him all that was to be in time, and conſequently the colours, odours, and other ideas they were to produce in us. I cannot be ſo bold as to pretend to ſay what thoſe ideas are in God, or to determine that they are real beings; but this I think I may ſay, that the idea of the colour of a marigold, or the motion of a ſtone, are as much real beings in God, as the idea of the figure or number of its leaves.

42. The reader muſt not blame me for making uſe here all along of the word "ſentiment," which is our author's own, and I underſtood it ſo little, that I knew not how to tranſlate it to any other. He concludes, "that he believes there is no appearance of truth in "any other ways of explaining theſe things, and that "this of ſeeing all things in God, is more than pro-"bable." I have conſidered with as much indifferency and attention as is poſſible; and I muſt own it appears to me as little or leſs intelligible than any of the reſt; and the ſummary of his doctrine, which he here ſubjoins, is to me wholly incomprehenſible. His words are, "Thus our ſouls depend on God all manner of "ways: for as it is he which makes them feel pleaſure "and

" and pain, and all other ſenſations, by the natural " union which he has made between them and our bo- " dies, which is nothing elſe but his decree and gene- " ral will: ſo it is he, who by the natural union which " he has made betwixt the will of man and the repre- " ſentation of ideas, which the immenſity of the di- " vine being contains, makes them know all that they " know; and this natural union is alſo nothing but his " general will." This phraſe of the union of our wills to the ideas contained in God's immenſity, ſeems to me a very ſtrange one; and what light it gives to his doctrine I truly cannot find. It ſeemed ſo unintelligible to me, that I gueſſed it an errour in the print of the edition I uſed, which was the 4to. printed at Paris, 78, and therefore conſulted the 8vo. printed alſo at Paris, and found it " will" in both of them. Here again the " immenſity of the divine being" is mentioned as that which contains in it the ideas to which our wills are united; which ideas being only thoſe of quantity, as I ſhall ſhow hereafter, ſeems to me to carry with it a very groſs notion of this matter, as we have above remarked. But that which I take notice of principally here, is, that this union of our wills to the ideas contained in God's immenſity, does not at all explain our ſeeing of them. This union of our wills to the ideas, or, as in other places, of our ſouls to God, is, ſays he, nothing but the will of God. And, after this union, our ſeeing them is only when God diſcovers them, i. e. our having them in our minds, is nothing but the will of God; all which is brought about in a way we comprehend not. And what then does this explain more than when one ſays, our ſouls are united to our bodies by the will of God, and by the motion of ſome parts of our bodies? V. g. the nerves or animal ſpirits have ideas or perceptions produced in them, and this is the will of God. Why is not this as intelligible and as clear as the other? Here is by the will of God given union and perception in both caſes; but how that perception is made in both ways, ſeems to me equally incomprehenſible. In one, God diſcovers ideas in himſelf to the ſoul united to him when he pleaſes; and

and in the other, he discovers ideas to the soul, or produces perception in the soul united to the body by motion, according to laws established by the good pleasure of his will; but how it is done in the one or the other I confess my incapacity to comprehend. So that I agree perfectly with him in his conclusion, that "there "is nothing but God that can enlighten us:" but a clear comprehension of the manner how he does it, I doubt I shall not have, till I know a great deal more of him and myself, than in this state of darkness and ignorance our souls are capable of.

43. In the next, chap. 7. he tells us, "there are "four ways of knowing; the first is to know things "by themselves;" and thus, he says, "we know God "alone;" and the reason he gives of it is this, because "at present he alone penetrates the mind, and "discovers himself to it."

First, I would know what it is to penetrate a thing that is unextended? These are ways of speaking, which taken from body, when they are applied to spirit, signify nothing, nor show us any thing but our ignorance. To God's penetrating our spirits, he joins his discovering himself; as if one were the cause of the other, and explained it: but I not conceiving any thing of the penetration of an unextended thing, it is lost upon me. But, next God penetrates our souls, and therefore we "see him by a direct and immediate "view," as he says in the following words. The ideas of all things which are in God, he elsewhere tells us, are not at all different from God himself; and if God's penetrating our minds be the cause of our direct and immediate seeing God, we have a direct and immediate view of all that we see; for we see nothing but God and ideas; and it is impossible for us to know that there is any thing else in the universe; for since we see, and can see nothing but God and ideas, how can we know there is any thing else which we neither do nor can see? But if there be any thing to be understood by this penetration of our souls, and we have a direct view of God by this penetration, why have we not also a direct and immediate view of other separate spirits besides God?

God? To this he says, that there is none but God alone who at present penetrates our spirits. This he says, but I do not see for what reason, but because it suits with his hypothesis: but he proves it not, nor goes about to do it, unless the direct and immediate view, he says, we have of God, be to be taken as a proof of it. But what is that direct and immediate view we have of God that we have not of a cherubim? The ideas of being, power, knowledge, goodness, duration, make up the complex idea we have of one and of the other; but only that in the one we join the idea of infinite to each simple idea, that makes our complex one; but to the other that of finite. But how have we a more direct or immediate view of the idea of power, knowledge, or duration, when we consider them in God, than when we consider them in an angel? The view of these ideas seems to be the same. Indeed we have a clearer proof of the existence of God than of a cherubim; but the idea of either, when we have it in our minds, seems to me to be there by an equally direct and immediate view. And it is about the ideas which are in our minds that I think our author's inquiry here is, and not about the real existence of those things whereof we have ideas, which are two very remote things.

44. Perhaps it is God alone, says our author, "who "can enlighten our minds by his substance." When I know what the substance of God is, and what it is to be enlightened by that substance, I shall know what I also shall think of it; but at present I confess myself in the dark as to this matter; nor do these good words of substance and enlightening, in the way they are here used, help me one jot out of it.

45. He goes on, "one cannot conceive, says he, that "any thing created can represent what is infinite." And I cannot conceive that there is any positive comprehensive idea in any finite mind that does represent it fully and clearly as it is. I do not find that the mind of man has infinity positively and fully represented to it, or comprehended by it; which must be, if his argument were true, that therefore God enlightens our

our minds by his proper ſubſtance: becauſe no created thing is big enough to repreſent what is infinite; and therefore what makes us conceive his infinity, is the preſence of his own infinite ſubſtance in our minds: which to me manifeſtly ſuppoſes, that we comprehend in our minds God's infinite ſubſtance, which is preſent to our minds; for if this be not the force of his argument, where he ſays, " nothing created can repreſent " what is infinite; the being that is without bounds, " the being immenſe, the being univerſal, cannot be " perceived by an idea, i. e. by a particular being, by " a being different from the univerſal infinite being " itſelf." It ſeems to me that this argument is founded on a ſuppoſition of our comprehending the infinite ſubſtance of God in our minds, or elſe I ſee not any force in it, as I have already ſaid. I ſhall take notice of one or two things in it that confound me, and that is, that he calls God here the univerſal being; which muſt either ſignify that being which contains, and is made up as one comprehenſive aggregate of all the reſt, in which ſenſe the univerſe may be called the univerſal being; or elſe it muſt mean being in general, which is nothing but the idea of being, abſtracted from all inferiour diviſions of that general notion, and from all particular exiſtence. But in neither of theſe ſenſes can I conceive God to be the univerſal being, ſince I cannot think the creatures either to be a part or a ſpecies of him. Next he calls the ideas that are in God particular beings. I grant whatever exiſts is particular, it cannot be otherwiſe; but that which is particular in exiſtence, may be univerſal in repreſentation, which I take to be all the univerſal beings we know, or can conceive to be. But let univerſal or particular beings be what they will, I do not ſee how our author can ſay, that God is an univerſal being, and the ideas we ſee in him particular beings; ſince he in another place tells us, that the ideas we ſee in God are not at all different from God. But, ſays he, " as to particular beings it " is not hard to conceive that they can be repreſented " by the infinite being which contains them, and con- " tains them after a very ſpiritual manner, and conſe-

" quently very intelligible." It ſeems as impoſſible to me, that an infinite ſimple being, in whom there is no variety, nor ſhadow of variety, ſhould repreſent a finite thing, as that a finite thing ſhould repreſent an infinite: nor do I ſee how its " containing all things in it after " a very ſpiritual manner makes it ſo very intelligible;" ſince I underſtand not what it is to contain a material thing ſpiritually, nor the manner how God contains any thing in himſelf, but either as an aggregate contains all things which it is made up of; and ſo indeed that part of him may be ſeen, which comes within the reach of our view. But this way of containing all things can by no means belong to God, and to make things thus viſible in him, is to make the material world a part of him, or elſe as having a power to produce all things; and in this way, it is true, God contains all things in himſelf, but in a way not proper to make the being of God a repreſentative of thoſe things to us; for then his being, being the repreſentative of the effects of that power, it muſt repreſent to us all that he is capable of producing, which I do not find in myſelf that it does.

Secondly, " the ſecond way of knowing things, he " tells us, is by ideas, that is, by ſomething that is " different from them; and thus we know things when " they are not intelligible by themſelves, either becauſe " they are corporeal, or becauſe they cannot penetrate " the mind, or diſcover themſelves to it; and this is " the way we know corporeal things." This reaſoning I do not underſtand: firſt, becauſe I do not underſtand why a line or a triangle is not as intelligible as any thing that can be named; for we muſt ſtill carry along with us, that the diſcourſe here is about our perception, or what we have any idea or conception of in our own minds. Secondly, becauſe I do not underſtand what is meant by the penetrating a ſpirit; and till I can comprehend theſe, upon which this reaſoning is built, this reaſoning cannot work on me. But from theſe reaſons he concludes, " thus it is in God, and by their ideas " that we ſee bodies and their properties; and it is for " this reaſon that the knowledge we have of them is

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" moſt perfect." Whether others will think that what we ſee of bodies, is ſeen in God, by ſeeing the ideas of them that are in God, muſt be left to them. Why I cannot think ſo, I have ſhown; but the inference he makes here from it, I think, few will aſſent to, that we know bodies and their properties moſt perfectly. For who is there that can ſay, he knows the properties either of body in general, or of any one particular body perfectly? One property of body in general is to have parts cohering and united together; for wherever there is body, there is coheſion of parts; but who is there that perfectly underſtands that coheſion? And as for particular bodies, who can ſay that he perfectly underſtands gold or a loadſtone, and all its properties? But to explain himſelf, he ſays, " that the idea we have of " extenſion, ſuffices to make us know all the proper- " ties whereof extenſion is capable, and that we cannot " deſire to have an idea more diſtinct, and more fruitful " of extenſion, of figures, and of motions, than that " which God has given us of them." This ſeems to me a ſtrange proof that we ſee bodies and their properties in God, and know them perfectly, becauſe God hath given us diſtinct and fruitful ideas of extenſion, figure, and motion; for this had been the ſame, whether God had given theſe ideas by ſhowing them in himſelf, or by any other way; and his ſaying, that God has given us as diſtinct and fruitful ideas of them as we can deſire, ſeems as if our author himſelf had ſome other thoughts of them. If he thought we ſee them in God, he muſt think we ſee them as they are in themſelves, and there would be no room for ſaying, God hath given them us as diſtinct as we could deſire: the calling them fruitful, ſhows this yet more; for one that thinks he ſees the ideas of figures in God, and can ſee no idea of a figure, but in God, with what thought can he call any one of them feconde, which is ſaid only of ſuch things as produce others? Which expreſſion of his ſeems to proceed only from this thought in him, that when I have once got the idea of extenſion, I can frame the ideas of what figures, and of what bigneſs I pleaſe. And in this I agree with him, as appears in what I

have ſaid L. 2. C. 13. But then this can by no means proceed from a ſuppoſition, that I ſee theſe figures only in God; for there they do not produce one another, but are there, as it were, in their firſt pattern to be ſeen, juſt ſuch, and ſo many as God is pleaſed to ſhow them to us. But it will be ſaid, our deſire to ſee them is the occaſional cauſe of God's ſhowing them us, and ſo we ſee whatever figure we deſire. Let it be ſo, this does not make any idea feconde, for here is no production of one out of another: but as to the occaſional cauſe, can any one ſay that it is ſo? I, or our author, deſire to ſee an angle next in greatneſs to a right angle; did upon this God ever ſhow him or me ſuch an angle? That God knows, or has in himſelf the idea of ſuch an angle, I think will not be denied; but that he ever ſhowed it to any man, how much ſoever he deſired it, I think may be doubted. But after all, how comes it by this means that we have a perfect knowledge of bodies and their properties, when ſeveral men in the world have not the ſame idea of body, and this very author and I differ in it? He thinks bare extenſion to be body, and I think extenſion alone makes not body, but extenſion and ſolidity; thus either he, or I, one of us, has a wrong and imperfect knowledge of bodies and their properties. For if bodies be extenſion alone, and nothing elſe, I cannot conceive how they can move and hit one againſt another, or what can make diſtinct ſurfaces in an uniform ſimple extenſion. A ſolid extended thing I can conceive moveable; but then, if I have a clear view of bodies and their properties in God, I muſt ſee the idea of ſolidity in God, which yet I think, by what our author has ſaid in his Eclairciſſements, he does not allow that we do. He ſays farther, "that whereas "the ideas of things that are in God contain all their "properties, he that ſees their ideas may ſee ſucceſſively "all their properties." This ſeems to me not to concern our ideas more, whether we ſee them in God, or have them otherwiſe. Any idea that we have, whenceſoever we have it, contains in it all the properties it has, which are nothing but the relations it has to other ideas, which are always the ſame. What he ſays concerning

cerning the properties, that we may ſucceſſively know them, is equally true, whether we ſee them in God, or have them by any other means. They that apply them as they ought to the conſideration of their ideas, may ſucceſſively come to the knowledge of ſome of their properties; but that they may know all their properties, is more than I think the reaſon proves, which he ſubjoins in theſe words, " for when one ſees the things " as they are in God, one ſees them always in a moſt " perfect manner." We ſee, for example, in God, the idea of a triangle, or a circle; does it hence follow, that we can know all the properties of either of them? He adds, that the manner of ſeeing them " would be " infinitely perfect, if the mind which ſees them in " God was infinite." I confeſs myſelf here not well to comprehend his diſtinction between ſeeing after a manner " [tres parfait] moſt perfect and infinitely per- " fect;" he adds, " that which is wanting to the know- " ledge that we have of extenſion, figures, and motion, " is not a defect of the idea which repreſents it, but of " our mind which conſiders it." If by ideas be meant here the real objects of our knowledge, I eaſily agree, that the want of knowledge in us is a defect in our minds, and not in the things to be known. But if by ideas be here meant the perception or repreſentation of things in the mind, that I cannot but obſerve in myſelf to be very imperfect and defective, as when I deſire to perceive what is the ſubſtance of body or ſpirit, the idea thereof fails me. To conclude, I ſee not what there is in this paragraph that makes any thing for the doctrine of ſeeing all things in God.

46. " The third way of knowing is by conſciouſneſs " or interiour ſentiments; and thus," he ſays, " we " know our ſouls; and it is for this reaſon that the " knowledge we have of them is imperfect, we know " nothing of our ſouls but what we feel within our- " ſelves." This confeſſion of our author brings me back, do what I can, to that original of all our ideas which my thoughts led me to when I writ my book, viz. ſenſation and reflection; and therefore I am forced to aſk any one who is of our author's principles, whether

God had not the idea of mine, or of an human ſoul, before he created it? Next, whether that idea of an human ſoul be not as much a real being in God as the idea of a triangle? If ſo, why does not my ſoul, being intimately united to God, as well ſee the idea of my ſoul which is in him, as the idea of a triangle which is in him? And what reaſon can there be given, why God ſhows the idea of a triangle to us, and not the idea of our ſouls, but this, that God has given us external ſenſation to perceive the one, and none to perceive the other, but only internal ſenſation to perceive the operation of the latter? He that pleaſes may read what our author ſays in the remainder of this, and the two or three next paragraphs, and ſee whether it carries him beyond where my ignorance ſtopped; I muſt own that me it does not.

47. This (i. e. the ignorance we are in of our own "ſouls,) ſays he, may ſerve to prove that the ideas that "repreſent any thing to us that is without us are not "modifications of our ſouls; for if the ſoul ſaw all "things by conſidering its own proper modifications, "it ſhould know more clearly its own eſſence, or its "own nature, than that of bodies; and all the ſenſa-"tions or modifications whereof it is capable, than the "figures or modifications of which bodies are capable. "In the mean time, it knows not that it is capable of "any ſuch ſenſation by ſight, as it has of itſelf, but "only by experience; inſtead of that, it knows that "extenſion is capable of an infinite number of figures "by the ideas that it has of extenſion. There are, "moreover, certain ſenſations, as colours and ſounds, "which the greateſt part of men cannot diſcover whe-"ther they are modifications of the ſoul; and there "are figures which all men do not diſcover by the idea "of extenſion to be modifications of bodies." This paragraph is, as he tells us, to prove, "That the ideas "that repreſent to us ſomething without us, are not "modifications of the ſoul;" but inſtead of that, it ſeems to prove that figure is the modification of ſpace, and not of our ſouls. For if this argument had tended to prove, "That the ideas that repreſent any thing

"without

" without us were not modifications of the ſoul," he ſhould not have put the mind's not knowing what modifications itſelf was capable of, and knowing what figures ſpace was capable of, in oppoſition one to another: but the antitheſis muſt have lain in this, that the mind knew it was capable of the perception of figure or motion without any modification of itſelf, but was not capable of the perception of ſound or colour without a modification of itſelf. For the queſtion here is not whether ſpace be capable of figure, and the ſoul not; but whether the ſoul be capable of perceiving, or having the idea of figure, without a modification of itſelf, and not capable of having the idea of colour without a modification of itſelf. I think now of the figure, colour, and hardneſs, of a diamond that I ſaw ſome time ſince: in this caſe I deſire to be informed how my mind knows that the thinking on, or the idea of the figure, is not a modification of the mind; but the thinking on, or having an idea of the colour or hardneſs, is a modification of the mind? It is certain there is ſome alteration in my mind when I think of a figure which I did not think of before, as well as when I think of a colour that I did not think of before. But one, I am told, is ſeeing it in God, and the other a modification of my mind. But ſuppoſing one is ſeeing in God, is there no alteration in my mind between ſeeing and not ſeeing? And is that to be called a modification or no? For when he ſays ſeeing a colour, and hearing a ſound, is a modification of the mind, what does it ſignify but an alteration of the mind from not perceiving to perceiving that ſound or colour? And ſo when the mind ſees a triangle, which it did not ſee before, what is this but an alteration of the mind from not ſeeing to ſeeing, whether that figure be ſeen in God or no? And why is not this alteration of the mind to be called a modification, as well as the other? Or indeed what ſervice does that word do us in the one caſe or the other, when it is only a new ſound brought in without any new conception at all? For my mind, when it ſees a colour or figure, is altered, I know, from the not having ſuch or ſuch a perception to the having

it; but when, to explain this, I am told that either of theſe perceptions is a modification of the mind, what do I conceive more than that from not having ſuch a perception my mind is come to have ſuch a perception? Which is what I as well knew before the word modification was made uſe of, which, by its uſe, has made me conceive nothing more than what I conceived before.

48. One thing I cannot but take notice of here by the by, that he ſays, that "the ſoul knows that extenſion is capable of an infinite number of figures by "the idea it has of extenſion," which is true. And afterwards he ſays, that "there are no figures, which "all men do not diſcover by the idea they have of "extenſion to be modifications of body." One would wonder why he did not ſay modifications of extenſion, rather than as he does modifications of body, they being diſcovered by the idea of extenſion; but the truth would not bear ſuch an expreſſion. For it is certain that in pure ſpace or extenſion, which is not terminated, there is truly no diſtinction of figures; but in diſtinct bodies that are terminated there are diſtinct figures, becauſe ſimple ſpace or extenſion, being in itſelf uniform, inſeparable, immoveable, has in it no ſuch modification or diſtinction of figures. But it is capable, as he ſays; but of what? Of bodies of all ſorts of figures and magnitudes, without which there is no diſtinction of figures in ſpace. Bodies that are ſolid, ſeparable, terminated, and moveable, have all ſorts of figures, and they are bodies alone that have them: and ſo figures are properly modifications of bodies, for pure ſpace is not any where terminated, nor can be; whether there be or be not body in it, it is uniformly continued on. This that he plainly ſaid there, to me plainly ſhows that body and extenſion are two things, though much of our author's doctrine be built upon their being one and the ſame.

49. The next paragraph is to ſhow us the difference between ideas and ſentiments in this, that "ſentiments "are not tied to words; ſo that he that never had ſeen "a colour, or felt heat, could never be made to have "thoſe

" thoſe ſenſations by all the definitions one could give " him of them." This is true of what he calls ſentiments; and as true alſo of what he calls ideas. Show me one who has not got by experience, i. e. by ſeeing or feeling, the idea of ſpace or motion, and I will as ſoon by words make one, who never felt what heat is, have a conception of heat, as he, that has not by his ſenſes perceived what ſpace or motion is, can by words be made to conceive either of them. The reaſon why we are apt to think theſe ideas belonging to extenſion got another way than other ideas, is becauſe, our bodies being extended, we cannot avoid the diſtinction of parts in ourſelves; and all that is for the ſupport of our lives, being by motion applied to us, it is impoſſible to find any one who has not by experience got thoſe ideas; and ſo by the uſe of language learnt what words ſtand for them, which by cuſtom came to excite them in his mind; as the names of heat and pleaſure do excite in the mind of thoſe who have by experience got them the ideas they are by uſe annexed to. Not that words or definitions can teach or bring into the mind one more than another of thoſe I call ſimple ideas; but can by uſe excite them in thoſe who, having got them by experience, know certain ſounds to be by uſe annexed to them as the ſigns of them.

50. Fourthly, " The fourth way of knowing, he tells " us, is by conjecture, and thus only we know the ſouls " of other men and pure intelligences," i. e. We know them not at all: but we probably think there are ſuch beings really exiſting in " rerum naturâ." But this looks to me beſide our author's buſineſs here, which ſeems to me to examine what ideas we have, and how we came by them. So that the thing here conſidered, ſhould in my opinion be, not whether there were any ſouls of men or pure intelligences any where exiſting, but what ideas we have of them, and how we came by them. For when he ſays, we know not angels, either " in themſelves, or by their ideas, or by conſciouſ- " neſs," what in that place does angel ſignify? What idea in him does it ſtand for? Or is it the ſign of no idea at all, and ſo a bare ſound without ſignification?

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He that reads this ſeventh chapter of his with attention, will find that we have ſimple ideas as far as our experience reaches, and no farther. And beyond that we know nothing at all, no not even what thoſe ideas are that are in us, but only that they are perceptions in the mind, but how made we cannot comprehend.

51. In his Eclairciſſements on the nature of ideas, p. 535. of the quarto edition, he ſays, that "he is "certain that the ideas of things are unchangeable." This I cannot comprehend; for how can I know that the picture of any thing is like that thing, when I never ſee that which it repreſents? For if theſe words do not mean that ideas are true unchangeable repreſentations of things, I know not to what purpoſe they are. And if that be not their meaning, then they can only ſignify, that the idea I have once had will be unchangeably the ſame as long as it recurs the ſame in my memory; but when another different from that comes into my mind, it will not be that. Thus the idea of an horſe, and the idea of a centaur, will, as often as they recur in my mind, be unchangeably the ſame; which is no more than this, the ſame idea will be always the ſame idea; but whether the one or the other be the true repreſentation of any thing that exiſts, that, upon his principles, neither our author nor any body elſe can know.

52. What he ſays here of univerſal reaſon, which enlightens every one, whereof all men partake, ſeems to me nothing elſe but the power men have to conſider the ideas they have one with another, and by thus comparing them, find out the relations that are between them; and therefore if an intelligent being at one end of the world, and another at the other end of the world, will conſider twice two and four together, he cannot but find them to be equal, i. e. to be the ſame number. Theſe relations, it is true, are infinite, and God, who knows all things and their relations as they are, knows them all, and ſo his knowledge is infinite. But men are able to diſcover more or leſs of theſe relations, only as they apply their minds to conſider any ſort of ideas, and to find out intermediate ones, which can ſhow the relation of thoſe ideas, which cannot be

immediately compared by juxta-poſition. But then what he means by that infinite reaſon which men conſult; I confeſs myſelf not well to underſtand. For if he means that they conſider a part of thoſe relations of things which are infinite, that is true; but then this is a very improper way of ſpeaking, and I cannot think that a man of his parts would uſe it to mean nothing elſe by it. If he means, as he ſays, p. 536, that this infinite and univerſal reaſon, whereof men partake, and which they conſult, is the reaſon of God himſelf; I can by no means aſſent to it. Firſt, becauſe I think we cannot ſay God reaſons at all; for he has at once a view of all things. But reaſon is very far from ſuch an intuition; it is a laborious and gradual progreſs in the knowledge of things, by comparing one idea with a ſecond, and a ſecond with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. to find the relation between the firſt and the laſt of theſe in this train, and in ſearch for ſuch intermediate ideas, as may ſhow us the relation we deſire to know, which ſometimes we find, and ſometimes not. This way therefore of finding truth, ſo painful, uncertain, and limited, is proper only to men of finite underſtandings, but can by no means be ſuppoſed in God; it is therefore in God underſtanding or knowledge. But then to ſay that we partake in the knowledge of God, or conſult his underſtanding, is what I cannot receive for true. God has given me an underſtanding of my own; and I ſhould think it preſumption in me to ſuppoſe I apprehended any thing by God's underſtanding, ſaw with his eyes, or ſhared of his knowledge. I think it more poſſible for me to ſee with other men's eyes, and underſtand with another man's underſtanding, than with God's; there being ſome proportion between mine and another man's underſtanding, but none between mine and God's. But if this infinite reaſon which we conſult, be at laſt nothing but thoſe infinite unchangeable relations which are in things, ſome of which we make a ſhift to diſcover; this indeed is true, but ſeems to me to make little to our author's purpoſe of ſeeing all things in God; and that, " if we ſee not all things by the natu-

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" ral union of our minds with the univerſal and infinite " reaſon, we ſhould not have the liberty to think on " all things," as he expreſſes it, p. 538. To explain himſelf farther concerning this univerſal reaſon, or, as he there calls it by another name, order, p. 539. he ſays, that " God contains in himſelf the perfections of all " the creatures that he has created, or can create, after " an intelligible manner." Intelligible to himſelf, it is true; but intelligible to men, at leaſt to me, that I do not find, unleſs, " by containing in himſelf the per- " fections of all the creatures," be meant, that there is no perfection in any creature, but there is a greater in God, or that there is in God greater perfection than all the perfections in the creatures taken together. And therefore though it be true what follows in the next words, " that it is by theſe intelligible perfections that " God knows the eſſence of every thing;" yet it will not follow from hence, or from any thing elſe that he has ſaid, that thoſe perfections in God, which contain in them the perfections of all the creatures, are " the " immediate objects of the mind of man;" or that " they are ſo the objects of the mind of man," that he can in them ſee the eſſences of the creatures. For I aſk in which of the perfections of God does a man ſee the eſſence of an horſe or an aſs, of a ſerpent or a dove, of hemlock or parſley? I for my part, I confeſs, ſee not the eſſence of any of theſe things in any of the perfections of God, which I have any notion of. For indeed I ſee not the diſtinct eſſence either of theſe things at all, or know wherein it conſiſts. And there- fore I cannot comprehend the force of the inference, which follows in theſe words, " then the intelligible " ideas or perfections that are in God, which repreſent " to us what is out of God, are abſolutely neceſſary " and unchangeable." That the perfections that are in God are neceſſary and unchangeable, I readily grant: but that the ideas that are intelligible to God, or are in the underſtanding of God (for ſo we muſt ſpeak of him whilſt we conceive of him after the manner of men) can be ſeen by us; or, that the perfections that are in God repreſent to us the eſſences of things that are out

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of God, that I cannot conceive. The eſſence of matter, as much as I can ſee of it, is extenſion, ſolidity, diviſibility, and mobility; but in which of the perfections of God do I ſee this eſſence? To another man, as to our author perhaps, the eſſence of body is quite another thing; and when he has told us what to him is the eſſence of body, it will be then to be conſidered in which of the perfections of God he ſees it. For example, let it be pure extenſion alone, the idea then that God had in himſelf of the eſſence of body, before body was created, was the idea of pure extenſion; when God then created body he created extenſion, and then ſpace, which exiſted not before, began to exiſt. This, I confeſs, I cannot conceive; but we ſee in the perfections of God the neceſſary and unchangeable eſſences of things. He ſees one eſſence of body in God, and I another: which is that neceſſary and unchangeable eſſence of body which is contained in the perfections of God, his or mine? Or indeed how do or can we know there is any ſuch thing exiſting as body at all? For we ſee nothing but the ideas that are in God; but body itſelf we neither do nor can poſſibly ſee at all; and how then can we know that there is any ſuch thing exiſting as body, ſince we can by no means ſee or perceive it by our ſenſes, which is all the way we can have of knowing any corporeal thing to exiſt? But it is ſaid, God ſhows us the ideas in himſelf, on occaſion of the preſence of thoſe bodies to our ſenſes. This is gratis dictum, and begs the thing in queſtion; and therefore I deſire to have it proved to me that they are preſent. I ſee the ſun, or an horſe; no, ſays our author, that is impoſſible, they cannot be ſeen, becauſe being bodies they cannot be united to my mind, and be preſent to it. But the ſun being riſen, and the horſe brought within convenient diſtance, and ſo being preſent to my eyes, God ſhows me their ideas in himſelf: and I ſay God ſhows me theſe ideas when he pleaſes, without the preſence of any ſuch bodies to my eyes. For when I think I ſee a ſtar at ſuch a diſtance from me; which truly I do not ſee, but the idea of it which God ſhows me; I would have it proved to me that there is ſuch a ſtar exiſting a million

million of million of miles from me when I think I ſee it, more than when I dream of ſuch a ſtar. For until it be proved that there is a candle in the room by which I write this, the ſuppoſition of my ſeeing in God the pyramidical idea of its flame, upon occaſion of the candle's being there, is begging what is in queſtion. And to prove to me that God exhibits to me that idea, upon occaſion of the preſence of the candle, it muſt firſt be proved to me that there is a candle there, which upon theſe principles can never be done.

Farther, We ſee the "neceſſary and unchangeable "eſſences of things" in the perfections of God. Water, a roſe, and a lion, have their diſtinct eſſences one from another, and all other things; what I deſire to know are theſe diſtinct eſſences, I confeſs I neither ſee them in nor out of God, and in which of the perfections of God do we ſee each of them?

Page 504, I find theſe words, "It is evident that "the perfections that are in God which repreſent created "or poſſible beings, are not at all equal: that thoſe "for example that repreſent bodies, are not ſo noble "as thoſe for example that repreſent ſpirits; and "amongſt thoſe themſelves, which repreſent nothing "but body, or nothing but ſpirit, there are more "perfect one than another to infinity. This is con-"ceivable clearly, and without pain, though one finds "ſome difficulty to reconcile the ſimplicity of the "divine Being with this variety of intelligible ideas "which he contains in his wiſdom." This difficulty is to me inſurmountable; and I conclude it always ſhall be ſo, till I can find a way to make ſimplicity and variety the ſame. And this difficulty muſt always cumber this doctrine, which ſuppoſes that the perfections of God are the repreſentatives to us of whatever we perceive of the creatures; for then thoſe perfections muſt be many, and diverſe, and diſtinct one from another, as thoſe ideas are that repreſent the different creatures to us. And this ſeems to me to make God formally to contain in him all the diſtinct ideas of all the creatures, and that ſo, that they might be ſeen one after another. Which ſeems to me after all the talk

of

of abſtraction to be but a little leſs groſs conception than of the ſketches of all the pictures that ever a painter draws, kept by him in his cloſet, which are there all to be ſeen one after another, as he pleaſes to ſhow them. But whilſt theſe abſtract thoughts produce nothing better than this, I the eaſier content myſelf with my ignorance which roundly thinks thus: God is a ſimple being, omniſcient, that knows all things poſſible; and omnipotent, that can do or make all things poſſible. But how he knows, or how he makes, I do not conceive: his ways of knowing as well as his ways of creating, are to me incomprehenſible; and, if they were not ſo, I ſhould not think him to be God, or to be perfecter in knowledge than I am. To which our author's thoughts ſeem in the cloſe of what is above-cited ſomewhat to incline, when he ſays, "the variety "of intelligible ideas which God contains in his wiſ-dom;" whereby he ſeems to place this variety of ideas in the mind or thoughts of God, as we may ſo ſay, whereby it is hard to conceive how we can ſee them; and not in the being of God, where they are to be ſeen as ſo many diſtinct things in it.

A DIS-

A

DISCOURSE

OF

MIRACLES.

TO diſcourſe of miracles without defining what one means by the word (miracle) is to make a ſhow, but in effect to talk of nothing.

A miracle then I take to be a ſenſible operation, which, being above the comprehenſion of the ſpectator, and in his opinion contrary to the eſtabliſhed courſe of nature, is taken by him to be divine.

He that is preſent at the fact, is a ſpectator: he that believes the hiſtory of the fact, puts himſelf in the place of a ſpectator.

This definition, it is probable, will not eſcape theſe two exceptions.

1. That hereby what is a miracle is made very uncertain; for it depending on the opinion of the ſpectator, that will be a miracle to one which will not be ſo to another.

In anſwer to which, it is enough to ſay, that this objection is of no force, but in the mouth of one who can produce a definition of a miracle not liable to the ſame exception, which I think not eaſy to do; for it being agreed, that a miracle muſt be that which ſurpaſſes the force of nature in the eſtabliſhed, ſteady laws of cauſes and effects, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but what is judged to exceed thoſe laws. Now every one being able to judge of thoſe laws only by his own acquaintance with nature, and notions of its force (which

(which are different in different men) it is unavoidable that that ſhould be a miracle to one, which is not ſo to another.

2. Another objection to this definition, will be, that the notion of a miracle thus enlarged, may come ſometimes to take in operations that have nothing extraordinary or ſupernatural in them, and thereby invalidate the uſe of miracles for the atteſting of divine revelation.

To which I anſwer, not at all, if the teſtimony which divine revelation receives from miracles be rightly conſidered.

To know that any revelation is from God, it is neceſſary to know that the meſſenger that delivers it is ſent from God, and that cannot be known but by ſome credentials given him by God himſelf. Let us ſee then whether miracles, in my ſenſe, be not ſuch credentials, and will not infallibly direct us right in the ſearch of divine revelation.

It is to be conſidered, that divine revelation receives teſtimony from no other miracles, but ſuch as are wrought to witneſs his miſſion from God who delivers the revelation. All other miracles that are done in the world, how many or great ſoever, revelation is not concerned in. Caſes wherein there has been, or can be need of miracles for the confirmation of revelation, are fewer than perhaps is imagined. The heathen world, amidſt an infinite and uncertain jumble of deities, fables, and worſhips, had no room for a divine atteſtation of any one againſt the reſt. Thoſe owners of many gods were at liberty in their worſhip; and no one of their divinities pretending to be the one only true God, no one of them could be ſuppoſed in the pagan ſcheme to make uſe of miracles to eſtabliſh his worſhip alone, or to aboliſh that of the other; much leſs was there any uſe of miracles to confirm any articles of faith, ſince no one of them had any ſuch to propoſe as neceſſary to be believed by their votaries. And therefore I do not remember any miracles recorded in the greek or roman writers, as done to confirm any one's miſſion and doctrine. Conformable hereunto we find

St. Paul, 1 Cor. i. 22. takes notice that the jews (it is true) required miracles, but as for the greeks they looked after ſomething elſe; they knew no need or uſe there was of miracles to recommend any religion to them. And indeed it is an aſtoniſhing mark how far the God of this world had blinded men's minds, if we conſider that the gentile world received and ſtuck to a religion, which, not being derived from reaſon, had no ſure foundation in revelation. They knew not its original, nor the authors of it, nor ſeemed concerned to know from whence it came, or by whoſe authority delivered; and ſo had no mention or uſe of miracles for its confirmation. For though there were here and there ſome pretences to revelation, yet there were not ſo much as pretences to miracles that atteſted it.

If we will direct our thoughts by what has been, we muſt conclude that miracles, as the credentials of a meſſenger delivering a divine religion, have no place but upon a ſuppoſition of one only true God; and that it is ſo in the nature of the thing, and cannot be otherwiſe, I think will be made appear in the ſequel of this diſcourſe. Of ſuch who have come in the name of the one only true God, profeſſing to bring a law from him, we have in hiſtory a clear account but of three, viz. Moſes, Jeſus, and Mahomet. For what the perſees ſay of their Zoroaſter, or the indians of their Brama (not to mention all the wild ſtories of the religions farther eaſt) is ſo obſcure, or ſo manifeſtly fabulous, that no account can be made of it. Now of the three before-mentioned, Mahomet having none to produce, pretends to no miracles for the vouching his miſſion; ſo that the only revelations that come atteſted by miracles, being thoſe of Moſes and Chriſt, and they confirming each other; the buſineſs of miracles, as it ſtands really in matter of fact, has no manner of difficulty in it; and I think the moſt ſcrupulous or ſceptical cannot from miracles raiſe the leaſt doubt againſt the divine revelation of the goſpel.

But ſince the ſpeculative and learned will be putting of caſes which never were, and it may be preſumed never will be; ſince ſcholars and diſputants will be

raiſing

raiſing of queſtions where there are none, and enter upon debates whereof there is no need; I crave leave to ſay, that he who comes with a meſſage from God to be delivered to the world, cannot be refuſed belief if he vouches his miſſion by a miracle, becauſe his credentials have a right to it. For every rational thinking man muſt conclude as Nicodemus did, "we know that "thou art a teacher come from God, for no man can "do theſe ſigns which thou doeſt, except God be with "him."

For example, Jeſus of Nazareth profeſſes himſelf ſent from God: he with a word calms a tempeſt at ſea. This one looks on as a miracle, and conſequently cannot but receive his doctrine. Another thinks this might be the effect of chance, or ſkill in the weather, and no miracle, and ſo ſtands out; but afterwards ſeeing him walk on the ſea, owns that for a miracle and believes: which yet upon another has not that force, who ſuſpects it may poſſibly be done by the aſſiſtance of a ſpirit. But yet the ſame perſon, ſeeing afterwards our Saviour cure an inveterate palſy by a word, admits that for a miracle, and becomes a convert. Another overlooking it in this inſtance, afterwards finds a miracle in his giving ſight to one born blind, or in raiſing the dead, or his raiſing himſelf from the dead, and ſo receives his doctrine as a revelation coming from God. By all which it is plain, that where the miracle is admitted, the doctrine cannot be rejected; it comes with the aſſurance of a divine atteſtation to him that allows the miracle, and he cannot queſtion its truth.

The next thing then is, what ſhall be a ſufficient inducement to take any extraordinary operation to be a miracle, i. e. wrought by God himſelf for the atteſtation of a revelation from him?

And to this I anſwer, the carrying with it the marks of a greater power than appears in oppoſition to it. For,

1. Firſt, this removes the main difficulty where it preſſes hardeſt, and clears the matter from doubt, when extraordinary and ſupernatural operations are brought to ſupport oppoſite miſſions, about which methinks

more duſt has been raiſed by men of leiſure than ſo plain a matter needed. For ſince God's power is paramount to all, and no oppoſition can be made againſt him with an equal force to his; and ſince his honour and goodneſs can never be ſuppoſed to ſuffer his meſſenger and his truth to be born down by the appearance of a greater power on the ſide of an impoſtor, and in favour of a lye; wherever there is an oppoſition, and two pretending to be ſent from heaven claſh, the ſigns, which carry with them the evident marks of a greater power, will always be a certain and unqueſtionable evidence, that the truth and divine miſſion are on that ſide on which they appear. For though the diſcovery, how the lying wonders are or can be produced, be beyond the capacity of the ignorant, and often beyond the conception of the moſt knowing ſpectator, who is therefore forced to allow them in his apprehenſion to be above the force of natural cauſes and effects; yet he cannot but know they are not ſeals ſet by God to his truth for the atteſting of it, ſince they are oppoſed by miracles that carry the evident marks of a greater and ſuperiour power, and therefore they cannot at all ſhake the authority of one ſo ſupported. God can never be thought to ſuffer that a lye, ſet up in oppoſition to a truth coming from him, ſhould be backed with a greater power than he will ſhow for the confirmation and propagation of a doctrine which he has revealed, to the end it might be believed. The producing of ſerpents, blood and frogs, by the egyptian ſorcerers and by Moſes, could not to the ſpectators but appear equally miraculous: which of the pretenders then had their miſſion from God, and the truth on their ſide, could not have been determined, if the matter had reſted there. But when Moſes's ſerpent eat up theirs, when he produced lice which they could not, the deciſion was eaſy. It was plain Jannes and Jambres acted by an inferiour power, and their operations, how marvellous and extraordinary ſoever, could not in the leaſt bring in queſtion Moſes's miſſion; that ſtood the firmer for this oppoſition, and remained the more unqueſtionable after this, than if no ſuch ſigns had been brought againſt it.

So

So likewiſe the number, variety and greatneſs of the miracles wrought for the confirmation of the doctrine delivered by Jeſus Chriſt, carry with them ſuch ſtrong marks of an extraordinary divine power, that the truth of his miſſion will ſtand firm and unqueſtionable, till any one riſing up in oppoſition to him ſhall do greater miracles than he and his apoſtles did. For any thing leſs will not be of weight to turn the ſcales in the opinion of any one, whether of an inferiour or more exalted underſtanding. This is one of thoſe palpable truths and trials, of which all mankind are judges; and there needs no aſſiſtance of learning, no deep thought, to come to a certainty in it. Such care has God taken that no pretended revelation ſhould ſtand in competition with what is truly divine, that we need but open our eyes to ſee and be ſure which came from him. The marks of his over-ruling power accompany it; and therefore to this day we find, that where-ever the goſpel comes, it prevails to the beating down the ſtrong holds of Satan, and the diſlodging the prince of the power of darkneſs, driving him away with all his lying wonders; which is a ſtanding miracle, carrying with it the teſtimony of ſuperiority.

What is the uttermoſt power of natural agents or created beings, men of the greateſt reach cannot diſcover; but that it is not equal to God's omnipotency, is obvious to every one's underſtanding; ſo that the ſuperiour power is an eaſy, as well as ſure guide to divine revelation, atteſted by miracles, where they are brought as credentials to an embaſſy from God.

And thus upon the ſame grounds of ſuperiority of power, unconteſted revelation will ſtand too.

For the explaining of which, it may be neceſſary to premiſe,

1. That no miſſion can be looked on to be divine, that delivers any thing derogating from the honour of the one, only, true, inviſible God, or inconſiſtent with natural religion and the rules of morality: becauſe God having diſcovered to men the unity and majeſty of his eternal godhead, and the truths of natural religion and morality by the light of reaſon, he cannot be ſuppoſed

to back the contrary by revelation; for that would be to deſtroy the evidence and the uſe of reaſon, without which men cannot be able to diſtinguiſh divine revelation from diabolical impoſture.

2. That it cannot be expected that God ſhould ſend any one into the world on purpoſe to inform men of things indifferent, and of ſmall moment, or that are knowable by the uſe of their natural faculties. This would be to leſſen the dignity of his majeſty in favour of our ſloth, and in prejudice to our reaſon.

3. The only caſe then wherein a miſſion of any one from heaven can be reconciled to the high and awful thoughts men ought to have of the Deity, muſt be the revelation of ſome ſupernatural truths relating to the glory of God, and ſome great concern of men. Supernatural operations atteſting ſuch a revelation may with reaſon be taken to be miracles, as carrying the marks of a ſuperiour and over-ruling power, as long as no revelation accompanied with marks of a greater power appears againſt it. Such ſupernatural ſigns may juſtly ſtand good, and be received for divine, i. e. wrought by a power ſuperiour to all, till a miſſion atteſted by operations of a greater force ſhall diſprove them: becauſe it cannot be ſuppoſed, God ſhould ſuffer his prerogative to be ſo far uſurped by any inferiour being, as to permit any creature, depending on him, to ſet his ſeals, the marks of his divine authority, to a miſſion coming from him. For theſe ſupernatural ſigns being the only means God is conceived to have to ſatisfy men as rational creatures of the certainty of any thing he would reveal, as coming from himſelf, can never conſent that it ſhould be wreſted out of his hands, to ſerve the ends and eſtabliſh the authority of an inferiour agent that rivals him. His power being known to have no equal, always will, and always may be ſafely depended on, to ſhow its ſuperiority in vindicating his authority, and maintaining every truth that he hath revealed. So that the marks of a ſuperiour power accompanying it, always have been, and always will be, a viſible and ſure guide to divine revelation; by which men may conduct themſelves in their examining of revealed

vealed religions, and be satisfied which they ought to receive as coming from God; though they have by no means ability precisely to determine what is, or is not above the force of any created being; or what operations can be performed by none but a divine power, and require the immediate hand of the Almighty. And therefore we see it is by that our Saviour measures the great unbelief of the jews, John xv. 24. saying, " If " I had not done among them the works which no " other man did, they had not had sin; but now have " they both seen and hated both me and my father;" declaring, that they could not but see the power and presence of God in those many miracles he did, which were greater than ever any other man had done. When God sent Moses to the children of Israel with a message, that now according to his promise he would redeem them by his hand out of Egypt, and furnished him with signs and credentials of his mission; it is very remarkable what God himself says of those signs, Exod. iv. 8. " And it shall come to pass, if they will not " believe thee, nor hearken to the voice of the first " sign" (which was turning his rod into a serpent) that " they will believe the voice of the latter sign" (which was the making his hand leprous by putting it in his bosom). God farther adds, v. 9. " And it shall " come to pass, if they will not believe also these two " signs, neither hearken unto thy voice, that thou shalt " take of the water of the river and pour upon the dry " land: and the water which thou takest out of the " river shall become blood upon the dry land." Which of those operations was or was not above the force of all created beings, will, I suppose, be hard for any man, too hard for a poor brick-maker, to determine; and therefore the credit and certain reception of the mission, was annexed to neither of them, but the prevailing of their attestation was heightened by the increase of their number; two supernatural operations showing more power than one, and three more than two. God allowed that it was natural, that the marks of greater power should have a greater impression on

the minds and belief of the ſpectators. Accordingly the jews, by this eſtimate, judged of the miracles of our Saviour, John vii. 31. where we have this account, " And many of the people believed on him, and ſaid, " When Chriſt cometh, will he do more miracles than " theſe which this man hath done?" This, perhaps, as it is the plaineſt, ſo it is alſo the ſureſt way to preſerve the teſtimony of miracles in its due force to all ſorts and degrees of people. For miracles being the baſis on which divine miſſion is always eſtabliſhed, and conſequently that foundation on which the believers of any divine revelation muſt ultimately bottom their faith, this uſe of them would be loſt, if not to all mankind, yet at leaſt to the ſimple and illiterate (which is the far greateſt part) if miracles be defined to be none but ſuch divine operations as are in themſelves beyond the power of all created beings, or at leaſt operations contrary to the fixed and eſtabliſhed laws of nature. For as to the latter of thoſe, what are the fixed and eſtabliſhed laws of nature, philoſophers alone, if at leaſt they, can pretend to determine. And if they are to be operations performable only by divine power, I doubt whether any man, learned or unlearned, can in moſt caſes be able to ſay of any particular operation, that can fall under his ſenſes, that it is certainly a miracle. Before he can come to that certainty, he muſt know that no created being has a power to perform it. We know good and bad angels have abilities and excellencies exceedingly beyond all our poor performances or narrow comprehenſions. But to define what is the utmoſt extent of power that any of them has, is a bold undertaking of a man in the dark, that pronounces without ſeeing, and ſets bounds in his narrow cell to things at an infinite diſtance from his model and comprehenſion.

Such definitions therefore of miracles, however ſpecious in diſcourſe and theory, fail us when we come to uſe, and an application of them in particular caſes. 170½.

" Theſe

" Theſe thoughts concerning miracles, were occa-
" ſioned by my reading Mr. Fleetwood's Eſſay on
" Miracles, and the letter writ to him on that ſubject.
" The one of them defining a miracle to be an extra-
" ordinary operation performable by God alone: and
" the other writing of miracles without any definition
" of a miracle at all."

J. LOCKE.

MEMOIRS

RELATING TO THE

LIFE

OF

ANTHONY First Earl of SHAFTESBURY.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

Three LETTERS writ by the Earl of Shafteſbury while Priſoner in the Tower; one to King Charles II, another to the Duke of York, a Third to a noble Lord: found with Mr. LOCKE's MEMOIRS, &c.

BEING at Oxford in the beginning of the civil war (for he was on that ſide as long as he had any hopes to ſerve his country there) he was brought one day to king Charles I, by the lord Falkland, his friend, then ſecretary of ſtate, and preſented to him as having ſomething to offer to his majeſty worth his conſideration. At this audience he told the king that he thought he could put an end to the war if his majeſty pleaſed, and would aſſiſt him in it. The king anſwered, that he was a very young man for ſo great an undertaking. Sir, replied he, that will not be the worſe for your affairs, provided I do the buſineſs; whereupon the king ſhowing a willingneſs to hear him, he diſcourſed to him to this purpoſe:

The

The gentlemen and men of eſtates, who firſt engaged in this war, ſeeing now after a year or two that it ſeems to be no nearer the end than it was at firſt, and beginning to be weary of it, I am very well ſatisfied would be glad to be at quiet at home again, if they could be aſſured of a redreſs of their grievances, and have their rights and liberties ſecured to them. This I am ſatisfied is the preſent temper generally through all England, and particularly in thoſe parts where my eſtate and concerns lie; if therefore your majeſty will empower me to treat with the parliament garriſons to grant them a full and general pardon, with an aſſurance that a general amneſty (arms being laid down on both ſides) ſhould re-inſtate all things in the ſame poſture they were before the war, and then a free parliament ſhould do what more remained to be done for the ſettlement of the nation:—

That he would begin and try the experiment firſt in his own country; and doubted not but the good ſucceſs he ſhould have there would open him the gates of other adjoining garriſons, bringing them the news of peace and ſecurity in laying down their arms.

Being furniſhed with full power according to his deſire, away he goes to Dorcheſter, where he managed a treaty with the garriſons of Pool, Weymouth, Dorcheſter, and others; and was ſo ſucceſsful in it, that one of them was actually put into his hands, as the other were to have been ſome few days after. But prince Maurice, who commanded ſome of the king's forces, being with his army then in thoſe parts, no ſooner heard that the town was ſurrendered, but he preſently marched into it, and gave the pillage of it to his ſoldiers. This ſir A. ſaw with the utmoſt diſpleaſure, and could not forbear to expreſs his reſentments to the prince; ſo that there paſſed ſome pretty hot words between them; but the violence was committed, and thereby his deſign broken. All that he could do was, that he ſent to the other garriſons, he was in treaty with, to ſtand upon their guard, for that he could not ſecure his articles to them; and ſo this deſign proved abortive and died in ſilence.

Prince Maurice.

This

This project of his for putting an end to a civil war, which had ſufficiently harraſſed the kingdom, and nobody could tell what fatal conſequences it might have, being thus fruſtrated, it was not long before his active thoughts, always intent upon ſaving his country (the good of that being that by which he ſteered his counſels and actions through the whole courſe of his life) it was not long before he ſet his head upon framing another deſign to the ſame purpoſe. The firſt project of it took its riſe in a debate between him and ſerjeant Fountain, in an inn at Hungerford, where they accidentally met: and both diſliking the continuance of the war, and deploring the ruin it threatened, it was ſtarted between them, that the countries all through England ſhould arm and endeavour to ſuppreſs the armies on both ſides. This propoſal, which in one night's debate, looked more like a well-meant wiſh than a formed deſign, he afterwards conſidered more at leiſure, framed and faſhioned into a well-ordered and practical contrivance, and never left working in it till he had brought moſt of the ſober and well-intentioned gentlemen of both ſides all through England into it. This was that which gave riſe to that third ſort of army, which of a ſudden ſtarted up in ſeveral parts of England, with ſo much terrour to the armies both of king and parliament; and had not ſome of thoſe who had engaged in it, and had undertaken to riſe at the time appointed, failed, the clubmen, for ſo they were called, had been ſtrong enough to carry their point, which was to make both ſides lay down their arms, and if they would not do it, to force them to it; to declare for a general amneſty; to have the then parliament diſſolved; and to have a new one called for redreſſing the grievances, and ſettling the nation. This undertaking was not a romantic fancy, but had very promiſing grounds of ſucceſs; for the yeomanry and body of the people had ſuffered already very much by the war; and the gentry and men of eſtates had abated much of their fierceneſs, and wiſhed to return to their former eaſe, ſecurity, and plenty; eſpecially perceiving that the game, particularly on the king's ſide, began to be played

Clubmen.

played out of their hands, and that it was the soldiers of fortune who were best looked upon at court, and had the commands and power put into their hands.

He had been for some time before in Dorsetshire, forming and combining the parts of this great machine, till at length he got it to begin to move. But those, who had been forward to enter into the design, not being so vigorous and resolute, when the time was to appear and act; and the court, who had learnt or suspected that it had its rise and life from him, having so strict an eye upon him that he could not maintain correspondence with distant countries, and animate the several parts as it was necessary, before it was his time to stir; he received a very civil and more than ordinary letter from the king to come to him at Oxford: but he wanted not friends there to inform him of the danger it would be to him to appear there, and to confirm him in the suspicion that the king's letter put him in, that there was something else meant him, and not so much kindness as that expressed. Besides, the lord Goring, who lay with an army in those parts, had orders from court to seize him, and had civilly sent him word, that he would come such a day and dine with him. All this together made him see that he could be no longer safe at home, nor in the king's quarters; he therefore went, whither he was driven, into the parliament quarters; and took shelter in Portsmouth. Thus, for endeavouring to save his king and country, he was banished from the side he had chosen. And the court, that was then in high hopes of nothing less than perfect conquest, and being masters of all, had a great aversion to moderate counsels, and to those of the nobility and gentry of their party, who were authors or favourers of any such proposals as might bring things to a composition. Such well-wishers to their country, though they had spent much, and ventured all on the king's side, when they appeared for any other end of the war but dint of arms, and a total reduction of the parliament by force, were counted enemies; and any contrivance carried on to that end was interpreted treason.

A person

A perſon of his conſideration, thus rejected and caſt off by the king, and taking ſanctuary with them, was received by the parliament with open arms; and though he came in from the other ſide, and put himſelf into their hands without any terms; yet there were thoſe among them that ſo well knew his worth, and what value they ought to put upon it, that he was ſoon after offered conſiderable employments under them, and was actually truſted with command without ſo much as ever being queſtioned concerning what he knew of perſons or counſels on the other ſide, where they knew that his great penetration and forward mind would not let him live in ignorance among the great men, who were moſt of them his friends, and all his acquaintance.

But though he was not ſuffered to ſtay among thoſe with whom he had embarked, and had lived in confidence with, and was forced to go over to the parliament, he carried thither himſelf only, and nothing of any body's elſe; he left them and all their concerns, actions, purpoſes, counſels, perfectly behind him; and no-body of the king's ſide could complain of him after the day he went from his houſe, where he could be no longer ſafe, that he had any memory of what he had known when one of them.

This forgetfulneſs, ſo becoming a gentleman, and a man of honour, he had eſtabliſhed ſo firmly in his own mind, that his reſolution to perſiſt in it was like afterwards to coſt him no little trouble. Mr. Denzil Hollis (afterwards the lord Hollis) had been one of the commiſſioners employed by the parliament in the treaty at Uxbridge; he had there had ſome ſecret and ſeparate tranſactions with the king; this could not be kept ſo ſecret, but that it got ſome vent, and ſome of the parliament had ſome notice of it. Mr. Hollis being afterwards attacked in parliament by a contrary party, there wanted nothing perfectly to ruin him, but ſome witneſs to give credit to ſuch an accuſation againſt him. Sir A. Aſhley Cooper they thought fit for their purpoſe; they doubted not but he knew enough of it; and they made ſure that he would not fail to embrace ſuch a fair and unſought-for opportunity of ruining Mr. Hollis, who

who had been long his enemy upon a family quarrel, which he had carried so far, as, by his power in the house, to hinder him from sitting in the parliament, upon a fair election for that parliament. Upon this presumption he was summoned to the house; and being called in, was there asked, whether when he was at Oxford he knew not, or had not heard something concerning Mr. Hollis's secret transaction with the king at the treaty at Uxbridge. To this question he told them he could answer nothing at all; for though, possibly, what he had to say would be to the clearing of Mr. Hollis; yet he could not allow himself to say any thing in the case, since, whatever answer he made, it would be a confession that, if he had known any thing to the disadvantage of Mr. Hollis, he would have taken that dishonourable way of doing him a prejudice, and wreak his revenge on a man that was his enemy.

Those who had brought him there pressed him mightily to declare, but in vain, though threats were added of sending him to the Tower. He persisting obstinately silent, was bid to withdraw; and those who had depended upon his discovery being defeated, and consequently very much displeased, moved warmly for his commitment; of which he, waiting in the lobby, having notice, unmoved expected his doom, though several of his friends coming out, were earnest with him to satisfy the house; but he kept firm to his resolution, and found friends enough among the great men of the party that opposed Mr. Hollis to bring him off; who very much applauded the generosity of his carriage, and showed that action so much to deserve the commendation, rather than the censure of that assembly, that the angry men were ashamed to insist farther on it, and so dropt the debate.

Some days after Mr. Hollis came to his lodging, and having, in terms of great acknowledgment and esteem, expressed his thanks for his late behaviour in the house, with respect to him; he replied, that he pretended not thereby to merit any thing of him, or to lay an obligation on him; that what he had done was not out of any consideration of him, but what was due to himself,

and he ſhould equally have done, had any other man been concerned in it; and therefore he was perfectly as much at liberty as before to live with him as he pleaſed. But with all that he was not ſo ignorant of Mr. Hollis's worth, nor knew ſo little how to put a juſt value on his friendſhip, as not to receive it as a very great and ſenſible favour, if he thought him a perſon worthy on whom to beſtow it. Mr. Hollis, not leſs taken with his diſcourſe than what had occaſioned it, gave him freſh and repeated aſſurances of his ſincere and hearty friendſhip, which were received with ſuitable expreſſions. And thus an old quarrel between two men of high ſpirits and great eſtates, neighbours in the ſame county, ended in a ſound and firm friendſhip, which laſted as long as they lived.

This paſſage brings to my mind what I remember to have often heard him ſay concerning a man's obligation to ſilence, in regard of diſcourſe made to him or in his preſence: that it was not enough to keep cloſe and uncommunicated what had been committed to him with that caution, but there was a general and tacit truſt in converſation, whereby a man was obliged not to report again any thing that might be any way to the ſpeaker's prejudice, though no intimation had been given of a deſire not to have ſpoken it again.

He was wont to ſay, that wiſdom lay in the heart, and not in the head; and that it was not the want of knowledge, but the perverſeneſs of the will that filled men's actions with folly, and their lives with diſorder.

That there were in every one, two men, the wiſe and the fooliſh, and that each of them muſt be allowed his turn. If you would have the wiſe, the grave, and the ſerious, always to rule and have the ſway, the fool would grow ſo peeviſh and troubleſome, that he would put the wiſe man out of order, and make him fit for nothing: he muſt have his times of being let looſe to follow his fancies, and play his gambols, if you would have your buſineſs go on ſmoothly.

I have heard him alſo ſay, that he deſired no more of any man but that he would talk: if he would but talk, ſaid he, let him talk as he pleaſes. And indeed I never

I never knew any one penetrate so quick into men's breasts, and from a small opening survey that dark cabinet, as he would. He would understand men's true errand as soon as they had opened their mouths, and begun their story in appearance to another purpose.

Sir Richard Onslow and he were invited by sir J. D. to dine with him at Chelsea, and desired to come early, because he had an affair of concernment to communicate to them. They came at the time, and being sat, he told them he had made choice of them both for their known abilities, and particular friendship to him, for their advice in a matter of the greatest moment to him that could be. He had, he said, been a widower for many years, and began to want somebody that might ease him of the trouble of house-keeping, and take some care of him under the growing infirmities of old age; and to that purpose had pitched upon a woman very well known to him by the experience of many years, in fine, his house-keeper. These gentlemen, who were not strangers to his family, and knew the woman very well, and were besides very great friends to his son and daughter, grown up, and both fit for marriage, to whom they thought this would be a very prejudicial match, were both in their minds opposite to it; and to that purpose sir Richard Onslow began the discourse; wherein, when he came to that part, he was entering upon the description of the woman, and going to set her out in her own colours, which were such as could not have pleased any man in his wife. Sir Anthony seeing whither he was going, to prevent any mischief, begged leave to interrupt him, by asking sir J. a question, which in short was this, "whether he were "not already married?" Sir J. after a little demur, answered, "Yes truly, he was married the day before." Well then, replied sir Anthony, there is no more need of our advice; pray let us have the honour to see my lady and wish her joy, and so to dinner. As they were returning to London in their coach, I am obliged to you, said sir Richard, for preventing my running into a discourse which could never have been forgiven me, if I had spoke out what I was going to say. But as for

ſir J. he, methinks, ought to cut your throat for your civil queſtion. How could it poſſibly enter into your head to aſk a man, who had ſolemnly invited us on purpoſe to have our advice about a marriage he intended, had gravely propoſed the woman to us, and ſuffered us ſeriouſly to enter into the debate, "whether he were "already married or no?" The man, and the manner, replied ſir Anthony, gave me a ſuſpicion that, having done a fooliſh thing, he was deſirous to cover himſelf with the authority of our advice. I thought it good to be ſure before you went any farther, and you ſee what came of it. This afforded them entertainment till they came to town, and ſo they parted.

Soon after the reſtoration of king Charles II, the earl of Southampton and he having dined together at the chancellor's, as they were returning home, he ſaid to my lord Southampton, "Yonder Mrs. Anne Hyde (for ſo, as I remember, he ſtyled her) "is certainly married "to one of the brothers." The earl, who was a friend to the chancellor, treated this as a chimæra, and aſked him how ſo wild a fancy could get into his head. Aſſure yourſelf, ſir, replied he, it is ſo. A concealed reſpect, however ſuppreſſed, ſhowed itſelf ſo plainly in the looks, voice, and manner, wherewith her mother carved to her, or offered her of every diſh, that it is impoſſible but it muſt be ſo. My lord S. who thought it a groundleſs conceit then, was not long after convinced by the duke of York's owning of her, that lord Aſhley was no bad gueſſer.

I ſhall give one inſtance more of his great ſagacity, wherein it proved of great uſe to him in a caſe of mighty conſequence. Having reaſon to apprehend what tyranny the uſurpation of the government by the officers of the army, under the title of the committee of ſafety, might end in; he thought the firſt ſtep to ſettlement was the breaking of them, which could not be done with any pretence of authority, but that of the long parliament. Meeting therefore ſecretly with ſir Arthur Haſelrig, and ſome others of the members, they gave commiſſions in the name of the parliament to be major-generals, one of the forces about London, another

ther of the west, &c. and this when they had not one soldier. Nay, he often would tell it laughing, that when he had his commission his great care was where to hide it. Before this he had secured Portsmouth; for the governor of it, colonel Metham, being his old acquaintance and friend, he asked him one day, meeting him by chance in Westminster-hall, whether he would put Portsmouth into his hands if he should happen to have an occasion for it? Metham promised it should be at his devotion. These transactions, though no part of them were known in particular, yet causing some remote preparations, alarmed Wallingford-house, where the committee of safety sat, and made them so attentive to all actions and discoveries that might give them any light, that at last they were fully persuaded there was something a brewing against them, and that matter for commotions in several parts was gathering. They knew the vigour and activity of sir A. Ashley, and how well he stood affectionated to them, and therefore suspected that he was at the bottom of the matter. To find what they could, and secure the man they most apprehended, he was sent for to Wallingford-house, where Fleetwood examined him according to the suspicions he had of him; that he was laying designs in the west against them, and was working the people to an insurrection that he intended to head there. He told them, he knew no obligation he was under to give them an account of his actions, nor to make them any promises; but to show them how ill grounded their suspicions were, he promised that he would not go out of town without coming first and giving him an account of it. Fleetwood knowing his word might be relied on, satisfied with the promise he had made, let him go upon his parole. That which deceived them in the case, was, that knowing his estate and interest lay in the west, they presumed, that that was his post, and there certainly, if any stir was, he would appear, since there lay his great strength, and they had no-body else in view who could supply his room, and manage that part. But they were mistaken: Haselrig, upon the knowledge that they should have Portsmouth, forwardly took that

province; and he, who had inſtruments at work in the army quartered in and about London, and knew that muſt be the place of moſt buſineſs and management, and where the turn of affairs would be, had choſen that.

Lambert, who was one of the rulers at Wallingford-houſe, happened to be away when he was there, and came not in till he was gone: when they told him that ſir A. Aſhley had been there, and what had paſſed, he blamed Fleetwood for letting him go, and told him they ſhould have ſecured him, for that certainly there was ſomething in it that they were deceived in, and they ſhould not have parted ſo eaſily with ſo buſy and dangerous a man as he was. Lambert was of a quicker ſight, and a deeper reach than Fleetwood, and the reſt of that gang; and knowing of what moment it was to their ſecurity to fruſtrate the contrivances of that working and able head, was reſolved, if poſſibly he could, to get him into his clutches.

Sir A. A. coming home to his houſe in ſtreet in Covent-Garden one evening, found a man knocking at his door. He aſked his buſineſs; the man anſwered, it was with him, and fell a diſcourſing with him. Sir A. A. heard him out, and gave him ſuch an anſwer as he thought proper, and ſo they parted; the ſtranger out of the entry where they ſtood into the ſtreet, and ſir A. A. along the entry into the houſe: but gueſſing by the ſtory the other told him, that the buſineſs was but a pretence, and that his real errand he came about was ſomething elſe; when he parted from the fellow he went inwards, as if he intended to go into the houſe; but as ſoon as the fellow was gone, turned ſhort, and went out, and went to his barber's, which was but juſt by; where he was no ſooner got in, and got up ſtairs into a chamber, but his door was beſet with muſketeers, and the officer went in too with others to ſeize him: but not finding him, they ſearched every corner and cranny of the houſe diligently, the officer declaring he was ſure he was in the houſe, for he had left him there juſt now; as was true, for he had gone no farther than the corner of the Half-moon tavern, which was juſt by, to fetch a file of ſoldiers that he had left there in the Strand out of ſight, whilſt

whilst he went to discover whether the gentleman he sought were within or no; where doubting not to find him safely lodged, he returned with his myrmidons to his house, sure, as he thought, of his prey; but sir A. A. saw through his made story, and gave him the slip. After this he was fain to get out of the way and conceal himself under a disguise; but he hid himself not lazily in a hole; he made war upon them at Wallingford-house, incognito as he was, and made them feel him, though he kept out of sight. * Several companies of their soldiers drew up in Lincoln's-inn-fields without their officers, and there put themselves under the command of such officers as he appointed them. The city began to rouse itself, and to show manifest signs of little regard to Wallingford-house; and he never left working till he had raised a spirit and strength enough to declare openly for the old parliament, as the only legal authority then in England, which had any pretence to claim and take on them the government. For Portsmouth being put into the hands of sir Arthur Haselrig, and the city showing their inclination; the counties readily took it, and by their concurrent weight re-instated the excluded members in their former administration. This was the first open step he made towards wresting the civil power out of the hands of the army; who, having thought Richard, Oliver's son, unworthy of it, had taken it to themselves, executed by a committee of their own officers, where Lambert, who had the chief command and influence in the army, had placed it, till he had modelled things among them, so as might make way for his taking the sole administration into his own hands; but sir A. A. found a way to strip him of that as soon as the parliament was restored.

The first thing he did was to get from them a commission to himself, and two or three more of the most weighty and popular members of the house, to have the power of general of all the forces in England, which they were to execute jointly. This was no sooner done but he got them together, where he had provided abundance of clerks, who were immediately

ſet to work to tranſcribe a great many copies of the form of a letter, wherein they reciting, that it pleaſed God to reſtore the parliament to the exerciſe of their power, and that the parliament had given to them a commiſſion to command the army, they therefore commanded him (viz. the officer to whom the letter was directed) immediately with his troop, company, or regiment, as it happened, to march to N. Theſe letters were directed to the chief officer of any part of the army who had their quarters together in any part of England. Theſe letters were diſpatched away by particular meſſengers that very night, and coming to the ſeveral officers ſo peremptorily to march immediately, they had not time to aſſemble and debate among themſelves what to do; and having no other intelligence but that the parliament was reſtored, and that the city and Portſmouth, and other parts of England, had declared for them; the officers durſt not diſobey, but all, according to their ſeveral orders, marched ſome one way, and ſome another; ſo that this army, which was the great ſtrength of the gentlemen of Wallingford-houſe, was by this means quite ſcattered, and rendered perfectly uſeleſs to the committee of ſafety, who were hereby perfectly reduced under the power of the parliament, as ſo many diſarmed men to be diſpoſed of as they thought fit.

It is known, that, whilſt the long parliament remained intire, Mr. Denzil Hollis was the man of the greateſt ſway in it, and might have continued it on, if he would have followed ſir A. A.'s advice. But he was a haughty ſtiff man, and ſo by ſtraining it a little too much loſt all.

From the time of their reconcilement already mentioned, they had been very hearty friends; it happened one morning that ſir A. A. calling upon Mr. Hollis in his way to the houſe, as he often did; he found him in a great heat againſt Cromwell, who had then the command of the army, and a great intereſt in it. The provocation may be read at large in the pamphlets of that time, for which Mr. Hollis was reſolved, he ſaid, to bring him to puniſhment. Sir A. A. diſſuaded him

all he could from any such attempt, showing him the danger of it, and told him it would be sufficient to remove him out of the way, by sending him with a command into Ireland. This Cromwell, as things stood, would be glad to accept; but this would not satisfy Mr. Hollis. When he came to the house the matter was brought into debate, and it was moved, that Cromwell, and those guilty with him, should be punished. Cromwell, who was in the house, no sooner heard this, but he stole out, took horse, and rode immediately to the army, which, as I remember, was at Triplow-heath; there he acquainted them what the presbyterian party was a doing in the house, and made such use of it to them, that they, who were before in the power of the parliament, now united together under Cromwell, who immediately led them away to London, giving out menaces against Hollis and his party as they march, who with Stapleton and some others were fain to fly; and thereby the independent party becoming the stronger, they, as they called it, purged the house, and turned out all the presbyterian party. Cromwell, some time after, meeting sir A. A. told him, I am beholden to you for your kindness to me; for you, I hear, were for letting me go without punishment; but your friend, God be thanked, was not wise enough to take your advice.

Monk, after the death of Oliver Cromwell, and the removal of Richard, marching with the army he had with him into England, gave fair promises all along in his way to London to the Rump that were then sitting, who had sent commissioners to him that accompanied him. When he was come to town, though he had promised fair to the Rump and commonwealth party on one hand, and gave hopes to the royalists on the other; yet at last agreed with the french ambassador to take the government on himself, by whom he had promise from Mazarine of assistance from France to support him in his undertaking. This bargain was struck up between them late at night, but not so secretly but that his wife, who had posted herself conveniently behind the hangings, where she could hear all that passed,

finding what was reſolved, ſent her brother Clarges away immediately with notice of it to ſir A. A. She was zealous for the reſtoration of the king, and had therefore promiſed ſir A. to watch her huſband, and inform him from time to time how matters went. Upon this notice ſir A. cauſed the council of ſtate, whereof he was one, to be ſummoned; and when they were met, he deſired the clerks might withdraw, he having matter of great importance to communicate to them. The doors of the council-chamber being locked, and the keys laid upon the table, he began to charge Monk, not in a direct and open accuſation, but in obſcure intimations, and doubtful expreſſions, giving ground of ſuſpicion, that he was playing falſe with them, and not doing as he promiſed. This he did ſo ſkilfully and intelligibly to Monk, that he perceived he was diſcovered, and therefore in his anſwer to him fumbled and ſeemed out of order; ſo that the reſt of the council perceived there was ſomething in it, though they knew not what the matter was; and the general at laſt averring that what had been ſuggeſted was upon groundleſs ſuſpicions, and that he was true to his principles, and ſtood firm to what he had profeſſed to them, and had no ſecret deſigns that ought to diſturb them, and that he was ready to give them all manner of ſatisfaction; whereupon ſir A. A. cloſing with him, and making a farther uſe of what he had ſaid than he intended: for he meant no more than ſo far as to get away from them upon this aſſurance which he gave them. But ſir A. A. told him, that if he was ſincere in what he had ſaid, he might preſently remove all ſcruples, if he would take away their commiſſions from ſuch and ſuch officers in his army, and give them to thoſe whom he named; and that preſently before he went out of the room. Monk was in himſelf no quick man; he was guilty alone among a company of men who he knew not what they would do with him; for they all ſtruck in with ſir A. A. and plainly perceived that Monk had deſigned ſome foul play. In theſe ſtraits being thus cloſe preſſed, and knowing not how elſe to extricate himſelf, he conſented to what was propoſed; and ſo immediately, before he ſtirred, a great

part

part of the commissions of his officers were changed; and sir Edward Harley, amongst the rest, who was a member of the council, and there present, was made governor of Dunkirk in the room of sir William Lockhart, and was sent away immediately to take possession of it. By which means the army ceased to be at Monk's devotion, and was put into hands that would not serve him in the design he had undertaken. The french ambassador, who had the night before sent away an express to Mazarine, positively to assure him that things went here as he desired, and that Monk was fixed by him in his resolution to take on himself the government, was not a little astonished the next day to find things taking another turn; and indeed this so much disgraced him in the french court, that he was presently called home, and soon after broke his heart.

This was that which gave the great turn to the restoration of king Charles II, whereof sir A. had laid the plan in his head a long time before, and carried it on, * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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Quantus hîc situs est ex titulis, quod rarò, discas.
Baro Ashley de Winborne St. Giles,
Deinde Comes Shaftesburiensis,
Cancellarius Scaccarij, Ærarij Triumvir,
Magnus Angliæ Cancellarius,
CAROLO Secundo à Sanctioribus & Secretioribus Conciliis, &c.
Hæc non Sepulchri ornamenta, sed Viri.
Quippe quæ nec Majoribus debuit nec favori.
Comitate, acumine, suadelâ, consilio, animo, constantia, fide,
Vix Parem alibi invenias, Superiorem certè nullibi.
Libertatis Civilis, Ecclesiasticæ,
Propugnator strenuus, indefessus.
Vitæ publicis commodis impensæ memoriam & laudes,
Stante libertate, nunquam obliterabit
Tempus edax, nec edacior Invidia.
Servo pecori inutilia, invisa magna exempla.
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THREE

THREE LETTERS writ by the E. of SHAFTESBURY whilſt Priſoner in the Tower; one to K. Charles II, another to the D. of York, a third to a Noble Lord: found with Mr. LOCKE'S MEMOIRS relating to the Life of Anthony, Firſt Earl of Shafteſbury.

To King CHARLES II.

SIR,

THE Almighty God, the King of kings, permitted Job to diſpute with him, and to order his cauſe before him; give me leave therefore, great ſir, to lay my caſe before your majeſty, and to plead not only my innocence but my merits towards your majeſty; for "my integrity will I hold faſt, and will not let it go; "my heart ſhall not reproach me ſo long as I live."

I had the honour to have a principal hand in your reſtoration; neither did I act in it, but on a principle of piety and honour: I never betrayed (as your majeſty knows) the party or councils I was of. I kept no correſpondence with, nor I made no ſecret addreſſes to your majeſty; neither did I endeavour to obtain any private terms or articles for myſelf, or reward for what I had or ſhould do. In whatever I did toward the ſervice of your majeſty, I was ſolely acted by the ſenſe of that duty I owed to God, the engliſh nation, and your majeſty's juſt right and title. I ſaw the hand of Providence that had led us through various forms of government, and had given power into the hands of ſeveral ſorts of men, but he had given none of them a heart to uſe it as they ſhould; they all fell to the prey, ſought not the good or ſettlement of the nation, endeavoured only the enlargement and continuance of their own authority, and graſped at thoſe very powers they had complained of ſo much, and for which ſo bloody and ſo fatal a war had been raiſed and continued in the bowels of the nation. I obſerved the leaders of the great

great parties of religion, both laity and clergy, ready and forward to deliver up the rights and liberties of the people, and to introduce an absolute dominion; so that tyranny might be established in the hands of those that favoured their way, and with whom they might have hopes to divide the present spoil, having no eye to posterity, or thought of future things. One of the last scenes of this confusion was general Lambert's seizing of the government in a morning by force of arms, turning out the parliament and their council of state, and in their room erecting a committee of safety. The news of this gives a great surprize to general Monk, who commanded the army in Scotland.******

To the D. of York.

SIR,

I Humbly confess I never thought my person or my principles acceptable to your royal highness; but at that juncture of time and occasion when I was committed, I had no reason to expect you should be my severe enemy. Reputation is the greatest concern of great dealers in the world; great princes are the greatest dealers; no reputation more their interest than to be thought merciful, relievers of the distressed, and maintainers of the ancient laws and rights of their country. This I ever wish may attend your royal highness, and that I may be one instance of it.

To the Lord ——

My Lord,

I Had prepared this for your meeting in December; but that being adjourned to the 3d of April, an age to an old infirm man, especially shut up in a winter's prison; forgive me if I say you owe yourself and your posterity,

poſterity, as well as me, the endeavouring to remove ſo ſevere a precedent on one of your members; ſuch as I may truly ſay is the firſt of the kind, and I pray heartily may be the laſt. Your interceſſion to his majeſty, if it be general, is not like to be refuſed; if you are ſingle, yet you have done honourably, and what I ſhould have done for you.

SOME

SOME

FAMILIAR LETTERS

BETWEEN

Mr. LOCKE,

AND

SEVERAL OF HIS FRIENDS.

TO THE

READER.

THE following letters, offered to your perusal, are the genuine productions of those gentlemen, to whom they are attributed.

They contain not only such civil and polite conversation, as friendship produces among men of parts, learning, and candour; but several matters relating to literature, and more particularly to Mr. Locke's notions, in his "Essay concerning human understanding," and in some of his other works: and, therefore I cannot doubt of your thanks for the present I make you. For, though the curiosity of some, to see whatever drops from the pens of great men, and to inform themselves in their private characters, their tempers, dispositions, and manner of conversing with their friends, would perhaps have justified me, in publishing any letters of Mr. Locke's, and of his friends to him, that were not letters of mere business; yet my regard to what I take to be the more general judgment of the public, has determined me to publish such only, as have relation to this twofold view, and shall determine me hereafter, if gentlemen, that have any letters of Mr. Locke's by them, think fit to communicate them to me.

FAMILIAR

FAMILIAR LETTERS, &c.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

SIR, London, July 16, 1692.

THOUGH the extraordinary compliment you were pleaſed to make me, in the epiſtle dedicatory *, eaſily perſuaded me, from whom that preſent was likely to come; when, at my coming to town, I found your book left for me, by Mr. Tooke, at my bookſeller's; yet my conſciouſneſs, how little I could deſerve the one, or the other, from you, made me fear ſome miſtake, till inquiring of Mr. Tooke himſelf, he aſſured me of the favour you had done me. I will not pretend to return you ſuch thanks as I ought, till I can write ſuch a book as your's is. Only give me leave to ſay, that if my trifle could poſſibly be an occaſion of vanity to me, you have done moſt to make it ſo, ſince I could ſcarce forbear to applaud myſelf, upon ſuch a teſtimony from one who ſo well underſtands demonſtration, did I not

* Before A Treatiſe of Dioptrics, printed at London 1692, wherein it is ſaid, "that to none do we owe, for a greater advancement in this "part of philoſophy, (viz. logic) than to the incomparable Mr. Locke, "who, in his Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, hath rectified more re-"ceived miſtakes, and delivered more profound truths, eſtabliſhed on "experience and obſervation, for the direction of man's mind in the "proſecution of knowledge, (which I think may be properly termed "logic) than are to be met with in all the volumes of the ancients. He "has clearly overthrown all thoſe metaphyſical whimſies, which infected "men's brains with a ſpice of madneſs, whereby they feigned a know-"ledge where they had none, by making a noiſe with ſounds, without "clear and diſtinct ſignifications."

ſee that thoſe, who can be extreme rigorous and exact in the ſearch of truth, can be as civil and as complaiſant in their dealing with thoſe whom they take to be lovers of it. But this cannot keep me from being out of countenance at the receipt of ſuch obligations, without the hopes of making ſuch returns as I ought. Inſtead of that, give me leave to do what is next to it, and let you ſee that I am not ſorry I am obliged to you. The bearer hereof, Dr. Sibelius, is a friend of mine, who comes to Dublin with a deſign to ſettle there, and I beg your aſſiſtance of him, in what lies in your way. I ſhall take it as a favour done to me. And methinks I have reaſon now to expect it of you, ſince you have done me, more than once, very great ones, when I had no reaſon to expect any at all. Sir, you have made great advances of friendſhip towards me, and you ſee they are not loſt upon me. I am very ſenſible of them, and would make ſuch an uſe of them as might aſſure you I ſhould take it for a new favour, if you would afford me an occaſion wherein I might, by any ſervice, tell you how much I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt obliged ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

I had the honour to know one of your name at Leyden about ſeven or eight years ſince. If he be any relation of your's, and now in Dublin, I beg the favour of you to preſent my humble ſervice to him.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR,

UPON the arrival of our lord lieutenant in this place (which was on the 25th inſtant) I had the favour of a letter from you, by the hands of Dr. Sibelius. I cannot eaſily tell you how grateful it was to me, having the higheſt

higheſt eſteem for him that ſent it, from the firſt moment that I was ſo happy as to ſee any of his writings; and therefore it was, that I was ſo ambitious of making a friendſhip with you, by preſenting you one of my trifles, which I ordered my bookſeller to lay before you, under this character, " as a mean teſtimony of the great re-" ſpect I had for the author of the Eſſay of Human " Underſtanding." And ſince I find, by your's to me, that my ambition is not fallen ſhort of its deſign; but that you are pleaſed to encourage me, by aſſuring me that I have made great advances of friendſhip towards you; give me leave to embrace the favour with all joy imaginable. And that you may judge of ſincerity by my open heart, I will plainly confeſs to you, that I have not in my life read any book with more ſatisfaction than your eſſay; inſomuch, that a repeated peruſal of it is ſtill more pleaſant to me.

And I have endeavoured, with great ſucceſs, to recommend it to the conſideration of the ingenious, in this place. Dr. King, biſhop of Derry, when he read it, made ſome ſlight remarks on the foremoſt parts of the book; but his buſineſs would not permit him to go through it all. What he did, rough as it was, he gave to me, and they are at your commands, when you pleaſe.

One thing I muſt needs inſiſt on to you, which is, that you would think of obliging the world with " A " Treatiſe of Morals," drawn up according to the hints you frequently give in your eſſay, of being demonſtrable, according to the mathematical method. This is moſt certainly true. But then the taſk muſt be undertaken, only by ſo clear and diſtinct a thinker as you are. This were an attempt worthy your conſideration. And there is nothing I ſhould more ardently wiſh for than to ſee it. And therefore, good ſir, let me beg of you to turn your thoughts this way; and if ſo young a friendſhip as mine have any force, let me prevail upon you.

Upon my reading your eſſay, I was ſo taken with it, that when I was in London, in Auguſt 1690, I made inquiry amongſt ſome of my learned friends, for any

other of your writings, if perhaps they knew any: I was recommended, by ſome, to "Two Diſcourſes "concerning Government," and a little "Treatiſe "concerning Toleration." There is neither of them carries your name; and I will not venture to aſk you, whether they are your's or not? This only I think, no name need be aſhamed of either.

Dr. Sibelius, I find, is your friend, and therefore I aſſure him of all ſervice I can poſſibly do him. I will make it my buſineſs to get him acquaintance in this place; and I dare promiſe him ſome of the beſt.

The incloſed from my brother will tell you that he was your acquaintance in Leyden. I myſelf have been there, anno 1685, but had not the good fortune of being known to you. But from this time I ſhall reckon myſelf happy in your friendſhip, and ſhall ever ſubſcribe myſelf

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt obliged

humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, Sept. 20, 1692.

THERE being nothing, that I think of ſo much value, as the acquaintance and friendſhip of knowing and worthy men, you may eaſily gueſs how much I find myſelf obliged, I will not ſay by the offer, but by the gift you have made me, of your's. That which confirms me in the aſſurance of it, is the little pretence I have to it. For, knowing myſelf, as I do, I cannot think ſo vainly of myſelf, as to imagine that you ſhould make ſuch overtures and expreſſions of kindneſs to me, for any other end, but merely as the pledges and exerciſe of it. I return you therefore my thanks, as for the greateſt and moſt acceptable preſent you could have made me; and deſire you to believe, that ſince I cannot

not hope that the returns, which I made you of mine, should be of any great use to you, I shall endeavour to make it up, as well as I can, with an high esteem, and perfect sincerity. You must, therefore, expect to have me live with you hereafter, with all the liberty and assurance of a settled friendship. For meeting with but few men in the world, whose acquaintance I find much reason to covet, I make more than ordinary haste into the familiarity of a rational inquirer after, and lover of truth, whenever I can light on any such. There are beauties of the mind, as well as of the body, that take and prevail at first sight: and wherever I have met with this, I have readily surrendered myself, and have never yet been deceived in my expectation. Wonder not therefore, if, having been thus wrought on, I begin to converse with you, with as much freedom, as if we had begun our acquaintance when you were in Holland; and desire your advice and assistance about a second edition of my Essay, the former being now dispersed. You have, I perceive, read it over so carefully, more than once, that I know no-body I can more reasonably consult, about the mistakes and defects of it. And I expect a great deal more, from any objections you shall make, who comprehend the whole design and compass of it, than from one who has read but a part of it, or measures it, upon a slight reading, by his own prejudices. You will find, by my epistle to the reader, that I was not insensible of the fault I committed, by being too long upon some points; and the repetitions, that by my way of writing of it, had got in, I let it pass with, but not without advice so to do. But now, that my notions are got into the world, and have in some measure bustled through the opposition and difficulty they were like to meet with from the received opinion, and that prepossession, which might hinder them from being understood upon a short proposal; I ask you, whether it would not be better now to pare off, in a second edition, a great part of that, which cannot but appear superfluous to an intelligent and attentive reader? If you are of that mind, I shall beg the favour of you to mark to me these passages, which

you would think fitteſt to be left out. If there be any thing, wherein you think me miſtaken, I beg you to deal freely with me, that either I may clear it up to you, or reform it in the next edition. For I flatter myſelf that I am ſo ſincere a lover of truth, that it is very indifferent to me, ſo I am poſſeſſed of it, whether it be by my own, or any other's diſcovery. For I count any parcel of this gold not the leſs to be valued, nor not the leſs enriching, becauſe I wrought it not out of the mine myſelf. I think every one ought to contribute to the common ſtock, and to have no other ſcruple, or ſhyneſs, about the receiving of truth, but that he be not impoſed on, and take counterfeit, and what will not bear the touch, for genuine and real truth. I doubt not but, to one of your largeneſs of thought, that, in the reading of my book, you miſs ſeveral things, that perhaps belong to my ſubject, and you would think belongs to the ſyſtem: if, in this part too, you will communicate your thoughts, you will do me a favour. For though I will not ſo far flatter myſelf, as to undertake to fill up the gaps, which you may obſerve in it; yet it may be of uſe, where mine is at a ſtand, to ſuggeſt to others matter of farther contemplation. This I often find, that what men by thinking have made clear to themſelves, they are apt to think, that upon the firſt ſuggeſtion it ſhould be ſo to others, and ſo let it go, not ſufficiently explained; not conſidering what may be very clear to themſelves, may be very obſcure to others. Your penetration and quickneſs hinders me from expecting from you many complaints of this kind. But, if you have met with any thing, in your reading of my book, which at firſt ſight you ſtuck at, I ſhall think it a ſufficient reaſon, in the next edition, to amend it, for the benefit of meaner readers.

The remarks of that learned gentleman you mention, which you ſay you have in your hands, I ſhall receive as a favour from you.

Though by the view I had of moral ideas, whilſt I was conſidering that ſubject, I thought I ſaw that morality might be demonſtratively made out; yet whether I am able ſo to make it out, is another queſtion. Every

one could not have demonſtrated what Mr. Newton's book hath ſhown to be demonſtrable; but to ſhow my readineſs to obey your commands, I ſhall not decline the firſt leiſure I can get, to employ ſome thoughts that way; unleſs I find what I have ſaid in my eſſay ſhall have ſtirred up ſome abler man to prevent me, and effectually do that ſervice to the world.

We had here, the 8th inſtant, a very ſenſible earthquake, there being ſcarce an houſe, wherein it was not by ſome body or other felt. We have news of it at ſeveral places, from Cologn as far as Briſtol. Whether it reached you I have not heard. If it did, I would be glad to know, what was the exact time it was felt, if any body obſerved it. By the queen's pendulum at Kenſington, which the ſhake ſtopped from going, it was 2 h. poſt m. At Whitehall, where I obſerved it, it was by my watch 2 h. 5 m. poſt m. Which, ſuppoſing the queen's pendulum went exact, and adding the equation of that day, will fall near the time marked by my watch, or a little later. If there could be found people, that in the whole extent of it, did by well-adjuſted clocks exactly obſerve the time, one might ſee whether it were all one ſhock, or proceeded gradually from one place to another.

I thank you for having taken Dr. Sibelius into your protection. I deſire you, with my ſervice, to preſent my moſt humble thanks to your brother, for the favour of his letter; to which, though I have not time this poſt to return an anſwer, I ſhall not long delay my acknowledgments.

I hope you will ſee, by the freedom I have here taken with you, that I begin to reckon myſelf amongſt your acquaintance. Uſe me ſo, I beſeech you. If there be any ſervice I can do you here, employ me, with an aſſurance that I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Oct. 15,—92.

I DO moſt heartily beg your pardon for my long ſilence to yours of the 20th laſt. Our then approaching parliament was the occaſion of my not returning you an immediate anſwer; and I expected withal to give you a more large account of ſome things, you deſire from me. But, ſeeing no immediate hopes of leiſure, by reaſon of our parliamentary buſineſs, I venture at preſent to ſend you only the incloſed rough papers. And till I can have an opportunity myſelf of reviſing your book, have put it into the hands of a very ingenious and learned perſon, who promiſes me to give his obſervations in writing; which, as ſoon as obtained, I ſhall tranſmit to you.—The earthquake was not at all felt here.—I am wonderfully pleaſed that you give me hopes of ſeeing a moral eſſay from your hand; which I aſſure you, ſir, with all ſincerity, is highly reſpected by

Your moſt humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 22, 1692.

I NOW ſit down to anſwer your's of September 20, concerning the ſecond edition of your book, wherein you deſire my opinion and advice. And, after ſo long conſideration of the matter, as between that and this; and conſulting ſome ingenious heads here about it, I can ſay but little; only that the ſame judicious hand, that firſt formed it, is beſt able to reform it, where he ſees convenient. I never quarrelled with a book for being too prolix, eſpecially where the prolixity is pleaſant,

sant, and tends to the illustration of the matter in hand, as I am sure your's always does. And, after I received your letter on this subject, I communicated the contents thereof to two very ingenious persons here; and, at the same time, I lent them your book, desiring them to examine it strictly; and to find out, and note, whatever might be changed, added, or substracted. And after a diligent perusal, they agreed with me in the same conclusion, viz. that the work, in all its parts, was so wonderfully curious and instructive, that they would not venture to alter any thing in it. But however, that I may in some measure answer your expectations, I shall briefly note to you, what I conceive on this subject.

And, 1st, the errata typographica (besides those mentioned in the table) are many and great; these therefore, in your next edition, are diligently to be corrected.

2dly, pag. 270. It is asserted, " that, without a " particular revelation, we cannot be certain, that " matter cannot think, or that omnipotency may not " endow matter with a power of thinking."

And pag. 314, 315. " the immateriality of God is " evinced from the absolute impossibility of matter's " thinking." These two places, I know, have been stumbled at by some, as not consistent. To me indeed they appear, and are, very agreeable; and I have clearly evinced their consistency to those that have scrupled them. But I thought fit to give you this hint, that in your next edition you may prevent any such doubt. My sense of these two places is this. In the first it is said, " that we cannot tell (without a particular revelation to the contrary) " but an almighty God can " make matter think." In the other it is asserted, " that unthinking matter cannot be this almighty " God." The next place I take notice of, as requiring some farther explication, is your discourse about man's liberty and necessity. This thread seems so wonderfully fine spun in your book, that, at last, the great question of liberty and necessity seems to vanish. And herein you seem to make all sins to proceed from our understandings,

ſtandings, or to be againſt conſcience, and not at all from the depravity of our wills. Now it ſeems harſh to you, that a man will be damned, becauſe he underſtands no better than he does. What you ſay concerning genera and ſpecies is unqueſtionably true; and yet it ſeems hard to aſſert, that there is no ſuch ſort of creatures in nature, as birds: for though we may be ignorant of the particular eſſence, that makes a bird to be a bird, or that determines and diſtinguiſhes a bird from a beaſt; or the juſt limits and boundaries between each; yet we can no more doubt of a ſparrow's being a bird, and an horſe's being a beaſt, than we can of this colour being black, and the other white: though, by ſhades, they may be made ſo gradually to vaniſh into each other, that we cannot tell where either determines.

But all this I write more in deference to your deſires from me, than to ſatisfy myſelf, that I have given you any material hints, or have offered any conſiderable objection, that is worth your notice and removal. Mr. Norris's unfortunate attempts on your book ſufficiently teſtify its validity; and truly I think he trifles ſo egregiouſly, that he ſhould forewarn all men how far they venture to criticiſe on your work. But thus far, after all, I'll venture to intimate to you, that if you are for another work of this kind, I ſhould adviſe you to let this ſtand as it does. And your next ſhould be of a model wholly new, and that is by way of logic; ſomething accommodated to the uſual forms, together with the conſideration of extenſion, ſolidity, mobility, thinking, exiſtence, duration, number, &c. and of the mind of man and its powers; as may make up a complete body of what the ſchools call logic and metaphyſics. This I am the more inclinable to adviſe on two accounts; firſt, becauſe I have lately ſeen Johannis Clerici Logica, Ontologia, et Pneumatologia, in all which he has little extraordinary, but what he borrows from you; and in the alteration he gives them, he robs them of their native beauties; which can only be preſerved to them by the ſame incomparable art that firſt framed them. Secondly, I was the firſt that recommended and

lent

lent to the reverend provoſt of our univerſity, Dr. Aſhe, a moſt learned and ingenious man, your eſſay, with which he was ſo wonderfully pleaſed and ſatisfied, that he has ordered it to be read by the bachelors in the college, and ſtrictly examines them in their progreſs therein. Now a large diſcourſe, in the way of a logic, would be much more taking in the univerſities, wherein youths do not ſatisfy themſelves to have the breeding or buſineſs of the place, unleſs they are engaged in ſomething that bears the name and form of logic.

This, ſir, is in ſhort what offers itſelf to me, at preſent, concerning your work. There remains only, that I again put you in mind of the ſecond member of your diviſion of ſciences, the ars practica, or ethics; you cannot imagine what an earneſt deſire and expectation I have raiſed, in thoſe that are acquainted with your writings, by the hopes I have given them from your promiſe of endeavouring ſomething on that ſubject. Good ſir, let me renew my requeſts to you therein; for believe me, ſir, it will be one of the moſt uſeful and glorious undertakings that can employ you. The touches you give, in many places of your book, on this ſubject, are wonderfully curious, and do largely teſtify your great abilities that way; and I am ſure the pravity of men's morals does mightily require the moſt powerful means to reform them. Be as large as it is poſſible on this ſubject, and by all means let it be in engliſh. He that reads the 45th ſection, in your 129th page, will be inflamed to read more of the ſame kind, from the ſame incomparable pen. Look, therefore, on yourſelf as obliged by God Almighty to undertake this taſk (pardon me, ſir, that I am ſo free with you, as to inſiſt to yourſelf on your duty, who, doubtleſs, underſtand it better than I can tell you) ſuffer not therefore your thoughts to reſt, till you have finiſhed it; and that God Almighty may ſucceed your labours, is, and ſhall be the prayer of,

Worthy Sir,

Your intirely affectionate humble ſervant,

Will. Molyneux.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Sir, Oates, Dec. 26, 1692.

WHATEVER has happened to give you leiſure ſooner than was expected, I hope to receive ſome advantage by it. And that now you will be able to ſend me your own thoughts on my book, together with the obſervations of your friend, into whoſe hands you have put it with that deſign. I return you my humble thanks for the papers you did me the favour to ſend me in your laſt: but am apt to think you agree with me that there is very little in thoſe papers, wherein either my ſenſe is not miſtaken, or very little, wherein the argument is directly againſt me. I ſuppoſe that learned gentleman, if he had had the leiſure to read my eſſay quite through, would have found ſeveral of his objections might have been ſpared. And I can eaſily forgive thoſe who have not been at the pains to read the third book of my eſſay, if they make uſe of expreſſions that, when examined, ſignify nothing at all, in defence of hypotheſes, that have long poſſeſſed their minds. I am far from imagining myſelf infallible; but yet I ſhould be loth to differ from any thinking man, being fully perſuaded there are very few things of pure ſpeculation, wherein two thinking men, who impartially ſeek truth, can differ, if they give themſelves the leiſure to examine their hypotheſes, and underſtand one another. I, preſuming you to be of this make, whereof ſo few are to be found (for it is not every one that thinks himſelf a lover, or ſeeker of truth, who ſincerely does it) took the liberty to deſire your objections, that in the next edition I might correct my miſtakes. For I am not fond of any thing in my book, becauſe I have once thought or ſaid it. And therefore I beg you, if you will give yourſelf the pains to look over my book again with this deſign, to oblige me, that you would uſe all manner of freedom, both as to matter, ſtyle, diſpoſition, and every thing wherein, in your own thoughts, any thing appears to you fit, in the leaſt, to be

be altered, omitted, explained, or added. I find none so fit, nor so fair judges, as those whose minds the study of mathematics has opened, and dis-entangled from the cheat of words, which has too great an influence in all the other, which go for sciences: and I think (were it not for the doubtful and fallacious use that is made of those signs) might be made much more sciences than they are.

I sent order, some time since, that a posthumous piece of Mr. Boyle's should be given to your bookseller in London, to be conveyed to you. It is "A General "History of the Air;" which, though left by him very imperfect, yet I think the very design of it will please you; and it is cast into a method that any one who pleases may add to it, under any of the several titles, as his reading or observation shall furnish him with matter of fact. If such men as you are, curious and knowing, would join to what Mr. Boyle had collected and prepared what comes in their way, we might hope, in some time, to have a considerable history of the air, than which I scarce know any part of natural philosophy would yield more variety and use; but it is a subject too large for the attempts of any one man, and will require the assistance of many hands to make it a history very short of complete.

Since I did myself the honour to write to your brother, I have been very ill, to which you must pardon some part of the length of my silence. But my esteem and respect for you is founded upon something so much beyond compliment and ceremony, that I hope you will not think me the less so, though I do not every post importune you with repeated professions that I am,

SIR,

Your most humble servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Jan. 20, 1692-3.

HAD I known I ſhould, within ſo few days, have received the favour of ſuch a letter as your's of Dec. 22, I ſhould not have troubled you with mine, that went hence but a little before the receipt of your's. I was afraid, in reading the beginning of your's, that I had not ſo great an intereſt in you as I flattered myſelf, and upon a preſumption whereof it was, that I took the liberty ſo confidently to aſk your advice, concerning the ſecond edition of my book. But what followed ſatisfied me, that it was your civility, and not reſervedneſs, made you tell me, that the ſame hand, which firſt formed it, is beſt able to reform it. Could I flatter myſelf ſo, as to think I deſerved all that you ſay of me, in your obliging letter, I ſhould yet think you a better judge of what is to be reformed in my book, than I myſelf. You have given the world proofs of your great penetration, and I have received great marks of your candour. But were the inequality between us as much to my advantage, as it is on the other ſide, I ſhould nevertheleſs beg your opinion. Whatſoever is our own, let us do what we can, ſtands a little too near us to be viewed as it ſhould: and, though we ever ſo ſincerely aim at truth, yet our own thoughts, judging ſtill of our own thoughts, may be ſuſpected to overlook errours and miſtakes. And I ſhould think he valued himſelf more than truth, and preſumed too much on his own abilities, who would not be willing to have all the exceptions could be made, by any ingenious friend, before he ventured any thing into the public. I therefore heartily thank you, for thoſe you have ſent me, and for conſulting ſome of your friends, to the ſame purpoſe: and beg the favour, if any thing more occurs from your own thoughts, or from them, you will be pleaſed to communicate it to me, if it be but thoſe errata typographica you meet with, not taken notice of in the table. I confeſs, I thought ſome of the explications in

in my book too long, though turned several ways, to make those abstract notions the easier sink into minds prejudiced in the ordinary way of education; and therefore I was of a mind to contract it. But finding you, and some other friends of mine, whom I consulted in the case, of a contrary opinion, and that you judge the redundancy in it a pardonable fault, I shall take very little pains to reform it.

I confess what I say, page 270, compared with 314, 315, may, to an unwary reader, seem to contain a contradiction: but you, considering right, perceive that there is none. But it not being reasonable for me to expect, that every body should read me with that judgment you do, and observe the design and foundation of what I say, rather than stick barely in the words, it is fit, as far as may be, that I accommodate myself to ordinary readers, and avoid the appearances of contradiction, even in their thoughts. P. 314, I suppose matter, in its own natural state, void of thought; a supposition I concluded would not be denied me, or not hard to be proved, if it should: and thence I inferred, matter could not be the first eternal being. But, page 270, I thought it no absurdity, or contradiction, to suppose, "that, a thinking, omnipotent being once "granted, such a being might annex to some systems "of matter ordered in a way, that he thought fit, a "capacity of some degrees of sense and thinking." To avoid this appearance of a contradiction, in my two suppositions, and clear it up to less attentive readers, I intend in the second edition to alter it thus, if you think it will do:

P. 270. l. 20. read, "For I see no contradiction in "it, that the first, eternal, thinking being, or omni-"potent spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain "systems of created, senseless matter, put together as "he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and "thought; though I judge it no less than a contradic-"tion, to suppose matter (which is evidently, in its "own nature, without sense and thought) should be "the eternal, first, thinking being. What certainty "of knowledge can any one have, that some percep-

"tions,

" tions, such as, v. g. pleasure and pain, should not be " in some bodies themselves after"——

P. 315. l. 5. read, " Thought can never begin to " be: for it is impossible to conceive that matter, either " with or without motion, could have originally, in " and from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; " as is evident from hence, that sense, perception, and " knowledge must then be a property eternally inse- " parable from matter, and every particle of it. Not " to add, that though our general or specific concep- " tion of matter makes us speak of it as one thing; " yet really all matter is not one individual thing, " neither is there any such thing existing as one mate- " rial being, or one body, that we know or can con- " ceive. And therefore, if matter were the eternal, " first, cogitative being, there would not be one eter- " nal, infinite, cogitative being: but an infinite num- " ber of finite, cogitative beings, independent one of " another, of limited force and distinct thoughts, which " could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty, " is to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatso- " ever is the first, eternal being must necessarily be " cogitative: and whatsoever is first of all things—— " higher degree, it necessarily follows, that the eternal, " first being cannot be matter." Pray give me your opinion, whether, if I print it thus, it will not remove the appearance of any contradiction.

I do not wonder to find you think my discourse about liberty a little too fine spun; I had so much that thought of it myself, that I said the same thing of it to some of my friends, before it was printed; and told them, that upon that account I judged it best to leave it out; but they persuaded me to the contrary. When the connexion of the parts of my subject brought me to the consideration of power, I had no design to meddle with the question of liberty; but barely pursued my thoughts in the contemplation of that power in man of choosing, or preferring, which we call the will, as far as they would lead me, without any the least bias to one side, or other; or, if there was any leaning in my mind, it was rather to the contrary side of that,

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where I found myself at the end of my pursuit. But doubting that it bore a little too hard upon man's liberty, I showed it to a very ingenious but professed arminian, and desired him, after he had considered it, to tell me his objections, if he had any, who frankly confessed he could carry it no farther. I confess, I think there might be something said, which with a great many men would pass for a satisfactory answer to your objection; but it not satisfying me, I neither put it into my book, nor shall now into my letter. If I have put any fallacy on myself, in all that deduction, as it may be, and I have been ready to suspect it myself, you will do me a very acceptable kindness to show it me, that I may reform it. But if you will argue for, or against, liberty from consequences, I will not undertake to answer you. For I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable, that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God, our maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing, than that I am free; yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both, as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And, therefore, I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion, that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it.

In the objection you raise about species, I fear you are fallen into the same difficulty I often found myself under, when I was writing on that subject, where I was very apt to suppose distinct species I could talk of, without names. For pray, sir, consider what it is you mean, when you say, that, "we can no more doubt of "a sparrow's being a bird, and a horse's being a beast, "than we can of this colour being black, and the "other white," &c. but this, that the combination of simple ideas, which the word, bird, stands for, is to be found in that particular thing we call a sparrow. And therefore I hope I have no-where said, "there is no "such sort of creatures in nature, as birds;" if I have, it is both contrary to truth and to my opinion. This I

do ſay, that there are real conſtitutions in things, from whence theſe ſimple ideas flow, which we obſerve combined in them. And this I farther ſay, that there are real diſtinctions and differences in thoſe real conſtitutions, one from another; whereby they are diſtinguiſhed one from another, whether we think of them, or name them, or no: but that that whereby we diſtinguiſh and rank particular ſubſtances into ſorts, or genera and ſpecies, is not thoſe real eſſences, or internal conſtitutions, but ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as we obſerve in them. This I deſigned to ſhow, in lib. iii. c. 6. If, upon your peruſal of that chapter again, you find any thing contrary to this, I beg the favour of you to mark it to me, that I may correct it; for it is not what I think true. Some parts of that third book, concerning words, though the thoughts were eaſy and clear enough, yet coſt me more pains to expreſs, than all the reſt of my eſſay. And therefore I ſhall not much wonder, if there be in ſome places of it obſcurity and doubtfulneſs. It would be a great kindneſs from my readers to oblige me, as you have done, by telling me any thing they find amiſs; for the printed book being more for others uſe than my own, it is fit I ſhould accommodate it to that, as much as I can; which truly is my intention.

That which you propoſe, of turning my eſſay into a body of logic and metaphyſics, accommodated to the uſual forms, though I thank you very kindly for it, and plainly ſee in it the care you have of the education of young ſcholars, which is a thing of no ſmall moment; yet I fear I ſhall ſcarce find time to do it: you have cut out other work for me, more to my liking, and I think of more uſe. Beſides that, if they have, in this book of mine, what you think the matter of theſe two ſciences, or what you will call them; I like the method it is in, better than that of the ſchools, where I think it is no ſmall prejudice to knowledge, that predicaments, predicables, &c. being univerſally, in all their ſyſtems, come to be looked on as neceſſary principles, or unqueſtionable parts of knowledge, juſt as they are ſet down there. If logic be the firſt thing

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to be taught young men, after grammar, as is the uſual method, I think yet it ſhould be nothing but propoſition and ſyllogiſm. But that being in order to their diſputing exerciſes in the univerſity, perhaps I may think thoſe may be ſpared too: diſputing being but an ill (not to ſay the worſt) way to knowledge. I ſay this not as pretending to change, or find fault with, what public allowance and eſtabliſhed practice has ſettled in univerſities; but to excuſe myſelf to you, from whom I cannot allow myſelf to differ, without telling you the true reaſons of it. For I ſee ſo much knowledge, candour, and the marks of ſo much good-will to mankind in you, that there are few men, whoſe opinion I think ought to have ſo much authority with me as yours. But, as to the method of learning, perhaps I may entertain you more at large hereafter: only now let me aſk you, ſince you mention logic and metaphyſics in relation to my book, whether either of thoſe ſciences may ſuggeſt to you any new heads, fit to be inſerted into my eſſay, in a ſecond edition?

You have done too much honour to me in the recommendation I ſee you have given to my book; and I am the more pleaſed with it, becauſe I think it was not done out of kindneſs to one ſo much a ſtranger to you as I then was. But yet, pray do not think me ſo vain that I dare aſſume to myſelf almoſt any part of what you ſay of me in your laſt letter. Could I find in myſelf any reaſon you could have to flatter me, I ſhould ſuſpect you reſolved to play the courtier a little. But I know what latitude civil and well-bred men allow themſelves with great ſincerity, where they are pleaſed, and kindneſs warms them. I am ſenſible of the obligation, and in return ſhall only tell you, that I ſhall ſpeedily ſet myſelf to obey your commands in the laſt part of your letter. I beg your pardon for treſpaſſing ſo much on your patience, and am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt obliged ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Dublin, March 2, $169\frac{2}{3}$.

Honoured Sir,

YOURS of Jan. 20. came to my hands, juſt as I lay down on a bed of ſickneſs, being a ſevere colic, that held me nigh five weeks, and brought me very weak; this was the more grievous to me, in that it hindered me from giving that ready anſwer to your letters, which I deſired; being very covetous, on all opportunities, of keeping up a correſpondence with one, for whom I had ſo great a reſpect. I am now, God be thanked, pretty well recovered; but yet weak, and have not yet ſtirred abroad. I know the bare ſignifying this to you is ſufficient in my excuſe; ſo that, relying on your pardon, I proceed to anſwer your laſt.

And firſt, ſir, believe me, that whatever reſpect I have at any time uſed to you, has been the ſincere thoughts of my heart, and not the vain compliments that uſually paſs between courtiers, and, how extravagant ſoever, are looked upon as the effects of good breeding, and paſs only as ſuch, by licence. I think I know a worthy man when I meet him, and they are ſo rare in the world, that no honour is too great for thoſe that are ſuch. And I muſt plainly ſay it to yourſelf, that ſo much humanity, candour, condeſcenſion, and good-nature, joined with ſo great judgment, learning, and parts, I have not met with in any man living, as in the author of the "Eſſay concerning Human "Underſtanding." You ſo favourably entertain all men's objections, you are ſo deſirous to hear the ſenſe of others, you are ſo tender in differing from any man, that you have captivated me beyond reſiſtance. What you propoſe to add in thoſe places, which I intimated to you, as ſeemingly repugnant to unwary readers, p. 270 and 314, 315, is abundantly ſufficient; unleſs you may think it convenient (for the prevention of all manner of ſcruple, and to ſhow your readers, that you are aware of the objection that may be raiſed againſt theſe

these passages) to add in the margin a little note to that purpose, specifying the seeming repugnancy that was in the first edition, and that, for the clearing thereof, you have thus farther illustrated it in this. But this, as every thing else, I propose with all submission to your better judgment. Mentioning the marginal note to you minds me to intimate, that I should think it convenient, in your next edition, to express the abstract or content of each section in the margin, and to spare (if you think fit) the table of contents at the latter end of the book, though I think both may do best. I can assure you, for my own reading, and consulting your book, I have put the table of contents to their respective sections throughout the whole.

I am fully convinced, by the arguments you give me, for not turning your book into the scholastic form of logic and metaphysics; and I had no other reason to advise the other, but merely to get it promoted the easier in our university; one of the businesses of which places is to learn according to the old forms. And this minds me to let you know the great joy and satisfaction of mind I conceived, on your promise of the method of learning; there could be nothing more acceptable to me, than the hopes thereof, and that on this account: I have but one child in the world, who is now nigh four years old, and promises well; his mother left him to me very young, and my affections (I must confess) are strongly placed on him: it has pleased God, by the liberal provisions of our ancestors, to free me from the toiling cares of providing a fortune for him; so that my whole study shall be to lay up a treasure of knowledge in his mind, for his happiness both in this life and the next. And I have been often thinking of some method for his instruction, that may best obtain the end I propose. And now, to my great joy, I hope to be abundantly supplied by your method. And my brother has sometimes told me, that, whilst he had the happiness of your acquaintance at Leyden, you were upon such a work, as this I desire; and that too, at the request of a tender father, for the use of his only son. Wherefore, good sir, let me most earnestly intreat

you, by no means to lay aſide this infinitely uſeful work, till you have finiſhed it; for it will be of vaſt advantage to all mankind, as well as particularly to me, your intire friend. And, on this conſideration of uſefulneſs to mankind, I will preſume again to remind you of your "diſcourſe of morality;" and I ſhall think myſelf very happy, if, by putting you on the thought, I ſhould be the leaſt occaſion of ſo great good to the world. What I have more to ſay, relating to your book, is of little or no moment; however, you ſo readily entertain all men's thoughts of your works, that futile as mine are, you ſhall have a remark or two more from me.

But firſt to your query, whether I know any new heads from logic or metaphyſics to be inſerted in the ſecond edition of your eſſay: I anſwer, I know none, unleſs you think it may not do well to inſiſt more particularly, and at large, on "æternæ veritates, and the "principium individuationis." Concerning the firſt, you have ſome touches, page 281. § 31. p. 323. § 14. p. 345. § 14. and concerning the latter, p. 28. § 4. p. 40. § 12.

Page 96. ſect. 9. you aſſert, what I conceive is an errour in fact, viz. "that a man's eye can diſtinguiſh "a ſecond of a circle, whereof its ſelf is the centre." Whereas it is certain, that few men's eyes can diſtinguiſh leſs than 30 ſeconds, and moſt not under a minute, or 60 ſeconds, as is manifeſt from what Mr. Hook lays down in his animadverſions, on the firſt part of Hevelii machina cœleſtis, p. 8, 9, &c. but this, as I ſaid before, is only an errour in fact, and affects not the doctrine laid down in the ſaid ſection.

Page 341. ſect. 2. you ſay, "the exiſtence of all "things without us (except only of God) is had by our "ſenſes." And p. 147. ſect. 33, 34, 35, 36, you ſhow how the idea we have of God, is made up of the ideas we have gotten by our ſenſes. Now this, though no repugnancy; yet, to unwary readers, may ſeem one, and therefore perhaps may deſerve a fuller expreſſion. To me it is plain, that in page 341. you ſpeak barely of the exiſtence of a God; and in p. 147. you ſpeak of

the ideas that are ingredient in the complex idea of God; that is, p. 147, you ſay, "that all the ideas in-"gredient in the idea of a God, are had from ſenſe;" and p. 341, you only aſſert, "that the exiſtence of this "God, or that really there are united in one being all "theſe ideas, is had, not from ſenſe, but demonſtra-"tion." This to me ſeems your ſenſe; yet perhaps every reader may not ſo readily conceive it; and, therefore, poſſibly you may think this paſſage, p. 341, worth your farther conſideration and addition.

I will conclude my tedious lines with a jocoſe problem, that, upon diſcourſe with ſeveral, concerning your book and notions, I have propoſed to divers very ingenious men, and could hardly ever meet with one, that, at firſt daſh, would give me the anſwer to it which I think true, till by hearing my reaſons they were convinced. It is this: "Suppoſe a man born "blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to "diſtinguiſh between a cube and a ſphere (ſuppoſe) of "ivory, nighly of the ſame bigneſs, ſo as to tell when "he felt one and t'other, which is the cube, which the "ſphere. Suppoſe then the cube and ſphere placed "on a table, and the blind man to be made to ſee; "query," "Whether by his ſight, before he touched "them, he could now diſtinguiſh and tell, which is the "globe, which the cube?" I anſwer, not; for though "he has obtained the experience of how a globe, and "how a cube affects his touch; yet he has not yet at-"tained the experience, that what affects his touch ſo "or ſo, muſt affect his ſight ſo or ſo; or that a pro-"tuberant angle in the cube, that preſſed his hand un-"equally, ſhall appear to his eye as it does in the "cube." But of this enough; perhaps you may find ſome place in your eſſay, wherein you may not think it amiſs to ſay ſomething of this problem.

I am extremely obliged to you for Mr. Boyle's book of the air, which lately came to my hands. It is a vaſt deſign, and not to be finiſhed but by the united labours of many heads, and indefatigably proſecuted for many years; ſo that I deſpair of ſeeing any thing complete therein. However, if many will lend the ſame helping

hands that you have done, I ſhould be in hopes: and certainly there is not a chapter in all natural philoſophy of greater uſe to mankind than what is here propoſed. I am,

Worthy SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, 28 Mar. 1693.

YOUR ſilence, that ſpared me a great deal of fear and uneaſineſs, by concealing from me your ſickneſs, 'till it was well over, is abundantly made amends for, by the joy it brings me, in the news of your recovery. You have given me thoſe marks of your kindneſs to me, that you will not think it ſtrange, that I count you amongſt my friends; and with thoſe, deſiring to live with the eaſe and freedom of a perfect confidence, I never accuſe them to myſelf of neglect, or coldneſs, when I fail to hear from them, ſo ſoon as I expected or deſired: though had I known you ſo well before as I do now, ſince your laſt letter, I ſhould not have avoided being in pain upon account of your health.

I cannot at all doubt the ſincerity of any thing you ſay to me; but yet give me leave to think, that it is an exceſs of kindneſs alone could excuſe it from looking like compliment. But I am convinced you love your friends extremely, where you have made choice of them, and then believe you can never think nor ſpeak too well of them. I know not whether it belongs to a man, who gets once in print, to read in his book, that it is perfect, and that the author is infallible. Had I had ſuch an opinion of my own ſufficiency before I writ, my eſſay would have brought me to another, and given me ſuch a ſight of the weakneſs of my under-

ſtanding,

standing, that I could not fail to suspect myself of errour and mistake, in many things I had writ, and to desire all the light I could get from others to set me right. I have found you one of the likeliest to afford it me; your clearness and candour gave me the confidence to ask your judgment; and I take it for no small assurance of your friendship that you have given it me, and have condescended to advise me of the printer's faults, which gives me hopes you have not concealed any you have observed in the work itself. The marginal summaries you desire, of the paragraphs, I shall take care to have added, were it only for your sake; but I think too it will make the book the more useful.

That request of your's, you press so earnestly upon me, makes me bemoan the distance you are from me, which deprives me of the assistance I might have from your opinion and judgment, before I ventured any thing into the public. It is so hard to find impartial freedom in one's friends, or an unbiassed judgment any where, that amongst all the helps of conversation and acquaintance, I know none more wanted, nor more useful, than speaking freely and candidly one's opinion upon the thoughts and compositions of another intended for the press. Experience has taught me, that you are a friend of this rank, and therefore I cannot but heartily wish that a sea between us did not hinder me from the advantage of this good office. Had you been within reach, I should have begged your severe examination of what is now gone to the printer, at your instance; I had rather I could have said upon your perusal, and with your correction. I am not in my nature a lover of novelty, nor contradiction; but my notions in this treatise have run me so far out of the common road and practice, that I could have been glad to have had them allowed by so sober a judgment as yours, or stopped, if they had appeared impracticable or extravagant, from going any farther. That which your brother tells you, on this occasion, is not wholly besides the matter. The main of what I now publish, is but what was contained in several letters to a friend of mine, the greatest part whereof were writ out of Holland. How your brother

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came to know of it, I have clearly forgot, and do not remember that ever I communicated it to any body there. Theſe letters, or at leaſt ſome of them, have been ſeen by ſome of my acquaintance here, who would needs perſuade me it would be of uſe to publiſh them; your impatience to ſee them has not, I aſſure you, ſlackened my hand, or kept me in ſuſpence: and I wiſh now they were out, that you might the ſooner ſee them, and I the ſooner have your opinion of them. I know not yet whether I ſhall ſet my name to this diſcourſe, and therefore ſhall deſire you to conceal it. You ſee I make you my confeſſor, for you have made yourſelf my friend.

The faults of the preſs are, I find, upon a ſedate reading over my book, infinitely more than I could have thought; thoſe that you have obſerved, I have corrected, and return you my thanks; and, as far as I have gone in my review, have added and altered ſeveral things; but am not yet got ſo far as thoſe places you mark for the "æternæ veritates, and principium indi-"viduationis," which I ſhall conſider, when I come to them, and endeavour to ſatisfy your deſire. "Male-"branche's hypotheſis of ſeeing all things in God," being that from whence I find ſome men would derive our ideas, I have ſome thoughts of adding a new chapter, wherein I will examine it, having, as I think, ſomething to ſay againſt it, that will ſhow the weakneſs of it very clearly. But I have ſo little love to contro-verſy, that I am not fully reſolved. Some other additions I have made, I hope, will not diſpleaſe you, but I wiſh I could ſhow them you, before they are in print; for I would not make my book bigger, unleſs it were to make it better.

I thank you for adviſing me of the errour about ſight, for indeed it was a great one in matter of fact, but it was in the expreſſion; for I meant a minute, but by miſtake called $\frac{1}{60}$ of a degree a ſecond. Your ingeni-ous problem will deſerve to be publiſhed to the world.

The ſeeming contradiction between what is ſaid page 147, and p. 341, is juſt as you take it, and I hope ſo clearly expreſſed, that it cannot be miſtaken, but by a very

very unwary reader, who cannot distinguish between an idea in the mind, and the real existence of something out of the mind answering that idea. But I heartily thank you for your caution, and shall take care how to prevent any such mistake, when I come to that place. My humble service to your brother. I am,

SIR,

Your most humble servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, April 18, 1693.

I HAVE lately received farther testimonies of your kindness and friendship to me, in your last of March 28; which brings withal the welcome news of your having committed your work of education to the press; than which, I know not any thing, that I ever expected with a more earnest desire. What my brother told me, relating to that treatise, he had from yourself in Holland; but perhaps you might have forgot what passed between you on that occasion. I perceive you fear the novelty of some notions therein may seem extravagant; but, if I may venture to judge of the author, I fear no such thing from him. I doubt not but the work will be new and peculiar, as his other performances; and this it is that renders them estimable and pleasant. He that travels the beaten roads may chance, indeed, to have company; but he that takes his liberty, and manages it with judgment, is the man that makes useful discoveries, and most beneficial to those that follow him. Had Columbus never ventured farther than his predecessors, we had yet been ignorant of a vast part of our earth, preferable (as some say) to all the other three. And, if none may be allowed to try the ocean of philosophy farther than our ancestors, we shall have but little

little advancements, or diſcoveries, made in the "mun-"dus intellectualis;" wherein, I believe, there is much more unknown, than what we have yet found out.

I ſhould very much approve of your adding a chapter in your eſſay, concerning Malebranche's hypotheſis. As there are enthuſiaſms in divinity, ſo there are in philoſophy; and as one proceeds from not conſulting or miſapprehending the book of God; ſo the other from not reading and conſidering the book of nature. I look upon Malebranche's notions, or rather Plato's, in this particular, as perfectly unintelligible. And if you will engage in a philoſophic controverſy, you cannot do it with more advantage, than in this matter. What you lay down, concerning our ideas and knowledge, is founded and confirmed by experiment and obſervation, that any man may make in himſelf, or the children he converſes with, wherein he may note the gradual ſteps that we may make in knowledge. But Plato's fancy has no foundation in nature, but is merely the product of his own brain.

I know it is none of your buſineſs to engage in controverſy, or remove objections, ſave only ſuch as ſeem immediately to ſtrike at your own poſitions; and therefore I cannot inſiſt upon what I am now going to mention to you. However, I will give you the hint, and leave the conſideration thereof to your own breaſt. The 10th chapter of your ivth book, is a moſt exact demonſtration of the exiſtence of God. But perhaps it might be more full, by an addition againſt the eternity of the world, and that all things have not been going on in the ſame manner, as we now ſee them; "ab "æterno." I have known a pack of philoſophical atheiſts, that rely much on this hypotheſis; and even Hobbes himſelf does ſomewhere allege (if I am not forgetful, it is his book "De corpore," in the chapter "de univerſo") "that the ſame arguments, which are "brought againſt the eternity of the world, may ſerve "as well againſt the eternity of the Creator of the "world." I am,

Honoured Sir,

Your moſt affectionate, devoted ſervant,

Will. Molyneux.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Sir, London, 15 July, 1693.

I had not been so long, before I had acknowledged the favour of your last, had not I a design to give you, at large, an account of some alterations I intended to make, in the chapter of power, wherein I should have been very glad you had showed me any mistake. I myself, not being very well satisfied, by the conclusion I was led to, that my reasonings were perfectly right, reviewed that chapter again with great care, and by observing only the mistake of one word (viz. having put "things" for "actions," which was very easy to be done in the place where it is, viz. p. 123, as I remember, for I have not my book by me, here in town) I got into a new view of things, which, if I mistake not, will satisfy you, and give a clearer account of human freedom than hitherto I have done, as you will perceive by the summaries of the following sections of that chapter.

§. 28. Volition is the ordering of some action by thought.

§. 29. Uneasiness determines the will.

§. 30. Will must be distinguished from desire.

§. 31. The greater good in view, barely considered, determines not the will. The joys of heaven are often neglected.

§. 32. Desire determines the will.

§. 33. Desire is an uneasiness.

§. 34. The greatest present uneasiness usually determines the will, as is evident in experience. The reasons.

§. 35. Because uneasiness being a part of unhappiness, which is first to be removed in our way to happiness.

§. 36. Because uneasiness alone is present.

§. 37. The uneasiness of other passions have their share with desire.

§. 38. Happiness alone moves the desire.

§. 39.

§. 39. All abſent good not deſired, becauſe not neceſſary to our happineſs.

§. 40. The greateſt uneaſineſs does not always determine the will, becauſe we can ſuſpend the execution of our deſires.

This ſhort ſcheme may perhaps give you ſo much light into my preſent hypotheſis, that you will be able to judge of the truth of it, which I beg you to examine by your own mind. I wiſh you were ſo near, that I could communicate it to you at large, before it goes to the preſs. But it is ſo much too long for a letter, and the preſs will be ſo ready to ſtay for it, before it is finiſhed, that I fear I ſhould not be able to have the advantage of your thoughts, upon the whole thread of my deduction. For I had much rather have your corrections, whilſt they might contribute to make it receive your approbation, than flatter myſelf before-hand that you will be pleaſed with it.

I hope, ere this, you have received from Mr. —— that which I promiſed you, the beginning of the ſpring. I muſt deſire your opinion of it without reſerve, for I ſhould not have ventured, upon any other condition, to have owned and preſented to you ſuch a trifle. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Auguſt 12, 1693.

YOURS of July 15, came to my hands about a fortnight ſince; and I had, ere this, acknowledged the favour thereof, but that I waited the arrival of your much deſired piece, of education, which came not to me 'till about three days ago. I immediately ſet myſelf to read it, as all things from its author, with the utmoſt

most attention; and I find it answerable to the highest expectations I had of it. And since, with your usual modesty, you are pleased to require my thoughts more particularly concerning it, I shall with all freedom, but at the same time with all deference, propose them to you, not doubting of your favourable interpretation and pardon, where you see it needful. And first, in general, I think you propose nothing in your whole book, but what is very reasonable, and very practicable, except only in one particular, which seems to bear hard on the tender spirits of children, and the natural affections of parents: it is page 117, 118, where you advise, "that "a child should never be suffered to have what he "craves, or so much as speaks for, much less if he "cries for it." I acknowledge what you say in explaining this rule, sect. 101, in relation to natural wants, especially that of hunger, may be well enough allowed: but in sect. 102, where you come to apply it to "wants "of fancy and affectation," you seem too strict and severe. You say indeed, "this will teach them to stifle "their desires, and to practise modesty and temper-"ance;" but for teaching these virtues I conceive we shall have occasions enough, in relation to their hurtful desires, without abridging them so wholly, in matters indifferent and innocent, that tend only to divert and please their busy spirits. You allow indeed, "that it "would be inhumanity to deny them those things "one perceives would delight them;" if so, I see no reason why, in a modest way, and with submission to the wills of their superiours, they may not be allowed to declare what will delight them. No, say you; "but "in all wants of fancy and affectation they should "never, if once declared, be hearkened to, or com-"plied with." This I can never agree to, it being to deny that liberty between a child and its parents, as we desire, and have granted us, between man and his Creator. And as, in this case, man is allowed to declare his wants, and with submission to recommend his requests to God; so I think children may be allowed by their parents, or governors. And as between the creature and Creator all manner of repining upon denial,

or

or disappointment, is forbidden; so, in the case of children, all frowardness or discontent, upon a refusal, is severely to be reprimanded. But thus far I agree with you, in the whole, that whether it be in wants natural, or fanciful, that they express their desires in a froward, humoursome manner, there they should be surely denied them. A farther reason for my allowing children a liberty of expressing their innocent desires, is, that the contrary is impracticable; and you must have the children almost moped for want of diversion and recreation; or else you must have those about them study nothing all day, but how to find employment for them; and how this would rack the invention of any man alive, I leave you to judge. And besides, were it an easy task for any adult person to study the fancy, the unaccountable fancy, and diversion of children, the whole year round; yet it would not prove delightful to a child, being not his own choice. But this, you will say, is what you would have imprinted on them, that they are not to choose for themselves; but why not, in harmless things, and plays or sports, I see no reason. In all things of moment let them live by the conduct of others wiser than themselves.

This, sir, is all that in your whole book I stick at; to all the rest I could subscribe. And I am not a little pleased, when I consider that my own management of my only little one has hitherto been agreeable, in the main, to your rules, save only in what relates to his hardy breeding, which I was cautious in, because he is come from a tender and sickly mother; but the child himself is hitherto (God be thanked) very healthful, though not very strong.

The rules you give for the correcting of children, and implanting in their minds an early sense of praise or dispraise, of repute and dishonour, are certainly very just.

The contrivances you propose for teaching them to read and write, are very ingenious. And because I have practised one much of the same nature, I will venture to describe it: "It is by writing syllables and "words in print-hand, on the face of a pack of cards,

"with

" with figures or cyphers adjoined to each word; by " which I can form twenty ſeveral ſorts of games, that " ſhall teach children both to read and count at the ſame " time; and this with great variety." One thing more I ſhall venture to add to what you direct concerning writing; that is, I will have my ſon taught ſhort-hand; I do not mean to that perfection as to copy a ſpeech from the mouth of a ready ſpeaker, but to be able to write it readily, for his own private buſineſs. Believe me, ſir, it is as uſeful a knack as a man of buſineſs, or any ſcholar, can be maſter of, and I have found the want of it myſelf, and ſeen the advantage of it in others, frequently.

You are certainly in the right of it, relating to the manner of acquiring languages, french, latin, &c. and in what you lay down concerning grammar-ſchools, themes, verſes, and other learning. But above all, what you direct, in every particular, for the forming of children's minds, and giving them an early turn to morality, virtue, religion, &c. is moſt excellent.

And I can only ſay in general, that I can give no better proof of my liking your book in all theſe precepts, than by a ſtrict obſervance of them, in the education of my own ſon; which I ſhall purſue (God willing) as exactly as I can. One thing I fear I ſhall be at a loſs in, that is, a tutor agreeable to the character you preſcribe. But in this neither ſhall my endeavours be wanting, though I leave him the worſe eſtate, to leave him the better mind.

I could heartily have wiſhed you had been more particular in naming the authors you would adviſe gentlemen to read, and be converſant in, in the ſeveral parts of learning you recommend to their ſtudy. Had you done this, I know no logic, that deſerves to be named, but the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding. So that I fear you would rather have left that head open, than recommended your own work.

The laſt thing I ſhall take notice of, is what mightily pleaſes me, it being the very thought of my own mind, theſe many years; which is, " your recommending a " manual trade to all gentlemen." This I have ever

been for, and have wondered how it comes to pass, that it is so generally neglected; but the lazy, effeminate luxuriousness that over-runs the nation, occasions the neglect thereof. Painting I have ever designed for my son; but you have raised two objections against it, that are not easily answered, especially its taking up so much time to attain a mastery in it.

I have now given you my opinion of your book, and now I am obliged to thank you for sending me a present, which I so highly value.

As to that part of your letter, relating to the alterations you have made, in your Essay, concerning man's liberty, I dare not venture, upon those short hints you give me, to pass my opinion. But now, that you have discovered it to me, I plainly perceive the mistake of sect. 28. p. 123, where you put "thing" for "action." And I doubt not, but in your next edition, you will fully rectify this matter. And I would advise you to hasten that edition with what speed you can, lest foreigners undertake a translation of your first, without your second thoughts. Thus they have served me, by translating into latin, and printing my Dioptrics in Holland, when I have now by me a translation of my own of that work, with many amendments and large additions.

Pray, sir, let me beg the favour of your correspondence as frequently as you can; for nothing is more acceptable to

Your most obliged humble servant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Aug. 23, 1693.

YOURS of August 12, which I received last night, eased me of a great deal of pain, your silence had for some time put me in; for you must allow me to be con-

concerned for your health, as for a friend that I could not think in danger, or a diſeaſe, without a concern and trouble ſuitable to that great eſteem and love I have for you. But you have made me amends plentifully, by the length and kindneſs, and, let me add too, the freedom of your letter. For the approbation you ſo largely give to my book, is the more welcome to me, and gives me the better opinion of my method, becauſe it has joined with it your exception to one rule of it; which I am apt to think you yourſelf, upon ſecond thoughts, will have removed before I ſay any thing to your objections. It confirms to me that you are the good-natured man I took you for: and I do not at all wonder that the affection of a kind father ſhould ſtartle at it at firſt reading, and think it very ſevere that children ſhould not be ſuffered to expreſs their deſires; for ſo you ſeem to underſtand me. And ſuch a reſtraint, you fear, "would be apt to mope them, and hinder "their diverſion." But if you pleaſe to look upon the place, and obſerve my drift, you will find that they ſhould not be indulged, or complied with, in any thing, their conceits have made a want to them, as neceſſary to be ſupplied. What you ſay, "that children would "be moped for want of diverſion and recreation, or "elſe we muſt have thoſe about them ſtudy nothing all "day, but how to find employment for them; and "how this would rack the invention of any man "living, you leave me to judge;" ſeems to intimate, as if you underſtood that children ſhould do nothing but by the preſcription of their parents or tutors, chalking out each action of the whole day in train to them. I hope my words expreſs no ſuch thing; for it is quite contrary to my ſenſe, and I think would be uſeleſs tyranny in their governors, and certain ruin to the children. I am ſo much for recreation, that I would, as much as poſſible, have all they do be made ſo. I think recreation as neceſſary to them as their food, and that nothing can be recreation which does not delight. This, I think, I have ſo expreſſed; and when you have put that together, judge whether I would not have them have the greateſt part of their time left to them, with-

out reſtraint, to divert themſelves any way they think beſt, ſo it be free from vicious actions, or ſuch as may introduce vicious habits. And therefore, if they ſhould aſk to play, it could be no more interpreted a want of fancy, than if they aſked for victuals when hungry; though, where the matter is well ordered, they will never need to do that. For when they have either done what their governor thinks enough, in any application to what is uſually made their buſineſs, or are perceived to be tired with it, they ſhould of courſe be diſmiſſed to their innocent diverſions, without ever being put to aſk for it. So that I am for the full liberty of diverſion as much as you can be; and, upon a ſecond peruſal of my book, I do not doubt but you will find me ſo. But being allowed that, as one of their natural wants, they ſhould not yet be permitted to let looſe their deſires, in importunities for what they fancy. Children are very apt to covet what they ſee thoſe above them in age have or do, to have or do the like; eſpecially if it be their elder brothers and ſiſters. Does one go abroad? The other ſtraight has a mind to it too. Has ſuch an one new, or fine clothes, or play-things? They, if you once allow it them, will be impatient for the like; and think themſelves ill dealt with, if they have it not. This being indulged when they are little, grows up with their age, and with that enlarges itſelf to things of greater conſequence, and has ruined more families than one in the world. This ſhould be ſuppreſſed in its very firſt riſe, and the deſires you would not have encouraged, you ſhould not permit to be ſpoken, which is the beſt way for them to ſilence them to themſelves. Children ſhould, by conſtant uſe, learn to be very modeſt in owning their deſires; and careful not to aſk any thing of their parents, but what they have reaſon to think their parents will approve of. And a reprimand upon their ill-bearing a refuſal comes too late, the fault is committed and allowed, and if you allow them to aſk, you can ſcarce think it ſtrange they ſhould be troubled to be denied; ſo that you ſuffer them to engage themſelves in the diſorder, and then think the fitteſt time for a cure, and I think

think the ſureſt and eaſieſt way is prevention. For we muſt take the ſame nature to be in children that is in grown men; and how often do we find men take ill to be denied what they would not have been concerned for, if they had not aſked? But I ſhall not enlarge any farther in this, believing you and I ſhall agree in the matter; and indeed it is very hard, and almoſt impoſſible to give general rules of education, when there is ſcarce any one child which, in ſome caſes, ſhould not be treated differently from another. All that we can do, in general, is only to ſhow what parents and tutors ſhould aim at, and leave to them the ordering of particular circumſtances as the caſe ſhall require.

One thing give me leave to be importunate with you about: you ſay, your ſon is not very ſtrong; to make him ſtrong, you muſt uſe him hardly, as I have directed; but you muſt be ſure to do it by very inſenſible degrees, and begin an hardſhip you would bring him to only in the ſpring. This is all the caution needs be uſed. I have an example of it in the houſe I live in, where the only ſon of a very tender mother was almoſt deſtroyed by a too tender keeping. He is now, by a contrary uſage, come to bear wind and weather, and wet in his feet; and the cough which threatened him, under that warm and cautious management, has left him, and is now no longer his parents conſtant apprehenſion, as it was.

I am of your mind, as to ſhort-hand. I myſelf learned it, ſince I was a man; but had forgot to put it in when I writ, as I have, I doubt not, overſeen a thouſand other things, which might have been ſaid on this ſubject. But it was only, at firſt, a ſhort ſcheme for a friend, and is publiſhed to excite others to treat it more fully.

I know not whether it would be uſeful to make a catalogue of authors to be read by a young man, or whether it could be done, unleſs one knew the child's temper, and what he was deſigned to.

My eſſay is now very near ready for another edition; and upon review of my alterations, concerning what determines the will, in my cool thoughts, I am apt to

think them to be right, as far as my thoughts can reach in ſo nice a point, and in ſhort is this. Liberty is a power to act, or not to act, accordingly as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or reſt, in particular inſtances, is that which we call the will. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is ſome preſent uneaſineſs, which is, or at leaſt is always accompanied with that of deſire. Deſire is always moved by evil to fly it; becauſe a total freedom from pain always makes a neceſſary part of our happineſs. But every good, nay every greater good, does not conſtantly move deſire, becauſe it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any neceſſary part of our happineſs; for all that we deſire is only to be happy. But though this general deſire of happineſs operates conſtantly and invariably in us; yet the ſatisfaction of any particular deſire, can be ſuſpended from determining the will to any ſubſervient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good we then deſire, make a part of our real happineſs, or be conſiſtent, or inconſiſtent with it. The reſult of our judgment, upon examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free, if his will were determined by any thing but his own deſire, guided by his own judgment. This, in ſhort, is what I think of this matter; I deſire you to examine it by your own thoughts. I think I have ſo well made out the ſeveral particulars, where I treat them at large, that they have convinced ſome I have ſhown them to here, who were of another mind: and therefore how much ſoever contrary to the received opinion, I think I may publiſh them; but I would firſt have your judicious and free thoughts, which I much rely on; for you love truth for itſelf, and me ſo well, as to tell it me without diſguiſe.

You will herewith receive a new chapter "Of iden-" tity and diverſity," which, having writ only at your inſtance, it is fit you ſhould ſee and judge of, before it goes to the preſs. Pray ſend me your opinion of every part of it. You need not ſend back the papers, but your

your remarks on the paragraphs you ſhall think fit; for I have a copy here.

You deſired me too to enlarge more particularly about eternal verities, which, to obey you, I ſet about; but upon examination, find all general truths are eternal verities, and ſo there is no entering into particulars; though, by miſtake, ſome men have ſelected ſome, as if they alone were eternal verities. I never, but with regret, reflect on the diſtance you are from me, and am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, Sept. 16, 1693.

Honoured SIR,

I HAVE your's from Oates of Aug. 23, with your chapter "of identity and diverſity;" and I acknowledge myſelf extremely obliged to you, for being at all that thought, on my account. However, I repent not of the trouble I gave you therein, ſeeing the effects thereof, ſuch clear reaſoning, and profound judgment, that convinces and delights at once. And I proteſt, ſir, it is to me the hardeſt taſk in the world, to add any thing to, or make any remarks upon, what you deliver therein; every thing you write therein is delivered with ſuch convincing reaſon, that I fully aſſent to all. And to make remarks where I have no room to ſay any thing, would pleaſe neither you nor myſelf. And to ſhow you that I would not wholly rely on my own examination of your chapter, I imparted it to others, deſiring their cenſure of it; but ſtill with the ſame event, all acknowledged the clearneſs of the reaſoning, and that nothing more was left to be ſaid on the ſubject.

The anſwer you make to what I writ on your Thoughts of Education, does fully ſatisfy me. But I aſſure you, ſir, I was not the only perſon ſhocked at that paſſage. I find ſeveral ſtumble at it, as taking little play-things, that children are very apt to deſire and aſk for, to be matters of fancy and affectation within your rule. But ſeeing in your laſt letter, you confine deſires of affectation and fancy to other matters, I am ſatisfied in this buſineſs.

I can ſay no more to the ſcheme you lay down of man's liberty, but that I believe it very juſt, and will anſwer in all things. I long to ſee the ſecond edition of your eſſay; and then, if any thing offer, I will give my thoughts more fully.

I am very ſenſible how cloſely you are engaged, till you have diſcharged this work off your hands; and therefore I will not venture, till it be over, to preſs you again to what you have promiſed in the buſineſs of man's life, morality. But you muſt expect that I ſhall never be forgetful of that, from which I propoſe ſo great good to the world, and ſo much ſatisfaction to

Your moſt entirely affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 23, 1693.

I HAVE now read over your Eſſay of Human Underſtanding a third time, and always make new diſcoveries therein, of ſomething profound. I ſhould ſet upon it again, but that I will wait for your next edition, which I hope, by this time, is almoſt finiſhed. The uſual ſatisfaction I take in reading all things that come from you, made me lately again run over your chapter

chapter " of identity and diversity;" concerning the justness whereof, I have yet the same opinion as formerly. But one thought suggested itself to me, which on my first reading did not occur. It relates to sect. 22, wherein the reason you give, why the law may justly punish a sober man, for what he did when drunk, or a waking man, for what he did when walking in his sleep, though it be true and full in the case of the night-walker: yet I conceive it not so full in the case of the drunken man. For drunkenness is itself a crime, and therefore no one shall allege it an excuse of another crime. And in the law we find, " that killing a man " by chance-medley is not capital;" yet if I am doing an unlawful act, as shooting at a deer in a park, to steal it, and by chance-medley I kill a man unawares, this is capital; because the act wherein I was engaged, and which was the occasion of this mischief, was in itself unlawful, and I cannot plead it in excuse. In the case of the night-walker, your answer is true, full, and satisfactory; but that in the drunkard's case is somewhat short. The night-walking is a sort of distemper, not to be helped, or prevented, by the patient. But drunkenness is a deliberate act, which a man may easily avoid and prevent. Moreover, whatever the law appoints in this case, I think, were I on the jury of one, who walking in his sleep had killed another, I should not violate a good conscience, if I acquitted him; for he is certainly, during those fits, " non " compos mentis;" and it were easy to distinguish, by circumstances, how far he counterfeited, or not.

You will very much oblige me, by a line or two, to let me know how forward your work is, and what other things you have on the anvil before you; amongst which, I hope you will not forget your " Thoughts on " Morality." For I am obliged to prosecute this request to you, being the first, I presume, that moved you in it.

There is a gentleman in this town, one capt. Henry Monk, a nigh relation of the Albemarles, who tells me he has been known to you long ago; and on all occasions

ſions mentions you with the higheſt reſpects. He deſired me, the other day, to give you his moſt humble ſervice. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt obedient ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Oates, 19 Jan.—93-4.

Honoured SIR,

I CAN take it for no other, than a great mark of your kindneſs to me, that you ſpend ſo much of your time, in the peruſal of my thoughts, when you have ſo much better of your own to improve it. To which you add this farther obligation, that you read my book for my inſtruction, ſtill taking notice to me of what you judge amiſs in it. This is a good office that ſo few in the world perform in the way that you do, that it deſerves my particular acknowledgment. And I own myſelf no leſs beholden to you, when I differ from you, than when, convinced by your better judgment, you give me opportunity to mend what before was amiſs; your intention being that, to which I equally, in both caſes, owe my gratitude.

You doubt, whether my anſwer be full in the caſe of the drunkard. To try whether it be or no, we muſt conſider what I am there doing. As I remember (for I have not that chapter here by me) I am there ſhowing that puniſhment is annexed to perſonality, and perſonality to conſciouſneſs: how then can a drunkard be puniſhed for what he did, whereof he is not conſcious? To this I anſwer, human judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the fact is proved againſt him; but want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. This you think not ſufficient, but would have me add the common reaſon, that drunkenneſs being a crime, one crime cannot

cannot be alleged in excuse for another. This reason, how good soever, cannot, I think, be used by me, as not reaching my case; for what has this to do with consciousness? Nay, it is an argument against me, for if a man may be punished for any crime which he committed when drunk, whereof he is allowed not to be conscious, it overturns my hypothesis. Your case of shooting a man by chance, when stealing a deer, being made capital, and the like, I allow to be just; but then, pray consider, it concerns not my argument; there being no doubt of conscious in that case, but only shows, that any criminal action infects the consequences of it. But drunkenness has something peculiar in it, when it destroys conscious; and so the instances you bring, justify not the punishing of a drunken fact, that was totally and irrecoverably forgotten; which the reason that I give being sufficient to do, it well enough removed the objection, without entering into the true foundation of the thing, and showing how far it was reasonable for human justice to punish a crime of a drunkard, which he could be supposed not conscious of, which would have uselessly engaged me in a very large discourse, and an impertinent digression. For I ask you, if a man, by intemperate drinking, should get a fever, and in the frenzy of his disease (which lasted not, perhaps, above an hour) committed some crime, would you punish him for it? If you would not think this just, how can you think it just to punish him for any fact committed in a drunken frenzy, without a fever? Both had the same criminal cause, drunkenness, and both committed without conscious. I shall not enlarge any farther into other particular instances, that might raise difficulties about the punishing, or not punishing, the crime of an unconscious, drunken man; which would not easily be resolved, without inquiring into the reason upon which human justice ought to proceed in such cases, which was beyond my present business to do. Thus, sir, I have laid before you the reasons, why I have let that passage go, without any addition made to it. I desire you to lay by your friendship to me, and only to make use of your judgment in considering

ſidering them. And if you are ſtill of opinion, that I need give the reaſon too, that one crime cannot be alleged in excuſe of another, I beg the favour of you to let me know it as ſoon as you can, that I may add what is neceſſary in this place, amongſt the errata, before my book comes out, which advances now apace, and I believe there are by this time, near 150 pages of it printed. And now, ſir, though I have not agreed with your opinion in this point; yet I beſeech you, believe I am as much obliged to your kindneſs in it as if you had ſhown me what, upon your reaſon, had appeared to me the groſſeſt miſtake; and I beg the favour of you, whenever you caſt your eye upon any of my writings, to continue and communicate to me your remarks.

You write to me, as if ink had the ſame ſpell upon me, that mortar, as the italians ſay, has upon others, that when I had once got my fingers into it, I could never afterwards keep them out. I grant, that methinks I ſee ſubjects enough, which way ever I caſt my eyes, that deſerve to be otherwiſe handled, than I imagine they have been; but they require abler heads, and ſtronger bodies than I have, to manage them. Beſides, when I reflect on what I have done, I wonder at my own bold folly, that has ſo far expoſed me, in this nice and critical, as well as quick-ſighted and learned age. I ſay not this to excuſe a lazy idleneſs, to which I intend to give up the reſt of my few days. I think every one, according to what way Providence has placed him in, is bound to labour for the public good, as far as he is able, or elſe he has no right to eat. Under this obligation of doing ſomething, I cannot have a ſtronger to determine me what I ſhall do, than what your deſires ſhall engage me in. I know not whether the attempt will exceed my ſtrength. But there being ſeveral here, who join with you to preſs me to it; (I received a letter with the ſame inſtance, from two of my friends at London, the laſt poſt) I think, the firſt leiſure I can get to myſelf, I ſhall apply my thoughts to it; and however I may miſs my aim, will juſtify myſelf in my obedience

obedience to you, and ſome others of my ingenious friends.

I am exceedingly obliged to capt. Monk, for his kind remembrance, and to you for ſending it me, and letting me know he is alive. I have, as I ought, all the eſteem for him, that you know ſo modeſt and good a man deſerves. Pray, when you ſee him, preſent my humble ſervice to him, and let him know that I am extremely glad to hear that he is well, and that he has not forgot me, and ſhould be much more ſo, to ſee him here again in England. Pray, give my humble ſervice to your brother. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, Feb. 17, 1693-4.

Honoured SIR,

I AM ſo very ſenſible of the great caution, and deep conſideration you uſe, before you write any thing, that I wonder at my own hardineſs, when I venture to object any thing againſt your poſitions. And when I read your anſwers to any ſuch of my objections, I much more admire at my own weakneſs in making them. I have a new inſtance of this in your laſt of January 18th, which came not to this place before yeſterday. This has moſt abundantly ſatisfied me, in the doubt I lay under, concerning the caſe of a drunken man; which you have cleared up to me, in three words, moſt convincingly. So that I think you have no reaſon in the leaſt to alter that paragraph, unleſs you may think it convenient to expreſs that matter a little plainer. Which, I think, indeed, your laſt letter to me does better

better than your twenty-ſecond ſection of that chapter. That ſection runs thus:

22. " But is not a man, drunk and ſober, the ſame " perſon? Why elſe is he puniſhed for the fact he com- " mits, when drunk, though he be never afterwards " conſcious of it? Juſt as much the ſame perſon as a " man that walks and does other things in his ſleep, is " the ſame perſon, and is anſwerable for any miſchief " he ſhall do in it. Human laws puniſh both with a " juſtice ſuitable to their way of knowledge; becauſe, " in theſe caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what " is real, what counterfeit. And ſo the ignorance in " drunkenneſs, or ſleep, is not admitted as a plea," &c.

Now I conceive that which makes the expreſſion herein not ſo very clear, is, " ſuitable to their way of " knowledge;" ſome will be apt to miſtake the word, their, to refer to the drunken, or ſleeping man, whereas it refers to the laws, as if you had ſaid, " ſuitable to " that way of knowledge, or information, which the " laws have eſtabliſhed to proceed by."

This, in your letter, is very manifeſt in a few words. There you ſay, " puniſhment is annexed to perſonality, " perſonality to conſciouſneſs. How then can a drunk- " ard be puniſhed for what he did, whereof he is not " conſcious? To this I anſwer, human judicatures " juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the fact is proved againſt " him, but want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for " him." This, ſir, is moſt full in the caſe you are there treating of. So I have nothing more to offer in that matter.

Only give me leave to propoſe one queſtion more to you, though it be foreign to the buſineſs you are upon, in your chapter of identity. How comes it to paſs, that want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for a drunkard as well as for a frantic? One, methinks, is as manifeſt as the other; and if drunkenneſs may be counterfeit, ſo may a frenzy. Wherefore to me it ſeems, that the law has made a difference in theſe two caſes, on this account, viz. " that drunkenneſs is commonly incurred " voluntarily and premeditately; whereas a frenzy is " com-

" commonly without our conſent, or impoſſible to be " prevented." But enough of this.

I ſhould not have troubled you with this, but that, according to your uſual candour and goodneſs, you ſeemed to deſire my farther thoughts thereon, as ſpeedily as I could. I am,

Moſt worthy SIR,

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, May 26, 1694.

THE ſlowneſs of the preſs has ſo long retarded my anſwer to your laſt obliging letter, that my book, which is now printed and bound, and ready to be ſent to you, muſt be an excuſe for my long ſilence. By the obedience I have paid to you in the index and ſummaries, ordered according to your deſires, you will ſee it is not want of deference to you, or eſteem of you, that has cauſed this neglect. And the profit I have made by your reflections, on ſeveral paſſages of my book, will, I hope, encourage you to the continuance of that freedom, to a man who can diſtinguiſh between the cenſures of a judicious friend, and the wrangling of a peeviſh critic. There is nothing more acceptable to me than the one, nor more, I think, to be ſlighted than the other. If therefore, as you ſeem to reſolve, you ſhall throw away any more of your time in a peruſal of my eſſay; judge, I beſeech you, as ſeverely as you can, of what you read. I know you will not forſake truth to quarrel with me; and, whilſt you follow her, you will always oblige me, by ſhowing me my miſtakes, or what ſeems to you to be ſo. You will find in this ſecond edition, that your advice, at any time, has not been thrown away upon me. And you will ſee by the errata, that, though your

your laſt came a little too late, yet that could not hinder me from following what you ſo kindly, and with ſo much reaſon, ſuggeſted.

I agree with you, that, drunkenneſs being a voluntary defect, want of conſciouſneſs ought not to be preſumed in favour of the drunkard. But frenzy being involuntary, and a misfortune, not a fault, has a right to that excuſe, which certainly is a juſt one, where it is truly a frenzy. And all that lies upon human juſtice is to diſtinguiſh carefully between what is real, and what counterfeit in the caſe.

My book, which I deſire you to accept from me, is put into Mr. Churchill the bookſeller's hand, who has told me he will ſend it in a bale of books, the next week, to Mr. Dobſon, a bookſeller in Caſtle-ſtreet, Dublin; and I have ordered him to ſend with it a copy of the additions and alterations which are printed by themſelves, and will help to make your former book uſeful to any young man, as you will ſee (is deſigned) by the concluſion of the epiſtle to the reader. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, June 2, 1694.

SIR,

I AM highly obliged to you for the favour of your laſt, of May 26, which I received yeſterday. It brought me the welcome news of the ſecond edition of your eſſay being publiſhed; and that you have favoured me with a copy, which I ſhall expect with ſome impatience; and when I have peruſed it, I ſhall, with all freedom, give you my thoughts of it.

And

And now that you have cleared your hands of your ſecond edition, I hope you may have leiſure to turn your thoughts to the ſubject I have ſo often propoſed to you; but this, you will ſay, is a cruelty in me, that no ſooner you are rid of one trouble, but I ſet you on another. Truly, ſir, were I ſenſible it could be a trouble to you, I ſhould hardly preſume ſo far on your goodneſs; but I know thoſe things are ſo eaſy and natural to your mind, that they give you no pain in the production. And I know alſo, ſuch is your univerſal love of mankind, that you count nothing troubleſome that tends to their good, in a matter of ſo great concernment as morality.

I have formerly told you what care I propoſed to take in the education of my only child. I muſt now beg your pardon, if I trouble you in a matter wherein I ſhall be at a loſs without your aſſiſtance. He is now five years old, of a moſt towardly and promiſing diſpoſition; bred exactly, as far as his age permits, to the rules you preſcribe, I mean as to forming his mind, and maſtering his paſſions. He reads very well, and I think it time now to put him forward to ſome other learning. In order to this, I ſhall want a tutor for him, and indeed this place can hardly afford me one to my mind. If, therefore, you know any ingenious man that may be proper for my purpoſe, you would highly oblige me, by procuring him for me. I confeſs the encouragement I can propoſe to ſuch an one is but moderate, yet, perhaps, there may be ſome found that may not deſpiſe it. He ſhould eat at my own table, and have his lodging, waſhing, firing, and candlelight, in my houſe, in a good handſome apartment; and beſides this, I ſhould allow him 20l. per annum. His work for this ſhould be only to inſtruct three or four boys in latin, and ſuch other learning as you recommend in your book; I ſay three or four boys, becauſe, perhaps, I may have a relation's child or two; one, who is my ſiſter's ſon, I have always, and do intend to keep, as a companion to my own ſon; and of more I am uncertain. But if there be one or two, that will be no great addition to his trouble, conſidering that perhaps their

parents may recompenſe that by their gratuities. I mention to you, of the languages, only latin, but, if I could obtain it, I ſhould be glad he were alſo maſter of the french. As to his other qualifications, I ſhall only ſay, in general, I could wiſh them ſuch as you would deſire in a tutor to inſtruct a young gentleman, as you propoſe in your book. I would have him indeed a good man, and a good ſcholar; and I propoſe very much ſatisfaction to myſelf, in the converſation of ſuch a one. And becauſe a man may be cautious of leaving his native ſoil, and coming into a ſtrange country, without ſome certainty of being acceptable to thoſe that ſend for him, and of ſome continuance and ſettlement, I can ſay that I deſign him to ſtay with my ſon to his ſtate of manhood; whether he go into the univerſity, or travel, or whatever other ſtate of life he may take to. And if perhaps on trial for ſome time, he or I may not like each other, I do promiſe to bear his charges both to and from me, ſo that he ſhall be no loſer by his journey.

I beg your anſwer to this at your leiſure; and if any ſuch preſent, be pleaſed to let me know of him what particulars you can, as his parentage, education, qualifications, diſpoſition, &c. with what other particulars you pleaſe to mention; and accordingly I ſhall write to you farther about it.

In the mean time, I beſeech you to pardon this trouble given you by,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt obliged

humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Sir, London, June 28, 1694.

SINCE the receipt of your's of the fecond inſtant, I have made what inquiry I can for a tutor for your ſon; the moſt likely, and the beſt recommended that I have met with, you will have an account of from himſelf in the encloſed, to which I need add little but theſe two things; 1ſt. that Mr. Fletcher, who is a good judge, and a perſon whoſe word I can rely on, gave me a very good character of him, both as to his manners and abilities, and ſaid he would be anſwerable for him: the other is, that, however it comes to paſs, the Scotch have now here a far greater reputation for this ſort of employment than our own countrymen. I am ſorry it is ſo, but I have of late found it in ſeveral inſtances.

I hope, by this time, the ſecond edition of my book, which I ordered for you, and a printed copy of the additions, are come to your hands. I wiſh it were more anſwerable to the value you place in it, and better worth your acceptation. But, as I order the matter, methinks I make it a hard bargain to you, to pay ſo much time and pains as muſt go to the reading it over, though it were more ſlightly than we ſeem agreed, when you promiſe, and I expect, your obſervations on it. There appears to me ſo little material, in the objections that I have ſeen in print againſt me, that I have paſſed them all by but one gentleman's, whoſe book not coming to my hand till thoſe parts of mine were printed that he queſtions, I was fain to put my anſwer in the latter end of the epiſtle.

I wiſh the endeavours I have uſed to procure you a tutor for your ſon may be as ſucceſsful as I deſire. It is a buſineſs of great concernment to both you and your ſon; but governors, that have right thoughts concerning education, are hard to be found. It is happy for your ſon that a good part of it is to be under your eye. I ſhall be very glad, if on this, or any other occa-

ſion, I may be able to do you any ſervice; for with great ſincerity and reſpect, I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, July 28, 1694.

My moſt honoured Friend,

FOR ſo you have publicly allowed me to call * you; and it is a title wherein I boaſt more than in maces or parliament-robes. By this you may find I have received the ſecond edition of your eſſay, which I prize as an ineſtimable treaſure of knowledge. It is but a week ſince it came to me; and I have yet only looked over thoſe parts which are newly added, particularly that of liberty, the alterations wherein I take to be moſt judiciouſly made; and now I think that whole chapter ſtands ſo well put together, and the argumentation ſo legitimate, that nothing can ſhake it. I was mightily pleaſed to find therein a rational account of what I have often wondered at, viz. "why men ſhould content "themſelves to ſtay in this life for ever, though at the "ſame time they will grant, that in the next life they "expect to be infinitely happy?" Of this you give ſo clear an account in the 44th ſection of your xxi. chapter, book II, that my wonder no longer remains. That candid receſſion from your former hypotheſis, which you ſhow in this chapter, where truth required it, raiſes in me a greater opinion (if poſſible) of your worth than ever. This is rarely to be found amongſt men,

* See Mr. Locke's Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, 2d edit. p. 68.

and

and they ſeem to have ſomething angelical, that are ſo far raiſed above the common pitch.

In time, I ſhall give you my farther thoughts of the other parts of your book, where any thing occurs to me. But, at preſent, I can only pour out my thanks to you for the favourable character under which you have tranſmitted me to poſterity, page 67. My only concern is, that I can pretend to none of it, but that of your friend; and this I ſet up for in the higheſt degree. I ſhould think myſelf happy, had I but half the title to the reſt.

I am extremely obliged to you for the trouble you took on you in my laſt requeſt, about a tutor for my ſon. I received your letter with Mr. Gibbs's encloſed; to which I returned an anſwer, addreſſed to himſelf. The import whereof was, "That I had ſome offers "made to me in this place, relating to that matter, to "which I thought I ſhould hearken, at leaſt, ſo far as "to make ſome trial. That I was loth to divert him "from his good intentions to the miniſtry, and there-"fore I could not encourage him to undertake ſo long "a journey, on ſuch uncertainties on both ſides, &c." I am,

My moſt highly eſteemed friend,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Sept. 3, 1694.

I HAVE ſo much the advantage in the bargain, if friendſhip may be called one, that whatſoever ſatisfaction you find in yourſelf, on that account, you muſt allow in me with a large overplus. The only riches I have valued, or laboured to acquire, has been the friendſhip of ingenious and worthy men, and therefore you

cannot blame me, if I ſo forwardly laid hold of the firſt occaſion that opened me a way to your's. That I have ſo well ſucceeded in it I count one of my greateſt happineſſes, and a ſufficient reward for writing my book, had I no other benefit by it. The opinion you have of it gives me farther hopes, for it is no ſmall reward to one who loves truth, to be perſuaded that he has made ſome diſcoveries of it, and any ways helped to propagate it to others. I depend ſo much upon your judgment and candour, that I think myſelf ſecure in you from peeviſh criticiſm or flattery; only give me leave to ſuſpect, that kindneſs and friendſhip do ſometimes carry your expreſſions a little too far on the favourable ſide. This, however, makes me not apprehend you will ſilently paſs by any thing you are not thoroughly ſatisfied of in it. The uſe I have made of the advertiſements I have received from you of this kind, will ſatisfy you that I deſire this office of friendſhip from you, not out of compliment, but for the uſe of truth, and that your animadverſions will not be loſt upon me. Any faults you ſhall meet with in reaſoning, in perſpicuity, in expreſſion, or of the preſs, I deſire you to take notice of, and ſend me word of. Eſpecially if you have any where any doubt; for I am perſuaded that, upon debate, you and I cannot be of two opinions; nor, I think, any two men uſed to think with freedom, who really prefer truth to opiniatrety, and a little fooliſh vain-glory, of not having made a miſtake.

I ſhall not need to juſtify what I have ſaid of you in my book: the learned world will be vouchers for me; and that in an age not very free from envy and cenſure. But you are very kind to me, ſince for my ſake you allow yourſelf to own that part which I am more particularly concerned in, and permit me to call you my friend, whilſt your modeſty checks at the other part of your character. But, aſſure yourſelf, I am as well perſuaded of the truth of it, as of any thing elſe in my book; it had not elſe been put down in it. It only wants a great deal more I had to ſay, had that been a place to draw your picture at large. Herein I pretend not to any peculiar obligation above others that know you.

you. For though perhaps I may love you better than many others; yet, I conclude, I cannot think better of you than others do.

I am very glad you were provided of a tutor nearer home, and it had this particular good luck in it, that otherwiſe you had been diſappointed, if you had depended on Mr. Gibbs; as a letter I wrote to you from London about it, I hope, acquainted you. I am,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt humble ſervant,

John Locke.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Sir, Oates, Nov. 23, 1694.

YOU ſpeak of my book in ſuch terms, that had I not convincing arguments that you are not a man of compliments, I ſhould a little ſuſpect your civility bordered very much on them in this caſe. But there are ſo few of them to be found, that you think you cannot ſpeak too highly of the endeavours of one who purſues truth unbiaſſedly, and chooſes not his opinions firſt, and then ſeeks arguments to ſupport them. Upon that account I admit of whatever you pleaſe to ſay; but withal give me leave to aſſure you, that in the performance itſelf, I ſee nothing but what any one might have done, who would have ſat down to it with the ſame love of truth and indifferency that I did. However, I cannot but be pleaſed that you think ſo well of it: for whether your friendſhip to me bribes your judgment, or whether your good opinion of my eſſay adds to your kind thoughts of the author; I find my account both ways, and ſhould think myſelf well rewarded for my pains in this ſingle purchaſe. But, ſir, will you not

pardon ſo lawful a deſire, in one that loves you, if I aſk, ſhall I never have the happineſs to ſee you in England?

Mr. Churchill, my bookſeller, ſends me word by the laſt poſt, that he has ſent you the ſix copies that you ſent for, and advice of it. I ſent to him a project of a new reduction of the year by Dr. Wood, to be ſent with the copy of my eſſay to you. The author gave it me himſelf, and I thought it might poſſibly pleaſe you, if you had not ſeen it before. This, with the ſupernumerary cuts I ordered him to ſend you, will, with the books, I hope, come ſafe to your hands. The mentioning of thoſe cuts puts me in mind again of your civility, which I ſee ſtudies all manner of ways of expreſſing itſelf.

You ſee, by this liberty I take with you, that I am paſt terms of compliment with you, that is, I uſe you as one I look upon to be my friend, with a freedom of good offices, either to receive or do them, as it happens. Look upon me as ſuch, I beſeech you, and believe that I am, with the utmoſt ſincerity,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate friend,

and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 18, 1694.

YOURS, of November 23, found me labouring under a ſharp fever, which has held me this month paſt; but I am now, God be thanked, pretty well recovered. I am obliged to you for the earneſt deſire you expreſs of ſeeing me in England. But as to that particular, the truth is thus: laſt ſummer I deſigned to make a journey, on

on purpose to pay my respects to you, and for no other errand; but my resolutions were not so fixed as to give you any intimations thereof. For indeed the state of my health was so very uncertain, that I was very mistrustful whether I should be able to undertake the journey. However, I thought to make an essay of my strength in our own country; so that some business calling me about threescore miles from this city, the fatigue was so troublesome to me, that I was quite discouraged from thinking of England that season. I have now had another pull-back by my present sickness, so that I cannot yet well tell how to think of the other side of the water. This only I will assure you, that the first entire health God is pleased to bestow on me shall be employed in a journey towards you; there being nothing I so earnestly covet as the personal acquaintance of one for whom I have so great a respect and veneration, to whom I am so highly obliged for many favours.

There is a very worthy person, Dr. St. George Ashe, provost of the college here, lately gone from hence to London; he is a great admirer, and zealous promoter, of your writings in his college. He desired from me a letter of recommendation to you; but I fear your being in the country will hinder his designed happiness in your conversation. He stays in London these three or four months to come, in which time, if your business call you to the city, you will hear of him either at your lodgings at Mr. Pawlin's, (where perhaps he will leave the place of his residence) or at Mr. Tucker's, in the secretary's office at Whitehall, where a penny-post letter will find him out.

I thank you for the care you have taken to send me the books and sculptures, which I hope to receive in good time, having advice thereof already from Mr. Churchill. I am,

Worthy Sir,

Your most affectionate humble servant,

Will. Molyneux.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Dublin, January 15, 169⅘.

Honoured Sir,

I HAVE received the ſix copies of your book, and thank you for the care you have taken about them. I acknowledge myſelf likewiſe obliged to you for your preſent of Dr. Wood's almanac, though it was not new to me, having received the favour of one from the author himſelf, when accomptant-general here in Ireland, many years ago. It is a very pretty project, but, I believe, it will hardly ever be practiſed; becauſe men think what they have already ſufficiently accurate for the common uſes of life, and are hardly brought from what they have uſed, ſo long as they have done the common julian account, unleſs prevailed upon by ſome ſuch potent authority as the church, which abrogated the julian, and eſtabliſhed the gregorian kalendar.

The ſculptures alſo I received, and thank you for them. I ſhall do them all the honour that outward ornament can give them. And I heartily wiſh I had more effectual ways of ſhowing my reſpects, which I think I can never do ſufficiently.

I have ever thought that an elegant tranſlation of your Eſſay into latin would be highly acceptable to foreigners, and of great uſe in thoſe countries, whoſe minds lie yet captivated in verboſe, diſputative philoſophy, and falſe reaſoning; I therefore preſume to mention it to you, that though your own leiſure may not permit you to perform it yourſelf, you may think of putting ſome one on it, that under your eye may do it correctly. And were I not perſuaded that your own eye and correction were abſolutely requiſite herein, I would venture to make a bold propoſal to have it done by ſome one in this place, whom I ſhould reward for his labour herein. And this I do, not that I think you may not with a great deal of eaſe employ one yourſelf in this matter, but merely that herein I may have an opportunity of doing ſo much good in the world. You

ſee,

ſee, ſir, what a veneration I have for your writings, and therefore you will pardon me, if I deſire from you, "ſub amicitiæ teſſerâ," the names of what books you have publiſhed. I remember, once I propoſed to you the like requeſt, and you were ſilent to it. If it were, that you deſignedly conceal them, I acquieſce; but perhaps it proceeded from your curſory paſſing over that part of my letter, which makes me venture again on the ſame requeſt. And now that your thoughts are at liberty from that eſſay, you will give me leave, with all ſubmiſſion, to mind you of what you once told me you would think of, viz. of demonſtrating morals. I am ſure, as no hand could perform it better; ſo no age ever required it more than ours.

I do heartily wiſh you an happy ſucceeding year; and may it end with us happier than the laſt paſt. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt obliged, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, 8 Mar. 169$\frac{4}{5}$.

YOU will, I fear, think me frozen up with this long winter, or elſe with a negligence colder than that, having two very obliging letters of yours by me, the one ever ſince January, the other February laſt, I make you no anſwer to either, till thus far in March. The truth is, expecting ever ſince I received your laſt letter an account from London, concerning ſomething I had a mind to put into my letter, and after writing four times about it, being yet delayed, I can forbear no longer to return you my thanks, and to beg your pardon that I have been ſo ſlow in it. If you interpret it right, you will look upon it as the effect of a friendſhip got paſt

paſt formalities, and that has confidence enough to make bold with you, where it is without neglect of you, or prejudice to either. I was not a little rejoiced with the news you ſent me in the firſt of your letters, of your ſafe recovery of a fever. Had I known it before the danger was over, that you had been ill, it would have been no ſmall fright and pain to me. For I muſt aſſure you that, amongſt all the friends your kindneſs or worth has procured you, there is not any one who values you more than I do, or does more intereſt himſelf in all your concerns. This makes me, that though I have a long time extremely deſired to ſee you, and propoſe to myſelf an infinite ſatisfaction in a free converſation with you; yet what you tell me, that you were coming laſt ſummer into England, to make me a viſit, makes me dread the ſatisfaction of my own wiſhes. And methinks I ought not to purchaſe one of the greateſt happineſſes I can propoſe to myſelf at ſo dear and dangerous a rate. I have received many and great obligations from you before; but they were ſuch as, though I had no title to, I thought I might accept from one whom I love, and therefore was glad to find kind to me. But when I reflect on the length of the way, and the ſea between us, the danger of the one, and the fatigue of both, and your no very robuſt conſtitution, as I imagine, I cannot conſent you ſhould venture ſo much for my ſake. If any harm ſhould happen to you in the journey, I could never forgive it myſelf, to be the occaſion of ſo great a loſs to the world and myſelf. And if you ſhould come ſafe, the greatneſs of the hazard, and an obligation out of all proportion to what I either ought to receive, or was capable to return, would overwhelm me with ſhame, and hinder my enjoyment. And yet, if I may confeſs my ſecret thoughts, there is not any thing which I would not give, that ſome other unavoidable occaſion would draw you into England. A rational free-minded man, tied to nothing but truth, is ſo rare a thing, that I almoſt worſhip ſuch a friend; but when friendſhip is joined to it, and theſe are brought into a free converſation, where they meet, and can be together; what is there can have

equal

equal charms? I cannot but exceedingly wish for that happy day, when I may see a man I have so often longed to have in my embraces. But yet, though it would endear the gift to receive it from his kindness, I cannot but wish rather that fortune alone would throw him into my arms.

This cold winter has kept me so close a prisoner within doors, that, 'till yesterday, I have been abroad but once these three months, and that only a mile in a coach. And the inability I am in to breathe London air in cold weather has hindered me yet from the happiness of waiting on Dr. Ashe; but I hope to get to London before he leaves it, that I may, to a person whom you have an esteem for, pay some part of the respects I owe you. I had last week the honour of a visit from an ingenious gentleman, a member of your college at Dublin, lately returned from Turky. He told me he was a kinsman of yours; and though his other good qualities might have made him welcome any where, he was not, you may be sure, the less welcome to me, for being known and related to you. He seems to me to have been very diligent and curious in making observations whilst he has been abroad, and more inquisitive than most of our people that go into those parts. And, by the discourse I had with him the little time we were together, I promise myself we shall have a more exact account of those parts, in what I hope he intends to publish, than hitherto is extant. Dr. Huntington, who was formerly at Aleppo, and is my old acquaintance, and now my neighbour in this country, brought Mr. Smith hither with him from his house. But yet I must acknowledge the favour to you, and desire you to thank him for it when he returns to Dublin. For the friendship he knew you had for me, was, I take it, the great inducement that made him give himself the trouble of coming six or seven miles in a dirty country.

You do so attack me on every side with your kindness to my book, to me, to my shadow, that I cannot but be ashamed I am not in a capacity to make you any other acknowledgment, but in a very full and deep sense of it. I return you my thanks for the corrections you have

have ſent me, which I will take all the care of I can in the next edition, which, my bookſeller tells me, he thinks, will be this ſummer. And if any other fall under your obſervation, I ſhall deſire the continuance of your favour in communicating them.

I muſt own to you, that I have been ſolicited from beyond ſea to put my eſſay into latin; but you gueſs right, I have not the leiſure to do it. It was once tranſlated by a young man in Holland into latin; but he was ſo little maſter of the engliſh or latin tongue, that when it was ſhowed me, which he did not till he had quite done it, I ſatisfied him that it would be very little for his credit to publiſh it; and ſo that was laid by. Since that, my bookſeller was, and had been for ſome time, ſeeking for a tranſlator, whom he would have treated with to have undertaken it, and have ſatisfied for his pains. But a little before the coming of your letter, he writ me word he had been diſappointed, where he expected to have found one who would have done it, and was now at a loſs. So that what you call a bold, is not only the kindeſt, but the moſt ſeaſonable propoſal you could have made. You underſtand my thoughts as well as I do myſelf, and can be a fit judge, whether the tranſlator has expreſſed them well in latin or no; and can direct him, where to omit or contract any thing where you think I have been more large than needed. And though in this I know you intend, as you ſay, ſome good to the world; yet I cannot but take it as a very particular obligation to myſelf, and ſhall not be a little ſatisfied to have my book go abroad into the world with ſtrokes of your judicious hand to it. For, as to omitting, adding, altering, tranſpoſing any thing in it, I permit it wholly to your judgment. And if there be any thing in it defective, or which you think may be added with advantage to the deſign of the whole work, if you will let me know, I ſhall endeavour to ſupply that defect the beſt I can. The chapter "of "Identity and Diverſity," which owes its birth wholly to your putting me upon it, will be an encouragement to you to lay any the like commands upon me. I have had ſome thoughts myſelf, that it would not be poſſibly

amiss to add, in lib. iv. cap. 18, something about enthusiasm, or to make a chapter of it by itself. If you are of the same mind, and that it will not be foreign to the business of my essay, I promise you, before the translator you shall employ shall be got so far, I will send you my thoughts on that subject, so that it may be put into the latin edition. I have also examined P. Malebranche's opinion concerning "seeing all things in God," and to my own satisfaction laid open the vanity, inconsistency, and unintelligibleness of that way of explaining human understanding. I have gone almost, but not quite through it, and know not whether I now ever shall finish it, being fully satisfied myself about it. You cannot think how often I regret the distance that is between us; I envy Dublin for what I every day want in London. Were you in my neighbourhood, you would every day be troubled with the proposal of some of my thoughts to you. I find mine generally so much out of the way of the books I meet with, or men led by books, that, were I not conscious to myself that I impartially seek truth, I should be discouraged from letting my thoughts loose, which commonly lead me out of the beaten track. However, I want somebody near me, to whom I could freely communicate them, and without reserve lay them open. I should find security and ease in such a friend as you, were you within distance. For your judgment would confirm and set me at rest, where it approved; and your candour would excuse what your judgment corrected, and set me right in. As to your request you now repeat to me, I desire you to believe that there is nothing in your letters which I pass over slightly, or without taking notice of; and if I formerly said nothing to it, think it to be, that I thought it the best way of answering a friend, whom I was resolved to deny nothing that was in my power. There are some particular obligations that tie me up in the point, and which have drawn on me some displeasure for a time, from some of my friends, who made me a somewhat like demand. But I expect to find you more reasonable, and give you this assurance, that you shall be the first that shall be satisfied in that point.

point. I am not forgetful of what you ſo kindly put me upon. I think nobody ought to live only to eat and drink, and count the days he ſpends idly. The ſmall remainder of a crazy life I ſhall, as much as my health will permit, apply to the ſearch of truth, and ſhall not neglect to propoſe to myſelf thoſe that may be moſt uſeful. My paper is more than done, and, I ſuppoſe, you tired, and yet I can ſcarce give off. I am,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt faithful humble ſervant,

John Locke.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Sir, Dublin, March 26, 1695.

THE concern you expreſs for my welfare is extremely obliging, and I never prized my health ſo much, as ſince thereby I am enabled to enjoy your correſpondence and friendſhip. But whatever becomes of me and my carcaſe, I can heartily wiſh you had one more eaſy, healthful, and ſtrong. For I know mankind in general is intereſted in you; whereas I am ſure to fall unlamented to all, ſave a few particular friends.

I underſtand my kinſman has enjoyed that which I have earneſtly longed for. He tells me, by letter, the great obligations he bears you, for the civilities you ſhowed him, and deſires me to acknowledge them.

I am very glad to find your eſſay like to ſuffer a third impreſſion; it is a good ſign, and ſhows the world not ſo averſe to truth, when fairly laid open. To have truth prevail, the only way is calmly and meekly to publiſh it, and let it ſhift for itſelf; "magna res eſt "veritas & prævalebit." It will make its own party good without fire and faggot, which never promoted, but, I am ſure, has often ſtifled it.

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This encourages me, with more vigour, to promote the tranſlation of your work; and to own myſelf infinitely obliged to you, that you are pleaſed ſo readily to comply with the offer I made you in my laſt. Yeſterday I ſent for an ingenious young man of the college here, to diſcourſe with him about it. The reſult was, he would make an eſſay, and ſhow it me, and accordingly would proceed or deſiſt. But then, he tells me, that he cannot ſet himſelf fully to it till towards the latter end of May; for he deſigns to ſtand candidate for a fellowſhip in the college, which, by the removal of the provoſt, is to be diſpoſed of about next Trinity-ſunday; and, in the mean time, he is to prepare himſelf for the examination they undergo on that occaſion. I ſhall ſee his firſt attempt the next week, and ſhall give you an account. As to any alterations to be made by me, I ſhould be very cautious of meddling therein; I know the whole work has already undergone ſo exact a judgment, that there is no room left for amendments. However, if any ſuch offer, after your approbation of them, I ſhould venture to inſert them.

I muſt freely confeſs, that if my notion of enthuſiaſm agrees with yours, there is no neceſſity of adding any thing concerning it, more than by the by, and in a ſingle ſection in chap. 18. lib. iv. I conceive it to be no other than a religious ſort of madneſs, and compriſes not in it any mode of thinking, or operation of the mind, different from what you have treated of in your eſſay. It is true, indeed, the abſurdities men embrace on account of religion are moſt aſtoniſhing; and if in a chapter of enthuſiaſm you endeavour to give an account of them, it would be very acceptable. So that (on ſecond thoughts) I do very well approve of what you propoſe therein, being very deſirous of having your ſentiments on any ſubject.

Pere Malebranche's chapter "of ſeeing all things "in God," was ever to me abſolutely unintelligible; and unleſs you think a polemic diſcourſe in your eſſay (which you have hitherto avoided therein) may not be of a piece with the reſt, I am ſure it highly deſerves to be expoſed, and is very agreeable to the buſineſs of

your work. I would therefore humbly propoſe it to you, to conſider of doing ſomething therein. Pere Malebranche has many curious notions, and ſome as erroneous and abſurd. It is a good while ſince I read him; but I am now turning him over a ſecond time: he is moſtly platonic, and, in ſome things, almoſt enthuſiaſtical. I am,

Honoured dear SIR,

Your moſt obliged humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, April 26, 1695.

YOU look with the eyes, and ſpeak the language of friendſhip, when you make my life of much more concern to the world than your own. I take it, as it is, for an effect of your kindneſs, and ſo ſhall not accuſe you of compliment; the miſtakes and over-valuings of good-will being always ſincere, even when they exceed what common truth allows. This on my ſide, I muſt beg you to believe, that my life would be much more pleaſant and uſeful to me, if you were within my reach, that I might ſometimes enjoy your converſation, and, upon twenty occaſions, lay my thoughts before you, and have the advantage of your judgment. I cannot complain that I have not my ſhare of friends of all ranks, and ſuch, whoſe intereſt, aſſiſtance, affection, and opinions too, in fit caſes, I can rely on. But methinks, for all this, there is one place vacant, that I know nobody that would ſo well fill as yourſelf; I want one near me to talk freely with, "de quolibet ente;" to propoſe to the extravagancies that riſe in my mind; one with whom I would debate ſeveral doubts and queſtions, to ſee what was in them. Meditating by one's ſelf is like digging in the mine; it often, perhaps, brings

brings up maiden earth, which never came near the light before; but whether it contains any metal in it, is never ſo well tried as in converſation with a knowing judicious friend, who carries about with him the true touch-ſtone, which is love of truth in a clear-thinking head. Men of parts and judgment the world uſually gets hold of, and by a great miſtake (that their abilities of mind are loſt, if not employed in the purſuit of wealth or power) engages them in the ways of fortune and intereſt, which uſually leave but little freedom or leiſure of thought for pure diſintereſted truth. And ſuch who give themſelves up frankly, and in earneſt, to the full latitude of real knowledge, are not every where to be met with. Wonder not, therefore, that I wiſh ſo much for you in my neighbourhood; I ſhould be too happy in a friend of your make, were you within my reach. But yet I cannot but wiſh that ſome buſineſs would once bring you within diſtance; and it is a pain to me to think of leaving the world, without the happineſs of ſeeing you.

I do not wonder that a kinſman of yours ſhould magnify civilities that ſcarce deſerve the name; I know not wherein they conſiſted, but in being glad to ſee one that was any way related to you, and was himſelf a very ingenious man; either of thoſe was a title to more than I did, or could ſhow him. I am ſorry I have not yet had an opportunity to wait on him in London, and I fear he ſhould be gone before I am able to get thither. This long winter, and cold ſpring, has hung very heavy upon my lungs, and they are not yet in a caſe to be ventured in London air, which muſt be my excuſe for not waiting upon him and Dr. Aſhe yet.

The third edition of my eſſay has already, or will be ſpeedily in the preſs. But what perhaps will ſeem ſtranger, and poſſibly pleaſe you better, an abridgment is now making (if it be not already done) by one of the univerſity of Oxford, for the uſe of young ſcholars, in the place of an ordinary ſyſtem of logic. From the acquaintance I had of the temper of that place, I did not expect to have it get much footing there. But ſo it is, I ſome time ſince received a very civil letter from one,

wholly a ſtranger to me there, concerning ſuch a deſign; and, by another from him ſince, I conclude it near done. He ſeems to be an ingenious man, and he writes ſenſibly about it, but I can ſay nothing of it till I ſee it; and he, of his own accord, has offered that it ſhall wholly be ſubmitted to my opinion, and diſpoſal of it. And thus, ſir, poſſibly that which you once propoſed may be attained to, and I was pleaſed with the gentleman's deſign for your ſake.

You are a ſtrange man, you oblige me very much by the care you take to have it well tranſlated, and you thank me for complying with your offer. In my laſt, as I remember, I told you the reaſon why it was ſo long before I writ, was an expectation of an anſwer from London, concerning ſomething I had to communicate to you: it was in ſhort this; I was willing to know what my bookſeller would give for a good latin copy; he told me, at laſt, twenty pounds. His delay was, becauſe he would firſt have known what the tranſlator demanded. But I forced him to make his propoſal, and ſo I ſend it to you, to make what uſe of it you pleaſe. He ſince writ me word, that a friend of his at Oxford would, in ſome time, be at leiſure to do it, and would undertake it. I bid him excuſe himſelf to him, for that it was in hands I approved of, and ſome part of it now actually done. For I hope the eſſay (he was to ſhow you the next week after you writ to me laſt) pleaſed you. Think it not a compliment, that I deſire you to make what alterations you think fit. One thing particularly you will oblige me and the world in, and that is, in paring off ſome of the ſuperfluous repetitions, which I left in for the ſake of illiterate men, and the ſofter ſex, not uſed to abſtract notions and reaſonings. But much of this reaſoning will be out of doors in a latin tranſlation. I refer all to your judgment, and ſo am ſecure it will be done as is beſt.

What I ſhall add concerning enthuſiaſm, I gueſs, will very much agree with your thoughts, ſince yours jump ſo right with mine, about the place where it is to come in, I having deſigned it for chap. 18. lib. iv. as a falſe principle of reaſoning often made uſe of. But, to give

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an hiſtorical account of the various ravings men have embraced for religion, would, I fear, be beſides my purpoſe, and be enough to make an huge volume.

My opinion of P. Malebranche agrees perfectly with yours. What I have writ concerning "ſeeing all things "in God," would make a little treatiſe of itſelf. But I have not quite gone through it, for fear I ſhould by ſomebody or other be tempted to print it. For I love not controverſies, and have a perſonal kindneſs for the author. When I have the happineſs to ſee you, we will conſider it together, and you ſhall diſpoſe of it.

I think I ſhall make ſome other additions to be put into your latin tranſlation, and particularly concerning the "connexion of ideas," which has not, that I know, been hitherto conſidered, and has, I gueſs, a greater influence upon our minds, than is uſually taken notice of. Thus, you ſee, I make you the confident of my reveries; you would be troubled with a great many more of them, were you nearer. I am,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, May 7, 1695.

I AM extremely pleaſed to underſtand by yours of April 26, that we are to expect an abridgment of your work from a judicious hand in Oxford; it is what I always thought might be of good uſe in the univerſities, where we yet want another ſort of language, than what has hitherto prevailed there, to the great hindrance of ſcience.

As to the tranſlation that is going on here, it is undertaken by one Mr. William Mullart, a ſenior bachelor

in the college. He has the repute of an ingenious and learned young man, and I hope he may perform it well. I here encloſe a ſpecimen of his performance, concerning which I deſire you would give me your thoughts, before he proceed much farther. This only may be hinted, that when he is better acquainted with the work, and your language, and has entered farther into it, it is probable his tranſlation may be better, more eaſy and natural. He propoſes to finiſh it in half a year, or nine months at fartheſt; for he cannot wholly diſengage himſelf from ſome other ſtudies. I perceive your bookſeller is reſolved to ſhare with me in the good I thought to do the world, by beſtowing on it this tranſlation. And ſince he is ſo generous as to have it ſo, I will, by no means, be the tranſlator's hindrance in partaking of the bookſeller's proffer; and, at the ſame time, to engage his diligence the more, I will increaſe the reward conſiderably, that I may not wholly miſs the good deſign I firſt propoſed to myſelf. If you encourage the tranſlator to go forward, you may be pleaſed to tranſmit to me the additions you deſign; as that of "enthuſiaſm, connexion of ideas," and what elſe you have.

And now, with redoubled force, I ſend back to you the complaints you make for our diſtance. I cannot but hope, that Providence has yet in ſtore for me ſo much happineſs on this ſide the grave; and if it have not, I ſhall think I have miſſed the greateſt temporal good my mind was ever ſet on. But I ſtill ſay, I live in hopes, the accompliſhment whereof would be the greateſt ſatisfaction to

Your moſt cordially affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Were it not too nigh approaching to vanity, I could tell you of the extraordinary effects your method of education has had on my little boy.

Mr.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Dear Sir, Oates, 2 July, 1695.

DID I not aſſure myſelf that our friendſhip were grown beyond ſuſpicion or compliment, I ſhould think I ſhould have need to make excuſes to you for my long ſilence; but I know you will credit me, when I tell you it has been neither forgetfulneſs nor negligence. The ſpecimen of the tranſlation you ſent me, gave me ſome reaſon to apprehend, that Mr. Mullart's ſtyle would lay too great a burthen on your kindneſs, by often needing the correction of your hand, to make it expreſs my ſenſe with that clearneſs and eaſineſs, which I know you deſire. My bookſeller therefore having before told me of one who had offered to undertake the tranſlation of my eſſay, I have been ever ſince endeavouring to get from him a ſpecimen, that I might ſend it you, and have your opinion, which is like to do beſt; that ſo if this man had a talent that way, you might be eaſed of the trouble, which your friendſhip to me, and zeal to the work, I foreſee, is likely to lay upon you. But, having the laſt poſt received this account from Mr. Churchill, that the gentleman propoſed is in the country, and muſt have a book ſent him down, on purpoſe, before we can expect to ſee any thing from him, and this being all to be managed by a third hand, who is not every day to be met with; I have reſolved to loſe no more time on that thought, but accepting of your kind offer, put that whole matter into your hands, to be ordered as you ſhall think beſt, and ſhall ſpend no more time in other inquiries, ſince the gentleman you propoſe will (as I remember you told me) be about this time at leiſure to ſet himſelf in earneſt to it. There is one thing I would offer, which may be of advantage to him and the work too, and that is, that he would conſtantly and ſedulouſly read Tully, eſpecially his philoſophical works, which will inſenſibly work him into a good latin ſtyle. I have heard it reported of biſhop Sanderſon, that being aſked how he came to write latin

ſo well, as appears in the treatiſes he publiſhed in that tongue? he anſwered, "By ordering his ſtudies ſo, that "he read over all Tully's works every year." I leave it to you, whether you will think fit to mention this to Mr. Mullart.

The abridgment of my eſſay is quite finiſhed. It is done by a very ingenious man of Oxford, a maſter of arts, very conſiderable for his learning and virtue, who has a great many pupils. It is done with the ſame deſign you had in view, when you mentioned it. He has generally (as far as I could remember) made uſe of my words; he very civilly ſent it me when it was done, and, upon looking it over, I gueſs you will approve of it, and think it well done. It is in Mr. Churchill's hands, and will be printed as ſoon as the third edition of my eſſay, which is now in the preſs, is printed off.

I am extremely glad to hear that you have found any good effects of my method on your ſon. I ſhould be glad to know the particulars; for though I have ſeen the ſucceſs of it in a child of the lady, in whoſe houſe I am, (whoſe mother has taught him latin without knowing it herſelf when ſhe began) yet I would be glad to have other inſtances; becauſe ſome men, who cannot endure any thing ſhould be mended in the world by a new method, object, I hear, that my way of education is impracticable. But this I can aſſure you, that the child above-mentioned, but nine years old in June laſt, has learned to read and write very well; is now reading Quintus Curtius with his mother, underſtands geography and chronology very well, and the copernican ſyſtem of our vortex; is able to multiply well, and divide a little; and all this without ever having had one blow for his book. The third edition is now out: I have ordered Mr. Churchill to ſend you one of them, which I hope he has done before this. I expect your opinion of the additions, which have much increaſed the bulk of the book. And though I think all that I have ſaid right; yet you are the man I depend on for a fair and free cenſure, not inclined either to flatter, or quarrel. You know not of what value a knowing man, that is a ſincere lover of truth, is, nor

how hard to be found; wonder not, therefore, if I place a great part of my happineſs in your friendſhip, and wiſh every day you were my neighbour; you would then find what uſe I ſhould make of it. But, not to complain of what cannot be remedied, pray let me have all the advantage I can at this diſtance. Read the additions, and examine them ſtrictly, for I would not willingly miſlead the world. Pray let me know whether the doctor, your brother, has any children; when he has, I count I owe him one of my books of education.

With my treatiſe of education, I believe you will receive another little one concerning intereſt and coinage. It is one of the fatherleſs children, which the world lay at my door; but, whoever be the author, I ſhall be glad to know your opinion of it.

And now I muſt mightily bemoan the loſs of an happineſs which you deſigned me, and I through great misfortune miſſed. The impreſſions of the laſt ſevere winter on my weak lungs, and the ſlow return of warm weather this ſpring, confined me ſo long to the country, that I concluded Dr. Aſhe would be gone before I ſhould get to town, and I ſhould loſe the honour of ſo deſired an acquaintance. However, as ſoon as I was got to London, I inquired of Mr. Churchill, who told me Dr. Aſhe was lately in town, and he promiſed me, as I deſired him, that he would inquire whether he was ſtill there, and where he lodged. He returned me no anſwer, and I (through a multitude of buſineſs) forgot to inquire again, for ſome few days. Upon the firſt thought of it again, I went to the ſecretary's office at Whitehall, and not finding Mr. Tucker there, I went to his houſe, who told me that Dr. Aſhe was that very morning gone out of town. The miſſing of him thus unluckily, when he had been within my reach, very much vexed me; and it looked, as if fortune had a mind ſenſibly to croſs me, in what ſhe knew I was extremely deſirous of. I inquired too for Mr. Smith; but he, I heard, was gone to Flanders before I came to town. It would have been more than ordinary ſatisfaction to me, to have converſed and made an acquaintance with ſo eſteemed a friend of yours as Dr. Aſhe. I

ſhall

ſhall not be at quiet, till ſome buſineſs brings you into England to repair this loſs, and brings me a ſatisfaction to the moſt earneſt of all my deſires. My decaying health does not promiſe me any long ſtay in this world; you are the only perſon in it, that I deſire to ſee once, and to converſe ſome time with, before I leave it. I wiſh your other occaſions might draw you into England, and then let me alone to huſband our time together; I have laid all that in my head already. But I talk my deſires and fancies as if they were in view. I wiſh you all manner of happineſs, and am,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt faithful ſervant,

John Locke.

Pray preſent my humble ſervice to Dr. Aſhe, and excuſe my misfortunate loſs to him.

When you conſider the length of this, you will find my late ſilence was not from a ſparingneſs of ſpeech, or backwardneſs to talk with you; I have more reaſon now to beg your pardon for my talkativeneſs than ſilence.

The additions I intend to make, ſhall be ſent time enough for the tranſlator.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Sir, Dublin, Aug. 24, 1695.

I DEFERRED my anſwer all this while to yours of July 2, (which I received ſome weeks ago) in expectation of the books you have been pleaſed to order for me; but hitherto they are not arrived, and I would not omit my duty any longer, leſt the buſineſs of our enſuing parliament ſhould give me a farther hinderance. The univerſity

univerſity has done me the honour to chooſe me as one of their repreſentatives; and though I cannot pretend to do them any great ſervice, yet it ſhall not be for want of conſtant attendance on their buſineſs, which will take up moſt of my time, till the ſeſſion is ended.

I am now at a great loſs what apology to make you, for the diſappointment you are at laſt like to receive in the tranſlation of your eſſay. But, to a candid and ingenuous man, the beſt excuſe is a plain narrative of the matter of fact.

The gentleman whom I formerly mentioned to you, Mr. Mullart, went into the country about the middle of laſt June, and returned about a fortnight ago. When he went away, he aſſured me, he would make a conſiderable progreſs in the work, in a month or ſix weeks time; but he was taken ill for about a fortnight, and, at his return, I found he had ſcarce done four pages of the book. I found alſo, (as you rightly ſurmiſed) that his ſtyle will hardly anſwer expectation; but this difficulty, I thought, might be overcome by time and application. But what to ſay to his very ſlow performance I cannot tell, or whether it may anſwer your, or your bookſeller's deſigns. But that which moſt of all diſcourages me, is, that the young man himſelf ſeems not very fond of the undertaking, but has fixed his thoughts on another purſuit. I formerly told you how he deſigned for a fellowſhip, had any at that time happened vacant, as there did none. But very lately there are two fellowſhips become void, and a third like to be ſo, before the time of ſitting for them, which is next June 1696, and he tells me plainly, he muſt endeavour to get one of them; and that there will be at leaſt five competitors, if not ſix, who are all his ſeniors; and therefore, he muſt uſe his utmoſt diligence, application and ſtudy in the intermediate time, to fit himſelf for the examination they undergo; and this, he ſays, will take up ſo much of his time, that he knows not whether he ſhall have any to ſpare for the tranſlation.

I cannot well tell which way next to turn myſelf in this affair. I have but one anchor more, and that is not at hand immediately to uſe. There is a gentleman of

of my acquaintance, the greateſt maſter of ſtyle of any I have known, who, I am confident, would perform this work to your utmoſt ſatisfaction; but he is not, at preſent, in town; and when he comes, (which, I expect, may be about Michaelmas next, as I have it from himſelf) I make ſome doubt, whether his other avocations will permit him to undertake this. He is chancellor of the dioceſe of Down and Connor, and has alſo a private work of his own, in latin, now fitting for the preſs, which he permits to run through my hands, as he goes on with it. When he comes to town, I will move him in it, if you will give me leave, and you ſhall know the event.

I am mightily pleaſed that your eſſay is abridged, though, for my own reading, I would not part with a ſyllable of it. However, others may not have ſo much leiſure as to ſet on a large book, and for ſuch the abridgment may be uſeful. It is to me no ſmall argument of the curious genius of the engliſh nation, that a work ſo abſtract as yours, ſhould now ſuffer three impreſſions in ſo ſhort a time.

I have already ſo much experience of your method of education, that I long to ſee your third edition. And ſince you put me upon it, (to whom I can refuſe nothing in my power) I will give you a ſhort account of my little boy's progreſs under it.

He was ſix years old about the middle of laſt July. When he was but juſt turned five, he could read perfectly well; and on the globes could have traced out, and pointed at all the noted parts, countries, and cities of the world, both land and ſea. And by five and an half could perform many of the plaineſt problems on the globe, as the longitude and latitude, the antipodes, the time with them and other countries, &c. and this by way of play and diverſion, ſeldom called to it, never chid or beaten for it. About the ſame age he could read any number of figures, not exceeding ſix places, break it as you pleaſe by cyphers or zeros. By the time he was ſix, he could manage a compaſs, ruler and pencil, very prettily, and perform many little geometrical tricks, and advanced to writing and arithmetic; and

and has been about three months at latin, wherein his tutor obſerves, as nigh as he can, the method preſcribed by you. He can read a gazette, and, in the large maps of Sanſon, ſhows moſt of the remarkable places as he goes along, and turn to the proper maps. He has been ſhown ſome dogs diſſected, and can give ſome little account of the grand traces of anatomy. And as to the formation of his mind, which you rightly obſerve to be the moſt valuable part of education; I do not believe that any child had ever his paſſions more perfectly at command. He is obedient and obſervant to the niceſt particular, and at the ſame time ſprightly, playful, and active.

But I will ſay no more; this may be tireſome to others, however pleaſing to myſelf.

I have ſome thoughts of ſeeing England next ſpring, or ſummer; but the time I cannot prefix as yet, till I ſee how our affairs are like to go on in parliament, and whether we are like to have another ſeſſion, and when. The other day I chanced to mention your name accidentally to his excellency my lord Capel, who thereupon expreſſed himſelf with the utmoſt reſpect and eſteem for you. I am,

Honoured Sir,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

Will. Molyneux.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Sir, London, 16 Nov. 1695.

THOUGH there be no man in the world that I ſo much long to ſee as you; yet your laſt letter, of the ſecond inſtant, makes me afraid of your coming. Your kindneſs and expreſſion in my favour, has painted me ſo in your fancy, that I ſhall unavoidably fall many degrees

grees in your eſteem, when you find me come ſo much ſhort of what you expected; "Paratus eſt mihi magnus "adverſarius, expectatio," as I remember, Tully ſomewhere ſays. One thing only I have to ſatisfy myſelf, viz. that, whatever I may want of thoſe qualities you aſcribe to me, I have one that helps mightily to cover defects, and make one acceptable, without the recommendation of great perfections; I mean friendſhip, true and ſincere. This I can boaſt of to you, this I can bid you expect, and tell you, you ſhall not be deceived. Come then, but come with this reſolution, that you will be content, that ſhall make up to you all thoſe fine things which you imagine before-hand, in a man whom you will really find a plain, honeſt, well-meaning man, who unbiaſſedly ſeeks truth, though it be but a very ſmall part of it he has yet diſcovered.

I am very glad you approve of the additions to the third edition of my education; you are a father, and are concerned not to be deceived, and therefore I expect you will not flatter me in this point. You ſpeak ſo well of that you have, that I ſhall take care to have another of thoſe treatiſes of intereſt and coinage ſent to you. The affair of our money, which is in a lamentable ſtate, is now under debate here: what the iſſue will be, I know not; I pray for a good one. I find every body almoſt looks on it as a myſtery; to me there appears to be none at all in it. It is but ſtripping it of the cant which all men that talk of it involve it in, and there is nothing eaſier: lay by the arbitrary names of pence and ſhillings, and conſider and ſpeak of it as grains and ounces of ſilver, and it is as eaſy as telling of twenty.

I had a great deal more to ſay to you, in anſwer to this, and two other obliging letters, I am indebted to you for: but I am ſent for into the country by an expreſs. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble, and moſt affectionate ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Sir, Oates, 20 Nov. 1695.

BEFORE I left London, I gave order that the book you deſired about intereſt and money, ſhould be ſent you by the firſt opportunity. But it is to you I ſend it, and not to any body elſe; you may give it to whom you pleaſe, for it is yours as ſoon as you receive it; but pray do not give it to any body in my name, or as a preſent from me. And however you are pleaſed to make me a compliment, in making me the author of a book you think well of; yet you may be ſure I do not own it to be mine, till you ſee my name to it.

You, I ſee, are troubled there about your money, as well as we are here; though, I hope, you are not ſo deep in that diſeaſe, as we are. A little before his majeſty's return, the lords juſtices here had this matter under conſideration; and amongſt others, were pleaſed to ſend to me, for my thoughts about it. This is too publicly known here, to make the mentioning of it to you appear as vanity in me. The paper I here encloſe, would ſeem a ſtrange thing, did I not tell you the occaſion of my writing it. And ſince ſome of my friends here perſuade me, it gives ſome light to that which the ſtateſman you mention, thinks ſo profound a myſtery, I have taken the liberty to ſend it to you, either to open that matter a little farther to you, or that you may ſhow me the miſtakes and defects of it. But pray, whatever uſe you make of it, conceal my name.

I writ to you from London, juſt as I was leaving the town in haſte, in anſwer to yours of the ſecond inſtant. You muſt impute the faults of that, to the hurry and diſturbance I was then in. I am not much more at leiſure or at quiet now; but ſhame will not ſuffer me to be ſilent any longer, under the obligation of two other letters I have by me of yours, unanſwered.

I cannot read yours of the 24th of Auguſt laſt, without finding new marks of your kindneſs to me, in the concern you therein expreſs to get a good hand for the tranſlating my eſſay. I think, at laſt, you have got a

better than I could have expected. I designed to have brought Mr. Churchill and him together, and settled that matter, before I left London; but I was so unexpectedly called thence, that I left that, and several other businesses, undone. But I took order with Mr. Churchill, my bookseller, to go to him; he is a reasonable man, and I doubt not but it will be taken care of, as well as if I were there. I think the abridgment is near, if not quite printed; but I had not the time, or memory, to inquire, after my hasty summons into the country. I was told too, when I was in town, that somebody is printing against it; if it be a fair inquirer, I shall be glad; if a wrangling disputant, I shall not mind him.

Mr. Burridge is the man you speak him to be, in yours of September 19. Had I staid in London, I think I should have been able to have procured him some particulars would have been of use to him, in his design. Some of them I have taken care he should receive, notwithstanding my absence. But perhaps they might have been more, could I have stayed till more of my acquaintance were come to town. I am now in an house of sorrow and business, which hinders me from that freedom I would be in, when I write to you. I am,

SIR,

Your most affectionate, humble servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 24, 1695.

I AM ashamed to say, that I have two of yours before me unanswered.

Yours of Nov. 20. brought me a paper, which, of all things I have ever seen on that subject, I most highly admire. You have therein revealed the whole mystery of

of money, exchange, trade, &c. which have hitherto been wrapped up in unintelligible cant, I believe, partly out of knavery, partly out of ignorance. You gave me liberty to make what uſe of it I pleaſed, and therefore I ventured to give a copy of it to his excellency, my lord deputy Capel, rather than the book of intereſt and coinage, which I thought might be too long for his preſent peruſal, in his multitude of buſineſs. But I can tell you, that your admirable perſpicuity of writing is ſo clearly different from all the world, and almoſt peculiar to yourſelf; that in vain you expect to be concealed, in any thing that comes from you. For I aſſure you, in ſome diſcourſe I had with his excellency, no longer ago than yeſterday, concerning the buſineſs of money; he aſked me (without any occaſion given him from me) whether I had ever ſeen Mr. Locke's book of intereſt, &c.? for he has formerly known (as I think I have told you) that I had the happineſs of your acquaintance; I replied to his lordſhip, that I had ſeen ſuch a book, but that it did not bear your name in it: he anſwered me: the printer preſented it to him as yours; and beſides (ſays he) all the world knows Mr. Locke's way of writing; and, if I may gueſs, I believe the paper you gave me a few days ago, came from Mr. Locke; pray, did it not? I told his excellency I was under ſome obligation to conceal the author. That's enough (ſays he) I am ſure it is his, and will put his name to it, and lay it up amongſt my choiceſt papers.

I have lately received three ſmall prints from London, concerning the ſubject of money. They were encloſed in a blank wrapper, and franked to me by ſir Walter Yonge, bart. a gentleman whom I never ſaw, and have no manner of acquaintance with. I wonder how he comes to confer an obligation on me ſo ſuitable and agreeable to my preſent thoughts. If you have any hand in this favour to me, be pleaſed to accept of my thanks, and to expreſs the ſame to ſir Walter. The titles of thoſe papers are,

" Sir W. Petty's Quantulumcunque, concerning " money."

" A letter from an Engliſh merchant at Amſterdam " to his friend at London, concerning the trade and " coin of England."

" Some queſtions anſwered, relating to the badneſs " of the now ſilver coin of England."

I hear Mr. Lowndes of the Treaſury has publiſhed ſomething on that ſubject, and that Mr. Flamſtead has anſwered him, in a tract he calls Five, not Six.

I wiſh I could ſee them both, and ſhall beg the favour of you, if this letter finds you at London, to get them beaten pretty cloſe, and wrapped up in folds, and directed to me, unleſs they be much too bulky for the poſt. You need not have them franked, for our letters come to us ſo, as we are of the parliament here.

I herewith ſend you encloſed the copy of a letter from an ingenious man, on the problem which you have honoured with a place in page 67, of your eſſay. You will find thereby, that what I ſay, of its puzzling ſome ingenious men is true: and you will eaſily diſcover by what falſe ſteps this gentleman is led into his errour. The letter was communicated to me by the party to whom it was writ, Dr. Quayl. And the writer of the letter, Mr. Edw. Synge, is the author of a little book called The Gentleman's Religion, which is vended as yours. The gentleman is on a ſecond part, which he will ſhow me, before he ſends it to the preſs. But this is only between ourſelves and the bookſeller, who has been lately informed of thus much already. For though the book ſhows not that freedom of thought, as you or I, perhaps, may expect; yet it ſhows enough to incenſe his own herd againſt him; for there is little of myſtery or enthuſiaſtic in it, and yet the author is a clergyman. And you know that, in a writer on a religious ſubject, it is an high offence, even to be ſilent on thoſe abſtruſe points. The clergy are not diſſatisfied only with thoſe that plainly oppoſe them, but are enraged alſo, even at thoſe that omit zealouſly to advance them; as we have had a late inſtance in him, that writes againſt the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity.

I ſhould

I ſhould be mighty glad to hear that Mr. Burridge had ſet upon tranſlating your eſſay: I believe he will do it well.

I ſhall alſo be very much obliged by any information you give me of whatſoever is done, or doing by yourſelf, or others, relating to your works, of which there is none a more devoted admirer, than the excellent author's

Moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. SYNGE to Dr. QUAYL.

Dear SIR, Cork, Sept. 6, 1695.

MR. MOLYNEUX's ingenious queſtion, of which you gave me an account at Mr. Lukey's yeſterday, has run ſo much in my mind ever ſince, that I could ſcarce drive it out of my thoughts. To be revenged on you therefore for putting my brains in ſuch a ferment, I have reſolved to be ſo impertinent, as to ſend you the reſult of my meditations upon the ſubject.

The caſe is this: a man born perfectly blind has a globe and a cube given into his hands, and inſtructed, as much as he is capable of, in the notion of each of theſe figures, and the difference between them. Let us now ſuppoſe this man ſuddenly to be endowed with the ſenſe of ſeeing, and the queſtion is, "Whether, the "globe and the cube being placed before his eyes, he "would be able, by his ſight alone, and without "touching them, to tell which was the globe, and "which the cube?"

For the better underſtanding of what I ſhall ſay on this queſtion, I deſire you to take notice, that I call every notion of any thing, which a man entertains, an idea; but that notion only, which a man entertains of a viſible thing, as it is viſible, I call an image.

This being premiſed, I lay down theſe propoſitions.

1. A man born blind may have a true (though perhaps not a perfect) idea of a globe and of a cube, and of ſome difference, which is between them.

This evidently appears, becauſe he will certainly be able, by his touch, to diſtinguiſh them one from the other.

2. A man who has ever been perfectly blind, and whilſt he ſo remains, can have no image in his mind, either of a cube, or a globe.

This, in my opinion, is very evident, becauſe there is no paſſage but the organs of ſight (of which we ſuppoſe him to be deprived) for ſuch an image to enter: and I take it for granted, that ſuch images are not innate in men's apprehenſions.

3. Such a man, as ſoon as he is endowed with the ſenſe of ſeeing, will immediately have a different image in his mind, of a globe, and of a cube, as they are expoſed to his ſight.

This muſt needs be ſo, if his ſight and the organs thereof be ſuch as ours, which we ſuppoſe.

4. And if immediately, upon the ſight of the globe and cube, there be grounds enough for ſuch a perſon clearly to perceive the agreement, and the difference, between his pre-conceived ideas, and newly conceived images of thoſe figures, then may he be able to know which is the globe, and which the cube, without touching them again after he has ſeen them.

For the agreement which he may find between his idea and his image of a globe, and the difference of the idea of a globe from the image of a cube ("& ſic vice "versâ") will be a ſufficient direction to him. (If, I ſay, there be ſufficient ground immediately to perceive the ſaid agreement and difference.)

5. The idea which ſuch a blind man muſt needs, by his touch alone, form of a globe, will be this, that it is a body which is exactly alike on all ſides.

For let him roll it, as often as he will, between his hands, and he can find no manner of difference between the one ſide and the other.

6. Part of the idea which ſuch a man muſt needs, by his touch, conceive of a cube, will be, that it is a body which is not alike in every part of its ſuperficies.

For in one part he feels a ſmooth flat, in another the ſharp point of an angle, and in a third a long ridge, which reaches from one angle to another.

7. The image, which at the firſt ſight ſuch a man will form of a globe, muſt needs repreſent it as a body which is alike on all ſides, which conſequently muſt be agreeable to the idea which he before had of it, and different from that idea which he had of a cube.

For turn a globe ten thouſand ways, and it ſtill carries the ſame aſpect, if it be all of the ſame colour, which we now ſuppoſe.

8. The image, which upon the firſt view ſuch a man will frame of a cube, muſt needs be this, that it is a body, which is not alike in all the parts of its ſuperficies, which conſequently muſt be agreeable to the idea which before he had of it, and different from that idea which he had of a globe.

For a cube does not carry the ſame aſpect, when it is expoſed to our ſight in different poſitions.

Since then the image, which ſuch a man would have of a globe, would be agreeable to the idea which before he had conceived of it, and different from that idea which before he had entertained of a cube (" & ſic vice " versâ") it follows, that by his ſight alone he might be able to know, which was the globe, and which the cube.

I have no more, but to wiſh you a good journey, and tell you, that if you call me impertinent for ſending you my thoughts upon ſuch a ſpeculation, I will retort, and tell that it was yourſelf who put the queſtion to

Your moſt affectionate friend, and faithful ſervant,

EDW. SYNGE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, March 14, 169$\frac{5}{6}$.

AS nothing is more pleaſing to me than a letter from you; ſo my concern is not little, when in ſo long a time I have wanted that ſatisfaction; and more eſpecially ſo, when I have reaſon to fear it may proceed from your indiſpoſition in health. The laſt letter I had from Mr. Churchill intimated to me, that you were not well, and I have not yet received any account to the contrary; ſo that my fears daily increaſe upon me, and I ſhall be very uneaſy, 'till I receive the glad tidings of your recovery and ſafety.

Mr. Lowndes's book about our coin, and yours againſt him (which I underſtand you have ſent me, and for which I moſt heartily thank you) are not yet arrived; when they come, you ſhall hear farther from me concerning them.

I have lately received a letter from Mr. Burridge, who is gone down to his cure in the country; he takes all opportunities of thanking you for the civil reception you gave him; and as it was upon my recommendation, I muſt alſo thank you for my ſhare in the favour. He tells me he has read over your eſſay carefully, and has juſt ſet upon the tranſlation thereof; but he has not yet ſent me any ſpecimen thereof: when he does, you ſhall receive it forthwith from me. I doubt not but he will perform it to your ſatisfaction; there is not a man in Ireland, but himſelf, for whom I dare promiſe ſo boldly in this matter. One thing he intimates to me, which I muſt needs mention to you, as being ſo agreeable to the apprehenſions I have always had of the excellent author of the eſſay, to whom I have ſometimes preſumed to propoſe it, viz. that he would write a book of offices, or moral philoſophy. I give you Mr. Burridge's own words, who goes on, "The "fine ſtrokes which he has frequently in his eſſay, "make me think he would perform it admirably. I "wiſh you would try his inclinations; you may aſſure "him,

" him, I will chearfully undertake the tranſlation of it " afterwards."

Thus you ſee, ſir, how you are attacked on all ſides; I doubt not but you have as frequent ſolicitations from your friends in England. I will, at this time, add nothing more to the troubleſome importunity. Only on this occaſion I will venture to tell you, that I have a deſign on Mr. Burridge, to get him, by degrees, to tranſlate all the books you have written, and will give leave for. I am,

Honoured SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, March 30, 1696.

THOUGH I have been very ill this winter, not without ſome apprehenſions of my life, yet I am aſhamed that either that, or buſineſs, that has taken up more of my time than my health could well allow, ſhould keep me ſo long ſilent, to a man ſo kindly concerned to hear from me. It was more than once that I reſolved on the next poſt, but ſtill ſomething or other came between; and I more readily yielded to delays, in hopes to hear ſomething from you, concerning my anſwer to Mr. Lowndes. If this be a fault in me, it is ſuch an one that I am guilty of to nobody but my friends. Perhaps the running from ceremony, or punctuality, towards thoſe whom I look on as my ſure friends, that is, myſelf, may ſometimes carry me a little too far to the other ſide. But if you diſapprove of it, I ſhall only ſay, it is an ill effect of a very good cauſe; and beg you to believe, that I ſhall never be tardy in writing,

ſpeaking, or doing, whenever I ſhall think it may be of any moment to the leaſt intereſt of yours.

The buſineſs of our money has ſo near brought us to ruin, that, 'till the plot broke out, it was every body's talk, every body's uneaſineſs. And, becauſe I had played the fool to print about it, there was ſcarce a poſt wherein ſomebody or other did not give me freſh trouble about it. But now the parliament has reduced guineas to two-and-twenty ſhillings a-piece after the 10th inſtant, and prohibited the receipt of clipped money, after the 4th of may next. The bill has paſſed both houſes, and, I believe, will ſpeedily receive the royal aſſent. Though I can never bethink any pains, or time of mine, in the ſervice of my country, as far as I may be of any uſe; yet I muſt own to you, this, and the like ſubjects, are not thoſe which I now reliſh, or that do, with moſt pleaſure, employ my thoughts; and therefore ſhall not be ſorry, if I eſcape a very honourable employment, with a thouſand pounds a year ſalary annexed to it, to which the king was pleaſed to nominate me ſome time ſince. May I have but quiet and leiſure, and a competency of health to perfect ſome thoughts my mind is ſometimes upon, I ſhould deſire no more for myſelf in this world, if one thing were added to it, viz. you in my neighbourhood. You cannot imagine, how much I want ſuch a friend within diſtance, with whom I could confer freely " de quolibet " ente," and have his ſenſe of my reveries, and his judgment to guide me.

I am aſhamed to receive ſo many thanks for having done ſo little for a man who came recommended to me by you. I had ſo little opportunity to ſhow the civility I would have done to Mr. Burridge, that I ſhould not know how to excuſe it to you, or him, were not he himſelf a witneſs of the perpetual hurry I was in, all the time I was then in town. I doubt not at all of his performance in the tranſlation of my book he has undertaken. He has underſtanding, and latin, much beyond thoſe who uſually meddle with ſuch works. And I am ſo well ſatisfied, both of his ability and your care, that the ſending me a ſpecimen I ſhall look on as more than

than needs. As to a " treatiſe of morals," I muſt own to you that you are not the only perſons (you and Mr. Burridge, I mean) who have been for putting me upon it; neither have I wholly laid by the thoughts of it. Nay, I ſo far incline to comply with your deſires, that I, every now and then, lay by ſome materials for it, as they occaſionally occur, in the rovings of my mind. But when I conſider, that a book of offices, as you call it, ought not to be ſlightly done, eſpecially by me, after what I have ſaid of that ſcience in my eſſay; and that " nonumque prematur in annum," is a rule more neceſſary to be obſerved in a ſubject of that conſequence, than in any thing Horace ſpeaks of; I am in doubt, whether it would be prudent, in one of my age and health, not to mention other diſabilities in me, to ſet about it. Did the world want a rule, I confeſs there could be no work ſo neceſſary, nor ſo commendable. But the goſpel contains ſo perfect a body of ethics, that reaſon may be excuſed from that inquiry, ſince ſhe may find man's duty clearer and eaſier in revelation, than in herſelf. Think not this the excuſe of a lazy man, though it be, perhaps, of one who, having a ſufficient rule for his actions, is content therewith, and thinks he may, perhaps, with more profit to himſelf, employ the little time and ſtrength he has, in other reſearches, wherein he finds himſelf more in the dark.

You put too great a value on my writings, by the deſign you own on Mr. Burridge, in reference to them. I am not to flatter myſelf, that, becauſe they had the good luck to paſs pretty well here, amongſt engliſh readers, that therefore they will ſatisfy the learned world, and be fit to appear in the learned language. Mr. Wynne's abſtract of my eſſay is now publiſhed, and I have ſent order to Mr. Churchill to ſend you one of them. Thus far in anſwer to yours of the 14th of march. I come now to that of the 24th of december.

My lord deputy and you did too great honour to the paper I ſent you, and to me, upon that account. I know too well the deficiency of my ſtyle, to think it deſerves the commendations you give it. That which makes my writings tolerable, if any thing, is only this, that

that I never write for any thing but truth, and never publiſh any thing to others, which I am not fully perſuaded of myſelf, and do not think that I underſtand. So that I never have need of falſe colours to ſet off the weak parts of an hypotheſis, or of obſcure expreſſions, or the aſſiſtance of artificial jargon, to cover an errour of my ſyſtem, or party. Where I am ignorant (for what is our knowledge) I own it. And though I am not proud of my errours; yet I am always ready and glad to be convinced of any of them. I think there wants nothing, but ſuch a preference of truth to party-intereſt and vain-glory, to make any body out-do me, in what you ſeem ſo much to admire.

Though ſir Walter Yonge be an intimate friend of mine, yet I can aſſure you, I know nothing of thoſe three prints he franked you, and ſo have no title to any part of your thanks.

I ſee by Mr. S.'s anſwer to that which was originally your queſtion, how hard it is for even ingenious men to free themſelves from the anticipations of ſenſe. The firſt ſtep towards knowledge is to have clear and diſtinct ideas; which I have juſt reaſon, every day more and more, to think few men ever have, or think themſelves to want; which is one great cauſe of that infinite jargon and nonſenſe which ſo peſters the world. You have a good ſubject to work on; and therefore, pray let this be your chief care, to fill your ſon's head with clear and diſtinct ideas, and teach him on all occaſions, both by practice and rule, how to get them, and the neceſſity of it. This, together with a mind active and ſet upon the attaining of reputation and truth, is the true principling of a young man. But to give him a reverence for our opinions, becauſe we taught them, is not to make knowing men, but prattling parrots. I beg your pardon for this liberty; it is an expreſſion of good-will, and not the leſs ſo, becauſe not within the preciſe forms of good breeding. I am,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

John Locke.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, June 6, 1696.

Honoured SIR,

IT is a melancholy thought to me, that ſince I have had the happineſs of your correſpondence, there has hardly happened a year, when both you and I have not made it an apology for our long ſilence, that we have been indiſpoſed in our health; yet it has pleaſed God, that ſo it has been, and ſo it is on my ſide at preſent. About four years and an half ago I was firſt ſeized by a violent colic, which then ſo weakened me, that, to this time, I lie ſo far under the effects thereof, as upon any cold to be very apt to relapſe into the ſame. And ſo it has been with me, for a while paſt; but now, God be thanked, I am again well recovered. I had not otherwiſe ſo long deferred my anſwer to yours of march the 30th, which, after a long ſilence, brought me the aſſurance of your health, and therewith no ſmall ſatisfaction; having, before that, entertained ſome painful thoughts of your indiſpoſition, from ſome rumours I had heard. But, I find, heaven is not yet ſo angry with us, as to take you from amongſt us.

And now I moſt heartily congratulate you, both on the recovery of your health, and on the honourable preferment you have lately received from his majeſty. In your writings concerning money, you have given ſuch demonſtrative proofs of your reach, even in the buſineſs of the world, that I ſhould have wondered, had the king overlooked you. And I do as much wonder, that, after what you have publiſhed on that ſubject, there ſhould remain the leaſt doubt with any man, concerning that matter. But, I fancy, it is only thoſe who are prejudiced by their intereſt, that ſeem to be diſſatisfied; ſuch as bankers, &c. who made a prey of the people's ignorance in this great affair. But, I think, you have cleared up the myſtery, and made it ſo plain to all men's capacities, that England will never again fall into the like inconveniencies. 'Till you writ,

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we uſed money as the indians do their wampompeck; it ſerved us well enough for buying and ſelling, and we were content and heeded it no farther; but for the intimate nature, affections, and properties thereof, we did no more underſtand them than the indians their ſhells.

I have read over Mr. Wynne's abridgment of your eſſay. But I muſt confeſs to you, I was never more ſatisfied with the length of your eſſay, than ſince I have ſeen this abridgment; which, though done juſtly enough, yet falls ſo ſhort of that ſpirit, which every-where ſhows itſelf in the original, that nothing can be more different. To one already verſed in the eſſay, the abridgment ſerves as a good remembrancer; but, I believe, let a man, wholly unacquainted with the former, begin to read the latter, and he will not ſo well reliſh it. So that, how deſirous ſoever I might have formerly been, of ſeeing your eſſay put into the form of a logic for the ſchools, I am now fully ſatisfied I was in an errour; and muſt freely confeſs to you, that I wiſh Mr. Wynne's abridgment had been yet undone. That ſtrength of thought and expreſſion, that every-where reigns throughout your works, makes me ſometimes wiſh them twice as long.

I find, by ſome little pieces I have lately met with, that you are the reputed author of the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity; whether it be really ſo, or not, I will not preſume to inquire, becauſe there is no name to the book; this only I will venture to ſay, on that head, that whoever is the author, or vindicator thereof, he has gotten as weak an adverſary in Mr. Edwards to deal with, as a man could wiſh; ſo much unmannerly paſſion, and billingſgate language, I have not ſeen any man uſe. In ſo much, that were Mr. Edwards to defend the beſt cauſe in the world, ſhould he do it in that manner, he would ſpoil it. Were an angel of heaven to juſtify a truth, with virulence and heat, he would not prevail.

And now, my ever honoured friend, with much reluctance, I am to tell you, that I cannot be ſo happy this ſummer as to ſee you in England. It is needleſs

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to trouble you with a long detail of the reaſons hereof; but what between my own private affairs, and a little place I have in the public, ſo it is, and I cannot help it. But, as a ſmall repair to myſelf of this diſappointment, I ſhall beg the favour of you to admit a young gentleman, whom I ſhall ſend to you within a while, only to look on you, and afterwards look on a picture of yours, which I hear is at Mr. Churchill's. The young gentleman's name is Howard, a modeſt and ingenious youth, and excellently ſkilled both in the judicious and practical part of painting; for his advancement wherein, he is now kept at London, and deſigns ſoon for Italy. He is the eldeſt brother to my brother's wife, of a good fortune and family. If, by his report, I underſtand that that picture of yours at Mr. Churchill's be an excellent piece, and like you, he will procure it to be finely copied for me, and I may ſave you the trouble of ſitting; but if it prove otherwiſe, and be not worth copying, I will then make it my requeſt to you, that, at your leiſure, you would ſpare me ſo many hours time, as to ſit for ſuch a hand as Mr. Howard ſhall procure to take your picture. This I thought fit to intimate to you beforehand, that when he waits on you, you may be forewarned of his buſineſs.

I doubt not but, by this time, you have heard of our lord deputy Capel's death. We are now under a moſt unſettled government, and our eyes are fixed on England for relief. Some here wiſh for your noble patron, my lord Pembroke; and go ſo far as to ſay, that he will be the man. I am confident we ſhould be happy under one that favoured you; and if there be any thing in this report, you would highly favour me, by letting his lordſhip know, that here he will find me, amongſt ſeveral others, that are your admirers; for that I reckon the moſt advantageous character I can come, recommended under, to his lordſhip.

Mr. Burridge has been lately ſo taken up with his eccleſiaſtic affairs in the country, that (as he writes me word) he has hitherto made but little farther progreſs in the tranſlation of the eſſay, but he promiſes now to

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ſet about it earneſtly. I wiſh you would give me your free opinion of what I have already ſent you thereof.

I fear your public buſineſs will, in ſome meaſure, take you off from your more retired thoughts, by which the world were gainers every day. But, good ſir, let me intreat you, that, at your leiſure hours, you would think on, and ſend a line to

Your moſt affectionate, and humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, July 2, 1696.

I CANNOT, without great trouble, hear of any indiſpoſition of yours: your friendſhip, which heaven has beſtowed on me, as one of the greateſt bleſſings I can enjoy, for the remainder of my life, is what I value at ſo high a rate, that I cannot conſider myſelf within danger of loſing a perſon, every way ſo dear to me, without very great uneaſineſs of mind.

Thus far I got, when I ſat down to write to you, about a month ſince, as you will ſee, by the date at the top; buſineſs, and a little excurſion into the country, has hindered me ever ſince. Were you a man I only cared to talk with, out of civility, I ſhould ſooner anſwer your letters. But, not contenting myſelf with ſuch a formal correſpondence with you, I cannot find in my heart to begin writing to you, 'till I think I ſhall have time to talk a great deal, and pour out my mind to a man, to whom I make ſure I can do it with freedom; his candour and friendſhip allow that, and I find I know not what pleaſure in doing it. I promiſed myſelf abundance of pleaſure this ſummer, in ſeeing you here, and the diſappointment is one of the moſt ſenſible I could have met with, in my private concerns: and the occaſion, that robbed me of that ſatisfaction, frights me,

me. I have, I thank God, now as much health, as my conſtitution will allow me to expect. But yet, if I will think like a reaſonable man, the flattery of my ſummer vigour ought not to make me count beyond the next winter, at any time for the future. The laſt ſat ſo heavy upon me, that it was with difficulty I got through it; and you will not blame me, if I have a longing to ſee and embrace a man I eſteem and love ſo much, before I leave this ſilly earth; which, when the conveniencies of life are moderately provided for, has nothing of value in it equal to the converſation of a knowing, ingenious, and large-minded friend, who ſincerely loves and ſeeks truth.

When I took pen in hand to continue this letter, I had yours of march and june laſt before me, with a deſign to anſwer them. But my pen run on, as you ſee, before I could get leave of my forward thoughts, to come to what was my chief buſineſs, viz. to read again, and anſwer thoſe kind letters of yours.

That of march 28, brought me a ſample of Mr. Burridge's tranſlation: upon my reading of it, I began to correct it after my faſhion, and intended to have gone through that, and ſo all the reſt of the ſheets, as they came to my hand: but ſome other more preſſing occaſion interrupted me, and now I am paſt all hopes to have any leiſure at all to do any thing more to it in that kind, and muſt wholly leave it to his and your care. When I ſay your care, I do not make ſo ill an uſe of your kindneſs, as to expect you ſhould look it over and correct it; but I doubt not but you have ſuch an intereſt in your college, that you can have the aſſiſtance of ſome able man there to do it. The ſubject itſelf, and my way of expreſſing my thoughts upon them, may, I doubt not, but be very different from the genius of the latin tongue, and therefore I ſhould not think it amiſs, if Mr. Burridge would take more liberty to quit the ſcheme and phraſe of my ſtyle, and ſo he takes but my ſenſe, to comply more with the turn and manner of Tully's philoſophical language. For ſo he has but my ſenſe, I care not how much he neglects my words; and whether he expreſſes my thoughts, you are as good judge

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as I, for I think you as much maſter of them. I ſay this to excuſe you from the trouble of ſending his papers over to me, as he diſpatches them; for in my preſent circumſtances I ſhall hardly have time ſo much as to peruſe them. Pray, when you ſee, or ſend to him, give him my humble ſervice.

Though your colic has done me no ſmall prejudice, yet I am much more angry with it, upon the account of thoſe inconveniencies it has made you ſuffer. I know you are in ſkilful, as well as careful hands, under the care of your brother, and it could not be adviſeable in any one to draw you from them. The colic is ſo general a name for pains in the lower belly, that I cannot from thence pretend to make any judgment of your caſe; but it can be no harm to adviſe you to aſk him, whether he does not think that the drinking of our Bath waters may be uſeful to you in your caſe. I know thoſe waters mightily ſtrengthen thoſe parts.

Your congratulation to me I take, as you meant, kindly and ſeriouſly, and it may be it is what another would rejoice in: but, if you would give me leave to whiſper truth without vanity, in the ear of a friend, it is a preferment which I ſhall get nothing by, and I know not whether my country will, though that I ſhall aim at, with all my endeavours.

Riches may be inſtrumental to ſo many good purpoſes, that it is, I think, vanity, rather than religion or philoſophy, to pretend to contemn them. But yet they may be purchaſed too dear. My age and health demand a retreat from buſtle and buſineſs, and the purſuit of ſome inquiries, I have in my thoughts, makes it more deſirable than any of thoſe rewards, which public employments tempt people with. I think the little I have enough, and do not deſire to live higher, or die richer than I am. And therefore you have reaſon rather to pity the folly, than congratulate the fortune, that engages me in the whirlpool.

It is your pre-occupation, in favour of me, that makes you ſay what you do of Mr. Wynne's abridgment; I know not, whether it be that, or any thing elſe, that has occaſioned it; but I was told ſome time ſince, that my

my eſſay began to get ſome credit in Cambridge, where I think, for ſome years after it was publiſhed, it was ſcarce ſo much as looked into. But now I have ſome reaſon to think it is a little more favourably received there, by theſe two queſtions held there this laſt commencement; viz. "Probabile eſt animam non ſemper co-" gitare:" and, " Idea Dei non eſt innata."

What you ſay of the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, gives me occaſion to aſk your thoughts of that treatiſe, and alſo how it paſſes amongſt you there; for here, at its firſt coming out, it was received with no indifferency, ſome ſpeaking of it with great commendation, but moſt cenſuring it, as a very bad book. What you ſay of Mr. Edwards is ſo viſible, that I find all the world of your mind.

This is now a third ſitting before I finiſh this letter, whereby, I fear, I ſhall give you an ill picture of myſelf. By the reading of the next paragraph of your obliging letter of june 6, I am mightily comforted to find that it is not want of health (as it run in my head by a ſtrong impreſſion, I found remained in my mind, from the colic mentioned in the beginning of your letter) but buſineſs, that keeps me this year from the happineſs of your company. This is much more tolerable to me than the other, and though I ſuffer by it, yet I can bear it the better, whilſt there is room to hope it may be ſuch, that both you and your country may receive advantage by it. Mr. Howard, whom I was reſolving yeſterday morning to inquire after, prevented me by a viſit he made me, wherein he gave me an account he had received a letter from you, ſince his return from Cambridge. That which you deſire of me, as the chief reaſon of affording me his acquaintance, is what I cannot refuſe, and yet it cauſes in me ſome confuſion to grant. If the original could do you any ſervice, I ſhall be glad; but to think my picture worth your having, would carry too much vanity with it, to allow my conſent, did not the ſkill of the painter often make amends for the meanneſs of the ſubject, and a good pencil frequently make the painted repreſentation of more value than the real ſubſtance. This

may probably be my caſe. Mr. Howard is a very pretty young gentleman, and I thank you for his acquaintance. I wiſh it lay in my power to do him any ſervice, whilſt he is here. If the length of my letter could be an excuſe for the ſlowneſs of its coming, I have certainly made a very ample apology; though I ſatisfy myſelf neither in being ſilent ſo long, nor in tiring you with talking ſo much now; but it is from an heart wholly devoted to you. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, humble ſervant,

Aug. 4, 1696.

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, London, 12 Sept. 1696.

COULD the painter have made a picture of me, capable of your converſation, I ſhould have ſat to him with more delight, than ever I did any thing in my life. The honour you do me, in giving me thus a place in your houſe, I look upon as the effect of having a place already in your eſteem and affection; and that made me more eaſily ſubmit to what methought looked too much like vanity in me. Painting was deſigned to repreſent the gods, or the great men that ſtood next to them. But friendſhip, I ſee, takes no meaſure of any thing, but by itſelf; and where it is great and high, will make its object ſo, and raiſe it above its level. This is that which has deceived you into my picture, and made you put ſo great a compliment upon me; and I do not know what you will find to juſtify yourſelf to thoſe who ſhall ſee it in your poſſeſſion. You may, indeed, tell them the original is as much yours as the picture; but this will be no great boaſt, when the man is not more conſiderable than his ſhadow.

dow. When I looked upon it, after it was done, methought it had not that countenance I ought to accoſt you with. I know not whether the ſecret diſpleaſure I felt whilſt I was ſitting, from the conſideration that the going of my picture brought us no nearer together, made me look grave: but this I muſt own, that it was not without regret, that I remembered that this counterfeit would be before me, with the man, that I ſo much deſired to be with, and could not tell him, how much I longed to put myſelf into his hands, and to have him in my arms. One thing pray let it mind you of, and when you look on it at any time, pray believe, that the colours of that face on the cloth, are more fading and changeable than thoſe thoughts, which will always repreſent you to my mind, as the moſt valuable perſon in the world, whoſe face I do not know, and one whoſe company is ſo deſirable to me, that I ſhall not be happy 'till I do.

Though I know how little ſervice I am able to do; yet my conſcience will never reproach me, for not wiſhing well to my country, by which I mean engliſhmen, and their intereſt every-where. There has been, of late years, a manufacture of linen, carried on in Ireland, if I miſtake not; I would be glad to learn from you the condition it is in; and, if it thrives not, what are the rubs and hindrances that ſtop it. I ſuppoſe you have land very proper to produce flax and hemp, why could there not be enough, eſpecially of the latter, produced there to ſupply his majeſty's navy? I ſhould be obliged by your thoughts about it, and how it might be brought about. I have heard there is a law requiring a certain quantity of hemp to be ſown every year: if it be ſo, how comes it to be neglected? I know you have the ſame public aims for the good of your country that I have, and therefore, without any apology, I take this liberty with you. I received an account of your health, and your remembrance of me, not long ſince by Mr. Howard, for which I return you my thanks. I troubled you with a long letter about the beginning of the laſt month, and am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and moſt humble ſervant,

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Honoured Sir, Dublin, Sept. 26, 1696.

I HAVE now before me two of yours, one of auguſt the 4th, and t'other of the 12th inſtant. I had ſooner anſwered the former, but that I waited to give you an account of the the farther progreſs of the tranſlation, which Mr. Burridge faithfully promiſed me; and I lately underſtand from him, that he has gone through the three firſt chapters of the firſt book. I muſt confeſs his avocations are many, and therefore his progreſs is not ſo quick as I could deſire. But I am ſure he will accompliſh it, and that well too; and Mr. Churchill has told him that you ſay, " ſat cito, ſi ſat bene:" and he is very well pleaſed, that you give him time.

I do not wonder that your eſſay is received in the univerſities. I ſhould indeed have wondered with indignation at the contrary; " magna eſt veritas & præ- " valebit." We may expect a liberty of philoſophizing in the ſchools; but that your doctrine ſhould be ſoon heard out of our pulpits, is what is much more remarkable. He that, even ten years ago, ſhould have preached, that " idea Dei non eſt innata," had certainly drawn on him the character of an atheiſt; yet now we find Mr. Bentley very large upon it, in his ſermons at Mr. Boyle's lectures, ſerm. 1. p. 4. and ſerm. 3. p. 5. and Mr. Whiſton, in his new theory of the earth, p. 128.

Mentioning theſe books minds me to intimate to you, that theſe ingenious authors agree exactly with you, in a paſſage you have in your thoughts of education, p. 337. 3d. edit. § 192. " That the phenomenon of gra- " vitation cannot be accounted for, by mere matter " and motion, but ſeems an immediate law of the di- " vine will ſo ordering it." And you conclude that ſection thus, " reſerving to a fitter opportunity, a " fuller explication of this hypotheſis, and the appli- " cation of it to all the parts of the deluge, and " any difficulties can be ſuppoſed in the hiſtory of " the

" the flood." This seems to imply, that you have some thoughts of writing on that subject; it would be a mighty satisfaction to me, to know from you the certainty thereof. I should be very glad also to hear what the opinion of the ingenious is concerning Mr. Whiston's book.

As to the " Reasonableness of Christianity," I do not find but it is well approved of here, amongst candid, unprejudiced men, that dare speak their thoughts. I'll tell you what a very learned and ingenious prelate said to me on that occasion: I asked him whether he had read that book, and how he liked it; he told me, very well; and that if my friend Mr. Locke writ it, it was the best book he ever laboured at; but, says he, if I should be known to think so, I should have my lawns torn from my shoulders. But he knew my opinion aforehand, and was, therefore, the freer to commit his secret thoughts in that matter to me.

I am very sorry I can give you no better an account of the linen manufactures of late years set up in Ireland than what follows.

About the year 1692 (I think) one mons. Du Pin came to Dublin from England, and here, by the king and queen's letter and patents thereon, he set up a royal corporation for carrying on the linen manufacture in Ireland. Into this corporation many of the nobility and gentry were admitted, more for their countenance and favour to the project, than for any great help could be expected, either from their purses or heads, to carry on the work. Du Pin himself was nominated undergovernor, and a great bustle was made about the business; many meetings were held, and considerable sums advanced to forward the work, and the members promised themselves prodigious gains; and this expectation prevailed so far (by what artifices I cannot tell) as to raise the value of each share to 40 or 50 pounds, though but five pounds was paid by each member at first, for every share he had. At length artificers began to set at work, and some parcels of cloth were made, when on a sudden there happened some controversy between the corporation here in Ireland, and

ſuch another corporation eſtabliſhed in England by London undertakers, and in which Du Pin was alſo a chief member. Much time was loſt in managing this diſpute, and the work began in the mean time to flag, and the price of the ſhares to lower mightily.

But, ſome little time before this controverſy happened, ſome private gentlemen and merchants, on their own ſtock, without the authority of an incorporating patent, ſet up a linen manufacture at Drogheda, which promiſed, and thrived very well at firſt; and the corporation of Dublin, perceiving this, began to quarrel with them alſo, and would never let them alone till they embodied with them. Theſe quarrels and controverſies (the particulars whereof I can give you no account of, for I was not engaged amongſt them, and I can get no one that was, who can give any tolerable account of them; I ſay they) grew ſo high, and Du Pin began to play ſuch tricks, that all were diſcouraged, and withdrew as faſt as they could. So that now all is blown up, and nothing of this kind is carried on, but by ſuch as out of their own private purſes ſet up looms and bleaching-yards. We have many of theſe in many parts of Ireland; and I believe no country in the world is better adapted for it, eſpecially the north. I have as good diaper, made by ſome of my tenants, nigh Armagh, as can come to a table, and all other cloth for houſhold uſes.

As to the law for the encouraging the linen manufacture, it is this: In the 17th and 18th of Car. II. there was an act of parliament made, "obliging all landlords "and tenants to ſow ſuch a certain proportion of their "holdings with flax, under a great penalty on both, "on failure; and impowering the ſheriffs to levy 20 "pounds, in each of their reſpective counties, to be "diſtributed at the quarter ſeſſions, yearly, to the three "perſons who ſhould bring in the three beſt webs of linen "cloth, of ſuch a length and breadth, 10l. to the firſt, "6l. to the ſecond, and 4l. to the third." This, whilſt it laſted, was a great encouragement to the country people, to ſtrive to out-do each other, and it produced excellent cloth all over the kingdom; but then it was

but

but temporary, only for twenty years from passing the act, and is now expired. But that part of the act, "ordaining landlords and tenants to sow flax," is perpetual; and I can give no reason why it is not executed; only this I can say, that the transgression is so universal, and the forfeiture thereon to the king is so severe, that if it were inquired into, I believe all the estates in Ireland would be forfeited to his majesty. So that now the multitude of sinners is their security. This statute you will find amongst the irish acts, 17 & 18 Car. II. chap. 9.

England, most certainly, will never let us thrive by the woollen trade; this is their darling mistress, and they are jealous of any rival. But I see not that we interfere with them, in the least, by the linen trade. So that that is yet left open to us to grow rich by, if it were well established and managed; but by what means this should be, truly I dare not venture to give my thoughts. There is no country has better land, or water, for flax and hemp, and I do verily believe the navy may be provided here, with sailing and cordage, cheaper by far than in England. Our land is cheaper, victuals for workmen is cheaper, and labour is cheaper, together with other necessaries for artificers.

I know not in what manner to thank you for the trouble you have been at, in sitting for your picture, on my account. It is a favour of that value, that I acknowledge myself extremely obliged to you for; and therefore I could not think that the expressions concerning it in your last belonged to me, did they come from one less sincere than yourself. "Painting, it is true, "was designed to represent the gods, and the great men, "that stand next them;" and therefore it was, that I desired your picture. This, sir, is the real and sincere thought of

Your most obliged humble servant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Sir, Dublin, Jan. 5, 169$\frac{6}{7}$.

IT is now three months ſince I ventured to trouble you with a letter; you may ſee thereby that I have a regard to the public buſineſs you are engaged in; but I have not been all this while without the ſatisfaction of hearing that you are well; for, as all my friends know, that I have the moſt reſpectful concern for you in the world; ſo they are not wanting, on all opportunities, from t'other ſide the water, to give me the acceptable tidings of your welfare. I have lately received a letter from Mr. Howard, that obliges me to make his acknowledgments for the favours he has received from you. This I can hardly do, without complaining of him at the ſame time, for not yet ſending me your picture; but I ſuppoſe, by this time, it is on the road hither, and I forgive him; and with all gratitude imaginable, return you my thanks on his account.

The encloſed piece of natural hiſtory I am deſired by my brother to preſent to you, with his moſt affectionate humble ſervice. If, upon peruſing it, you think it may deſerve it, you may ſend it by the penny-poſt to the Royal Society, to fill up an empty page in the tranſactions. There is nothing to recommend it but its being exactly true, and an account of a non-deſcript animal. Formerly I had a conſtant correſpondence with the ſecretary of the ſociety, but of late it has failed; and therefore we take the liberty of ſending this through your hands.

I have lately met with a book here of Monſ. Le Clerc's, called The Cauſes of Incredulity, done out of french. It is the ſame Le Clerc that writes Ontologia, and dedicates it to you. I find thereby you are his acquaintance and friend; I ſhould be very glad you would be pleaſed to give me ſome account of that gentleman, and his circumſtances in the world, if you know

know them. To me he ſeems an impartial and candid inquirer after truth, and to have the true ſpirit of chriſtianity in that his book. The reaſon why I inquire after him, is, becauſe I ſuppoſe him one of the refugees from France, and perhaps he may receive ſome encouragement to come into this kingdom. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Feb. 3, $169\frac{5}{7}$.

AS I had reaſon to rejoice on the nation's account, when you were firſt put on public buſineſs; ſo I find, on my own particular, I had cauſe to lament; for ſince that time (to my great concern) your letters have been leſs frequent, and the ſatisfaction I had in them abundantly diminiſhed. Were I aſſured of the confirmed ſtate of your health, I could more patiently ſubmit to this; but knowing your ſickly diſpoſition, a month's ſilence puts me in pain for you; and I am very uneaſy under the apprehenſions of any danger that may attend you. Favour me therefore, good ſir, though it were but a line or two, in the crowd of your buſineſs; for that itſelf would be ſome contentment to me, in the want of thoſe noble philoſophical thoughts which ſometimes you were pleaſed to communicate to me.

And now, ſir, I ſhall beg a favour of you a little out of our common road of correſpondence. We have here lately received the certainty of Mr. Methwin's being declared our lord chancellor; and truly, ſir, all moderate and good men, I find, are very well pleaſed at it. I ſuppoſe, by your intereſt and acquaintance with my lord keeper of England, you have an acquaintance

quaintance likewiſe with Mr. Methwin; and I beg the favour of you to mention me to him as your devoted friend and ſervant. I am ſure, if he knows you rightly, I cannot be repreſented to him under a more advantageous character; and I know this will give me admittance to his graces, which I deſire more, as I hear he is a good, than a great man; and, being one of the maſters in chancery here, it is natural to covet the favour of him under whom I am to act.

I have lately met with a book of the biſhop of Worceſter's concerning the Trinity. He takes occaſion therein to reflect on ſome things in your Eſſay; but truly, I think, with no great ſtrength of reaſon. However, he being a man of great name, I humbly propoſe it to you, whether you may not judge it worth your while to take notice of what he ſays, and give ſome anſwer to it, which will be no difficult taſk. I do not intend hereby, that an anſwer, on purpoſe for that end only, ſhould be framed by you; I think it not of that moment; but perhaps you may find ſome accidental occaſion of taking notice thereof, either in the next edition of your Eſſay, or ſome other diſcourſe you may publiſh hereafter.

I have not yet received the ſatisfaction of having your likeneſs before me, and have therefore lately writ a very diſcontented letter about it to Mr. Howard. A great man here told me, I ſomething reſembled you in countenance; could he but aſſure me of being like you in mind too, it would have been the eternal honour and boaſt of

Your moſt devoted humble ſervant,

and entirely affectionate friend,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

I find, by a book I lately light on, of Mr. Norris's, that Mr. Maſham and my ſon agree in one odd circumſtance of life, of having both their mothers blind; for my wife loſt her ſight above twelve years before ſhe died, and I find lady Maſham is in the ſame condition.

Mr.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Sir, Oates, 22 Feb. $169\frac{6}{7}$.

I FEAR you will be of an opinion, that I take my picture for myſelf, and think you ought to look no farther, ſince that is coming to you, or is already with you. Indeed we are ſhadows much alike, and there is not much difference in our ſtrength and uſefulneſs. Yet I cannot but remember, that I cannot expect my picture ſhould anſwer your letters to me, pay the acknowledgments I owe you, and excuſe a ſilence as great as if I were nothing but a piece of cloth overlayed with colours. I could lay a great deal of the blame on buſineſs, and a great deal on want of health. Between theſe two I have had little leiſure ſince I writ to you laſt. But all that will bear no excuſe to myſelf, for being three letters in arrear to a perſon whom I the willingliеſt hear from of any man in the world, and with whom I had rather entertain myſelf, and paſs my hours in converſation, than with any one that I know. I ſhould take it amiſs if you were not angry with me for not writing to you all this while; for I ſhould ſuſpect you loved me not ſo well as I love you, if you could patiently bear my ſilence. I hope it is your civility makes you not chide me. I promiſe you, I ſhould have grumbled cruelly at you, if you had been half ſo guilty as I have been. But if you are angry a little, pray be not ſo very much; for if you ſhould provoke me any way, I know the firſt ſight of a letter from you, would allay all my choler immediately; and the joy of hearing you were well, and that you continued your kindneſs to me, would fill my mind, and leave me no other paſſion. For I tell you truly, that ſince the receipt of your letter in ſeptember laſt, there has ſcarce a day paſſed, I am ſure not a poſt, wherein I have not thought of my obligation and debt to you, and reſolved to acknowledge it to you, though ſomething or other has ſtill come between to hinder me. For you would have pitied me, to ſee how much of my time was forced from me this winter in the country (where

(where my illneſs confined me within doors,) by crouds of letters, which were therefore indiſpenſably to be anſwered, becauſe they were from people whom either I knew not, or cared not for, or was not willing to make bold with; and ſo you, and another friend I have in Holland, have been delayed, and put laſt, becauſe you are my friends beyond ceremony and formality. And I reſerved myſelf for you when I was at leiſure, in the eaſe of thoughts to enjoy. For, that you may not think you have been paſſed over by a peculiar neglect, I mention to you another very good friend of mine, of whom I have now by me a letter, of an ancienter date than the firſt of your three, yet unanſwered.

However you are pleaſed, out of kindneſs to me, to rejoice in yours of ſeptember 26, that my notions have had the good luck to be vented from the pulpit, and particularly by Mr. Bentley; yet that matter goes not ſo clear as you imagine. For a man of no ſmall name, as you know Dr. S—— is, has been pleaſed to declare againſt my doctrine of no innate ideas, from the pulpit in the Temple, and, as I have been told, charged it with little leſs than atheiſm. Though the doctor be a great man, yet that would not much fright me, becauſe I am told, that he is not always obſtinate againſt opinions which he has condemned more publicly, than in an harangue to a ſunday's auditory. But that it is poſſible he may be firm here, becauſe it is alſo ſaid, he never quits his averſion to any tenet he has once declared againſt, 'till change of times, bringing change of intereſt, and faſhionable opinions open his eyes and his heart, and then he kindly embraces what before deſerved his averſion and cenſure. My book crept into the world about ſix or ſeven years ago, without any oppoſition, and has ſince paſſed amongſt ſome for uſeful, and, the leaſt favourable, for innocent. But, as it ſeems to me, it is agreed by ſome men that it ſhould no longer do ſo. Something, I know not what, is at laſt ſpied out in it, that is like to be troubleſome, and therefore it muſt be an ill book, and be treated accordingly. It is not that I know any thing in particular, but ſome things that have happened at the ſame time together,

together, ſeem to me to ſuggeſt this: What it will produce, time will ſhow. But, as you ſay in that kind letter, " Magna eſt veritas & prævalebit;" that keeps me at perfect eaſe in this, and whatever I write; for as ſoon as I ſhall diſcover it not to be truth, my hand ſhall be the forwardeſt to throw it in the fire.

You deſire to know, what the opinion of the ingenious is, concerning Mr. Whiſton's book. I have not heard any one of my acquaintance ſpeak of it, but with great commendation, as I think it deſerves. And truly I think he is more to be admired, that he has laid down an hypotheſis, whereby he has explained ſo many wonderful, and, before, inexplicable things in the great changes of this globe, than that ſome of them ſhould not go eaſily down with ſome men, when the whole was entirely new to all. He is one of thoſe ſort of writers, that I always fancy ſhould be moſt eſteemed and encouraged. I am always for the builders who bring ſome addition to our knowledge, or, at leaſt, ſome new thing to our thoughts. The finders of faults, the confuters and pullers down, do not only erect a barren and uſeleſs triumph upon human ignorance, but advance us nothing in the acquiſition of truth. Of all the mottos I ever met with, this, writ over a water-work at Cleve, beſt pleaſed me, " Natura omnes fecit judices, paucos " artifices."

I thank you for the account you gave me of your linen manufacture. Private knavery, I perceive, does there as well as here deſtroy all public good works, and forbid the hope of any advantages by them, where nature plentifully offers what induſtry would improve, were it but rightly directed, and duly cheriſhed. The corruption of the age gives me ſo ill a proſpect of any ſucceſs in deſigns of this kind, ever ſo well laid, that I am not ſorry my ill health gives me ſo juſt a reaſon to deſire to be eaſed of the employment I am in.

Yours of the 5th of january, which brought with it that curious and exact deſcription of that non-deſcript animal, found me here under the confinement of my ill lungs; but knowing buſineſs of ſeveral kinds would make it neceſſary for me to go to London as ſoon as poſſible,

poſſible, I thought it better to carry it thither myſelf, than ſend it at random to the Royal Society. Accordingly when I went up to town, about a fortnight ſince, I ſhowed it to Dr. Sloane, and put it into his hands to be communicated to the Royal Society; which he willingly undertook; and I promiſe myſelf it will be publiſhed in their next Tranſactions. Dr. Sloane is a very ingenious man, and a very good friend of mine; and, upon my telling him that your correſpondence with the ſecretary of the ſociety had been of late interrupted, he readily told me, that, if you pleaſed, he would take it up, and be very glad if you would allow him the honour of a conſtant correſpondence with you.

You ſhow your charitable and generous temper, in what you ſay concerning a friend of mine in Holland, who is truly all that you think of him. He is married there, and has ſome kind of ſettlement; but I could be glad, if you in Ireland, or I here (though of the latter ſay nothing to others) could get him a prebendary of 100 or 200l. per annum, to bring him over into our church, and to give him eaſe, and a ſure retreat to write in, where, I think, he might be of great uſe to the Chriſtian world. If you could do this, you would offer him a temptation would ſettle him amongſt us; if you think you cannot, I am nevertheleſs obliged to you, for offering to one, whom you take to be a friend of mine, what you are able. If he ſhould miſs the effect, yet I have ſtill the obligation to you.

When yours of the 3d inſtant met me in London, when I was there lately, I was rejoiced at my journey, though I was uneaſy in town, becauſe I thought my being there, might give me an opportunity to do you ſome little ſervice, or at leaſt ſhow you my willingneſs to do it. To that purpoſe I went twice or thrice to wait upon Mr. Methwin, though he be a perſon, in whoſe company I remember not that I was ever but once in my life. I miſſed him, by good luck, both times; and my diſtemper increaſed ſo faſt upon me, that though I went to London with an intention to make ſome ſtay there, yet I was forced away in eight days, and had not an opportunity to ſee Mr. Methwin at all. You will, perhaps,

haps, wonder to hear me call my miſſing of him, good luck; but ſo I muſt always call that which any way favours my deſign of ſerving you, as this did. For hereupon I applied myſelf to a friend of mine, who has an intereſt in him, and one to whom your worth and friendſhip to me are not unknown, who readily undertook all I deſired on your behalf. And I promiſe myſelf, from thence, that you will find Mr. Methwin will be as deſirous of your acquaintance, as you are of his.

You will, in a little time, ſee that I have obeyed, or rather anticipated a command of yours, towards the latter end of your laſt letter. What ſentiments I have of the uſage I have received from the perſon you there mention, I ſhall ſhortly more at large acquaint you. What he ſays, is, as you obſerve, not of that moment much to need an anſwer; but the ſly deſign of it I think neceſſary to oppoſe; for I cannot allow any one's great name a right to uſe me ill. All fair contenders for the opinions they have, I like mightily; but there are ſo few that have opinions, or at leaſt ſeem, by their way of defending them, to be really perſuaded of the opinions they profeſs, that I am apt to think there is in the world a great deal more ſcepticiſm, or at leaſt want of concern for truth, than is imagined. When I was in town I had the happineſs to ſee Mr. Burridge; he is, he ſays, ſpeedily returning to you, where I hope his book, which is received with great applauſe, will procure him ſomething more ſolid than the name it has got him here; which I look upon as a good forerunner of greater things to come. He ſpoke ſomething of his intention to ſet about my book, but that I muſt leave to you and him. There is lately fallen into my hand a paper of monſ. L——, writ to a gentleman here in England, concerning ſeveral things in my Eſſay. I was told, when I was in London, that he had lately ordered his correſpondent to communicate them to me, and ſomething elſe he has ſince writ hither. He treats me all along with great civility, and more compliment than I can deſerve. And being, as he is, a very great man, it is not for me to ſay there appears to me no great weight in the exceptions he makes to ſome paſſages in my book;

book; but his great name and knowledge in all parts of learning, ought to make me think, that a man of his parts ſays nothing but what has great weight in it; only I ſuſpect he has, in ſome places, a little miſtaken my ſenſe, which is eaſy for a ſtranger, who has (as I think) learned engliſh out of England. The ſervant I have now cannot copy french, or elſe you ſhould ſee what he ſays: when I have all his papers you ſhall hear farther from me. I repine, as often as I think of the diſtance between this and Dublin.

I read that paſſage of your letter to my lady Maſham which concerned her ſight; ſhe bid me tell you, that ſhe hopes to ſee you here this ſummer. You will, poſſibly, wonder at the miracle, but that you muſt find in Mr. Norris's book. She has, it is true, but weak eyes, which Mr. Norris, for reaſons he knew beſt, was reſolved to make blind ones. And having fitted his epiſtle to that ſuppoſition, could not be hindered from publiſhing it ſo; though my lady, to prevent it, writ him word that ſhe was not blind, and hoped ſhe never ſhould be. It is a ſtrange power, you ſee, we authors take to ourſelves; but there is nothing more ordinary, than for us to make whomſoever we will blind, and give them out to the world for ſuch, as boldly as Bayard himſelf. But it is time to ſpare you and your eyes. I am, with the utmoſt reſpect and ſincerity,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt affectionate ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, March 16, $169\frac{6}{7}$.

I MUST confeſs, dear ſir, I have not lately (if ever in my life) been under a greater concern, than at your long ſilence. Sometimes I was angry with myſelf, but I could not well tell why; and then I was apt to blame you,

you, but I could less tell why. As your silence continued, my distraction increased; till, at last, I was happily relieved by yours of the 22d of february, which came not to my hands till the 10th instant. I then perceived I was to charge some part of my troubled time to the conveyance of your letter, which was almost three weeks on its way hither; and that which added to my concern, was the want of even your shadow before me; for to this moment I have not received that, which will be apt, on its appearance, to make me an idolater. Mr. Howard writes me word, he has sent it from London above five weeks ago; but I hear nothing of it from our correspondent, to whom it is consigned in Chester. However, seeing I know the substance to be in safety, and well, I can bear the hazard of the shadow with some patience, and doubt not but my expectation will be satisfied in due time.

Both Whiston and Bentley are positive against the idea of God being innate; and I had rather rely on them (if I would rely on any man) than on Dr. S——. It is true, the latter has a great name; but that, I am sure, weighs not with you or me. Besides, you rightly observe, the doctor is no obstinate heretic, but may veer about when another opinion comes in fashion; for some men alter their notions as they do their cloaths, in compliance to the mode. I have heard of a master of the Temple, who, during the siege of Limerick, writ over hither to a certain prelate, to be sure to let him know, by the first opportunity, whenever it came to be surrendered, which was done accordingly; and immediately the good doctor's eyes were opened, and he plainly saw the oaths to K. William and Q. Mary were not only expedient but lawful, and our duty. A good roaring train of artillery is not only the "ratio ultima "regum," but of other men besides.

I fancy I pretty well guess what it is that some men find mischievous in your Essay: It is opening the eyes of the ignorant, and rectifying the methods of reasoning, which perhaps may undermine some received errours, and so abridge the empire of darkness; wherein, though the subjects wander deplorably, yet the rulers

have their profit and advantage. But it is ridiculous, in any man, to say in general your book is dangerous; let any fair contender for truth sit down and show wherein it is erroneous. Dangerous is a word of an uncertain signification; every one uses it in his own sense. A papist shall say it is dangerous; because, perhaps, it agrees not so well with transubstantiation; and a lutheran, because his consubstantiation is in hazard; but neither consider, whether transubstantiation or consubstantiation be true or false; but taking it for granted that they are true, or at least gainful, whatever hits not with it, or is against it, must be dangerous.

I am extremely obliged to you for your introducing a correspondence between Dr. Sloane and me, and it would be the greatest satisfaction imaginable to me, could I but promise myself materials, in this place, fit to support it. However, I shall soon begin it, by sending him an account of the largest quadruped that moves on the earth, except the elephant, with which this country has anciently been plentifully stocked, but are now quite perished from amongst us, and is not to be found, for aught as I can learn, any where at present, but about New England, Virginia, &c.

And now I come to that part of your letter relating to monsr. Le Clerc, which grieves me every time I think on it. There are so many difficulties, in what you propose concerning him, that I know not how they will be surmounted. The clergy here, have given that learned, pious, and candid man, a name that will frighten any bishop from serving him, though otherwise inclinable enough in his own breast. I know but two or three that are in any post in the church capable to help him; on whom I could rely to do it; but, at the same time, I know them to be such cautious wary men, and so fearful of the censure of the rest of the tribe, that they would hardly be brought to it. I take monsr. Le Clerc to be one of the greatest scholars in Europe; I look on him as one of the most judicious, pious, and sincere Christians that has appeared publicly; and it would be an infinite honour to us, to have him amongst us, but, I fear, an ecclesiastical preferment will be very difficult to be obtained

obtained for him. And indeed, when I troubled you to give me ſome account of him, it was in proſpect of bringing him into my own family, could his circumſtances have allowed it; for I took him to be a ſingle man, and one of the refugees in Holland, and wholly unprovided for. On his own account, I am heartily glad he has any ſettlement there; but, for my own ſake, I could wiſh he were in other circumſtances. But, notwithſtanding theſe difficulties, I have ventured to break this matter to a clergyman here in a conſiderable poſt, Dr. . . . . dean of . . . . . , a gentleman who is happy in your acquaintance, and is a perſon of an extenſive charity and great candour. He reliſhed the thing extremely, but moved the forementioned difficulties, and raiſed ſome farther ſcruples concerning Mr. Le Clerc's ordination; for ordained he muſt neceſſarily be, to capacitate him for an eccleſiaſtical preferment; and he queſtioned whether he would ſubmit to thoſe oaths, and ſubſcription of aſſent and conſent, that are requiſite thereto. But he promiſed me, that when he attends the king this ſummer into Holland, as his chaplain, he will wait on monſieur Le Clerc at Amſterdam, and diſcourſe with him farther about this matter. This gentleman is the likelieſt eccleſiaſtic in Ireland to effect this buſineſs, for he is a riſing man in the church; and though he be very zealous in his own principles, yet it is with the greateſt charity and deference to others; which, I think, is the true ſpirit of Chriſtianity. I have not mentioned you in the leaſt to him, in all this matter.

I am extremely obliged to you for the good offices you have done me to Mr. Methwin our lord chancellor. I promiſe myſelf a great deal of ſatisfaction in the honour of his lordſhip's acquaintance. And, I could wiſh, if it were conſiſtent with your convenience, that you would let me know the perſon you deſired to mention my name to his lordſhip.

I am heartily glad to underſtand, that you have taken notice of what the biſhop of Worceſter ſays, relating to your book. I have been in diſcourſe here, with an ingenious man, upon what the biſhop alleges; and the

gentleman obſerved, that the biſhop does not ſo directly object againſt your notions as erroneous, but as miſuſed by others, and particularly by the author of "Chriſtian-"ity not myſterious;" but I think, this is no very juſt obſervation. The biſhop directly oppoſes your doctrine, though, it is true, he does it on the occaſion of the foreſaid book. I am told, the author of that diſcourſe is of this country, and that his name is Toland, but he is a ſtranger in theſe parts; I believe, if he belongs to this kingdom, he has been a good while out of it, for I have not heard of any ſuch remarkable man amongſt us.

I ſhould be very glad to ſee monſ. L.'s paper concerning your Eſſay. He is certainly an extraordinary perſon, eſpecially in mathematics; but really, to ſpeak freely of him, in relation to what he may have to ſay to you, I do not expect any great matters from him; for methinks (with all deference to his great name) he has given the world no extraordinary ſamples of his thoughts this way, as appears by two diſcourſes he has printed, both in the "Acta Erudit. Lipſiæ," the firſt Anno 1694. pag. 110. "De primæ Philoſophiæ Emenda-"tione," &c. the other Anno 1695. pag. 145. "Specimen "Dynamicum," which truly to me is, in many places, unintelligible; but that may be my defect, and not his.

I beg you would excuſe me to my lady Maſham, for the errour I committed relating to her ladyſhip. I ever looked on Mr. Norris as an obſcure enthuſiaſtic man, but I could not think he would knowingly impoſe on the world ſo notorious a falſity in matter of fact. I wiſh authors would take more pains to open than to ſhut men's eyes, and then we ſhould have more ſucceſs in the diſcoveries of truth.———But I have almoſt outrun my paper. I am,

Ever honoured Sir,

Your moſt affectionate, and

moſt obliged humble ſervant,

Will. Molyneux.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, April 6, 1697.

IN my laſt to you of march 16, there was a paſſage relating to the author of "Chriſtianity not myſte-"rious." I did not then think that he was ſo near me, as within the bounds of this city; but I find ſince, that he is come over hither, and have had the favour of a viſit from him. I now underſtand (as I intimated to you) that he was born in this country; but that he has been a great while abroad, and his education was, for ſome time, under the great Le Clerc. But that for which I can never honour him too much, is his acquaintance and friendſhip to you, and the reſpect, which, on all occaſions, he expreſſes for you. I propoſe a great deal of ſatisfaction in his converſation; I take him to be a candid free-thinker, and a good ſcholar. But there is a violent ſort of ſpirit that reigns here, which begins already to ſhow itſelf againſt him; and, I believe, will increaſe daily; for I find the clergy alarmed to a mighty degree againſt him. And laſt ſunday he had his welcome to this city, by hearing himſelf harangued againſt, out of the pulpit, by a prelate of this country.

I have at laſt received my moſt eſteemed friend's picture; I muſt now make my grateful acknowledgements to you, for the many idle hours you ſpent in ſitting for it, to gratify my deſire. I never look upon it, but with the greateſt veneration. But though the artiſt has ſhown extraordinary ſkill at his pencil, yet now I have obtained ſome part of my deſire, the greateſt remains unſatisfied; and ſeeing he could not make it ſpeak, and converſe with me, I am ſtill at a loſs. But I find you are reſolved, in ſome meaſure, to ſupply even that too, by the kind preſents you ſend me of your thoughts, both in your letters, and in your books, as you publiſh them. Mr. Churchill tells me, I am obliged to you for one or two of this kind, that you have been pleaſed to favour me with; they are not yet come to hand, but I return

6

you my heartieſt thanks for them. I long, indeed, to ſee your anſwer to the biſhop of Worceſter; but for Edwards, I think him ſuch a poor wretch, he deſerves no notice. I am,

Moſt worthy SIR,

Your affectionate humble ſervant.

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, April 10, 1697.

THOUGH I do not ſuſpect that you will think me careleſs or cold in that ſmall buſineſs you deſired of me, and ſo left it in negligent hands, give me leave to ſend you a tranſcript of a paſſage in my friend's letter, which I received laſt poſt.

" It is a great while ſince that Mr. P.—— undertook " to tell you that I had ſpoken to Mr. Methwin about " Mr. Molyneux, and that he received your recommen- " dation very civilly, and anſwered, he ſhould always " have a great regard for any body you thought worthy " of your eſteem; and you gave ſo advantageous a cha- " racter of Mr. Molyneux, that he ſhould covet his " acquaintance, and therefore he muſt deſire the favour " of you to recommend him to Mr. Molyneux."

Thus, my friend, whoſe words, though in them there be ſomething of compliment to myſelf, I repeat to you juſt as they are in his letter, that you may ſee he had the ſame ſucceſs I promiſed you in my laſt.

In obedience to your commands, I herewith ſend you a copy of Mr. L—'s paper. The laſt paragraph, which you will find writ in my hand, is a tranſcript of part of a letter, writ lately to his correſpondent here, one Mr. Burnet, who ſent it me lately, with a copy of Mr. L———'s

L———'s paper. Mr. Burnet has had it this year or two, but never communicated it to me, 'till about a fortnight agone. Indeed Mr. Cunningham procured me a ſight of it laſt ſummer, and he and I read it paragraph by paragraph over together, and he confeſſed to me, that ſome parts of it he did not underſtand; and I ſhowed him in others, that Mr. L———'s opinion would not hold, who was perfectly of my mind. I mention Mr. Cunningham to you, in the caſe, becauſe I think him an extraordinary man of parts and learning, and he is one that is known to Mr. L———. To anſwer your freedom with the like, I muſt confeſs to you, that Mr. L———'s great name had raiſed in me an expectation which the ſight of his paper did not anſwer, nor that diſcourſe of his in the "Acta "Eruditorum," which he quotes, and I have ſince read, and had juſt the ſame thoughts of it, when I read it, as I find you have. From whence I only draw this inference, that even great parts will not maſter any ſubject without great thinking, and even the largeſt minds have but narrow ſwallows. Upon this occaſion I cannot but again regret the loſs of your company and aſſiſtance, by this great diſtance.

I have lately got a little leiſure to think of ſome additions to my book, againſt the next edition, and within theſe few days have fallen upon a ſubject, that I know not how far it will lead me. I have written ſeveral pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the more upon me, and I cannot yet get ſight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will be, "Of the "Conduct of the Underſtanding," which, if I ſhall purſue, as far as I imagine it will reach, and as it deſerves, will, I conclude, make the largeſt chapter of my Eſſay. It is well for you, you are not near me; I ſhould be always peſtering you with my notions, and papers, and reveries. It would be a great happineſs to have a man of thought to lay them before, and a friend that would deal candidly and freely.

I hope, ere this, you and your brother have received printed copies of what the doctor communicated to the Royal Society. I preſume it is publiſhed before this

time, though I have not ſeen it; for Dr. Sloane writ me word, ſome time ſince, that it would be ſpeedily, and told me he would ſend it to you. And, if Mr. Churchill has taken that care he promiſed me, I hope you have alſo received my letter to the biſhop of Worceſter, and that I ſhall ſoon receive your thoughts of it.

The buſineſs you propoſed to Dr. S—— is generouſly deſigned, and well managed, and I very much wiſh it ſucceſs. But will not Dr. S—— be perſuaded to communicate to the world the obſervations he made in Turky? The diſcourſe I had with him ſatisfies me, they well deſerve not to be loſt, as all papers laid up in a ſtudy are. Methinks you ſhould prevail with him to oblige his country.

Though my paper be done, yet I cannot cloſe my letter till I have made ſome acknowledgments to you, for the many great marks you give me of a ſincere affection, and an eſteem extremely above what I can deſerve, in yours of the 16th of march. Such a friend, procured me by my Eſſay, makes me more than amends for the many adverſaries it has raiſed me. But, I think, no-body will be able to find any thing miſchievous in it, but what you ſay, which I ſuſpect, troubles ſome men; and I am not ſorry for it, nor like my book the worſe. He that follows truth impartially, ſeldom pleaſes any ſet of men; and I know not how a great many of thoſe, who pretend to be ſpreaders of light and teachers of truth, would yet have men depend upon them for it, and take it rather upon their words than their own knowledge, juſt cooked and ſeaſoned as they think fit. But it is time to releaſe you after ſo long a trouble. I am perfectly,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt humble, and moſt faithful ſervant,

John Locke.

Reflexions

Reflexions de Mr. L——— ſur "l'eſſai de l'entendement humain" de Monſieur Locke.

JE trouve tant de marques d'une penetration peu ordinaire dans ce que Mr. Locke nous a donné ſur l'entendement de l'homme, & ſur l'education, & je juge la matiere ſi importante, que j'ai crû ne pas mal employer le tems que je donnerois à une lecture ſi profitable; d'autant que j'ai fort medité moi-même ſur ce qui regarde les fondemens de nos connoiſſances. C'eſt ce qui m'a fait mettre ſur cette feüille quelques unes des remarques qui me ſont venues en liſant ſon "eſſai de l'entendement." De toutes les recherches il n'y en a point de plus importantes, puiſque c'eſt la clef de toutes les autres.

Le premier livre regarde principalement les principes qu'on dit être néz avec nous. Mr. Locke ne les admet pas, non plus que les idées inées. Il a eu ſans doute de grandes raiſons de s'oppoſer en cela aux préjugez ordinaires, car on abuſe extrêmement du nom d'idées & de principes. Les philoſophes vulgaires ſe font des principes à leur phantaſie, & les Carteſiens, qui font profeſſion de plus d'exactitude, ne laiſſent pas de faire leur retrenchement des idées prétendües, de l'étendüe de la matiere, & de l'ame; voulant s'éxempter par-là de la néceſſité de prouver ce qu'ils avancent; ſous prétexte que ceux qui méditeront les idées, y trouveront la même choſe qu'eux, c'eſt-à-dire, que ceux qui s'accoûtumeront à leur jargon & à leur maniere de penſer, auront les mêmes préventions, ce qui eſt très-véritable. Mon opinion eſt donc qu'on ne doit rien prendre pour principe primitif, ſi non les expériences & l'axiôme de l'identicité ou (ce qui eſt la même choſe) de la contradiction, qui eſt primitif, puiſqu' autrement il n'y auroit point de difference entre la verité & la fauſſeté; & toutes les recherches ceſſeroient d'abord, s'il étoit indifferent de dire oüi ou non. On ne ſauroit donc s'empêcher de ſuppoſer ce principe, dèſqu'on veut raiſonner.

ſonner. Toutes les autres veritez ſont prouvables, & j'eſtime extrêmement la methode d'Euclide, qui ſans s'arrêter à ce qu'on croiroit être aſſez prouvé par les prétendües idées, a demontré (par exemple) que dans une triangle un côté eſt toûjours moindre que les deux autres enſemble. Cependant Euclide a eu raiſon de prendre quelques axiômes pour accordés, non pas comme s'ils étoient véritablement primitifs & indémonſtrables, mais parce qu'il ſe feroit trop arrêté, s'il n'avoit voulu venir aux concluſions qu'après une diſcuſſion éxacte des principes: ainſi il a jugé à propos de ſe contenter d'avoir pouſſé les preuves, juſqu'à ce petit nombre de propoſitions, en ſorte qu'on peut dire que ſi elles ſont vraies, tout ce qu'il dit l'eſt auſſi. Il a laiſſé à d'autres le ſoin de démontrer ces principes mêmes, qui d'ailleurs ſont déja juſtifiées par les expériences. Mais c'eſt dequoi on ne ſe contente point en ces matieres: c'eſt pourquoi Apollonius, Proclus, & autres, ont pris la peine de démontrer quelques uns des axiômes d'Euclide. Cette maniere doit être imitée des philoſophes, pour venir enfin à quelques établiſſemens, quand ils ne ſeroient que proviſionels; de la maniere que je viens de dire. Quant aux idées j'en ai donné quelque éclairciſſement dans un petit écrit imprimé dans les actes des ſçavans de Leipzig au mois de novembre, 1684. p. 537. qui eſt intitulé, "Meditationes de cognitione, "veritate, & ideis," & j'aurois ſouhaité que Mr. Locke l'eut vû & éxaminé, car je ſuis des plus dociles, & rien n'eſt plus propre à avancer nos penſées que les conſiderations & les remarques des perſonnes de mérite, lorſqu'elles ſont faites avec attention & avec ſincerité. Je dirai ſeulement ici, que les idées vraies ou réelles ſont celles dont on eſt aſſûré que l'éxécution eſt poſſible, les autres ſont douteuſes ou (en cas de preuve de l'impoſſibilité) chimériques. Or la poſſibilité des idées ſe prouve tant à priori par des démonſtrations, en ſe ſervant de la poſſibilité d'autres idées plus ſimples, qu'à poſteriori par les expériences, car ce qui eſt ne ſçauroit manquer d'être poſſible: mais les idées primitives ſont celles dont la poſſibilité eſt indémonſtrable, & qui en effet ne ſont autre choſe que les attributs de

Dieu. Pour ce qui eſt de la queſtion, " s'il y a des idées & "des véritez créez avec nous ;" je ne trouve point abſolument néceſſaire pour les commencemens, ni pour la pratique de l'art de penſer, de la décider, ſoit qu'elles nous viennent toutes de déhors, ou qu'elles viennent de nous, on raiſonnera juſte pourvû qu'on garde ce que j'ai dit ci-deſſus & qu'on precede avec ordre & ſans prévention. La queſtion de " l'origine de nos idées & de nos max- " imes" n'eſt pas préliminaire en philoſophie, & il faut avoir fait de grands progrès pour la bien réſoudre. Je crois cependant pouvoir dire que nos idées (même celles de choſes ſenſibles) viennent de notre propre fonds, dont on pourra mieux juger parce que j'ai publié touchant la nature & la communication des ſubſtances & ce qu'on appelle " l'union de l'ame avec le " corps," car j'ai trouvé que ces choſes n'avoient pas été bien priſes. Je ne ſuis nullement pour la tabula raſa d'Ariſtote, & il y a quelque choſe de ſolide dans ce que Platon appelloit la reminiſcence. Il y a même quelque choſe de plus, car nous n'avons pas ſeulement une reminiſcence de toutes nos penſées paſſées, mais encore un preſſentiment de toutes nos penſées futures. Il eſt vrai que c'eſt confuſément & ſans les diſtinguer, à peu près comme lorſque j'entends le bruit de la mer, j'entends celui de toutes les vagues en particulier qui compoſent le bruit total ; quoique ce ſoit ſans diſcerner une vague de l'autre. Et il eſt vrai dans un certain ſens que j'ai expliqué, que non ſeulement nos idées, mais encore nos ſentimens naiſſent de nôtre propre fonds, & que l'ame eſt plus indépendante qu'on ne penſe, quoiqu'il ſoit toûjours vrai que rien ne ſe paſſe en elle qui ne ſoit déterminé.

Dans le livre ii. qui vient au détail des idées, j'avouë que les raiſons de Monſ. Locke pour prouver que l'ame eſt quelquefois ſans penſer à rien, ne me paroiſſent pas convainquantes ; ſi ce n'eſt qu'il donne le nom de penſées aux ſeules perceptions aſſez notables pour être diſtinguées & retenuës. Je tiens que l'ame & même le corps n'eſt jamais ſans action, & que l'ame n'eſt jamais ſans quelque perception. Même en dormant on a quelques ſentimens confus & ſombres du lieu où l'on eſt & d'autres choſes. Mais quand l'expérience ne le con-

confirmeroit pas je crois qu'il y en a démonſtration. C'eſt à peu près comme on ne ſçauroit prouver abſolument par les expériences s'il n'y a point de vuide dans l'eſpace & s'il n'y a point de repos dans la matiere. Et cependant ces ſortes de queſtions me paroiſſent décidées démonſtrativement, auſſi bien qu'à Mr. Locke; je demeure d'accord de la différence qu'il met avec beaucoup de raiſon entre la matiere & l'eſpace. Mais pour ce qui eſt du vuide pluſieurs perſonnes habiles l'ont crû. Monſieur Locke eſt de ce nombre, j'en étois preſque perſuadé moi-même, mais j'en ſuis revenu depuis long-tems. Et l'incomparable Monſieur Huygens, qui étoit auſſi pour le vuide, & pour les atômes, commença à faire réflexion ſur mes raiſons, comme ſes lettres le pouvent témoigner. La preuve du vuide priſe du mouvement, dont Mr. Locke ſe ſert, ſuppoſe que le corps eſt originairement dur, & qu'il eſt compoſé d'un certain nombre de parties inflexibles. Car en ce cas il ſeroit vrai, quelque nombre fini d'atômes qu'on pourroit prendre, que le mouvement ne ſçauroit avoir lieu ſans vuide; mais toutes les parties de la matiere ſont diviſibles & pliables. Il y a encore quelques autres choſes dans ce ſecond livre qui m'arrêtent, par éxemple, lorſqu'il eſt dit, chap. 17. que l'infinité ne ſe doit attribuer qu'à l'eſpace, au tems, & aux nombres. Je crois avec Mr. Locke qu'à proprement parler on peut dire qu'il n'y a point d'eſpace, de tems, ni de nombre, qui ſoit infini, mais qu'il eſt ſeulement vrai que plus grand que ſoit une eſpace, ou tems, ou bien un nombre, il y a toûjours un autre plus grand que lui ſans fin, & qu'ainſi le véritable infini ne ſe trouve point dans un tout compoſé de parties. Cependant il ne laiſſe pas de ſe trouver ailleurs, ſavoir dans l'abſolu, qui eſt ſans parties & qui a influence ſur les choſes compoſées, parce qu'elles réſultent de la limitation de l'abſolu. Donc l'infini poſitif n'étant autre choſe que l'abſolu, on peut dire qu'il y a en ce ſens une idée poſitive de l'infini, & qu'elle eſt antérieure à celle du fini. Au reſte en rejettant un infini compoſé on ne rejette point ce que les géométres démontrent "de ſeriebus infinitis," & particulierement l'excellent

Mr.

Mr. Newton. Quant à ce qui eſt dit chap. 30. " de " ideis adæquatis," il eſt permit de donner aux termes la ſignification qu'on trouve à propos. Cependant ſans blamer le ſens de Mr. Locke je mets un degré dans les idées ſelon lequelle j'appelle adequate celle où il n'y a plus rien à expliquer. Or toutes les idées des qualitez ſenſibles, comme de la lumiere, couleur, chaleur, n'étant point de cette nature, je ne les compte point parmi les adequates, auſſi n'eſt-ce point par elles-mêmes, ni à priori, mais par l'expérience que nous en ſçavons la réalité, ou la poſſibilité.

Il y a encore bien de bonnes choſes dans le livre iii. où il eſt traite des mots ou termes. Il eſt très-vrai qu'on ne ſçauroit tout définir, & que les qualitez ſenſibles n'ont point de définition nominale, & on les peut appeller primitives en ce ſens-la. Mais elles ne laiſſent pas de pouvoir recevoir une définition réelle. J'ai montré la différence de ſes deux ſortes de définitions dans la méditation citée ci-deſſus. La définition nominale explique le nom par les marques de la choſes; mais la definition réelle fait connoître à priori la poſſibilité du défini. Au reſte j'applaudis fort à la doctrine de Monſ. Locke touchant la demonſtrabilité des veritez morales.

Le iv. ou dernier livre, où il s'agit de la connoiſſance de la verité, montre l'uſage de ce qui vient d'être dit. J'y trouve (auſſi bien que dans les livres précédens) une infinité de belles reflexions. De faire là-deſſus les remarques convenables, ce ſeroit faire un livre auſſi grand que l'ouvrage même. Il me ſemble que les axiômes y ſont un peu moins conſiderés qu'ils ne méritent de l'être. C'eſt apparemment parce qu'excepté ceux des mathematiciens on n'en trouve guere ordinairement, qui ſoient importans & ſolides: tâché de rémedier à ce défaut. Je ne mépriſe pas les propoſitions identiques, & j'ai trouvé qu'elles ont un grand uſage même dans l'analyſe. Il eſt très-vrai, que nous connoiſſons nôtre exiſtence par une intuition immediate & celle de Dieu par démonſtration, & qu'une maſſe de matiere, dont les parties ſont ſans perception, ne ſçauroit faire un tout qui penſe. Je ne mepriſe point

l'argu-ment

l'argument inventé, il y a quelques ſiécles, par Anſelme, qui prouve que l'être parfait doit exiſter ; quoique je trouve qu'il manque quelque choſe à cet argument, parce qu'il ſuppoſe que l'être parfait eſt poſſible. Car ſi ce ſeul point ſe démonſtre encore, la démonſtration toute entiere ſera entierement achevé. Quant à la connoiſſance des autres choſes il eſt fort bien dit, que la ſeule expérience ne ſuffit pas pour avancer aſſez en phyſique. Un eſprit pénétrant tirera plus de conſéquences de quelques expériences aſſez ordinaires qu'un autre ne ſçauroit tirer des plus choiſies, outre qu'il y a un art d'expérimenter & d'interroger, pour ainſi dire, la nature. Cependant il eſt toujours vrai qu'on ne ſçauroit avancer dans le detail de la phyſique qu'à meſure qu'on a des expériences. Monſ. Locke eſt de l'opinion des pluſieurs habiles hommes, qui tiennent que la forme des logiciens eſt de peu d'uſage. Je ſerois quaſi d'un autre ſentiment ; & j'ai trouvé ſouvent que les paralogiſmes même dans les mathématiques ſont des manquemens de la forme. M. Huygens a fait la même remarque. Il y auroit bien à dire là-deſſus ; & pluſieurs choſes excellentes ſont mépriſées parce qu'on n'en fait pas l'uſage dont elles ſont capables. Nous ſommes portez à mépriſer ce que nous avons appris dans les écoles. Il eſt vrai que nous y apprenons bien des inutilitez, mais il eſt bon de faire la fonction della cruſca, c'eſt à dire de ſéparer le bon du mauvais. Mr. Locke le peut faire autant que qui que ce ſoit ; & de plus il nous donne des penſées conſiderables de ſon propre crû. Il n'eſt pas ſeulement eſſayeur, mais il eſt encore tranſmutateur, par l'augmentation qu'il donne du bon mètal. S'il continuoit d'en faire preſent au public, nous lui en ſerions fort redevables.

Je voudrois que monſ. Locke eut dit ſon ſentiment à monſ. Cunningham ſur mes remarques, ou que monſ. Cunningham voulut nous le dire librement. Car je ne ſuis pas de ceux qui ſont entêtez, & la raiſon peut tout ſur moi. Mais les affaires de négoce détournent monſ. Locke de ces penſées, car cette matiere de négoce eſt

de

de très grande etendue & même fort ſubtile & demimathematique, &c.

Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.

Dear Sir, Oates, May 3, 1697.

THOUGH the honour you do me, in the value you put upon my ſhadow, be a freſh mark of that friendſhip which is ſo great an happineſs to me, yet I ſhall never conſider my picture in the ſame houſe with you, without great regret at my ſo far diſtance from you myſelf. But I will not continue to importune you with my complaints of that kind; it is an advantage greater than I could have hoped, to have the converſation of ſuch a friend, though with the ſea between; and the remaining little ſcantling of my life would be too happy, if I had you in my neighbourhood.

I am glad to hear, that the gentleman you mention, in your's of the 6th of the laſt month, does me the favour to ſpeak well of me on that ſide the water; I never deſerved other of him, but that he ſhould always have done ſo on this. If his exceeding great value of himſelf do not deprive the world of that uſefulneſs, that his parts, if rightly conducted, might be of, I ſhall be very glad. He went from London, as I heard afterwards, ſoon after I left it, the laſt time. But he did me not the favour to give me a viſit whilſt I was there, nor to let me know of his intended journey to you; if he had, it is poſſible I might have writ by him to you, which I am now not ſorry he did not. I always value men of parts and learning, and think I cannot do too much in procuring them friends and aſſiſtance. But there may happen occaſions that may make one ſtop one's hand. And it is the hopes young men give of what uſe they will make of their parts, which is to me the encouragement of being concerned for them. But, if vanity increaſes with age, I always fear whither it

it will lead a man. I say this to you, because you are my friend, for whom I have no reserves, and think I ought to talk freely where you inquire, and possibly may be concerned; but I say it to you alone, and desire it may go no farther. For the man I wish very well, and could give you, if it needed, proofs that I do so. And therefore I desire you to be kind to him; but I must leave it to your prudence, in what way, and how far. If his carriage with you gives you the promises of a steady useful man, I know you will be forward enough of yourself, and I shall be very glad of it. For it will be his fault alone, if he prove not a very valuable man, and have not you for his friend.

But I have something to say to you of another man. Monsr. Le Clerc, in a letter I received from him, writes thus:

" Monsr. C— me disoit dernierement que s'il trouvoit occasion d'entrer dans une maison de condition en qualité de precepteur, il seroit ravi d'en profiter. C'est un fort honnête homme, & qui seroit bien capable de s'acquitter de cet emploi. Il ne sçait l'anglois que par les livres, c'est-a-dire, qu'il l'entend lorsqu'il le lit, mais qu'il ne le sçauroit parler non plus que moi faute d'habitude. Si quelque un de vos amis auroit besoin de precepteur, & qu'il lui donnât de quoi s'entretenir, il ne sçauroit trouver d'homme plus sage & plus réglé, outre qu'il sçait beaucoup de choses utiles pour un emploi comme celui-là, les belles lettres, l'histoire, &c."

This Mr. C— is he that translated my book of Education, upon which occasion I came to have some acquaintance with him by letters, and he seems a very ingenious man; and Mr. Le Clerc has often, before any thing of this, spoken of him to me with commendation and esteem. He has since translated " The " Lady's Religion," and " The Reasonableness of Christianity," into french. You may easily guess, why I put this into my letter to you, after what you said concerning Mr. Le Clerc in your last letter but one.

You are willing, I see, to make my little presents to you more and greater than they are. Amongst the books

books that Mr. Churchill ſent you, you are beholden to me (ſince you will call it ſo) but for one; and to that the biſhop of Worceſter, I hear, has an anſwer in the preſs, which will be out this week. So that I perceive this controverſy is a matter of ſerious moment beyond what I could have thought. This benefit I ſhall be ſure to get by it, either to be confirmed in my opinion, or be convinced of ſome errours, which I ſhall preſently reform, in my Eſſay, and ſo make it the better for it. For I have no opinions that I am fond of. Truth, I hope, I always ſhall be fond of, and ſo ready to embrace, and with ſo much joy, that I ſhall own it to the world, and thank him that does me the favour. So that I am never afraid of any thing writ againſt me, unleſs it be the waſting of my time, when it is not writ cloſely in purſuit of truth, and truth only.

In my laſt to you, I ſent you a copy of Mr. L——'s paper; I have this writ me out of Holland concerning it:

" Mr. L——, mathématicien de Hannover ayant " oüi dire, qu'on traduiſoit vôtre ouvrage, & qu'on l'al- " loit imprimer, a envoyé ici à un de mes amis ce " jugement qu'il en fait, comme pour la mettre à la " tête. Cependant il a été bien aiſe qu'on vous le " communicât. Il m'a été remis entre les mains pour " cela. On m'a dit mille biens de ce mathématicien. " Il y a long tems que magna & præclara minatur, " ſans rien produire que quelque démonſtrations déta- " chées. Je crois neanmoins qu'il ne vous entend " pas, & je doute qu'il s'entende bien lui-même."

I ſee you and I, and this gentleman, agree pretty well concerning the man; and this ſort of fiddling makes me hardly avoid thinking, that he is not that very great man as has been talked of him. His paper was in England a year, or more, before it was communicated to me, and I imagine you will think he need not make ſuch a great ſtir with it.

My Eſſay, you ſee, is tranſlating into french, and it is by the ſame Mr. Coſte above-mentioned. But this need not hinder Mr. Burridge in what he de-

ſigned; for Mr. Coſte goes on exceedingly ſlowly, as I am told.

You ſee how forward I am to importune you with all my little concerns. But this would be nothing to what I ſhould do, if I were nearer you. I ſhould then be talking to you de quolibet ente, and conſulting you about a thouſand whimſies that come ſometimes into my thoughts. But with all this, I unfeignedly am,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt faithful humble ſervant,

John Locke.

The poem that was ſent you by Mr. Churchill, amongſt the other books, I believe will pleaſe you: there are ſome noble parts in it.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Dublin, May 15, 1697.

My moſt honoured Friend,

NOTHING could excuſe my keeping your kind letter of april 10th ſo long by me unanſwered, but an unexpected and melancholy accident that has lately befallen a dear ſiſter of mine, who, on the 24th of laſt month, loſt her huſband, the lord biſhop of Meath, a learned and worthy prelate. Our whole family has ſo deeply partaken in this trouble, that we have been all under a great concern; but more particularly myſelf, who am intruſted by the good biſhop with the diſpoſal of ſome of his affairs. This has, of late, ſo taken me up, that I had not time to take the ſatisfaction of writing to you; but the hurry of that buſineſs being ſomewhat abated, I reſume the pleaſure of kiſſing your hands, and of aſſuring you, with what a deep ſenſe of gratitude

I receive the kindneſs you have done me with my lord chancellor Methwin. I hope we ſhall ſee his lordſhip ſoon here, for we underſtand he parts from London the 18th inſtant.

I am extremely obliged to you for the trouble you have been at in communicating to me monſ. L——'s paper, and I am now ſorry I ever put the taſk on you: for to ſpeak freely to you, as I formerly did, I find nothing in this paper to make me alter the opinion I had of monſ. L—'s performances this way. He is either very unhappy in expreſſing, or I am very dull in apprehending his thoughts. I do not know but ſome of the doubts he raiſes, concerning your Eſſay, may proceed from his unacquaintance with our language; and this makes me yet more earneſt to procure the tranſlation of your Eſſay; but Mr. Burridge, ſince he laſt arrived here, has been wholly employed in overtaking his buſineſs in the country, to which he is run much in arrear. He is chaplain to my lord chancellor Methwin, and on that account, I hope he will keep much in town, and then I ſhall ply him hard.

I will give you a thouſand thanks for the preſent of your letter to the biſhop of Worceſter; but I need not give you my opinion of it, otherwiſe than as you find it in the following paragraph of a letter which I received concerning it, from a reverend prelate of this kingdom. (The preſent biſhop of . . . . between ourſelves.)

" I read Mr. Locke's letter to the biſhop of Wor-
" ceſter with great ſatisfaction, and am wholly of your
" opinion, that he has fairly laid the great biſhop on
" his back; but it is with ſo much gentleneſs, as if he
" were afraid not only of hurting him, but even of
" ſpoiling or tumbling his cloaths. Indeed I cannot
" tell which I moſt admire, the great civility and
" good manners in his book, or the force and clear-
" neſs of his reaſonings. And I fancy the biſhop will
" thank him privately, and trouble the world no more
" with this diſpute."

You ſee thereby my friend's, and my own opinion of your book; and I can tell you farther, that all thoſe

whom I have yet converſed with in this place, concerning it, agree in the ſame judgment. And another (biſhop too) told me, that " though your words were as " ſmooth as oil, yet they cut like a two-edged ſword."

At the ſame time that Mr. Churchill ſent me your Letter to the biſhop, he ſent me likewiſe the " Second Vindi- " cation of the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity." If you know the author thereof, (as I am apt to ſurmiſe you may) be pleaſed to let him know, that I think he has done Edwards too much honour in thinking him worth his notice; for ſo vile a poor wretch certainly never appeared in print. But, at the ſame time, tell him, that, as this Vindication contains a farther illuſtration of the divine truths in the Reaſonableneſs of Chriſtianity, he has the thanks of me, and of all fair candid men that I converſe with about it.

In giving you the opinion we have here, of your letter to the biſhop of Worceſter, I have rather choſen to let you know, particularly, that of ſome of our biſhops with whom I converſe; for this rank, if any, might ſeem inclinable to favour their brother, could they do it with any ſhow of juſtice. And yet, after all, I am told from London, that the biſhop is hammering out an anſwer to you. Certainly ſome men think, or hope the world will think, that truth always goes with the laſt word.

You never write to me, that you do not raiſe new expectations in my longing mind of partaking your thoughts, on thoſe noble ſubjects you are upon. Your chapter concerning the conduct of the underſtanding muſt needs be very ſublime and ſpacious. Oh Sir! never more mention to me our diſtance as your loſs: it is my diſadvantage! it is my unhappineſs! I never before had ſuch reaſon to deplore my hard fate, in being condemned to this priſon of an iſland; but one day or other I will get looſe, in ſpite of all the fetters and clogs that incumber me at preſent. But if you did but know in what a wood of buſineſs I am engaged, (by the greateſt part whereof I reap no other advantage than the ſatisfaction of being ſerviceable to my friends) you would

pity

pity me. But I hope ſoon to rid my hands of a great part of this trouble, and then I ſhall be at more liberty. Till which happy time, and for ever, I remain

Your moſt faithful friend,

and moſt humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured DEAR SIR, Dublin, May 27, 1697.

THE hints you are pleaſed ſo friendly to communicate to me, in yours of the 3d inſtant, concerning Mr. T———, are freſh marks of your kindneſs and confidence in me, and they perfectly agree with the apprehenſions I had conceived of that gentleman. Truly, to be free, and without reſerve to you, I do not think his management, ſince he came into this city, has been ſo prudent. He has raiſed againſt him the clamours of all parties; and this, not ſo much by his difference in opinion, as by his unſeaſonable way of diſcourſing, propagating, and maintaining it. Coffee-houſes, and public tables, are not proper places for ſerious diſcourſes relating to the moſt important truths. But when alſo a tincture of vanity appears in the whole courſe of a man's converſation, it diſguſts many that may otherwiſe have a due value for his parts and learning. I have known a gentleman in this town, that was a moſt ſtrict ſocinian, and thought as much out of the common road as any man, and was alſo known ſo to do; but then his behaviour and diſcourſe were attended with ſo much modeſty, goodneſs, and prudence, that I never heard him publicly cenſured or clamoured againſt, neither was any man in danger of cenſure, by receiving his viſits, or keeping him company. I am very loth to tell you how far it is otherwiſe with Mr. T—— in this place; but I am perſuaded it may be for his advantage that you know

it, and that you friendly admoniſh him for it, for his conduct hereafter. I do not think that any man can be diſpenſed with to diſſemble the truth, and full perſuaſion of his mind, in religious truths, when duly called to it, and upon ſitting occaſions. But, I think, prudence may guide us in the choice of proper opportunities, that we may not run ourſelves againſt rocks to no purpoſe, and inflame men againſt us unneceſſarily. Mr. T—— alſo takes here a great liberty, on all occaſions, to vouch your patronage and friendſhip, which makes many that rail at him, rail alſo at you. I believe you will not approve of this, as far as I am able to judge, by your ſhaking him off in your Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter. But after all this, I look upon Mr. T—— as a very ingenious man, and I ſhould be very glad of any opportunity of doing him ſervice, to which I think myſelf indiſpenſably bound by your recommendation. One thing more I had almoſt forgot to intimate to you, that all here are mightily at a loſs in gueſſing what might be the occaſion of T——'s coming, at this time, into Ireland. He is known to be of no fortune or employ, and yet is obſerved to have a ſubſiſtence, but from whence it comes no one can tell certainly. Theſe things, joined with his great forwardneſs in appearing in public, make people ſurmiſe a thouſand fancies. If you could give me light into theſe matters, as far as it may help me in my own conduct, I ſhould be much obliged to you.

By the books which Mr. Coſte has tranſlated, I perceive his inclinations would be extremely agreeable to mine, and I ſhould be very happy could I give him, at preſent, any encouragement to come into my poor family. But I have a gentleman with me in the houſe, whoſe dependence is wholly upon me; and I cannot find fault with my little boy's progreſs under him. When I formerly made inquiry from you about monſ. Le Clerc, I was in ſome proſpect of providing for this gentleman whom I now have, by the favour of a good friend, who is ſince dead. So that, at preſent, having no opportunity of diſpoſing him to his advantage, I cannot conveniently part with him. However, I do not know how ſoon it may be otherwiſe; and therefore be

pleaſed,

pleased, in the mean time, to let me know something farther of monsr. Coste; as whether he be a complete master of the Latin tongue, or other language; whether a mathematician, or given to experimental philosophy; what his age, and where educated: as to the belles lettres, l'histoire, &c. monsr. Le Clerc has mentioned them already in his character.

I am mightily pleased to find that some others have the same thoughts of monsr. L—— as you and I. His performances in mathematics have made all the world mistaken in him. But certainly, in other attempts, I am of your opinion, he no more understands himself, than others understand him.

Mr. Churchill favoured me with the present of sir R. Blackmore's K. Arthur. I had Pr. Arthur before, and read it with admiration, which is not at all lessened by this second piece. All our english poets (except Milton) have been mere ballad-makers, in comparison to him. Upon the publication of his first poem, I intimated to him, through Mr. Churchill's hands, how excellently I thought he might perform a philosophic poem, from many touches he gave in his Pr. Arthur, particularly from Mopas's song. And, I perceive by his preface to K. Arthur, he has had the like intimations from others, but rejects them, as being an enemy to all philosophic hypotheses. Were I acquainted with sir R. Blackmore, I could assure him, (and, if you be so, I beseech you to tell him) that I am as little an admirer of hypotheses as any man, and never proposed that thought to him, with a design that a philosophic poem should run on such a strain. "A natural history "of the great and admirable phenomena of the uni-"verse," is a subject, I think, may afford sublime thoughts in a poem; and so far, and no farther, would I desire a poem to extend.

You see I am carried beyond my designed bounds, by the mark on the other side this leaf. But as I am never weary of reading letters from you, so, I think, I am never tired of writing to you. However, it is time I relieve you, by subscribing myself entirely

Your most affectionate and devoted servant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

DEAR SIR, Oates, June 15, 1697.

I HAVE the honour of your two obliging letters of the 15th and 27th of may, wherein I find the ſame mind, the ſame affection, and the ſame friendſhip, which you have ſo frankly, and ſo long, made me happy in. And, if I may gueſs by the paragraph which you tranſcribed out of your friend's letter into your's of the 15th of may, I ſhall have reaſon to think your kindneſs to me is grown infectious, and that by it you faſcinate your friends underſtandings, and corrupt their judgments in my favour. It is enough for me, in ſo unequal a match, if mighty truth can keep me from a ſhameful overthrow. If I can maintain my ground, it is enough, againſt ſo redoubtable an adverſary; but victory I muſt not think of. I doubt not but you are convinced of that by this time, and you will ſee how ſilly a thing it is for an unſkilled pigmy to enter the liſts with a man at arms, verſed in the uſe of his weapons.

My health, and buſineſſes that I like as little as you do thoſe you complain of, make me know what it is to want time. I often reſolve not to trouble you any more with my complaints of the diſtance between us, and as often impertinently break that reſolution. I never have any thoughts working in my head, or any new project ſtart in my mind, but my wiſhes carry me immediately to you, and I deſire to lay them before you. You may juſtly think this carries a pretty ſevere reflection on my country, or myſelf, that in it I have not a friend to communicate my thoughts with. I cannot much complain of want of friends to other purpoſes. But a man with whom one can freely ſeek truth, without any regard to old or new, faſhionable or not faſhionable, but truth merely for truth's ſake, is what is ſcarce to be found in an age; and ſuch an one I take you to be. Do but think then what a pleaſure, what an advantage it would be to me to have you by me, who have ſo much thought,

thought, ſo much clearneſs, ſo much penetration, all directed to the ſame aim which I propoſe to myſelf, in all the ramblings of my mind. I, on this occaſion, mention only the wants that I daily feel, which make me not ſo often ſpeak of the other advantages I ſhould receive, from the communication of your own notions, as well as from the correction of mine. But, with this repining, I trouble you too much, and, for the favours I receive from you, thank you too little, and rejoice not enough in having ſuch a friend, though at a diſtance,

As to the gentleman, to whom you think my friendly admoniſhments may be of advantage for his conduct hereafter, I muſt tell you, that he is a man to whom I never writ in my life, and, I think, I ſhall not now begin. And, as to his conduct, it is what I never ſo much as ſpoke to him of. This is a liberty to be only taken with friends and intimates, for whoſe conduct one is mightily concerned, and in whoſe affairs one intereſts himſelf. I cannot but wiſh well to all men of parts and learning, and be ready to afford them all the civilities and good offices in my power. But there muſt be other qualities to bring me to a friendſhip, and unite me in thoſe ſtricter ties of concern. For I put a great deal of difference between thoſe whom I thus receive into my heart and affection, and thoſe whom I receive into my chamber, and do not treat there with a perfect ſtrangeneſs. I perceive you think yourſelf under ſome obligation of peculiar reſpect to that perſon, upon the account of my recommendation to you; but certainly this comes from nothing but your over-great tenderneſs to oblige me. For, if I did recommend him, you will find it was only as a man of parts and learning, for his age, but without any intention that that ſhould be of any other conſequence, or lead you any farther, than the other qualities you ſhould find in him, ſhould recommend him to you. And therefore whatſoever you ſhall, or ſhall not do for him, I ſhall no way intereſt myſelf in. I know, of your own ſelf, you are a good friend to thoſe who deſerve it of you; and for thoſe that do not, I ſhall never blame your neglect of them. The occaſion of his coming into Ireland now, I gueſs to be the hopes of

ſome

ſome employment, now upon this change of hands there. I tell you, I gueſs, for he himſelf never told me any thing of it, nor ſo much as acquainted me with his intentions of going to Ireland, how much ſoever he vouches my patronage and friendſhip, as you are pleaſed to phraſe it. And as to his ſubſiſtence, from whence that comes, I cannot tell. I ſhould not have waſted ſo much of my converſation with you, on this ſubject, had you not told me it would oblige you to give you light in theſe matters, which I have done, as a friend to a friend, with a greater freedom than I ſhould allow myſelf to talk to another.

I ſhall, when I ſee ſir Rich. Blackmore, diſcourſe him as you deſire. There is, I with pleaſure find, a ſtrange harmony throughout between your thoughts and mine. I have always thought that laying down, and building upon hypotheſes, has been one of the great hindrances of natural knowledge; and I ſee your notions agree with mine in it. And, though I have a great value for ſir R. Blackmore, on ſeveral accounts, yet there is nothing has given me a greater eſteem of him, than what he ſays about hypotheſes in medicine, in his preface to King Arthur, which is an argument to me, that he underſtands the right method of practiſing phyſic; and it gives me great hopes he will improve it, ſince he keeps in the only way it is capable to be improved in; and has ſo publicly declared againſt the more eaſy, faſhionable, and pleaſing way of an hypotheſis, which, I think, has done more to hinder the true art of phyſic, which is the curing of diſeaſes, than all other things put together; by making it learned, ſpecious, and talkative, but ineffective to its great end, the health of mankind; as was viſible in the practice of phyſic, in the hands of the illiterate americans; and the learned phyſicians, that went thither out of Europe, ſtored with their hypotheſes, borrowed from natural philoſophy, which made them indeed great men, and admired in the ſchools; but, in curing diſeaſes, the poor americans, who had eſcaped thoſe ſplendid clogs, clearly out-went them. You cannot imagine how far a little obſervation, carefully made by a man not tied up to the four humours; or ſal, ſulphur, and

and mercury; or to acid and alcali, which has of late prevailed, will carry a man in the curing of diſeaſes, though very ſtubborn and dangerous, and that with very little and common things, and almoſt no medicines at all. Of this I could, from my own experience, convince you, were we together but a little while. But my letter is too long already. When I am writing to you, the pleaſure of talking to you makes me forget you are a man of buſineſs, and have your hands full. I beg your pardon for it. It is time to diſmiſs you. I am,

DEAR SIR,

Your moſt affectionate, and

moſt faithful humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, July 20, 1697.

THE lateſt favour I received from my ever honoured friend was of the 15th of june, and I have it before me, to acknowledge with all due gratitude. I was mightily ſurpriſed to ſee the "biſhop of Worceſter's anſwer to "your Letter;" I thought he would have let that matter fall, and have privately thanked you, and have ſaid no more. This was the leaſt I expected from him; for I think, indeed, he might have gone farther, and made his public acknowledgments to you. This had been like a man of ingenuity and candour; and by this he had been more valuable, in the opinion of all I converſe with here, than by the ſhiftings, windings, and turnings, he uſes in his laſt piece. You well obſerve the biſhop has ſhown himſelf a man at his weapon; but I think him "Andabatarum more pugnare," he winks as he fights. However, in the poſtſcript he ſhows a ſample of

of the old leaven, and muſt not let you go without coupling his obſervations on a ſocinian book, with his confutation of your's; as if there were ſomething ſo agreeable between them, that they cannot be well ſeparated. This is ſuch an indirect practice, and ſeems ſuch an invidious inſinuation, that I cannot but give it the name of malice.

I am obliged to you for the confidence you put in me, by communicating your thoughts concerning Mr. T——, more freely than you would do to every one. He has had his oppoſers here, as you will find by a book which I have ſent to you by a gentleman's ſervant, to be left for you at your lodging; wherein you will meet with a paſſage relating to yourſelf, which, though with decency, yet I fear will not redound much to the author's advantage; for, with very great aſſurance, (an uſual companion of ignorance) he undertakes to "demonſtrate the immateriality of the ſoul," and to ſhow the falſity of your argumentation, wherein you aſſert, "that "we have no proof, but that God may communicate a "power of thinking to a certain ſyſtem of matter." But this is all but aſſertion and promiſe; we are ſo unhappy as yet to want this demonſtration from this author, and I fear we ſhall ever want it from him; and, I believe, you will be of my opinion, when you read his book. The author is my acquaintance; but two things I ſhall never forgive in his book; the one is the foul language and opprobrious names he gives Mr. T——; the other is, upon ſeveral occaſions, calling in the aid of the civil magiſtrate, and delivering Mr. T—— up to ſecular puniſhment. This, indeed, is a killing argument; but ſome will be apt to ſay, that where the ſtrength of his reaſon failed him, there he flies to the ſtrength of the ſword. And this minds me of a buſineſs that was very ſurpriſing to many, even ſeveral prelates in this place, the preſentment of ſome pernicious books, and their authors, by the grand jury of Middleſex. This is looked upon as a matter of dangerous conſequence, to make our civil courts judges of religious doctrines; and no one knows, upon a change of affairs, whoſe turn it may be next to be condemned. But the example has been

been followed in our country; and Mr. T—— and his book have been presented here by a grand jury, not one of which (I am persuaded) ever read one leaf in "Christianity not mysterious." Let the Sorbonne for ever now be silent; a learned grand jury, directed by as learned a judge, does the business much better. The dissenters here were the chief promoters of this matter; but, when I asked one of them, what if a violent church of England jury should present Mr. Baxter's books as pernicious, and condemn them to the flames by the common executioner? he was sensible of the errour, and said, he wished it had never been done.

I must not forget to thank you for the countenance I have received from my lord chancellor Methwin, since his coming into Ireland. I know it is all owing to your, and your friends endeavours. My lord is a person from whom the kingdom expects very well, for hitherto his management has been very promising. Mr. Burridge is his chaplain, and expects very soon to be settled in a parish here in Dublin, and then he promises me to prosecute the Essay with vigour.

My brother gives you his most humble service. He is told, by Mr. Burridge, that you had sent him a book in medicine, but by what hand he could not inform him. He has such a value for every thing that comes from you, that he desired me to let you know that no such book came to his hands, or else he had not all this while deferred his acknowledgments.

I perceive you are so happy as to be acquainted with sir Richard Blackmore; he is an extraordinary person, and I admire his two prefaces as much as I do any parts of his books; the first, wherein he exposes the "licentiousness and immorality of our late poetry," is incomparable; and the second, wherein he prosecutes the same subject, and delivers his thoughts concerning hypotheses, is no less judicious. And I am wholly of his opinion, relating to the latter. However, the "history and phenomena of nature" we may venture at; and this is what I propose to be the subject of a philosophic poem. Sir Richard Blackmore has exquisite touches of this kind dispersed in many places of his books; (to pass

paſs over Mopas's ſong) I'll inſtance one particular, in the moſt profound ſpeculations of Mr. Newton's philoſophy, thus curiouſly touched in King Arthur, Book IX. p. 243.

> The conſtellations ſhine at his command,
> He form'd their radiant orbs, and with his hand
> He weigh'd, and put them off with ſuch a force,
> As might preſerve an everlaſting courſe.

I doubt not but ſir R. Blackmore, in theſe lines, had a regard to the proportionment of the projective motion to the "vis centripeta," that keeps the planets in their continued courſes.

I have by me ſome obſervations made by a judicious friend of mine, on both ſir R. Blackmore's poems; if they may be any ways acceptable to ſir R. I ſhall ſend them to you; they are in the compaſs of a ſheet of paper. And, were it proper, I ſhould humbly deſire you to procure for me, from ſir R. the key to the perſons names, in both his poems; moſt of the firſt I have already, and a great many in the ſecond, but many I alſo want, which I ſhould be very glad to underſtand. But if herein I deſire any thing diſagreeable, I beg ſir Richard's pardon, and deſiſt.

Ever ſince you firſt mentioned to me, that monſ. Le Clerc might be inticed into Ireland by a moderate encouragement, it has ſat grievous on my ſpirit, that it lay not in my power to procure for him what might be worth his acceptance. I ſhould reckon it (next to your friendſhip) one of the greateſt glories of my life, that I could be able any ways to contribute to tranſplanting him hither. The other day I ventured to mention it to a great prelate here, the biſhop of ——. He was pleaſed to favour the propoſal immediately, and gave me directions, that I ſhould inquire whether monſ. Le Clerc would be willing to take orders in our church, and to ſubmit to the oaths and injunctions hereof; and how far he is maſter of the engliſh language. He told me, he doubted not but he might procure for him 150, or 200l. per annum, in ſome place of eaſe and retirement.

ment. Be pleaſed therefore, dear ſir, to let me informed in theſe particulars, and in whatever elſe you think requiſite in managing this affair.

I have protracted this letter as if I had a deſign to kill you, by tiring you to death. I beg your excuſe for it.

I am,

DEAR SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

DEAR SIR, London, 11 Sept. 1697.

IF you have received my reply to the biſhop, before this comes to your hand, I ſhall need ſay no more to the firſt paragraph of your obliging letter of the 20th of july. Mr. Churchill tells me, he has taken care you ſhould have it with ſpeed. I have ordered another to Mr Burridge, who has, by his undertaking, ſome concernment now in my Eſſay. I am not delighted at all in controverſy, and think I could ſpend my time to greater advantage to myſelf. But being attacked, as I am, and in a way that ſufficiently juſtifies your remarks on it, I think every body will judge I had reaſon to defend myſelf; whether I have or no, ſo far as I have gone, the world muſt judge.

I think, with you, the diſſenters were beſt conſider, "that what is ſauce for a gooſe, is ſauce for a gander." But they are a ſort of men that will always be the ſame.

You thank me for what is owing to your own worth. Every one who knows you, will think (if he judges right) that he receives as much advantage as he gives by the countenance he ſhows you. However, I am obliged by your thanks to me; for, if I do not procure you as much good

good as you are capable of receiving from any one that comes to you from hence, it is my want of ability, and not want of will. My heart and inclination, wherein the friendſhip lies, will always be ſuch, as I can preſume will not diſpleaſe you, in a man whom I am very ſenſible you love.

Here was, the laſt year, a book in phyſic publiſhed by a young lad not twenty, who had never ſeen the Univerſity. It was about the motion of the muſcles, with as good an explication of it as any I have yet ſeen. I believe I might have ſpoke to Mr. Churchill to ſend your brother one of them, for the ſake of the author; (for as to the ſubject itſelf, I fear I ſhall never ſee it explained to my ſatisfaction) whether he did it or no, I have not yet aſked; but the book itſelf is not worth your brother's inquiry or acknowledgment; though being written by ſuch an author, made it a kind of curioſity. I ſhould be very glad if I could do him here any ſervice of greater importance. But I having now wholly laid by the ſtudy of phyſic, I know not what comes out new, or worth the reading, in that faculty. Pray give my humble ſervice to your brother, and let me know whether he hath any children; for then I ſhall think myſelf obliged to ſend him one of the next edition of my book of Education, which, my bookſeller tells me, is out of print; and I had much rather be at leiſure to make ſome additions to that, and my Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, than be employed to defend myſelf againſt the groundleſs, and, as others think, trifling quarrel of the biſhop. But his lordſhip is pleaſed to have it otherwiſe, and I muſt anſwer for myſelf as well as I can, till I have the good luck to be convinced.

I was not a little pleaſed to find what thoughts you had concerning hypotheſes in phyſic. Though ſir R. B.'s vein in poetry be what every body muſt allow him to have an extraordinary talent in, and though with you I exceedingly valued his firſt preface; yet I muſt own to you, there was nothing that I ſo much admired him for, as for what he ſays of hypotheſes in his laſt. It ſeems to me ſo right, and is yet ſo much out of the way of the ordinary writers, and practitioners in that

faculty, that it ſhows as great a ſtrength and penetration of judgment, as his poetry has ſhowed flights of fancy; and therefore I was very glad to find in you the ſame thoughts of it. And when he comes luckily in my way, I ſhall not forget your wiſhes, and ſhall acquaint him with the obſervations you mention. And the key you deſire I ſhall ſend you, if it be fit to be aſked of him, which I am at preſent in ſome doubt of.

Though I could myſelf anſwer many of your queſtions concerning monſ. le Clerc; yet I have ſent them to him himſelf, with the reaſon of them. I have not yet received his anſwer, the expectation whereof has delayed my writing to you for ſome time. In the mean time, till I hear from him, I thank you in his name and my own.

I ſhall be very glad to hear from you how the linen manufacture goes on, on that ſide the water, and what aſſiſtance the parliament there is like to give to it; for I wiſh proſperity to your country, and very particularly all manner of happineſs to you. I am unfeignedly,

SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

What I told you formerly of a ſtorm coming againſt my book, proves no fiction. Beſides what you will ſee I have taken notice of in my reply, Mr. Serjeant, a popiſh prieſt, whom you muſt needs have heard of, has beſtowed a thick 8vo upon my Eſſay, and Mr. Norris, as I hear, is writing hard againſt it. Shall I not be quite ſlain, think you, amongſt ſo many notable combatants, and the Lord knows how many more to come?

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, Sept. 11, 1697.

Honoured SIR,

MY laſt to you was of july 20, ſince which time I have not had the happineſs of a line from you. But I am ſatisfied you are better employed; and indeed, when I ſee daily what ſwarms of angry waſps do ariſe againſt you (beſides many which reach not our view in this place) I wonder not that you ſhould be ſo far engaged as to have little time to throw away on me. The other day I met with the laſt effort of Mr. Edwards's malice; I do now heartily pity the poor wretch; he is certainly mad, and no more to be taken notice of hereafter, than the railings of Oliver's porter in Bethlem. I have ſeen alſo a philoſophical writer againſt you, of another ſtrain, one J. S. that writes againſt all ideiſts; this gentleman, though civil, yet to me is abſolutely unintelligible, ſo unfortunate I am. Who he is I know not, but ſhould be glad to learn from you; and what you think, in general, of his book.

Mr. T—— is, at laſt, driven out of our kingdom; the poor gentleman, by his imprudent management, had raiſed ſuch an univerſal outcry, that it was even dangerous for a man to have been known once to converſe with him. This made all wary men of reputation decline ſeeing him; inſomuch that at laſt he wanted a meal's meat (as I am told) and none would admit him to their tables. The little ſtock of money which he brought into this country being exhauſted, he fell to borrowing from any one that would lend him half a crown, and run in debt for his wigs, cloaths, and lodging, (as I am informed,) and laſt of all, to complete his hardſhips, the parliament fell on his book, voted it to be burnt by the common hangman, and ordered the author to be taken into cuſtody of the ſerjeant at arms, and to be proſecuted by the attorney-general at law. Hereupon he is fled out of this kingdom, and none here knows where he has directed his courſe. I did believe

believe you might be a ſtranger to theſe proceedings a great while, unleſs I had intimated them to you; and that is one of my deſigns in writing this to you.

I am here very happy in the friendſhip of an honourable perſon, Mr. Moleſworth, who is an hearty admirer and acquaintance of your's. We never meet but we remember you; he ſometimes comes into my houſe, and tells me, it is not to pay a viſit to me, but to pay his devotion to your image that is in my dining room.

I ſhould be glad to hear farther from you, concerning monſ. le Clerc and monſ. Coſte, in relation to what I formerly writ to you concerning thoſe gentlemen.

I am, SIR,

Your moſt obliged, humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured SIR, Dublin, Oct. 4, 1697.

I PERCEIVE we were each of us mindful of the other on the 11th of the laſt month, for of that date was your laſt to me, as you will find mine likewiſe to you bore the ſame.

You have already anſwered ſome of my impertinent inquiries in that letter; you tell me therein, who J. S. is that writes againſt you. I do not now wonder at the confuſedneſs of his notions, or that they ſhould be unintelligible to me. I ſhould have much more admired, had they been otherwiſe. I expect nothing from Mr. Serjeant but what is abſtruſe in the higheſt degree.

I look for nothing elſe from Mr. Norris; I thought that gentleman had enough on it, in his firſt attempt on your Eſſay; but he is ſo over-run with father Male-

branche, and Plato, that it is in vain to endeavour to ſet him right, and I give him up as an inconvincible enemy.

But, above all theſe, I ſhould wonder at the biſhop of Worceſter's obſtinacy, did I not think that I partly know the reaſon thereof. He has been an old ſoldier in controverſies, and has hitherto had the good luck of victory; but now, in the latter end of his wars, to be laid on his back (as he thinks the world would certainly ſay, unleſs he has the laſt word) would wither all his former laurels, and loſe his glory. Your reply to him is not yet come to hand; but I can wait with the more patience, becauſe I am pretty well ſatisfied in the matter already.

I am very glad to underſtand that we are to expect another edition of your Education, with additions. I never thought you writ too much on any ſubject whatever.

I have formerly written to you, to know farther concerning monſ. Coſte, who tranſlated ſome of your books into french. I fancy, by that gentleman's inclinations to your works, he and I ſhould agree very well. Pray let me know, whether to his Belles Lettres he has any ſkill in the mathematics, natural hiſtory, &c. as alſo what his circumſtances are, as to his education, parentage, &c. For, according to theſe, I may judge whether I can give him any encouragement to come hither.

You had been troubled with this letter ſooner, but that I waited for the encloſed, to ſatisfy your inquiry concerning our linen manufacture. You will find thereby, that we have framed a bill to be enacted for the encouragement thereof. This bill is now before the council of England, purſuant to our conſtitution of parliament. What alterations, additions, and amendments it may receive there, we know not; but I am apt to think you will have the conſideration and modelling thereof at your committee of trade. We are very ſenſible, that the act we have drawn up (whereof the encloſed are the heads) is not ſo perfect and complete as it may be; but this

this we thought a fair beginning to ſo great an attempt, and that time muſt be given for a farther progreſs, and carrying it higher, by additional laws, as occaſion may require. The woollen manufacture of England was not eſtabliſhed at that high pitch (to which now it is raiſed,) by any one law, or any one generation. It muſt be ſo with us in relation to our linen; but this, we hope, may be a fair ſtep towards it: "Eſt aliquid prodire tenus, &c."

James Hamilton of Tullymore, eſq. is an indefatigable promoter of this deſign, and I may ſay indeed the whole ſcheme is owing to his contrivance. He is an hearty admirer of yours, and communicated to me the enclоſed abſtract purpoſely for your ſatisfaction; deſiring me with it to give you his moſt humble ſervice, and to requeſt of you your thoughts concerning this matter, by the firſt leiſure you can ſpare.

Whilſt our houſe of commons were framing this bill, our lords juſtices communicated to us ſome papers which they had received from the lords juſtices of England, laid before them by your board. But theſe papers coming in a little too late, when we had juſt cloſed the bill, and a very little time before our laſt adjournment for three weeks; all we did with them was to remit them again to our lords juſtices and council, with the houſes deſire, that if their lordſhips ſhould think fit to excerp any thing out of thoſe papers, and add it to our act, whilſt they had it before them, in order to be tranſmitted into England, their lordſhips might do therein as they pleaſed, and the houſe would agree to any ſuch additions, when the act came before us tranſmitted in due form under the ſeal of England. Whether the lords juſtices will make any ſuch additions out of thoſe papers I cannot yet tell; but I am ſure there were many things in thoſe papers that highly deſerved to be put in execution.

My brother gives you his moſt humble ſervice, and ſhould be very proud of the preſent of your Education. For though he has yet only two daughters, yet he is in hopes of many ſons; and the girls minds require as

much framing as the boys, and by the same rules: And that I take to be the chief part of education. I am,

Your's most sincerely,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, Oct. 28, 1697.

My most honoured Friend,

IF men could destroy by a quill, as they say porcupines do, I should think your death not very far off. But whatever venom they mix with their ink against you, I hope it is not mortal; I am sure in my opinion it is not the least harmful or dangerous. Your Reply to the bishop of Worcester shows how vainly the mightiest champion spends his darts at you, and with what force and strength of reason you return them on their own heads. But notwithstanding this, I verily believe he will offer again at his weak efforts; for he that was so fully possessed of his own sufficiency, as to think he could deal with the first letter to him, will certainly never lay down the cudgels till his blood be about his ears: And if he thought himself obliged in honour to justify his first blunders, much more will he think himself so now, when he is thrown over head and ears in the mire. To pass by all the rest of your Reply, (wherein you have given him many a severe wound) I think he is no-where so clearly and disgracefully foiled, as by the conversation between you and your friend concerning his notions of nature and person. But, above all, the consequence you draw from thence, of his being obliged to write against his own Vindication of the Trinity, must needs wound him to the heart; and indeed I do not see how it is possible for him to avoid the force of that blow, by all his art and cunning.

Yet

Yet write he will, I am ſure on it, and pour forth abundance of words; but ſo he may for ever. I envy not the place of his amanuenſis.

But all this while I have forgot to return you my acknowledgments for the favour of your book. I am extremely obliged to you for remembering me amongſt your other friends, whenever you are pleaſed to oblige the learned world with any of your happy thoughts. I had no ſooner peruſed them, but they were ſnatched out of my hands by my lord chancellor, (ſo covetous are all men of whatever comes from you) and he has them yet.

Amongſt the other ſmall craft that appears againſt you, I met with one J. H.'s State of England, in relation to coin and trade. I hear the author's name is Hodges. He is much of a claſs in this particular, as Mr. Serjeant, in relation to your Eſſay, that is, both to me unintelligible.

The encloſed is a ſample of what this place produces againſt you: I wiſh you may not ſay, that it reſembles our mountains and bogs, in being barren and uſeleſs. I have ventured to ſend you my ſhort anſwer thereto; for a longer I think it did not deſerve. I have not ſeen the biſhop ſince this has paſſed; but we are ſo good friends that this buſineſs will cauſe no anger between us. I am

Your moſt obliged and humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Biſhop of ——'s Letter to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Johnſtown, Oct. 26, 1697.

I HAVE met with Mr. Locke's Reply to the biſhop of Worceſter, and have had leiſure to look it over here. I meddle not with the controverſy between them, but

confeſs I am a little ſurprized at what I find p. 95 and 96, where we have theſe words: " To talk of the cer-" tainty of faith, ſeems all one to me, as to talk of " the knowledge of believing:" And, " When it is " brought to certainty, faith is deſtroyed:" And, " Bring it to certainty, and it ceaſes to be faith." And he in terms owns, p. 39. " With me to know and to " be certain, is the ſame thing; what I know, that I " am certain of; and what I am certain of, that I " know." And, p. 92. " Knowledge I find in myſelf, " and I conceive in others, conſiſts in the perception " of the agreement or diſagreement of the immediate " objects of the mind in thinking, which I call ideas." And, p. 38. " Certainty conſiſts in the perception of " the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas." Now to me it ſeems, that according to Mr. Locke I cannot be ſaid to know any thing except there be two ideas in my mind, and all the knowledge I have muſt be concerning the relation theſe two ideas have to one another, and that I can be certain of nothing elſe; which, in my opinion, excludes all certainty of ſenſe and of ſingle ideas, all certainty of conſciouſneſs, ſuch as willing, believing, knowing, &c. and, as he confeſſes, all certainty of faith; and laſtly, all certainty of remembrance, of what I have formerly demonſtrated, as ſoon as I have forgot, or do not actually think of the demonſtration. For I ſuppoſe you are well aware, that in demonſtrating mathematical propoſitions, it is not always from actual perception of the agreement of ideas, that we aſſume other propoſitions formerly demonſtrated to infer the concluſion, but from memory: And yet we do not think ourſelves leſs certain on that account. If this be the importance of Mr. L.'s words, as it ſeems to me to be, then we are not certain of the acts of our mind; we are not certain of any thing that remains in our minds merely by the ſtrength of our memory; and laſtly, we are not certain of any propoſition, though God and man witneſs the truth of it to us: And then judge how little certainty is left in the world, and how near this laſt comes to Mr. Toland's propoſition, that authority or teſtimony is only " a means of information, not a

" ground

" ground of perſuaſion." For I muſt own, that I think I am only perſuaded of the truth of a thing, in proportion to the certainty I have of it: And if knowledge and certainty be reciprocally the ſame, and conſiſt in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas; where I do not perceive theſe, though God and man, nay the whole world ſhould teſtify to me that they do agree or diſagree, I cannot be certain of it. I muſt profeſs myſelf of another opinion; and I think I am as certain there was ſuch a man as Mr. L. from the teſtimony of you, and other circumſtances, though I perceive no agreement or diſagreement in this caſe between the two ideas, to convince me of his being; as that the three angles of a ſtraight-lined triangle are equal to two right angles, where I actually perceive the agreement, or rather equality: Or, that the area of a cyclois is equal to triple the generating circle, of which I am certain by memory, though I do not at preſent perceive the demonſtration, or any agreement between the ideas of three circles and a cyclois, only remember that I once perceived it.

Let me farther add, that agreement and diſagreement are metaphorical terms when applied to ideas; for agreement properly, I think, either ſignifies, firſt, a compact between two perſons; or, ſecondly, two things fitting one another, as the two parts of a tally; or, thirdly, the likeneſs of two things, as of a pair of coach-horſes; or, fourthly, the aptitude of two things to ſupport or preſerve one another. So ſeveral meats agree with the ſtomach; but I do not find, that in a propoſition the ideas have an agreement in any of theſe ſenſes; and I rather think the old way of expreſſing this matter ought to be retained. I learned in Smiglecius, that when the " ſpecies intelligibilis" of the predicate was the ſame with the ſpecies of the ſubject, the one might be affirmed of the other: And when the " medius terminus" was the ſame with the one extreme term in one of the premiſſes, and the other extreme the ſame with it in the other of the premiſſes, the one might be affirmed of the other in the concluſion, becauſe of the old axiom: " Quæ ſunt idem uni tertio, ſunt idem

" idem inter ſe." You may uſe the metaphorical term of agreement here inſtead of identity; but Mr. L. has told us, p. 153. That " metaphorical expreſſions " (which ſeldom terminate in truth) ſhould be as much " as poſſible avoided, when men undertake to deliver " clear and diſtinct apprehenſions, and exact notions of " things."

I do find that men's thoughts do not differ ſo much as their words, and that moſt men are of one mind, when they come to underſtand one another, and have the ſame views; and hence many controverſies are only verbal. I doubt not but my difference from Mr. L. in this matter may be of the ſame nature; and perhaps, if I had carefully read his book of Human Underſtanding, I might perceive it; but I have neither opportunity, leiſure, or inclination to do ſo, and believe a great part of the world to be in the ſame circumſtances with me; and I verily believe, that the expreſſions I have noted in his reply, will ſeem unwary to them as well as to me.

I do find he claims a liberty that will not be allowed him by all, p. 92, " to pleaſe himſelf in his terms," ſo they be uſed conſtantly " in the ſame and a known " ſenſe." I remember others have claimed the ſame liberty under the notion of making their own dictionary; but I reckon the changing a term, though I declare my ſenſe, and forewarn the reader of it, to be a very great injury to the world; and to introduce a new one, where there is one altogether to ſignify the ſame thing, equally injurious; and that a man has only this liberty where he introduces a new thing, that has yet no name. And I believe you ſee my reaſons for being of this opinion, and therefore ſhall not mention them. Let me only obſerve, that the want of this caution ſeems to me to have brought moſt of Mr. L.'s trouble on him. Words were indeed arbitrary ſigns of things in thoſe that firſt impoſed them, but they are not to us. When we uſe the beſt caution we can, we are apt to tranſgreſs in changing them; and when we do ſo out of weakneſs, we muſt aſk pardon, but

muſt

muſt not claim it as liberty, it being really a fault. A few minutes lying on my hands, has given you this trouble; and I know your kindneſs to Mr. L. will not make it ungrateful to you, whilſt it aſſures you that I am

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant.

I could never comprehend any neceſſity for a criterion of certainty to the underſtanding, any more than of one to the eye, to teach it when it ſees. Let the eye be rightly diſpoſed, and apply an object to it, if duly applied, it will force it to ſee: and ſo apply an object to an underſtanding duly qualified, and if the arguments or object be as they ought to be, they will force the underſtanding to aſſent, and remove all doubts. And I can no more tell, what is in the object, or arguments, that aſcertains my underſtanding, than I can tell what it is in light, that makes me ſee. I muſt ſay, that the ſame God that ordered light to make me ſee, ordered truth, or rather certain objects, to aſcertain my underſtanding; and I believe Mr. L. can hardly give any other reaſon why his agreement, &c. of ideas ſhould cauſe certainty.

Mr. MOLYNEUX's Anſwer to the BISHOP.

MY LORD, Dublin, Oct. 27, 1697.

I AM extremely obliged to your lordſhip, that having a few minutes lying on your hands in your retirement from this town, you are pleaſed to beſtow them on my friend and me. I ſhould have acknowledged the favour more early, had your ſervant ſtaid for an anſwer when he delivered yours to me; but he was gone out of my reach before I was aware of it.

And now, my lord, all the anſwer I ſhall trouble your lordſhip with at preſent is this, that your lordſhip is much in the right on it, that had you read Mr. Locke's Eſſay of Human Underſtanding more carefully and

and throughout, you had never made the objections you raiſe againſt him in your letter to me; for your lordſhip would have found his fourth book abundantly ſatisfactory in the difficulties you propoſe, and particularly the 2d and 18th chapters of the fourth book, are a full anſwer to your lordſhip's letter.

But your lordſhip ſays, you have neither opportunity, leiſure, or inclination to read the Eſſay. My lord, I would not then have leiſure or inclination to animadvert on a book, that I had not (if not inclination) at leaſt leiſure to read. This, with ſubmiſſion, I cannot but ſay is great partiality. If your lordſhip ſays, your letter relates to his reply to the biſhop of Worceſter; neither will this do, in my humble opinion; ſeeing your lordſhip ſeems to ſurmiſe (as indeed you gueſs rightly) that the Eſſay might have ſet you right in this matter. I am,

My Lord,

Your lordſhip's moſt humble ſervant,

Will. Molyneux.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Dear Sir, Dublin, Dec. 18, 1697.

IT is now above three months ſince I heard from you, your laſt being of ſept. 11. You will therefore excuſe my impatience, if I can forbear no longer, and ſend this merely to know how you do. It is an anguiſhing thought to me, that you ſhould be ſubject to the common frailties and fate of mankind; but it would be ſome alleviation to my trouble, that, if you are ill, I ſhould know the worſt of it. This has ſo wholly taken up my mind at preſent, that I have no inclination

to

to write one word more to you in this, but again to repeat my request to you, that you would let me know how you are; for till I know this, I am dissatisfied, I am extremely uneasy; but for ever shall be

Your most affectionate admirer,

and devoted servant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, Jan. 10, 169$\frac{7}{8}$.

YOUR gentle and kind reproof of my silence, has greater marks of true friendship in it, than can be expressed in the most elaborate professions, or be sufficiently acknowledged by a man, who has not the opportunity nor ability to make those returns he would. Though I have had less health, and more business since I writ to you last than ever I had for so long together in my life; yet neither the one nor the other had kept me so long a truant, had not the concurrence of other causes, drilled me on from day to day, in a neglect of what I frequently purposed, and always thought myself obliged to do. Perhaps the listlessness my indisposition constantly kept me in, made me too easily hearken to such excuses; but the expectation of hearing every day from monsr. le Clerc, that I might send you his answer, and the thoughts that I should be able to send your brother an account, that his curious treatise concerning the chafers in Ireland was printed, were at least the pretences that served to humour my laziness. Business kept me in town longer than was convenient for my health: all the day from my rising was commonly spent in that, and when I came home at night, my shortness of breath, and panting for want of it, made me ordinarily so uneasy, that I had no heart to do

do any thing; so that the usual diversion of my vacant hours forsook me, and reading itself was a burthen to me. In this estate I lingered along in town to december, till I betook myself to my wonted refuge, in the more favourable air and retirement of this place. That gave me presently relief against the constant oppression of my lungs, whilst I sit still: but I find such a weakness of them still remain, that if I stir ever so little, I am immediately out of breath, and the very dressing or undressing me is a labour that I am fain to rest after to recover my breath; and I have not been once out of my house since I came last hither. I wish nevertheless that you were here with me to see how well I am: for you would find, that, sitting by the fire's side, I could bear my part in discoursing, laughing, and being merry with you, as well as ever I could in my life. If you were here (and, if wishes of more than one could bring you, you would be here to-day) you would find three or four in the parlour after dinner, who, you would say, passed their afternoons as agreeably and as jocundly as any people you have this good while met with. Do not therefore figure to yourself, that I am languishing away my last hours under an unsociable despondency and the weight of my infirmity. It is true, I do not count upon years of life to come; but I thank God I have not many uneasy hours here in the four and twenty; and if I can have the wit to keep myself out of the stifling air of London, I see no reason but, by the grace of God, I may get over this winter, and that terrible enemy of mine may use me no worse than the last did, which as severe, and as long as it was, let me yet see another summer.

What you say to me in yours of the 4th of october, concerning the bishop of W . . . . . , you will, I believe, be confirmed in, if his answer to my second letter, of which I shall say nothing to you yet, be got to you.

Mr. Coste is now in the house with me here, and is tutor to my lady Masham's son. I need not, I think, answer your questions about his skill in mathematics and natural history: I think it is not much; but he is an ingenious

ingenious man, and we like him very well for our purpoſe; and I have a particular obligation to you, for the reaſon why you inquired concerning him.

I come now to yours of the 28th of October, wherein you have found by this time, that you prophecied right concerning the biſhop of W....., and if you can remember what you ſaid therein, concerning abundance of words, you will not, I ſuppoſe, forbear ſmiling, when you read the firſt leaf of his laſt anſwer.

If there be not an evidence of ſenſe and truth, which is apt and fitted to prevail on every human underſtanding, as far as it is open and unprejudiced; there is at leaſt a harmony of underſtandings in ſome men, to whom ſenſe and nonſenſe, truth and falſhood, appear equally in the reſpective diſcourſes they meet with. This I find perfectly ſo between you and me, and it ſerves me to no ſmall purpoſe to keep me in countenance. When I ſee a man diſintereſted as you are, a lover of truth as I know you to be, and one that has clearneſs and coherence enough of thought to make long mathematical, i. e. ſure deductions, pronounce of J. H. and J. S.'s books, that they are unintelligible to you; I do not preſently condemn myſelf of pride, prejudice, or a perfect want of underſtanding, for laying aſide thoſe authors, becauſe I can find neither ſenſe or coherence in them. If I could think that diſcourſes and arguments to the underſtanding were like the ſeveral ſorts of cates to different palates and ſtomachs, ſome nauſeous and deſtructive to one, which are pleaſant and reſtorative to another; I ſhould no more think of books and ſtudy, and ſhould think my time better employed at puſh-pin than in reading or writing. But I am convinced to the contrary: I know there is truth oppoſite to falſhood, that it may be found if people will, and is worth the ſeeking, and is not only the moſt valuable, but the pleaſanteſt thing in the world. And therefore I am no more troubled and diſturbed with all the duſt that is raiſed againſt it, than I ſhould be to ſee from the top of an high ſteeple, where I had clear air and ſun-ſhine, a company of great boys or little boys

boys (for it is all one) throw up duſt in the air, which reached not me, but fell down in their own eyes.

Your anſwer to your friend the biſhop was certainly a very fit and full one to what he had ſaid, and I am obliged to you for it: but he nevertheleſs thought his objections ſo good, that I imagine he communicated them to my antagoniſt; for you will find the very ſame in his anſwer, and almoſt in the ſame words. But they will receive an anſwer at large in due time.

It will not be at all neceſſary to ſay any thing to you concerning the linen bill, which made ſo great a part of your letter of oct. 4th, and was the whole buſineſs of that of oct. 16th. You know (I believe) as well as I, what became of that bill. Pray return my humble thanks to Mr. Hamilton for his kind expreſſions concerning me, and for the favour he did me in thinking me any ways able to ſerve his country in that matter. I am ſo concerned for it, and zealous in it, that I deſire you to aſſure him, and to believe yourſelf, that I will neglect no pains or intereſt of mine to promote it as far as I am able; and I think it a ſhame, that whilſt Ireland is ſo capable to produce flax and hemp, and able to nouriſh the poor at ſo cheap a rate, and conſequently to have their labour upon ſo eaſy terms, that ſo much money ſhould go yearly out of the king's dominions, to enrich foreigners, for thoſe materials, and the manufactures made out of them, when his people of Ireland, by the advantage of their ſoil, ſituation, and plenty, might have every penny of it, if that buſineſs were but once put in the right way. I perceive by one of your letters, that you have ſeen the propoſals for an act ſent from hence. I would be very glad that you and Mr. Hamilton, or any other man, whom you know able, and a diſintereſted well-wiſher of his country, would conſider them together, and tell me whether you think that project will do, or wherein it is either impracticable or will fail, and what may be added or altered in it to make it effectual to that end. I know, to a man, a ſtranger to your country, as I am, many things may be overſeen, which by reaſon of the circumſtances of the place, or ſtate of the people, may

in

in practice have real difficulties. If there be any ſuch in regard of that project, you will do me a favour to inform me of them. The ſhort is, I mightily have it upon my heart to get the linen manufacture eſtabliſhed in a flouriſhing way in your country. I am ſufficiently ſenſible of the advantages it will be to you, and ſhall be doubly rejoiced in the ſucceſs of it, if I ſhould be ſo happy that you and I could be inſtrumental in it, and have the chief hand in forming any thing that might conduce to it. Employ your thoughts therefore I beſeech you about it, and be aſſured what help I can give to it here ſhall be as readily and as carefully employed, as if you and I alone were to reap all the profit of it.

I have not yet heard a word from monſ. le Clerc, in anſwer to my inquiries, and the queſtions you aſked, or elſe you had heard ſooner from me. I muſt beg you to return my acknowledgments to Mr. Moleſworth in the civileſt language you can find, for the great compliment you ſent me from him. If he could ſee my confuſion as often as I read that part of your letter, that would expreſs my ſenſe of it better than any words I am maſter of. I can only ſay that I am his moſt humble ſervant, and I have been not a little troubled, that I could not meet with the opportunities I ſought to improve the advantages I propoſed to myſelf, in an acquaintance with ſo ingenious and extraordinary a man as he is.

I read your brother's treatiſe, which he did me the honour to put into my hands, with great pleaſure, and thought it ſo unreaſonable to rob the public of ſo grateful a preſent by any delay of mine, that I forthwith put it into Dr. Sloane's hand to be publiſhed, and I expected to have ſeen it in print long ere this time. What has retarded it I have not yet heard from Dr. Sloane, who has not writ to me ſince I came into the country: but I make no doubt but he takes care of ſo curious a piece, and the world will have it ſpeedily. I muſt depend on you, not only for excuſing my ſilence to yourſelf, but I muſt be obliged to you to excuſe me to your brother for not having written to

him myſelf to thank him for the favour he did me. I hope ere long to find an opportunity to teſtify my reſpects to him more in form, which he would find I have in reality for him, if any occaſion of that kind ſhould come in my way. In the mean time I believe, if he ſaw the length of this letter, he would think it enough for one of a family to be perſecuted by ſo voluminous a ſcribbler, and would be glad that I ſpared him. I am both his, and,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt affectionate

and moſt humble ſervant,

John Locke.

Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Dear Sir, Dublin, March 15, 1697[8].

IN the midſt of my trouble for your long ſilence, ſoon after I had writ to two or three friends to inquire after your health, I was happily relieved by yours of laſt january the 10th from Oates. I am heartily concerned that you paſſed over the laſt winter with ſo much indiſpoſition; but I rejoice with you that you have eſcaped it, and hope you will yet paſs over many more. I could make to you great complaints likewiſe of my own late illneſs; but they are all drowned in this one, that I am hindered for a while in ſeeking a remedy for them. I fully purpoſed to be at the Bath this ſpring early, but I am diſappointed at preſent, and cannot ſtir from hence till my lord chancellor Methwin return to this kingdom. It has pleaſed the young lord Woodſtock, by directions from his majeſty, to chooſe my lord chancellor Methwin, Mr. Van Homrigh, preſent lord mayor of this city, and myſelf, to be his guardians, and managers of his affairs in this kingdom. Nothing can be done without two of us; ſo I am tied by the leg.

leg. Were it only in my health that I am disappointed, I could the easier bear it; but I am delayed from embracing my dear friend, which is most grievous of all. Yet I hope it will be so but for a time; but if my lord chancellor comes over in any convenient season, I will certainly get loose. But this I cannot hope for till the parliament in England rises. I should be glad to know from you when that is expected; for indeed they bear very hard upon us in Ireland. How justly they can bind us without our consent and representatives, I leave the author of the Two Treatises of Government to consider. But of this I shall trouble you farther another time, for you will hear more hereafter.

I have seen the bishop of Worcester's answer to your second letter. It is of a piece with the rest, and you know my thoughts of them already. I begin to be almost of old Hobbes's opinion, that, were it men's interest, they would question the truth of Euclid's Elements, as now they contest almost as full evidences.

I am very glad mons. Coste is so well settled as you tell me: I designed fully to invite him over hither; and if you know any other ingenious frenchman of that sort, or any such hereafter comes to your knowledge, I should be very glad you would give me intimation thereof.

I had certainly answered that part of your letter relating to the linen manufacture, but that I daily expected to do it more effectually by Mr. Hamilton himself, who gave me hopes of his going into England, and was resolved personally to wait on you about it. He is master of the whole mystery (and that I cannot pretend to be) and would have discoursed you most satisfactorily concerning it. I promised him a letter to you whenever he goes over, which will now be very speedily, and then I doubt not but you will concert matters together much for the good of this poor kingdom.

My brother gives you his most humble service, and thanks you for the care you took about his discourse concerning chafers. We hear from Dr. Sloane that it is printed. I am

Your most humble servant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, Oates, April 6, 1698.

THERE is none of the letters that ever I received from you gave me ſo much trouble as your laſt of march 15. I was told that you reſolved to come into England early in the ſpring, and lived in the hopes of it more than you can imagine. I do not mean that I had greater hopes of it than you can imagine; but it enlivened me, and contributed to the ſupport of my ſpirits more than you can think. But your letter has quite dejected me again. The thing I above all things long for, is to ſee, and embrace, and have ſome diſcourſe with you before I go out of this world. I meet with ſo few capable of truth, or worthy of a free converſation, ſuch as becomes lovers of truth, that you cannot think it ſtrange if I wiſh for ſome time with you, for the expoſing, ſifting, and rectifying of my thoughts. If they have gone any thing farther in the diſcovery of truth than what I have already publiſhed, it muſt be by your encouragement that I muſt go on to finiſh ſome things that I have already begun; and with you I hoped to diſcourſe my other yet crude and imperfect thoughts, in which if there were any thing uſeful to mankind, if they were opened and depoſited with you, I know them ſafe lodged for the advantage of truth ſome time or other. For I am in doubt whether it be fit for me to trouble the preſs with any new matter; or if I did, I look on my life as ſo near worn out, that it would be folly to hope to finiſh any thing of moment in the ſmall remainder of it. I hoped therefore, as I ſaid, to have ſeen you, and unravelled to you that which, lying in the lump unexplicated in my mind, I ſcarce yet know what it is myſelf; for I have often had experience, that a man cannot well judge of his own notions, till either by ſetting them down in paper, or in diſcourſing them to a friend, he has drawn them out, and as it were ſpread them fairly before himſelf. As for

for writing, my ill health gives me little heart or opportunity for it; and of seeing you I begin now to despair. And that which very much adds to my affliction in the case is, that you neglect your own health on considerations, I am sure, that are not worth your health; for nothing, if expectations were certainties, can be worth it. I see no likelihood of the parliament's rising yet this good while; and when they are up, who knows whether the man, you expect to relieve you, will come to you presently, or at all. You must therefore lay by that business for a while which detains you, or get some other body into it, if you will take that care of your health this summer which you designed, and it seems to require: and if you defer it till the next, who knows but your care of it may then come too late. There is nothing that we are such spendthrifts of as of health; we spare every thing sooner than that, though whatever we sacrifice it to is worth nothing without it. Pardon me the liberty I take with you: you have given me an interest in you; and it is a thing of too much value to me, to look coldly on, whilst you are running into any inconvenience or danger, and say nothing. If that could be any spur to you to hasten your journey hither, I would tell you I have an answer ready for the press, which I should be glad you should see first. It is too long: the plenty of matter of all sorts, which the gentleman affords me, is the cause of its too great length, though I have passed by many things worthy of remarks: but what may be spared of what there is, I would be glad should be blotted out by your hand. But this between us.

Amongst other things I would be glad to talk with you about before I die, is that which you suggest at the bottom of the first page of your letter. I am mightily concerned for the place meant in the question, you say you will ask the author of the treatise you mentioned, and wish extremely well to it; and would be very glad to be informed by you what would be best for it, and debate with you the ways to compose it. But this cannot be done by letters; the subject is of too great extent, the views too large, and the particulars too many to be so managed. Come therefore yourself, and

come as well prepared in that matter as you can. But if you talk with others on that point there, mention not me to any body on that ſubject; only let you and I try what good we can do for thoſe whom we wiſh well to. Great things have ſometimes been brought about from ſmall beginnings well laid together.

Pray preſent my moſt humble ſervice to your brother; I ſhould be glad of an opportunity to do him ſome ſervice. That which he thanks me for, in my care about his diſcourſe concerning the chafers, was a ſervice to the public, and he owes me no thanks for it. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your faithful, and moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Dublin, April 19, 1698.

Moſt honoured dear SIR,

I HAVE formerly had thoughts of coming into England, as I have told you on occaſion of my health. But ſince the receipt of yours of april 6, which came to my hands but this morning, that conſideration weighs but little with me. The deſire of ſeeing and converſing with you, has drowned all other expectations from my journey, and now I am reſolved to accompliſh it, let what will come on it. Your perſuaſions and arguments I think have ſomething in them of incantation: I am ſure their charms are ſo powerful on me on all occaſions, I can never reſiſt them. I ſhall therefore embrace you, God willing, as ſoon as ever the parliament of England riſes. I fix this period now, not ſo much in expectation of our chancellor's arrival, as on another account. My dear friend muſt therefore know,

that the conſideration of what I mentioned in my laſt, from the incomparable author of the Treatiſe, &c. has moved me to put pen to paper, and commit ſome thoughts of mine on that ſubject to the preſs in a ſmall 8vo, intitled, "The Caſe of Ireland's being bound by "Acts of Parliament in England ſtated." This you'll ſay is a nice ſubject, but I think I have treated it with that caution and ſubmiſſion, that it cannot juſtly give any offence; inſomuch that I ſcruple not to put my name to it, and, by advice of ſome good friends here, have preſumed to dedicate it to his Majeſty. I have ordered ſome of them to Mr. Churchill, to be preſented to you and ſome of your friends; and they are now upon the road towards you. I have been very free in giving you my thoughts on your pieces; I ſhould be extremely obliged to you for the like freedom on your ſide upon mine. I cannot pretend this to be an accompliſhed performance; it was done in haſte, and intended to overtake the proceedings at Weſtminſter; but it comes too late for that: what effect it may poſſibly have in time to come, God and the wiſe council of England only know; but were it again under my hands, I could conſiderably amend and add to it. But till I either ſee how the parliament at Weſtminſter is pleaſed to take it, or till I ſee them riſen, I do not think it adviſeable for me to go on t'other ſide the water. Though I am not apprehenſive of any miſchief from them, yet God only knows what reſentments captious men may take on ſuch occaſions.

My brother gives you his moſt reſpectful ſervice: he has now ready a diſcourſe on our giant's cauſeway, which indeed is a ſtupendous natural rarity: he has addreſſed it to Dr. Liſter; but you will ſoon ſee it in the Tranſactions.

Mr. Burridge goes on now with ſome ſpeed: I had lately an occaſion of writing to Mr. Churchill, and I gave him an account of his progreſs. I hope the whole will be finiſhed ſoon after midſummer; and indeed in my opinion he performs it incomparably. I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, London, July 9, 1698.

I AM juſt come to London, where your former promiſe, and what Mr. Churchill ſince tells me, makes me hope to ſee you ſpeedily. I long mightily to welcome you hither, and to remit, to that happy time, abundance that I may ſay to you. For I am,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

Honoured dear SIR, Dublin, Sept. 20, 1698.

I ARRIVED here ſafely the 15th inſtant; and now that the ruffling and fatigue of my journey is a little over, I ſit down to a taſk, which I muſt confeſs is the hardeſt I was ever under in my life; I mean, expreſſing my thanks to you ſuitable to the favours I received from you, and ſuitable to the inward ſenſe I have of them in my mind. Were it poſſible for me to do either, I ſhould in ſome meaſure be ſatisfied; but my inability of paying my debts, makes me aſhamed to appear before my creditor. However, thus much, with the ſtricteſt ſincerity, I will venture to aſſert to you, that I cannot recollect, through the whole courſe of my life, ſuch ſignal inſtances of real friendſhip, as when I had the happineſs of your company for five weeks together in London. It is with the greateſt ſatisfaction imaginable, that I recollect what then paſſed between us, and I reckon it the happieſt ſcene of my whole life. That part thereof, eſpecially, which I paſſed at Oates, has made

made ſuch an agreeable impreſſion on my mind, that nothing can be more pleaſing. To all in that excellent family, I beſeech you, give my moſt humble reſpects. It is my duty to make my acknowledgments there in a particular letter; but I beg of you to make my excuſe for omitting it at this time, becauſe I am a little preſſed by ſome buſineſs that is thrown upon me ſince my arrival. To which alſo you are obliged for not being troubled at preſent with a more tedious letter from,

SIR,

Your moſt obliged,

and entirely affectionate friend and ſervant,

WILL. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. MOLYNEUX.

Dear SIR, London, Sept. 29, 1698.

YOURS of the 20th has now diſcharged me from my daily employment of looking upon the weather-cock, and hearkening how loud the wind blowed. Though I do not like this diſtance, and ſuch a ditch betwixt us, yet I am glad to hear that you are ſafe and ſound on the other ſide the water. But pray ſpeak not in ſo magnificent and courtly a ſtyle of what you received from me here. I lived with you, and treated you as my friend, and therefore uſed no ceremony, nor can receive any thanks but what I owe you doubly, both for your company, and the pains you were at to beſtow that happineſs on me. If you keep your word, and do me the ſame kindneſs again next year, I ſhall have reaſon to think you value me more than you ſay, though you ſay more than I can with modeſty read.

I find you were beſet with buſineſs when you writ your letter to me, and do not wonder at it; but yet, for all

all that, I cannot forgive your ſilence concerning your health and your ſon. My ſervice to him, your brother, and Mr. Burridge, and do me the juſtice to believe, that I am, with a perfect affection,

Dear SIR,

Your moſt humble and moſt faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Mr. LOCKE to Mr. BURRIDGE.

SIR, Oates, October 27, 1698.

YOU gueſſed not amiſs, when you ſaid, in the beginning of yours of the 13th inſtant, that you gave me the trouble of a letter; for I have received few letters in my life, the contents whereof have ſo much troubled and afflicted me, as that of yours. I parted with my excellent friend, when he went from England, with all the hopes and promiſes, to myſelf, of ſeeing him again, and enjoying him longer in the next ſpring. This was a ſatisfaction that helped me to bear our ſeparation; and the ſhort taſte I had of him here, in this our firſt interview, I hoped would be made up in a longer converſation, which he promiſed me the next time: but it has ſerved only to give me a greater ſenſe of my loſs, in an eternal farewel in this world. Your earlier acquaintance may have given you a longer knowledge of his virtue and excellent endowments; a fuller ſight, or greater eſteem of them, you could not have than I. His worth, and his friendſhip to me, made him an ineſtimable treaſure, which I muſt regret the loſs of, the little remainder of my life, without any hopes of repairing it any way. I ſhould be glad, if what I owed the father could enable me to do any ſervice to his ſon. He deſerves it for his own ſake (his father has more than once talked to me of him) as well as for his father's. I deſire you therefore

fore to aſſure thoſe who have the care of him, that if there be any thing wherein I, at this diſtance, may be any way ſerviceable to young Mr. Molyneux, they cannot do me a greater pleaſure than to give me the opportunity to ſhow, that my friendſhip died not with him.

Pray give my moſt humble ſervice to Dr. Molyneux, and to his nephew. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt faithful and humble ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Aug. 27, 1692.

I AM very ſenſible of your great civility in remembering me upon ſo ſhort an acquaintance as I had with you in Holland, ſo long time ſince; and I aſſure you, without any compliment, I reckon it amongſt the moſt fortunate accidents of my life, my ſo luckily falling into your converſation, which was ſo candid, diverting, and inſtructive, that I ſtill reap the benefit and ſatisfaction of it. Some years after I left you in Holland, upon my return for England, I contracted no ſmall intimacy with Dr. Sydenham, on the account of having been known to you his much eſteemed friend; and I found him ſo accurate an obſerver of diſeaſes, ſo thoroughly ſkilled in all uſeful knowledge of his profeſſion, and withal ſo communicative, that his acquaintance was a very great advantage to me: and all this I chiefly owe to you, Sir, beſides the information of many uſeful truths, and a great deal of very pleaſing entertainment I have met with, in the peruſal of your lately publiſhed writings: ſo that, on many accounts, I muſt needs ſay, there

there are very few men in the world, to whom I can, with the like ſincerity, profeſs myſelf to be, as I am,

Dear Sir,

Your moſt real friend, and

very humble and obliged ſervant,

Tho. Molyneux.

Mr. Locke to Dr. Molyneux.

Sir, Oates, Nov. 1, 1692.

THE indiſpoſition of my health, which drove me out of London, and keeps me ſtill in the country, muſt be an excuſe for my ſo long ſilence. The very great civility you expreſs to me in your letter, makes me hope your pardon for the ſlowneſs of my anſwer, whereby I hope you will not meaſure the eſteem and reſpect I have for you. That your own diſtinguiſhing merit, amongſt the reſt of my countrymen I met with at Leyden, has ſo ſettled in me, that before the occaſion your brother's favour lately gave me to inquire after you, I often remembered you, and it was not without regret I conſidered you at a diſtance that allowed me not the hopes of renewing and improving my acquaintance with you. There being nothing I value ſo much, as ingenious knowing men, think it not ſtrange that I laid hold on the firſt opportunity to bring myſelf again into your thoughts. You muſt take it as an exerciſe of your goodneſs, drawn on you by your own merit; for, whatever ſatisfaction I gain to myſelf in having recovered you again, I can propoſe no advantage to you, in the offer of a very uſeleſs and infirm acquaintance, who can only boaſt that he very much eſteems you.

That which I always thought of Dr. Sydenham living, I find the world allows him now he is dead, and that he deſerved all that you ſay of him. I hope the age has many

many who will follow his example, and by the way of accurate practical observation, as he has so happily begun, enlarge the history of diseases, and improve the art of physic, and not by speculative hypotheses fill the world with useless, though pleasing visions. Something of this kind permit me to promise myself one day from your judicious pen. I know nothing that has so great an encouragement from mankind as this.

I beg you to present my most humble service to your brother, whom I forbear now to interrupt, in the midst of his parliamentary affairs, whereof I know a great part must fall to his share, with my thanks for the favour of his of the 15th of october, which lately found me out safe here. Let him know that I am exceedingly sensible of the obligation, and shall at large make my acknowledgments to him as soon as good manners will allow it. I am,

SIR,

Your most humble and most faithful servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Dec. 20, 1692.

I AM much concerned to hear you have your health no better, and on this occasion cannot but deplore the great losses the intellectual world in all ages has suffered, by the strongest and soundest minds possessing the most infirm and sickly bodies. Certainly there must be some very powerful cause for this in nature, or else we could not have so many instances, where the knife cuts the sheath, as the French materially express it: and if so, this must be reckoned among the many other inseparable miseries that attend human affairs.

I could

I could wish the physician's art were so powerful and perfect, as, in some measure, to prevent so great an evil; but we find where once nature, or the "Oeconomia Animalis" of the body, is so depraved, as not to co-operate with medicine, all remedies, and the courses of them, prove wholly ineffectual, or to very little purpose. But still the more imperfect physic is, so much the more is owing to those, who in the least improve so difficult a province, which certainly has been considerably advanced by some late English authors; and that puts me in mind to desire of you your thoughts, or what other learned physicians you converse with say, concerning Dr. Morton and his late Exercitations on Fevers. As for his general theory of them, I esteem it, as all others of this kind, a sort of mere waking dream, that men are strangely apt to fall into, when they think long of a subject, beginning quite at the wrong end; for by framing such conceits in their fancies, they vainly think to give their understandings light, whilst the things themselves are still, and perhaps ever must remain, in darkness.

In his first exercitation that treats of agues, I don't find he has said any thing very material, or worth notice, that the world did not sufficiently know before, unless it were some histories of the irregular shapes and symptoms this distemper appears under, which I think may be very instructive to the physician, and of great case and advantage to the sick.

But his practical remarks in his second exercitation about continuing and remitting fevers, if they be judiciously founded upon many and steady observations, so that they may safely pass into a rule, must certainly be of great moment in directing the management and cure of fevers. I confess my experience in this distemper as yet falls something too short for to determine positively, whether all his observations be real and well grounded; but, as far as I can judge at present, several of them do hold good.

I remember to have heard Dr. Morton was once a presbyterian preacher; and though he were, this does not make him a jot the less capable, in above twenty years

years practice, to have carefully obſerved the accidents that naturally occur in the progreſs of a diſeaſe; and if he be but a true and judicious regiſter, it is all I deſire from him.

You ſee I have taken great freedom in giving a character according to my apprehenſions of this author, but it is only to encourage you to uſe the ſame liberty; for if, at your leiſure, you would let me know your own thoughts, or what other candid men ſay concerning him and his methods of cure, or any other uſeful tract that comes abroad, you will extremely oblige,

SIR,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. LOCKE to Dr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Jan. 20, $169\frac{2}{3}$.

I MUST acknowledge the care you take of my health, in a way wherein you ſo kindly apply to my mind; and if I could perſuade myſelf that my weak conſtitution was owing to that ſtrength of mind you aſcribe to me, or accompanied with it, I ſhould find therein, if not a remedy, yet a great relief againſt the infirmities of my body. However, I am not the leſs obliged to you for ſo friendly an application; and if the cordial you preſcribe be not to be had (for I know none equal to a judicious and capacious mind) your kindneſs is not to be blamed, who I am confident wiſh me that ſatisfaction, or any thing elſe that could contribute to my health.

The doctor, concerning whom you inquire of me, had, I remember, when I lived in town, and converſed among the phyſicians there, a good reputation amongſt thoſe of his own faculty. I can ſay nothing of his late book of fevers, having not read it myſelf, nor heard it

ſpoke

ſpoke of by others: but I perfectly agree with you concerning general theories, that they are, for the moſt part, but a ſort of waking dreams, with which, when men have warmed their own heads, they paſs into unqueſtionable truths, and then the ignorant world muſt be ſet right by them. Though this be, as you rightly obſerve, beginning at the wrong end, when men lay the foundation in their own fancies, and then endeavour to ſuit the phenomena of diſeaſes, and the cure of them, to thoſe fancies. I wonder that, after the pattern Dr. Sydenham has ſet them of a better way, men ſhould return again to that romance way of phyſic. But I ſee it is eaſier, and more natural, for men to build caſtles in the air, of their own, than to ſurvey well thoſe that are to be found ſtanding. Nicely to obſerve the hiſtory of diſeaſes in all their changes and circumſtances, is a work of time, accurateneſs, attention, and judgment, and wherein if men, through prepoſſeſſion or oſcitancy, miſtake, they may be convinced of their errour by unerring nature and matter of fact, which leaves leſs room for the ſubtlety and diſpute of words, which ſerves very much inſtead of knowledge, in the learned world, where, methinks, wit and invention has much the preference to truth. Upon ſuch grounds as are the eſtabliſhed hiſtory of diſeaſes, hypotheſes might with leſs danger be erected, which I think are ſo far uſeful, as they ſerve as an art of memory to direct the phyſician in particular caſes, but not to be relied on as foundations of reaſoning, or verities to be contended for; they being, I think I may ſay all of them, ſuppoſitions taken up gratis, and will ſo remain, till we can diſcover how the natural functions of the body are performed, and by what alteration of the humours, or defects in the parts, they are hindered or diſordered. To which purpoſe, I fear the galeniſts four humours, or the chemiſts ſal, ſulphur, and mercury, or the late prevailing invention of acid and alcali, or whatever hereafter ſhall be ſubſtituted to theſe with new applauſe, will, upon examination, be found to be but ſo many learned empty ſounds, with no preciſe determinate ſignification. What we know of the works of nature, eſpecially in the conſtitution of health, and the operations

operations of our own bodies, is only by the sensible effects, but not by any certainty we can have of the tools she uses, or the ways she works by. So that there is nothing left for a physician to do, but to observe well, and so, by analogy, argue to like cases, and thence make to himself rules of practice: and he that is this way most sagacious, will, I imagine, make the best physician, though he should entertain distinct hypotheses concerning distinct species of diseases, subservient to this end, that were inconsistent one with another; they being made use of in those several sorts of diseases, but as distinct arts of memory, in those cases. And I the rather say this, that they might be relied on only as artificial helps to a physician, and not as philosophical truths to a naturalist. But, sir, I run too far, and must beg your pardon for talking so freely on a subject you understand so much better than I do. I hoped the way of treating of diseases, which, with so much approbation, Dr. Sydenham had introduced into the world, would have beaten the other out, and turned men from visions and wrangling to observation, and endeavouring after settled practices in more diseases; such as I think he has given us in some. If my zeal for the saving men's lives, and preserving their health (which is infinitely to be preferred to any speculations ever so fine in physic) has carried me too far, you will excuse it in one who wishes well to the practice of physic, though he meddles not with it. I wish you and your brother, and all yours, a very happy new-year, and am,

SIR,

Your most humble and faithful servant,

JOHN LOCKE.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Nov. 4, 1693.

FOR a while I deferred making any return for the favour of your last letter, on the account I understood,

by one of yours to my brother, that I was ſuddenly to expect another obligation from you, by the receipt of your Treatiſe of Education, which yeſterday firſt came to my hands; and now I return you my hearty thanks for both your kindneſſes together, of which ſhould I expreſs the real thoughts I have, I ſhould ſeem to run either into extravagant compliment, or groſs flattery: but thus much I muſt needs ſay, that as your letter certainly contains; in ſhort, the only true method for the proſecuting the curing part of the practice of phyſic, and the ſure way of improving it; a matter of the chiefeſt good, in relation to men's bodies; ſo your book of education lays down ſuch rules for the breeding of youth as, if followed, muſt neceſſarily prove of the greateſt advantage to the better part of man, the mind, by inſenſibly diſpoſing it to an habitual exerciſe of what is virtuous and laudable, and the acquiſition of all ſuch knowledge as is neceſſary for one's own good, or that of others whom we are to converſe with. Whence I cannot but think, had thoſe of our own countries but a thorough perſuaſion, and a right ſenſe of the great benefit that redounds from a chearful education, ſo as univerſally to put it in practice; without queſtion, we ſhould ſoon become a nation as remarkably different from the reſt of the world, for the inward endowments of our minds, and the rectitude of our manners, as the negroes are from the reſt of mankind, for their outward ſhape and colour of body. But this, I fear, is a happineſs only to be wiſhed for; however, he that makes it his endeavour to promote ſo great a good, by ſhowing the certain way to it, if they will follow him, juſtly deſerves the high eſteem of all that know how to value a truly public ſpirit.

I hope, ſir, you have your health better, and that we may ſuddenly have abroad your Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, with thoſe farther additions and alterations you have ſome time ſince deſigned for the preſs: I am confident it is impatiently expected by all that are acquainted with your writings, and that peculiar clear manner

manner of delivering truth you are ſo much maſter of, but by none more than,

SIR,

Your moſt faithful humble ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Dr. MOLYNEUX to Mr. LOCKE.

SIR, Dublin, Oct. 25, 1697.

I SHOULD oftener make acknowledgments to you for your favours, and expreſs the great eſteem I bear you, but that this barren place affords little elſe to ſay; and this I cannot think reaſon enough to trouble one ſo buſy and uſefully engaged as you always are. Yet I would not omit thanking you, by this worthy gentleman, Mr. Berriſford, your acquaintance, for a preſent of a book, I underſtand by my brother, you deſigned for me, though I was ſo unlucky as to miſs of it; and alſo communicate to you the encloſed letter, which the biſhop of Clogher was pleaſed (perhaps out of his too partial friendſhip) to tell me deſerved to be made public, and deſired me accordingly to tranſmit it to Dr. Sloane: but this I would not do, unleſs it have your approbation alſo; ſo that it is wholly at your diſpoſal to do with it as you pleaſe, as is likewiſe,

SIR,

Your very affectionate friend,

and humble ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Mr. Locke to Dr. Molyneux.

Sir, Oates, Oct. 27, 1698.

DEATH has, with a violent hand, haſtily ſnatched from you a dear brother. I doubt not but, on this occaſion, you need all the conſolation can be given to one unexpectedly bereft of ſo worthy and near a relation. Whatever inclination I may have to alleviate your ſorrow, I bear too great a ſhare in the loſs, and am too ſenſibly touched with it myſelf, to be in a condition to diſcourſe you on this ſubject, or do any thing but mingle my tears with yours. I have loſt, in your brother, not only an ingenious and learned acquaintance, that all the world eſteemed; but an intimate and ſincere friend, whom I truly loved, and by whom I was truly loved: and what a loſs that is, thoſe only can be ſenſible who know how valuable, and how ſcarce, a true friend is, and how far to be preferred to all other ſorts of treaſure. He has left a ſon, who I know was dear to him, and deſerved to be ſo as much as was poſſible, for one of his age. I cannot think myſelf wholly incapacitated from paying ſome of the affection and ſervice that was due from me to my dear friend, as long as he has a child, or a brother, in the world. If, therefore, there be any thing, at this diſtance, wherein I, in my little ſphere, may be able to ſerve your nephew or you, I beg you, by the memory of our deceaſed friend, to let me know it, that you may ſee that one who loved him ſo well, cannot but be tenderly concerned for his ſon, nor be otherwiſe than I am,

Sir,

Your moſt humble, and

moſt affectionate ſervant,

John Locke.

Dr.

Dr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.

Sir, Dublin, Nov. 26, 1698.

AS you have a true sense of every thing, so you were very much in the right, when you tell me, in the letter you favoured me with of the 27th of last month, that I needed all the consolation could be given one that had lost so unexpectedly a dear and only brother. His death indeed has been a severe affliction to me; and though I have you, and many more, that bear a great share with me in my sorrow, yet this does no way alleviate it, but makes it fall the heavier upon me; for it doubles my grief to think what an unspeakable loss he must be to so near a relation, that is so much lamented by those that were only acquainted with him. I could not believe that mortality could have made so deep an impression on me, whose profession leads into so thorough a familiarity with it; but I find a passionate affection surmounts all this, and the "tecum obeam lubens," though it was the expression of a poet, yet I am sensible was a very natural one, where we love extremely, and the indians prove it no less in fact. Could any outward circumstance of his life have increased that brotherly affection I had for him, it must have been that he had so great a part in your friendship, who must be allowed to have a nice judgment in discerning the true characters and worth of men. He frequently, in his life-time, has expressed to me with great complacency of mind, how happy he thought himself in your acquaintance; and he spoke of you several times, during his short sickness, with great respect. With his own hand he has writ this clause in his will: "I give and bequeath to my excellent friend John "Locke, esq. author of the Essay concerning Human "Understanding, the sum of five pounds, to buy him "a ring, in memory of the value and esteem I had for "him." This I shall take care to send you in a bill

by Mr. Churchill's hands, when he ſtates the account as it ſtands between him and my brother. The only child he has left behind him is under my care and management. I ſhall endeavour to diſcharge this truſt, with all the regard to my brother's memory, and the advantage of his child, I can: but it grieves me to think, that I muſt ſurely fall very much ſhort of that extraordinary application and prudence his father would have ſhown in his education; for he made it the chiefeſt, and indeed the only buſineſs of his life. I have made his little ſon as ſenſible as his tender age would allow, how much he is obliged to you, his father's friend, for your earneſt deſire to ſerve him: I wiſh you may both prolong your lives ſo, as he may one day be more thankful and capable of your kindneſs, by profiting much from your good inſtructions and advice. And ſince you ſo earneſtly preſs me, by the memory of your deceaſed friend, to let you know wherein you might oblige me, I will venture to break the bounds of modeſty ſo far, as to tell you I ſhould be extremely pleaſed to receive from yourſelf the laſt edition of your incomparable Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, and ſuch other pieces of your works as you ſhall think fit; for all which, as I have a great eſteem, ſo I ſhould have a more particular regard coming from yourſelf, as a private memorial of my dear brother's friend, and of a perſon for whom I have ſuch an extraordinary value, as I ſhall ever be proud of owning myſelf,

SIR,

Your truly affectionate humble ſervant,

THO. MOLYNEUX.

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE to Dr. MOLYNEUX.

SIR, Oates, Jan. 25, 169⅝.

I HAVE been ſlower in returning you my thanks for the favour of your letter of the 26th of november, and the civilities you expreſs to me in it, than perhaps I ſhould have been. But the truth is, my thoughts never look towards Dublin now, without caſting ſuch a cloud upon my mind, and laying ſuch a load of freſh ſorrow on me for the loſs of my dear friend, your brother, that I cannot without diſpleaſure turn them that way; and when I do it I find myſelf very unfit for converſation and the entertainment of a friend. It is therefore not without pain that I bring myſelf to write you a ſcurvy letter. What there wants in it of expreſſion, you muſt make up out of the eſteem I have for the memory of our common friend; and I deſire you not to think my reſpects to you leſs, becauſe the loſs of your brother makes me not able to ſpeak them as I would.

Since you are pleaſed to put ſuch a value on my trifles, I have given order to Mr. Churchill to ſend you my laſt reply to the biſhop of Worceſter, and the laſt edition of my treatiſe of Education, which came forth ſince Mr. Molyneux's death. I ſend this with the more confidence to you, becauſe your brother told me more than once that he followed the method I therein offer to the world, in the breeding of his ſon. I wiſh you may find it fit to be continued to him, and uſeful to you in his education; for I cannot but be mightily concerned for the ſon of ſuch a father, and wiſh that he may grow up into that eſteem and character, which his father left behind him amongſt all good men who knew him. As for my Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding, it is now out of print, and if it were not, I think I ſhould make you but an ill compliment in ſending it you leſs perfect than I deſign it ſhould be in the next edition, in which I ſhall make many additions to it: and when it is as perfect as I can make it, I know not whether in

ſending it you, I ſhall not load you with a troubleſome and uſeleſs preſent. But ſince by deſiring it you ſeem to promiſe me your acceptance, I ſhall as ſoon as it is re-printed take the liberty to thruſt it into your ſtudy. I am,

SIR,

Your moſt humble and faithful ſervant,

JOHN LOCKE.

INDEX

INDEX

TO THE

EIGHTH VOLUME.

A.

AFFECTATION, what, and whence it proceeds, 48
Arithmetic, how children ſhould learn it, 172
Aſhley (Anthony) See Cooper and Shaftſbury.
Aſtronomy, how to enter children into it, 173

B.

BEATING of children, to be avoided, 37
Bed, children to be uſed to an hard one, 22
Blackmore, (ſir Richard) Vid. Locke, Molyneux.
Bread, children ſhould be accuſtomed to eat it, 15—17
Breeding, wherein its goodneſs conſiſts, and how to attain it, 133
Burridge undertakes to tranſlate Mr. Locke's eſſay into Latin, 367, 368

C.

CAPELL, (lord) his high eſteem of Mr. Locke, and his works, 369
Ceremony, an exceſs of it contrary to good breeding, 137, 138
Certainty, an Iriſh biſhop's letter againſt Mr. Locke's notion of it, 439
Children, how a healthful conſtitution ſhould be preſerved in them, 7
——— ſhould be enured to cold and wet, 7—9
——— ſhould be much in the open air, 12
——— ſhould not have their cloaths ſtrait, 13
——— ſhould eat but little fleſh, 14
——— what diet fitteſt for them, 14, 15
——— ſhould not drink often, nor ſtrong drink, 18, 19
——— what fruit is bad for them, and what good, 19, 20

Children, what ſleep ſhould be allowed them, 20, 21
——— ſhould be uſed to hard lodging 21
——— phyſic, ſparingly to be given them, 26
——— are often taught ill habits in infancy, 27—31
——— their eager craving not to be complied with, 32, &c.
——— great care to be taken of their company, 53, &c.
——— ſhould be treated as rational creatures, 69
Chronology, how to be learnt, 174, 175
Civil law, how young men ſhould be taught it, 176
Commendation, children chiefly to be allured by it, 41
Company of their parents, neceſſary to children, 53
Complaints of children againſt one another, not to be encouraged, 99
Compulſion, in teaching, to be avoided, 63, 122, &c.
Cooper, (Sir Anthony Aſhley) was the firſt earl of Shaftſbury, 266
——— his advice to king Charles I. for putting an end to the war, ibid.
——— how his project was fruſtrated, 267
——— goes over to the parliament, 269
——— his great candour to his enemies, 270
——— ſeveral inſtances of his extraordinary ſagacity, 273, &c.
——— how he diſcovered general Monk's deſign of ſetting up himſelf, 280
——— was the cauſe of the return of king Charles II. 281
——— his letters to king Charles, &c. 282, &c.
Coſtiveneſs; its ill effects on the body, 23
——— how to be avoided, ibid. &c.
Courage, to be early wrought in children, 106
Courage, to be promoted, by keeping children from frights, 106
Craving of children not to be complied with, 32, 33
——— how to reſtrain it, 94, &c.
——— how this reſtraining is to be underſtood, 323
Cromwell, (Oliver) his eſcape from the preſbyterian party in parliament, 279
Cruelty, to be early rooted out of children, 112, 113
Crying in children, of two ſorts, 102
——— ſhould not be indulged in children, ibid, &c.
Curioſity in children ſhould be encouraged, 97
——— how it is to be encouraged in young perſons, 115, &c.

D.

DANCING, uſeful to be learned early, 190
Diet,—what, beſt for children, 14, 15
Diſpoſition of children ſhould be obſerved in their learning, 61, 62
Diſpute, over-great earneſtneſs in it ſhould be avoided, 140, 141
Diſſenters, cenſured for their inconſiſtency, 429
Dominion, wherein children's aiming at it firſt appears, 93, 94
——— how children's inclinations to it ſhould be reſtrained, ibid. &c.
Drawing, ſome ſkill in it neceſſary for a gentleman, 150
Drink, taking of it cold, when the body is hot, very dangerous, 12, 18
——— of children, ſhould be only ſmall beer, 18
——— much drinking, eſpecially of ſtrong liquors, cauſes thirſt, 18, 19

E.

EAGERNESS, the indecency of it in disputing, 139, &c.
Education of children, has a great influence upon their whole life, 6
——— a diligent and early care should be exercised about it, 27
Ethics, or morality, how best to be taught young people, 176, &c.
——— the gospel, a sufficient system thereof, 377

F.

FENCING, has both its use and danger, 192
Fool-hardiness, no less unreasonable than cowardice, 105
Friend, the advantages of free converse with a learned and judicious one, 292
——— the difficulty of finding such an one, 354
Fruit, what fruit children should be kept from, and what they may be allowed to eat, 19

G.

GEntleman's Religion, the author of the book so called, commended, 370
Genus and Species, Mr. Locke's notion of them explained, 305
Geography, how children may be easily taught it, 172
Geometry, a good way of entering children into it, 174
God, what notions of him should be early instilled into children, 128
Grammar, not so necessary in learning languages as commonly thought, 160, 161
Greek tongue, may be attained without much difficulty by a grown man, 187

H.

HABITS, ill ones too often fixed in children betimes, 27
——— good ones should be taught by practice, more than by rules, 46, 47
Hardiness, children should be early enured to it, 110
Health of the body, necessary to a happy state in this world, 6
——— how care should be taken of it in educating children, 7, &c.
History, how young persons should be entered into it, 175

I.

INterruption, of one speaking, a branch of rudeness, 139
Justice, how children should be enured to practise it, 101

L.

LAMBERT, (Major-general) his attempt to seize sir Anthony-Ashley Cooper disappointed, 276
Languages, better learned by use, than by a multitude of rules, 152, &c.
Latin tongue, much time ill spent in learning it, ibid.
——— how it may be easily attained, 152, &c.
Law, (of one's country) how young men should learn it, 177
Learning, more ado than should be is made about it, in educating children, 142, &c.
——— should be made a sport to children, from the first, 143
——— how it may be made a play to children, 143, 144
——— by rote, children should not be too much put to it, 168, &c.
Le Clerc, vid. Locke, Molyneux.
Letters, (or epistles) what care should be taken to instruct youth how to write them, 180, &c.

Liberality,

Liberality, how children ſhould be enured to it, 100
Linen manufacture, complaints of knavery about it in Ireland, 389
——— the parliament's endeavour to retrieve it, 436
——— the great advantage of promoting it, 448
Locke, (Mr. John) his letters to ſeveral of his friends, 289, &c.
—— writes to Mr. Molyneux about the earthquake on September 8, 1692, 295
—— concerning ſome miſtakes in his remarks on the eſſay, 302
—— corrects ſome paſſages in his eſſay, about the poſſibility of matter's thinking, 303. finds it difficult to reconcile God's omniſcience and man's liberty, 305, and yet is ſure of both, ibid.
—— his explication of genus and ſpecies, ibid.
—— his low opinion of the common logic, 306
—— informs Mr. Molyneux of his new account of freedom, 317, &c.
—— aſſerts the neceſſity of children's diverſion, 323, 324. deſires Mr. Molyneux to uſe his ſon hardily, 325
—— gives him a ſhort account of his chapter on what determines the will, 325, &c.
—— explains his judgment of puniſhing a man for a fault committed when drunk, 329. approves Mr. Molyneux's diſtinction between a drunken and a frantic man, 336
—— deſires Mr. Molyneux to ſupervife a Latin tranſlation of his eſſay, 356. ſignifies his thoughts of adding ſomething in it, about enthuſiaſm, ibid.
—— commends the often reading of Tully, for gaining a good Latin ſtyle, 359, 360. inſtances a gentlewoman, who taught her child Latin, without knowing it herſelf when ſhe began, 360
Locke relates to him the bad ſtate of our money, 367, 376
—— ſends him a paper concerning the recoining it, 367
—— lord Capel's high eſteem of him and his writings, 369
—— prefers retirement for ſtudy, before an honourable place of 1000l. per annum, 376
—— recommends the goſpel, as a ſufficient treatiſe of morality, 377
—— reflects on Mr. Synge's anſwer to Mr. Molyneux's problem, 378
—— his contempt of the preſent world, 383. his advice about tranſlating his eſſay into Latin, ibid.
—— his account of Dr. Sherlock's temper, the dean of St. Paul's, 396, 401
—— his judgment of Mr. Whiſton's theory of the earth, 397
—— his high eſteem of Mr. Le Clerc, 398
—— his ingenious remark on Mr. Norris's repreſenting the lady Maſham blind, 400
—— reflections in French on his eſſay, 409
—— his mean opinion of Mr. Toland, 415
—— what benefit he expected from the biſhop of Worceſter's writing againſt him, 417. his opinion of Mr. Leibnitz, who made the French reflections on his eſſay, ibid.
—— his ſhyneſs of Mr. Toland, and the reaſons of it, 425
—— his good opinion of ſir Richard Blackmore, 426, 432
—— an Iriſh biſhop's letter againſt his notion of certainty, 439
—— a diſtinct account of his difficulty of breathing, 445, 446
—— repreſents the unintelligibleneſs of his adverſary's writings, 447
—— his grief for the death of his dear friend Mr. Molyneux, 458. 468

Locke, his judgment of the usual mistakes of physicians 464
—— his letter of condolance to Dr. Molyneux, brother to his deceased friend, 468
Logic, how it may be best learned, 177.—the defects of the common logic, 177, 178
Lying, children should be carefully kept from it, and how, 126

M.

Malebranche, his opinion of seeing all things in God, confuted, 211
—— his argument from the impenetrability of bodies, answered, 215, &c.
—— his mistake about seeing a cube and an object vastly distant, 218.—his mistake about the mind's producing ideas, ibid.
—— his strange notion that ideas of material things are spiritual things, 219
—— it is hard, according to his notion, to prove a real sun, 221
—— his saying, that material things are in God after a spiritual manner, unintelligible, 222
—— the obscurity of his saying, that God is the place of spirits, 222, 223
—— his notion that we think upon all things, before we think on any particular thing, not true, 225
—— the unreasonableness of his asserting, we cannot desire to see any thing, unless we, in part, see it already, 226
—— he at length resolves all into the pleasure of God, 228
—— his mistake in saying we have the idea of infinite before that of finite, 230, 231
—— seems to affirm directly contrary to St. Paul, 232
—— groundlessly denies that we smell, or feel, things, in God, though we see them in him, 233
Malebranche, his telling us, a sentiment is a modification of the soul, is insignificant, 234
—— his distinction between idea and sentiment, not well grounded, ibid.
—— his talk of God's penetrating our souls, unintelligible, 239
—— his four ways of knowing things, confuted, ibid.
—— his notion of universal reason, in what sense true, 250
—— the unsurmountable difficulty which attends his opinion, 252
Manners, children should be taught good ones, rather by examples than rules, 50
Matter, Mr. Locke's notion of it explained, 303, 304
Meals, of children, should not be constantly kept to a certain hour, 17
Merchants accompts, gentlemen should be skilled therein, 199
Method, a good one necessary in all learning, 190
Minds, the general reason why the soundest minds have usually the most sickly bodies, 461
Miracles, the definition of them, and a discourse about them, 256
—— what proves extraordinary operations to be real miracles, 259
—— the only case wherein real miracles may be expected, 262
—— the occasion of writing the discourse on miracles, 265
Money, several authors mentioned, who have written about it, 366, 369, 370
—— the clipping of it, almost brought us to ruin, 376
—— a law made to prevent clipped money from passing, ibid.
Morality, vide Ethics.
Molyneux, (Mr.) his letters to Mr. Locke, 290, &c.
—— desires Mr. Locke to write a treatise of morality, 291

Molyneux writes to Mr. Locke, that the earthquake of 1692 was not felt at Dublin, 296
——— desires him to publish a logic, upon the principles of his essay, 298
——— desires him to put marginal notes in the second edition of his essay, 309
——— earnestly solicits him to publish a method of learning, ibid.
——— his problem concerning a man born blind, 311
——— desires him to write against Malebranche's enthusiasm, 316, 353,—and against the notion of the world's eternity, 316
——— his objection against denying the craving of children, 319
——— his ingenious method of teaching children to read, 320
——— doubts concerning Mr. Locke's judgment of a man's being punished for a fault committed, when drunk, 329
——— approves of Mr. Locke's explication of this matter, 333
——— his opinion of the difference made by the law, between a drunken and frantic man, 334
——— highly approves Mr. Locke's new explication of man's liberty, 341
——— recommends Dr. St. George Ashe to Mr. Locke, 345
——— approves Mr. Locke's design of writing about enthusiasm, 353
——— relates his child's great progress in learning, by Mr. Locke's method, 358
——— his problem answered by Mr. Synge, 371
——— commends Mr. Burridge to Mr. Locke, for a good translator, 371, 374
——— his smart censure of Mr. Edwards's writings, 380
——— intreats Mr. Locke, to let him have his picture, 381
——— his remarks on Dr. Bentley's sermons at Mr. Boyle's lecture, 388
Molyneux, his account of spoiling the linen manufacture in Ireland, 389
——— his favourable opinion of Mr. Le Clerc, 392, 393
——— his judgment of the bishop of Worcester's writing against Mr. Locke, 394
——— his account of Dr. Sherlock's politic foresight, 401
——— relates the difficulty of getting preferment for Mr. Le Clerc, 402
——— his very high opinion of Mr. Le Clerc, ibid.
——— his opinion of Mr. Norris, 404
——— his free censure of Mr. Toland's conduct, 421
——— his high character of sir Richard Blackmore's poems, 423, 429
——— his complaint of using violence in matters of religion, 428
——— relates Mr. Toland's miserable condition in Ireland, 434
——— mentions his treatise, intitled, The case of Ireland's being bound by acts of parliament, in England, stated, 455
——— dies, soon after his return from England, 458
——— left Mr. Locke a token of remembrance, by his last will, 469
——— (Dr. Thomas) his high opinion of Dr. Sydenham's judgment in medicine, 459
——— his opinion of Dr. Morton's treatise on fevers, 462
——— his great value for Mr. Locke's book of education, 466
——— his letter to Mr. Locke, concerning his great loss, by the death of his brother, 469
Music, much time should not be ordinarily spent in it, 191

N.

NATURAL philosophy, not advanced into a science, 185, &c.
——— how a good acquaintance with it may be best attained, ibid.
Norris,

Norris, (Mr.) the opinions of Mr. Locke and Mr. Molyneux, concerning him, 400, 404

O.

OBSTINACY, to be severely corrected in children, 65
——— whence learned mens obstinacy in controversy proceeds, 436

P.

PARENTS, should early settle authority over children, 33, 34
——— should make their children familiar with them, as they grow up, 88, &c.
Physic, never to be given to children by way of prevention, 25, 26
Play-things, children should not have many at once, 124, 125
——— should make them for themselves, 125
Punishment, to be avoided, as far as possible, in educating children, 35, &c.
——— less need of it, than is commonly thought, 60

R.

READING, how children should be brought to it, 143, &c.
——— how it should be improved, when learned, ibid. &c.
Reasoning, should be familiarly used with children, 69
Recreations, necessary for children, 98, &c.
——— how to be managed, ibid.
——— the advantage of children's being allowed it freely, ibid.
Reputation, children should be early enured to have a regard to it, 41, &c.
Reverence towards parents, to be early fixed in children, 91
Rewards, children should not be encouraged by such as please the senses, 38.—but chiefly by those which concern their reputation, 41, &c.
Rhetoric, how it may be best learned by young men, 177, &c.
Riding the great horse, how far it may be useful, 192
Rules, should not be multiplied to children, 45

S.

SAUNTERING, or (listless carelessness) how to be prevented, 119, &c.
Self-denial, children should be enured to it betimes, 36
Sergeant, a popish priest, his absurd way of writing against Mr. Locke's essay, 439
Shame, children should early be taught to be affected with it, 43
Short-hand, (writing) very useful. 151
Sleep, how it is to be indulged or restrained, in children, 20, &c.
Species, Mr. Locke's notion of it explained, 305
Spirits (good ones) their nature should be sought out, before that of bodies, 182.—The reason of this, 183.—The knowledge of them is best learned from the bible, ibid.
Spirits, (or goblins) children should be carefully kept from ill impressions concerning them, 129
State, an happy one, in this world, is having a sound mind in a sound body, 6
Stomach, of some, by constant use, set like a larum, 16
Stool, going to it regularly, how to be procured, 23, &c. Vid. costiveness.
Strait-laced, the ill effects of children's being so, 13
Synge (Mr. Edward) author of the gentleman's religion, 370
—— his letter to Dr. Quayl, about distinguishing a cube, &c. by one born blind, 371

TASK,

T.

TASK, what children learn, ſhould not be made ſuch to them, 61
Temper, of children to be carefully obſerved, in their education, 92, &c.
Themes, why children ſhould not be exerciſed in making them, 164, &c.
Timorouſneſs, how children ſhould be fortified againſt it, 108, 109
Toland, vid. Mr. Locke, Molyneux.
Trade, fit for gentlemen to learn a manual one, 194
Travel, in foreign countries, when, and how to be beſt done, 201, &c.
Tutors, of children, how to be choſen and treated, 75—88
——— are to put youths in the right way of ſtudy, for improving themſelves, 187

V.

VERSES, why children ſhould not be exerciſed in making them, 167
Vice, children are too commonly taught it, from their infancy, 27, &c,

W.

WHIPPING, ſhould be ſparingly uſed towards children, 37, 38
Wiſdom, how children's minds ſhould be enured to it, 132
——— how young men may advance in it, 193
Writing, how it may be well and eaſily learned, 150

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